

For Prophet and Tsar

ISLAM AND EMPIRE IN RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

Robert D. Crews

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND SPELLING

The Russian empire was constructed by peoples who, like the descendants of the builders of the Tower of Babel, spoke dozens of different languages and dialects and whose literatures appeared in a dizzying array of alphabets and scripts. The Soviets built on this imperial Babel by changing these writing systems. Post-Soviet elites continue to debate the utility of Cyrillic, Roman, and Arabic orthographies, while scholars disagree about how to transliterate them.

The sources for this study reflect only a small part of this linguistic heterogeneity. In the polyglot world of the empire, words appeared in different forms, depending on the context and the language of the document; the name of one important Muslim religious figure was written as "Muhammadjān bin al-Husayn" in Tatar using Arabic script, but became "Mukhamedzhan Khusainov" in Russian-language texts. In transliterating such names, I have tried to follow the spellings found in the original sources, while including alternatives in parentheses or in the notes that follow the text. For Russian sources, I have followed the Library of Congress system, with some simplifications (like "Kazan" in place of "Kazan'," "Dostoevsky" for

"Dostoevskii"). For others, I have relied on the transliteration charts found in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* and Edward Allworth's *Nationalities of the Soviet East*; however, I use modified spellings of a number of terms that are already familiar to readers in other forms (as in *mullah* for *mullā*, *'ulama* for *'ulamā*, and *fatwas* for *fatāwa*). Where names and places appear in a variety of spellings even in a single language, I draw on the comprehensive *Islam na territorii byyshei Rossiiskoi imperii*. The builders of Babel would understand.

Men belonged to a single community, and God sent them messengers to give them happy tidings and warnings, and sent the Book with them containing the truth to judge between them in matters of dispute; but only those who received it differed after receiving clear proofs, on account of waywardness (and jealousies) among them. Then God by His dispensation showed those who believed the way to the truth about which they were differing; for God shows whom He please the path that is straight.

Qur'an 2:213

We, the below-named, promise and vow before almighty God and the great Prophet Muhammad on four of his most just books, the Gospels, the Torah, Psalms of David, and the Qur'an, that we . . . must serve as loyal subjects of his imperial majesty . . . In concluding this our oath we kiss the Qur'an of our Prophet Muhammad. Amen.

An oath sworn by Muslims of the Russian empire, 1809

INTRODUCTION

The symbols of Orthodox Christianity have long permeated the landscape of modern Russia. In Russian empire, Orthodox tsars claimed God's blessing in ruling thronors. The golden domes of Orthodox cathedrals illuminated Moscow and brightened villages that stretched across a vast empire. The icons and banners of Orthodoxy, subjects swore loyalty to tsars and "Holy Russia." But this mythology of a sacred realm and Orthodoxy hid a more complex reality and a perennial dilemma for Russian elites: not all of the inhabitants of the empire were Orthodox Christians. The tsars also ruled Jews, Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, and others. From the fifteenth century, the eastward expansion of Moscow brought Muslims under the dominion of Orthodox tsars. By the early twentieth century, the empire was home to some twenty million Muslims (15 percent of the total population), forming the largest non-Orthodox group. From St. Petersburg to Central Asia, the minarets of thousands of mosques stood in a landscape dominated by Orthodox churches. Alone among non-Muslim states in

the modern era, Russia has ruled Muslims for more than five hundred years.

The linchpin of the tsarist regime's management of Islam and other non-Orthodox faiths was forged in the European Enlightenment. Beginning with Catherine the Great (r. 1762–1796), the empire created a religion-centered framework for its subjects to engage with the autocracy. Religious authority in all its varied forms, Catherine concluded, could be useful for the empire. Rather than try to impose religious uniformity on its varied subjects, the empress and her successors devised a policy of toleration to make faiths such as Islam the basic building blocks of the empire. They sought to transform religious authority in each community into an instrument of imperial rule. For millions of tsarist subjects, the state did more than tolerate other confessions; it presented itself as a defender of certain forms of Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Protestantism, and other faiths. Confessional politics facilitated a kind of civic engagement in a polity that recognized only subjects, not citizens. The tsarist regime competed for the loyalties of its subjects, especially of those with co-religionists across the empire's porous borders. Muslims, Jews, and other non-Orthodox subjects were encouraged to focus their allegiances, along with their complaints and aspirations, on the monarchy and its institutions.

Muslims presented a special challenge to this imperial project. Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Muslims lived in neighboring empires, but unlike the Jews, who had no foreign king or army on their side, Russia's Muslims could look to the Ottoman sultan, who pledged to protect the faithful on his frontiers. By the twentieth century, Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) faced competition not only from the Ottomans, but also from the Germans and Japanese, who tried to undermine rival empires with Muslim populations by promising to defend Islam as well. In pursuing toleration, the tsarist government attempted to both seal off the borders of the empire and extend its


reach into the local mosque. Law courts and administrative offices penetrated deeply into local communities because they became forums for the arbitration of disputes within the local mosque, synagogue, church, and temple. Millions of Muslims from all walks of life actively participated in these confessional politics. Many of them found common cause with a regime that appeared to back their understanding of the true meaning of the faith. Muslims came to accept the empire as the "House of Islam" (*dar al-Islam*), a place where they could legally fulfill their religious obligations. In the process, they became the essential intermediaries that permitted the policing, judicial, and administrative organs of the empire to expand and rule at relatively low cost in much of Eurasia. This book shows how Russia became a Muslim power—and how the government made Islam a pillar of imperial society, transforming Muslims into active participants in the daily operation of the autocracy and the local construction and maintenance of the empire.

The story of the making of Russia's "House of Islam" and of the confessional foundations of the Russian past has been obscured by a lengthy historical tradition that has focused on seemingly timeless conflict between Christianity and Islam and between Europe and the East. Violence plays a central role in such narratives. Russia's Chechen wars, like many others from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, are haunted by images of religious violence once consigned to Europe's distant past. They recall Reformation-era riots in which Catholics and Protestants sought to purify their communities of "pollution" by exterminating their "heretical" enemies and desecrating their sacred symbols.¹ Outside of Northern Ireland, most Western Europeans now view such hostilities as anachronistic. But in turning to Europe's frontiers, the Balkans and the Caucasus, observers have arrived at different conclusions. To many politicians, journalists, and scholars, the outbreak of fighting in the 1990s between Christians and Muslims represented a predictable return, after an artificial hia-

tus under socialism, to a natural state of conflict between these religious traditions. In one oft-repeated formulation, these wars were evidence of a "clash of civilizations" driven by age-old hatreds.

The standard accounts of Russia's past have offered fertile ground for such thinking. The medieval Russian state of Muscovy grew out of a dependency of the Muslim rulers of the Golden Horde. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Muscovite state managed to subjugate its former overlords. Aided by miracle-working icons in their struggle against the "infidels," the Muscovites celebrated this reversal as a victory of Orthodox Christianity over Islam, a wondrous occurrence commemorated by the construction of St. Basil's Cathedral on Red Square—and by the demolition of mosques in the newly conquered territories along the Volga River. As the Russian state expanded in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it faced resistance from Muslim populations along its eastern and southern frontiers. In the nineteenth century, we are often reminded, Russian troops fought a bitter war to dominate the Caucasus. Between the 1820s and the 1860s, mountain communities responded with *jihad*. The tsarist conquest of Central Asia in the second half of the century brought the empire prestige, but with it, the burden of absorbing a vast Muslim population on the distant frontiers of China and British India (see Map 1). By the early twentieth century, the Muslim population of the Romanov empire was larger than that under the Ottoman sultan. With each phase of expansion, Russia had risked confrontation with the Ottomans. In eleven major wars between the late seventeenth and early twentieth centuries, both the Orthodox Christian tsar and the Muslim sultan had to contend with the presence of his enemy's co-religionists within their borders.

Historians of later periods of Russian history have reinforced this vision of nearly continuous antagonism between the Russian state and Islam. By most accounts, Muslims proved no less a challenge to the Soviet regime that inherited the complex legacies of the Rus-



Map 1. The Russian Empire in the Early Twentieth Century

sian empire.² Muslims in the Caucasus and Central Asia continued to fight the new authorities after opposition had been crushed elsewhere. Armed with its ideology of militant atheism, the Soviet state launched antireligious campaigns that devastated Islamic institutions and personnel. When Hitler's armies advanced along the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union, they found Muslim volunteers, among others, ready to join anti-Soviet forces. Stalin's deportation of the Chechens and neighboring Muslim peoples demonstrated lingering doubts about the loyalty of populations that had long resisted tsarist, then Soviet, rule.

During the Cold War, Western observers identified Islam as the Achilles' heel of the Soviet system. It was not just that the faith seemed to safeguard Muslims against communist ideology; Muslims also had the highest birthrates in Soviet society. Under this demo-

graphic pressure the future Red Army, experts projected, would have a majority of Muslim conscripts. In the 1980s, the victory of the *mujahidin* over the Soviets in Afghanistan made a deep impression on the Eastern bloc and the West, as well as on its proxy warriors, the nascent jihadist circles. Their success pointed to the possibility of a revolution under the green banner of Islam to roll back the red empire.³

That Muslims failed to play the revolutionary role that many Westerners had predicted in the Soviet collapse of 1991 did not entirely diminish the perceived menace. From Moscow to Tashkent, post-Soviet elites have continued to regard Islam as the primary threat to the stability of these new states. They have pointed to dangers emanating from foreign Muslims along the volatile frontiers shared with Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China. The Taliban movement seemed to confirm these elites' sense of alarm about Islam as an aggressive ideological force. Moreover, recent experience has heightened anxieties about their own Muslim citizens. Chechen separatists have taken their struggle to civilian targets such as theaters and rock concerts in Russian cities, while oppositional groups in Central Asia have retreated to a murky underground, agitating against dictatorial regimes on behalf of diverse causes ranging from freedom of conscience and democratic elections to the creation of a single Islamic state for the region's Muslims.⁴

At the same time, the implosion of the Soviet empire yielded a paradox that has gone largely unnoticed. On the one hand, it unleashed diverse forms of violence that models of civilizational conflict purported to explain and even normalize. On the other, it produced opportunities to question understandings of the past upon which such interpretive schemes are based. The opening up of archives and libraries in the region and expanded avenues for intellectual exchange have permitted scholars to explore topics related to Islam that the Soviets had deemed taboo.

This book utilizes many of these new sources to revisit the history of Russia's engagement with Islam. Where other accounts of Russia's relationship with Islam have highlighted confrontation, as in Chechnya, this one examines the historical search for alternatives to such violence in the tsarist empire between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. It aims to demonstrate that the history of Islam in the Russian empire offers a crucial perspective on one of the most central interpretive questions of Russian history and, more broadly, the history of empire. Long concerned with explaining the revolutions of 1917 and judging the legitimacy of the Bolshevik regime, historians have only recently begun to explore how the tsarist empire endured for so long and enjoyed such relative stability, even despite the extraordinary heterogeneity of the empire's population, the vastness of its territory, and the seemingly weak and disordered character of its government. Recent research has underscored the essential role of the autocracy. As Richard Wortman has shown, the Romanov dynasty acted as a dynamic and adaptive force.⁵ Other historians have highlighted the regime's reliance on a multiethnic elite that assumed key governmental positions at the center and ruled on its behalf in the heterogeneous borderlands.⁶ Scholars have also noted that this elite was multiconfessional and that this religious diversity sometimes gave rise to tensions between the Orthodox Church and the state and between Orthodox Christians and those who did not share the tsar's faith.

What historians have not examined is the tsarist regime's persistent attempts to ground imperial authority in religion. Throughout its three-hundred-year history (1613–1917), the Romanov dynasty drew on Orthodox Christian symbols. Yet from the early eighteenth century, the empire was home to significant numbers of Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Muslims, and various localized faiths. Modern scholars tend to conceptualize this diversity in terms of ethnic or national categories, but tsarist elites consistently viewed the hetero-

geneous peoples of the empire through the lens of religious affiliation. In this book, I have tried to reconstruct how contemporaries, both Muslims and their rulers, related to the confessional politics that underpinned the empire. The tsarist state's commitment to ruling through religious practices and institutions and the policing of orthodoxy—the *confessionalization* of the population of the empire—allowed the state to govern with less violence, and with a greater degree of consensus, than historians have previously imagined. Religion was central to how both sides engaged in the construction of a shared moral universe. Social estate and rank mattered, of course; and the category of “nationality” grew in importance for some elites in the last years of the empire. Like the historians of other empires, historians of Russia have focused on the rise of nationalism as the key to understanding the unraveling of the empire.⁷ Concerned with tracing the origins of national movements that ultimately won out in Europe after the First World War and the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires, they have tended to exaggerate the appeal of national symbols as well as the secularization of Russian imperial society before 1917; they have neglected the continued viability of the integrative confessional politics that served as the *modus operandi* of the tsarist regime. For the Russian state, religion seemed to offer a more fundamental basis for allegiance—and discipline. Indeed, tsarist law obliged every subject to belong to a confessional group and, equally important, to submit to the authority of the clerical estate of each confession. According to this scheme, religious conformity enhanced respect for order. It regulated the family and conditioned obedience to temporal authorities. The opposite was also true. Nonconformity and religious heterodoxy seemed to pose threats to established authority. Deviation from the canonical norms, rites, and doctrines of one of the tolerated faiths presented a challenge to the imperial order. Memory of the seventeenth-century schism within the Orthodox Church, and the

rebellions that religious dissenters inspired, placed most tsarist officials firmly on the side of “orthodoxy” within each confession, even when they regarded these faiths as inferior to Orthodox Christianity.

Like members of other communities, many Muslims initially opposed tsarist conquest. Still, relatively few resisted Russian rule once it was established. Thus the story told here is not a romantic one of persecution and resistance. Nor is it about Muslims who ostensibly lived in a world apart, isolated in their own communities, indifferent or hostile to the empire that surrounded them. Some Muslims preached avoidance of all things Russian. But this option became more and more difficult to realize as tsarist institutions penetrated local communities. The prospect of avoiding contact with the state and its officials proved so difficult for such Muslims precisely because so many of their co-religionists looked to the regime to order these communities. To whom could pious Muslims turn when their neighbors refused to attend mosque prayers, drank alcohol, or performed mystical Sufi rites in error? Muslims themselves solicited state intervention in disputes with other Muslims. As we shall see, Muslims needed the tsarist state to live according to God's plan, as they understood it.

The tsarist empire emerged out of wars of conquest, of course. After the fighting ended, however, rulers and ruled had to come to some peace. Rarely did either side wish for a resumption of hostilities. From the late eighteenth century a peculiar regime of religious toleration lay at the heart of this quest for civil peace on the territory of the Russian empire. Though the Orthodox Church retained extensive privileges, Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Buddhists gained official recognition for their faiths. Initially a strategy to calm the passions that inflamed the persecuted against the regime, “toleration” became much more than a policy of noninterference, as the term is commonly understood today. The concept had a different meaning in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. In Rus-

sia, toleration was a structure for integrating non-Orthodox Christian subjects, whose numbers continuously increased as the empire expanded. This scheme rested on the proposition, elaborated by Enlightenment thinkers throughout Europe, that religions everywhere displayed certain traits in common. Essentially elaborate systems of discipline, tolerated faiths could prove valuable to "enlightened" rulers. Where violence was too blunt an instrument, recourse to religious authority might contribute to the making of loyal and disciplined subjects out of those who might not heed the sovereign's word alone but who could be persuaded to obey God. Toleration was a means of state intervention that Muslim subjects frequently welcomed.

This book seeks to show both how the regime sought to use religion to govern the empire and how Muslim communities utilized the tsarist police and courts for their own aims. The regime instrumentalized Islam, but Muslims captured the state, applying its instruments of coercion to the daily interpretive disputes that divided Muslim men and women. This empire held on to Muslim loyalties in significant measure because it became a fixture in the minds of Muslim intermediaries, an essential lever in diverse locales where Muslims debated, argued, and clashed with one another about the meaning of their faith and their place in this world. The Romanov state drew strength from this alliance with Muslims seeking assistance against their foes, even when it was not clear which ally was exploiting the other. Through such interactions, the empire took shape in the heads of its subjects, though the outcome might prove disappointing for some Muslims. Religion came to depend on the institutions of this state, just as the empire rested upon confessional foundations.

The dilemma for both the tsarist state and its Muslim subjects then was how to make Islam useful as a tolerated confession in the empire. Much as in Europe today, the government saw the recruit-

ment of influential but trustworthy Muslim religious specialists as the key to this strategy. They were to act as intermediaries for the regime, transmitting the state's directives, guarding the morality of the faithful, and symbolizing the tsar's paternal care for Islam. Like Judaism, this faith posed a particular challenge to the Romanov state, however. Whereas other tolerated confessions came with some form of hierarchical organization that the state might co-opt, Islam had evolved historically, as Richard Bulliet observes, "without the benefit, or burden, of an organized ecclesiastical structure or a centralized source of doctrinal authority." Religious authority had been fluid and informal: "local societies of Muslims largely found their own way, nominating their own local religious leaders through their willingness to follow those among them who seemed the most pious or learned."⁸ In Russia, the search for what was authoritative in Islam forced the regime to engage Muslims, to draw them into the process of constructing Islamic institutions to receive state patronage—and aid in the disciplining of the tsar's Muslim subjects.

For Muslims, the quest for social peace was no less thorny. Today Muslim political leaders in Moscow are quick to point out that Islam arrived in Russia before Orthodox Christianity; Islam thus is the most "traditional" of Russian faiths.⁹ Muslims brought their religion from the Arabian peninsula to the peoples of Eurasia in the first centuries of Islam. By the tenth century, substantial Muslim communities had become established along the Volga River, in Siberia, the Caucasus, and the oases towns of Central Asia. Islam spread throughout the basin formed by the Volga River and Ural Mountains and to the north Caspian steppe. Most of these converts became Sunnis and adopted the Hanafi school of legal interpretation (after the seventh-century jurist Abu Hanifa); smaller numbers became Shi'ites and followed other legal schools in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Conversion to Islam among the peoples inhabiting these varied forest, steppe, and desert regions continued into mod-

ern times.¹⁰ From the fifteenth century on, however, more and more of these communities fell under the rule of Russian tsars, who, by tradition, embodied Orthodox Christian piety.

The Muslims of the empire never constituted a homogeneous community. The timing and nature of their incorporation into the empire gave rise to different experiences of imperial rule. By the reign of Catherine the Great, Russian rulers had governed the Muslim peoples settled along the Volga River for more than two centuries. Catherine incorporated new Muslim populations in the Crimea and the steppe regions north of the Caucasus Mountains and Caspian Sea. By the late 1820s, tsarist forces under Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) and Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) had seized control of the territory south of the Caucasus range, driving the Iranians and Ottomans beyond the Aras River. The Russian military needed another three and a half decades to conquer the Muslim communities that dotted the North Caucasus range extending from the Black Sea to the Caspian. As tsarist forces confronted a formidable resistance movement under the leadership of Imam Shamil between 1834 and 1859 on the territory of Daghestan and Chechnya, Russian administrators simultaneously moved their frontier outposts beyond the Ural River and deeper into the Kazakh steppe. By the end of the nineteenth century, the tsarist state had pushed the borders of the empire to the Amu Darya River and Tien Shan Mountains in Central Asia. In this drive toward the Hindu Kush, the empire seized control of grasslands, deserts, high mountainous terrain, and densely settled oases inhabited by varied populations, including nomads, townspeople, and isolated highland communities.

This pattern of expansion into such heterogeneous regions inhabited by Muslims yielded another paradox of empire. Tsarist elites understood the conquest of the Caucasus, the Kazakh steppe, and Central Asia as an affirmation of Russia's imperial glory and European identity. Yet they also recognized that new borders created new vul-

nerabilities. Only the Black Sea separated the Crimea from the Ottoman empire. Expansion beyond the Caucasus range created an extended border with both the Ottoman state and Qajar Iran. Lengthy frontiers shared with Afghanistan, British India, and China symbolized Russia's great power status but also heightened official anxieties about projecting imperial power far from Peter the Great's capital. Along the southern edges of the empire stretching from the Crimea to the Pamirs, millions of Muslims lived on both sides of a border far from the imperial center. The tsarist state faced the challenge of severing Muslims' ties with their neighboring co-religionists, including their former masters in Istanbul, Tehran, and the oasis courts of the khans of Transoxiana.

By the late nineteenth century, Muslims resided in eighty-nine provinces and territories of the empire (plus the protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva). The environments they inhabited can be analytically divided into seven distinctive zones of concentrated settlement: the Crimea, the Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, the Volga River and Ural Mountains regions, the Kazakh steppe, and Central Asia (Transoxiana). An eighth zone, represented by a northern belt of scattered diaspora-like communities, extended from Poland through St. Petersburg and Moscow to Siberia. In 1897 the first comprehensive empire-wide census officially registered nearly fourteen million Muslims, though census-takers concluded that they had undercounted Muslims and estimated their true number at closer to twenty million. More than three and a half million Muslims lived in the provinces designated as "European Russia." Over three million resided in the Caucasus, and the largest proportion, some seven million, inhabited the Kazakh steppe and Central Asia.

Apart from geographical setting, demography, and historical exposure to Russian administrators and settlers, cultural differences marked the heterogeneity of the tsar's Muslims. According to the 1897 census, Muslims belonged to more than a dozen of the lan-

guage groups counted by the authorities. Over twelve million spoke a language of the "Turkic-Tatar" group. The two next largest groups were the "Caucasian mountaineers" (with over one million speakers) and the "eastern Indo-European" (with over a half a million speakers); more than ten thousand Muslims identified "Russian" as their "native tongue."¹¹ Moreover, before tsarist institutions tied these different communities together under imperial rule, they had limited contact with one another and probably had only the most abstract sense of belonging to a single religious community. Once under the tsar, the regime devised particular administrative arrangements for each locale, perpetuating differences among them. Muslims on the Volga and in the Crimea were subject to civilian administration, but those in the Urals, the Caucasus, and Central Asia experienced distinctive forms of military rule. The state similarly assigned duties and privileges to these populations on a regional basis, all the while incorporating them into the broader social estate structure of the empire.

The demographic size, territorial distribution, and geopolitical significance of these Muslim communities limited the range of policy options available to the Russian state. Beginning in the sixteenth century, sporadic attempts to proselytize on behalf of the tsar's faith among Muslims in the Volga and Urals regions yielded few converts but provoked serious resistance. In the eighteenth century, Muslims repeatedly took up arms against Christianization campaigns. Just as these populations could not be converted *en masse* without jeopardizing the stability of the empire, they could not be easily expelled beyond its borders. Unlike the rulers of medieval Spain who expelled (or converted) Muslims and Jews, the Romanovs never resorted to wholesale expulsions to create a homogeneous population. To be sure, the Muslim populations along the southern rim of the empire adjoining the Ottoman empire were vulnerable to such state-sponsored violence. In the course of the tsarist army's brutal

subjugation of the Caucasus, Russian commanders under Nicholas I boasted of putting disloyal Muslims to flight. Several hundred thousand Muslims abandoned their homes in the Caucasus and the Crimea in the wake of the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the defeat of the resistance movement in the Northern Caucasus.¹²

The bloody history of expulsions and flight from this southern frontier zone should not be viewed as the basis for generalizations about the empire's approach to Islam as a whole, however. Russian military strategies had limited, if merciless, goals. Tsarist elites did not imagine cleansing the Northern Caucasus or the Crimea of all Muslims. Russian generals had long promised to answer disloyalty with "extermination," and war with the Ottomans revealed the extent to which these regions—and the loyalties of their inhabitants—may still have been in play. But at no time did such strategies preclude co-optation of loyal elites or even the enlistment of defectors.

Nor was Muslim emigration the result of tsarist violence alone. Muslim commanders such as Imam Shamil, who led the anti-tsarist resistance in Daghestan and Chechnya, forcibly relocated communities who refused to join his jihad against the Russians. Mark Mazower has drawn attention to the problem of establishing intentionality and distinguishing between "expulsion and panic," noting that "the two may be intertwined, as the case of the Germans of East Prussia in 1944-1945 suggests." In the case of the Caucasus and the Crimea, both Ottoman recruitment and Islamic law played a role. Ottoman envoys traveled throughout the region to encourage migration from "infidel" rule in the "House of War" (*dar al-Harb*)—rejecting Russia's status as the "House of Islam" and promising aid in resettling Muslims in the sultan's "well-protected domains." Their appeals confirmed the judgment of Islamic religious authorities who called on fellow Sunni Muslims to flee Christian rule to reside in a state ruled by a Sunni Muslim sovereign. The connection between the geopolitics of these frontier zones and the treatment of Muslims

is reflected again in the pattern of in-migration by Muslims during the same period. In the wake of Sunni flight from the Caucasus, Shi'ites crossed the border into Russian territory from Iran, where Shi'ism was the dominant faith. By the 1860s the demographic balance shifted, from rough parity between Sunnis and Shi'ites, to Shi'ites outnumbering Sunnis by a ratio of 2 to 1. With the oil boom in Baku and the construction of the railway in Central Asia, Iranian migrants flocked to the Russian empire. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, tribes from northern Iran and Afghanistan repeatedly petitioned for permission to become Russian subjects.¹³

Tsarist elites desired secure borders and internal order. They sought domestic stability and, where possible, political advantage vis-à-vis weaker neighbors. Tsarist elites never countenanced the expulsion of the Muslim peasants, merchants, artisans, and soldiers who were so essential to the functioning of the empire in the interior provinces. Indeed, the Romanov empire endured for so long, and managed to rule such a vast and heterogeneous space with relatively modest resources, largely because its elites tended to be cautious. The forces that kept the empire together—the tsar's generals and policemen—had a feel for both the possibilities and the limits of imperial power. In the nineteenth century the path to imperial glory lay in Asia, especially when Russia's position in Europe appeared more vulnerable following defeat in the Crimean War. Further expansion, tsarist elites acknowledged, hinged on some accommodation with Muslims.

Muslims faced very similar constraints in responding to the Russian challenge. The prospect of becoming subjects of the tsarist empire was more attractive—and the costs associated with the alternatives much higher—than nationalist or Islamist rhetoric would suggest. Historians of the Muslims of the empire have, for the most part, treated them as a community affected by the social and economic structures of the empire but largely autonomous in their in-

ternal politics. In practice, this isolationist scenario was available to few contemporaries. A seemingly unlikely case given the mythology of Muslim resistance to the Russian presence in the Caucasus, the experience of the Muslims of Daghestan and Chechnya between the late 1820s and 1850s presents an instructive example. In the face of Russian military conquest, the Muslims of these regions failed to formulate a unified answer against tsarist forces, even though historians have long treated it as an era of "jihad" inspired and organized by Muslim Sufi brotherhoods. Muslims fought on both sides of the conflict, for and against the empire. More important, Michael Kemper has shown, the fundamental contours of the resistance drew upon pre-Russian arguments on behalf of Islamic law against indigenous—not tsarist—authorities. By this account, Imam Shamil and his predecessors used the "jihad state" as more than a way to "defend" Muslims against "infidels"; their concern with implementing Islamic law formed a critical strategy against other indigenous rulers and an essential component of state-building at the expense of local elites, some of whom had sided with Russia.¹⁴

Answering the tsarist regime's offer to act as patron of Islam meant, for Muslims and Christians, forgetting the violent conquests that had preceded it. To build social peace and imperial order, they built on a tradition of looking for common ground, not by ignoring religion but by dwelling on it. From the medieval period, Muslims had sworn oaths on a Qur'an kept for this purpose in the Kremlin. In later periods, Muslims in each conquered region swore oaths of loyalty on the holy book, which the regime recognized as a binding authority. Christians and Muslims remained sensitive to religious differences. But in dealings with one another, they learned to make reference to what they ostensibly shared, submission to one God. This idiom, of monotheism linking rulers and the ruled, established terms for negotiation. It was nonetheless only a starting point. The implications of such claims would be worked out in countless inter-

actions between Muslims and Russian authorities between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, with each side attempting to manage the response of the other. This common reference point did not erase distinctions between Islam and the tsar's faith. Nor did it mask the subordination of Muslim subjects to the coercive instruments of the tsarist state. Rather it established a framework for the search for congruences that would lend solidity to imperial rule, where possible, without resort to force. As in the scenarios of exchange in North America between Indians and whites analyzed by Richard White, each party pursued its own goals but justified "their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner's cultural premises."¹⁵

The Russians were not alone in pursuing such an approach. Napoleon pledged devotion to the same God worshipped by Muslims during his Egyptian campaign. As a strategic bridge between Christians and Muslims, such appeals, including the construction of parallels between Jesus and Muhammad, informed European diplomatic language in exchanges with the Ottomans. British and French administrators later sought Islamic legitimacy for their rule over colonies in Africa and Asia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Habsburgs created an Islamic hierarchy to administer Muslim affairs—and cut Muslim ties to Istanbul. In the twentieth century, the Japanese claimed a special bond with Islam as part of a broader campaign to subvert European empires in Asia and establish Japanese power in their place. Even the German Kaiser seized upon this strategy. In 1898, Wilhelm II pledged himself the protector of three hundred million Muslims, including those under the British, French, and Russian empires. In the First World War, he dreamed of inciting "the whole Mohammedan world to wild revolt" in a jihad against Germany's enemies.¹⁶

But in forging its empire the tsarist regime sought out Muslim allies with greater consistency, over a longer period of time, and with

greater success than its imperial challengers. Indeed, the notion that Islam had a particular utility for the state, even when it did not sit well with official ideology, outlived the tsars. It persisted in fitful but important ways under the very different conditions of the Soviet environment; it even survived the collapse of the USSR, resurfacing in the young post-Soviet republics intent on domesticating Islam to shore up their claims to political legitimacy.

Like their Ottoman rivals, the multiconfessional tsarist elite found valuable allies in seeking to ground imperial rule in religious authority. The construction of such a confessional state required not only religious elites but, in the tsarist context, the mobilization of laypeople as well.¹⁷ In order to claim benefit from the overlap of temporal and spiritual authority in administering the empire, the regime found itself obliged to reinforce particular religious injunctions, whether Muslim, Catholic, or Jewish. But in such a vast, polyglot empire stretching from the Baltics to the Caucasus and the Pacific Ocean, tsarist officials struggled to gain knowledge about the internal workings of the faiths from which they sought advantage. They looked first to a "clergy" in each community, even in traditions such as Islam that did not historically recognize such sociological categories. Yet in nineteenth-century Russia, as in Europe, an anticlerical spirit impinged upon toleration as well.

Where the tsarist bureaucracy valued the supposed contribution of religion to morality and order but distrusted clerics, it created a space for lay initiative, inviting challenges to clerical authority from below. As in colonial India, suspicion of indigenous religious elites stimulated official interest in the exploration of texts that would allow administrators to overcome their reliance on such mediation. Russian officials engaged different Muslim interlocutors in each region of the empire, but bureaucratic recourse to varying informants and texts meant that official conceptions of Islam shifted over time and space. Tsarist elites often disagreed with one another about their

assessment of Islam. They voiced some of their most hostile views where the Orthodox Church and its converts seemed to be at risk. Despite the variety of official opinion, and the heterogeneity of these Muslim communities themselves, imperial elites who argued for Islam's fundamental contribution to the stability of the empire tended to win out, whether they were in St. Petersburg or in the Caucasian or Central Asian borderlands. Where the critics of Islam had an advantage, as in the mid-nineteenth-century Kazakh steppe, their gains were Pyrrhic victories. The state remained weakest where it was least entangled with the affairs of Islam and where Muslims could not utilize its power on behalf of religion.

Drawing on sources from central and local state archives as well as on various sources authored by Muslims, this perspective casts the Russian empire in a new light. Long characterized as an "undergoverned" polity, with weak connections between the capital and its far-flung peripheries, the empire in fact loomed large in the minds of Muslim men and women, the subjects of the tsar who typically are depicted, alongside Jews, as among the least likely to be integrated into the imperial environment.¹⁸ Petitions, denunciations, court records, police reports, and numerous Muslim sources reveal how, within the broader framework of tsarist toleration, Muslim men and women came to imagine the imperial state as a potential instrument of God's will. Like historians of law courts and policing institutions in other societies, I read court records, police reports, and other sources for what their language reveals about these actors' identities, how they sought to adapt the law for specific purposes and, in this context, shape the Islamic tradition—and the workings of the tsarist state. Not every issue related to Islam in the empire made its way to the imperial archives. Yet, as I try to show, the tsarist state became an essential forum for the resolution of disputes among Muslims. Some Muslim subjects of the tsar may have preferred to avoid the state, but they could not be guaranteed that other Muslims, including their

neighbors or spouses, would not bring them before the court or police. This was an empire in which policing, justice, and piety were simultaneously intimate affairs—and the business of both the community and the institutions of the empire.

Long before modern Muslim thinkers conceived of the "Islamic state" as a bureaucratic instrument to enforce divine law, Muslim subjects of the Romanov dynasty looked to the institutions of the empire to realize the obligations and rights of the faith. Based on familiarity with other colonial environments, readers might expect a story of Muslim resistance to tsarist encroachment, especially in areas like the domestic sphere. Responses varied among the Muslims of the Russian empire. But even sources generated outside of state institutions by Muslim themselves document the varied channels of engagement with the institutions of the regime; Muslim scholars who collected biographies of other notable religious figures made reference to court cases and other interactions, even if they downplayed such contacts to avoid the appearance of corruption.¹⁹

Where the tsarist regime established administration, Muslims engaged the regime not simply as an instrument of repression, but as a means to advance true religion—to set spouses, children, relatives, and others on the correct path to God, the *shari'a*. Rather than isolate women and the family from police organs, Muslims learned to associate the state with the mediation of family conflicts and the defense of rights based on the *shari'a*. Thus the state reached deep into the mosque communities of the empire. Historians once saw "undergovernment" where the conventional, secular arm of government had no reach, but this is a misreading of the bonds that linked ruler and ruled. Both shared the conviction, emerging out of the eighteenth century, that the imperial order rested on religious authority, and that the tsar's agents, along with every subject, had a stake in establishing a world pleasing to God. Haunted by anxieties of popular upheaval inspired by religious heterodoxy within their

own Church in the seventeenth century, the interests of the Russians converged with those of the Muslim scholars who shielded the tradition against "illicit innovation" (*bid'a*) in religious interpretation. What in hindsight may look like "traditional" religious practices were, in fact, the creations of the state and its Muslim intermediaries.

These convictions did not mean that each side always acted as the other wished, of course. It gave ample room for misunderstandings, miscalculations, and conflict. Catherine the Great first formulated this mode of toleration, but many of her successors remained cool to it. The Orthodox Church remained a staunch opponent and insisted on exclusive state support. It campaigned not only against Muslims whom it suspected of proselytizing among Christians but also against the Orthodox who praised "the moral teaching of the Qur'an and find 'that it is not even inferior to the Gospels'" or who lived by the credo that "it's all the same whether you're a Christian or a Muhammadan, as long as you are an honest person." Moreover, repeated wars with the Ottomans revived and sustained misgivings about Islam both within and beyond government circles. The writer Fyodor Dostoevsky detested accommodationist policies. In 1877, in the midst of yet another Russo-Turkish war, he warned the Russian public against the "extolling of Muslims for monotheism," calling this the "hobby-horse of a great many lovers of the Turks" in society who mistakenly regarded Islam as more enlightened than the polytheism of the icon-worshipping Russian peasant. For Dostoevsky, as for other figures of Russian literature and especially opera, Russians who embraced the national spirit were to celebrate Russia's domination of the Orient.²⁰ For critics, the confessional politics of the empire were too particularistic. Liberals came to disdain them as an impediment to universally applied law, and conservative nationalists saw them as an obstacle to the consolidation of a more homogeneous empire dominated by Russian culture and ethnic-

ity. Both camps failed to grasp how the empire's systematic investment in particularism had managed to accommodate diversity while strengthening the regime's hold on these populations. Such champions of a more aggressive approach toward Islam influenced the tenor of local politics at the regional level but never fully succeeded in reorienting tsarist policy. With extraordinary consistency, the imperative of policing the empire trumped nationalist (and liberal) calls for conflict.

Institutional interests were also at stake. Having defined the task of the "preventive police" in "well-ordered states" as "the safeguarding of the rites of religion and the curbing of schisms," tsarist officials followed the model of the Napoleonic state and established a centralized bureaucratic body for the administration of the tolerated confessions.²¹ Founded in 1810 as the Main Administration of the Religious Affairs of Foreign Confessions and reconfigured as the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education in 1817, this institution became in 1832 a department of the primary organization entrusted with policing the imperial domestic order, the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This ministry oversaw the officially recognized clerical bodies for the non-Orthodox confessions, including an official Islamic establishment that Catherine the Great had created on the eastern steppe frontier in 1788, though it was forced to compete with other institutions—including the Orthodox Church—in shaping tsarist policy. The Ministry of War administered Muslims in the Caucasian and steppe borderlands. When the tsarist army assumed responsibility for the administration of Muslims in areas of the Caspian steppe and Transoxiana that it annexed between the 1860s and 1880s, it managed to wrest control of religious matters from the minister of internal affairs. In 1872, however, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reclaimed some of its power when it established an Islamic hierarchy for the administration of Sunni affairs, and another for Shi'a communities, in Transcaucasia. Yet another entity, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, inserted a voice in the policy debate. Sensitive to the perception of Muslims residing just beyond Russia's borders, its personnel frequently defended broad toleration for Islam as a means to prepare the way for expansion into the Ottoman empire, Persia, Transoxiana, Afghanistan, India, and China. But unlike other ministries, it remained open to the utility of émigré groups whom other Muslims regarded as "unorthodox," including Ismailis and Baha'is, treating them as a wedge against Persia and the British empire. Tsarist policy thus emerged out of an institutional patchwork marked both by competing ministries in the capitals and provincial towns as well as by different officially sponsored Muslim authorities based in the Crimea, the eastern steppe frontier town of Ufa, the Northern Caucasus, and Transcaucasia. Laypeople were another force. In resorting to the tsar's justice and calling for official intervention in disputes with other Muslims, they often directed the local course of tsarist state-building in ways that St. Petersburg could not predict or control.

Such lay activism underscores another little-studied dimension of the tsarist empire. Scholars have long followed Russian intellectuals in identifying Europe as Russia's natural framework for comparison. When they have juxtaposed Russia with the Ottomans or Safavids, the point has been to highlight difference. But the angle pursued in this book also points to similarities between the tsarist and Ottoman regimes. Both states introduced dramatic changes in the lives of their subjects in the nineteenth century, while simultaneously presenting the expanding state as a conservative guardian of Islamic piety. The symmetry of state decrees calling for compulsory mosque attendance is but one example of this common enterprise.²²

Alliances between Muslim activists and tsarist officials in the name of "orthodox" Islam did not reinforce an unchanging Islam, as some historians have suggested. Rather, these interactions produced novel

understandings of the sacred law. Like their contemporaries in the Ottoman empire and Egypt, Russia's Muslims perceived the rapid expansion of state institutions and legislation not as a displacement of the shari'a but instead as a complement to it.²³ While resisting some tsarist legal norms that they took to be in violation of God's law, Muslims responded to the extension of tsarist law and bureaucratic practice by adapting these new resources to local debates about the shari'a. At the same time, the prospect of state backing for legal norms that might shore up the moral foundations of the empire engaged officials and Muslims in attempts to regularize the process. As in British India and the Ottoman empire, local and variable understandings of the shari'a as a divinely ordained path began to give way in many circles to its conception as a uniform and static "law" whose meanings were fixed in texts and codes.²⁴ Official concern with consistency and uniformity aided particular Muslim actors who argued for a certain vision of orthodoxy based on a narrow selection of Hanafi legal texts. But state backing for the "letter of the law" could also work against Muslims, as when the state seized land held ostensibly in violation of the shari'a. These interactions placed religious authority—and the state-building processes to which it was linked—in flux.

The terms of such contests for influence were not infinitely malleable. Like "customary law" in colonial African societies, the elements of Islamic law that received state backing were likely to be those advanced by parties who presented themselves as the most authoritative arbiters of tradition and whose claims overlapped with the interests and expectations of the tsarist regime. Many of these Islamic legal texts accommodated the possibility of multiple outcomes to legal contests, including citations to authorities justifying a range of positions on a given legal issue. Under the tsars, the power of the state proved essential in tipping the balance in favor of one interpre-

tation over another. Thus in the tsarist empire, as in other societies, Muslims drew the boundaries of "orthodoxy" and community with the institutions of the state, not against it.²⁵

This story has not been told before because historians have tended to focus more narrowly on Muslim elites. In valuable research drawing on unpublished manuscript sources in a variety of languages, scholars have shown how Muslim thinkers who advocated the reform of various aspects of the Islamic tradition in the late tsarist empire reflected the adaptability and dynamism of Muslim culture from the second half of the nineteenth century. These elites have attracted attention in part because their renown extended beyond Russia. Most embraced Europe's fascination with nationalism. Unable to realize national political ambitions on the territory of the Russian empire in the early twentieth century, many were forced to pursue them in Europe, Japan, and, above all, in Turkey. There Muslim émigrés from Russia scripted national ideologies not only for the peoples back home, but for the Turks as well.²⁶ At the end of the twentieth century, the Communist Party bosses who found themselves the rulers of autonomous republics or independent states after the Soviet collapse rediscovered many of their ideas. Eager to manage a Muslim revival and consolidate loyalties toward new nation-states, elites looked back to the reformist heritage. Out of this varied body of thought, they have sought to construct a legitimate past for Islam seen as merely a secular attribute of national culture. A national lens has thus framed the history of Muslim intellectuals in Russia.

But this view has also obscured the wider context and hidden another story. This focus has not only neglected Muslims who rejected the national and secular platforms propagated by elites. It has too often reproduced narratives that celebrated the struggle of the nation against empire, treating all Muslims as outsiders. The reformist agenda of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not

the only controversial theme in the lives of the Muslims of the empire. Nor did it pit progressive reformers against backward-looking obscurantists, as much of this scholarship would suggest. Muslims challenged the authority of clerics well before the onset of print and other mass media that scholars have recently highlighted, following historians of the Reformation, in explaining religious change in Muslim societies. For their part, Muslim men of learning and piety in this context acted as "custodians of change," in Muhammad Qasim Zaman's apt formulation.²⁷ Though both Muslims and their Christian rulers appealed to "tradition," their engagement with one another unleashed dramatic changes that continually remade the logical contours both of the empire and Islam. The story of Islam in the empire is one of dynamic change. We should not assume the presence of a static Islam before the era of reform.

We should also not take Muslim solidarity for granted. Following Rogers Brubaker, this book probes the extent to which one can speak meaningfully of Muslims, even within a single region of the empire, as a bounded and homogeneous "group" at all. For many activists, being Muslim and living according to the shari'a meant to turn to the instruments of the state to seek their aid in compelling others to conform to a particular vision of Islam. Even in the Northern Caucasus, Muslims disagreed about the legitimacy of waging jihad against the Russians.²⁸ The story of Muslim reformist elites in the empire may offer a usable past for contemporary political agendas, but it contributes little to understanding how these Muslim communities fit into the empire, or how Islamic institutions and practices bound Muslims to the state. To illuminate both this wider perspective on Muslim politics and the Islamic underpinnings of the Orthodox tsar's empire, this book pays particular attention to the everyday controversies that most concerned clerics and laypeople alike, namely those surrounding the shari'a and the rites of the faith, including the Sufi devotions that divided local communities.

The chapters that follow trace efforts pursued by Russian officials and various Muslim actors to sustain social stability in the empire, with each side committed to making the most of the other's convictions for its own purposes. Far from underwriting the status quo, these relationships reshaped Muslim communities and state institutions. These efforts began on the eastern steppe frontier in the late eighteenth century (see Map 2). Chapter 1 traces the establishment of a state-backed Islamic hierarchy in the eastern town of Ufa under Catherine. The relationship forged on the frontier proved paradigmatic for other Muslim regions, though institutions everywhere took on the local cast of officialdom and indigenous intermediaries. Chapter 2 shows how this Islamic hierarchy extended its authority into mosque communities throughout the Volga and Urals regions in the first half of the nineteenth century, transforming local religious life and state institutions in the process. As a microcosm of the imperial order—one to be disciplined by the power of religion—the Muslim family forms the focus of Chapter 3. The remaining chapters chart the fate of official patronage of Islam as the eastern frontier evolved. By the mid-nineteenth century, the conceptions of Islam to which Muslims and tsarist officials appealed had changed dramatically, and Russia had begun to confront formidable Muslim resistance in the Northern Caucasus. Chapter 4 shows how the regime experimented with reworking its treatment of Islam among nomads in the Kazakh steppe. The conquest of Central Asia is the subject of Chapter 5 and reveals the state's efforts to integrate the most populous Muslim region it had yet encountered. Chapter 6 shifts from this eastern frontier to take in a wider view of the empire at a moment when Russian nationalism—and the social and economic change of the turn of the century—prompted both tsarist and Muslim elites to renegotiate the accord, sealed by commitment to Islamic orthodoxy, that had long served both Muslims' quest for piety and the solidity of the empire.



Map 2. The Southeastern Frontier of the Russian Empire

In the end, I want to suggest how the search for that which could be “useful” for the state in Islam was so embedded in the consciousness of so many actors that it survived the collapse of the tsarist regime. The Soviets retained central principles of the tsarist approach for much of the twentieth century, and it has been revived today in Eurasia as well as in Europe and other regions where Muslims form significant minorities. Calls for state involvement in backing certain kinds of religious interpretation on behalf of “moderates” (meaning “good Muslims”) now exercise a powerful attraction where nation-states feel threatened by transnational Islam and besieged by the

threat of terrorism.²⁹ The tsarist experience with such practices should alert us to their unintended consequences. The mechanisms of imperial rule were only as effective as their intermediaries. The crisis of tsarist rule in Central Asia during the First World War demonstrates some of the costs of overestimating the prestige of particular local authorities and institutions. Other imperial powers, most notably Germany, faced this challenge during the war when they solicited Islamic backing (including *fatwas*) and mobilized Muslim prisoners of war against their rivals. Poor choice of collaborators has doomed more than one empire.³⁰ At first glance, the strategy of supporting particular Muslim factions against others appears to be an alternative to the violence that has torn apart Bosnia and Chechnya. But its consequences have been more complicated. Although official patronage of select Islamic authorities was a powerful asset in the policing and integration of Muslim populations in the Russian empire, it also drew Muslims and their rulers together in the common enterprise of curtailing liberty of conscience. Applied more broadly, such strategies tend to promise further conflicts, not between "civilizations," but within modern states that deny their citizens basic legal protections, including respect for fundamental human rights. In Russia itself, the violence visited upon Chechnya since 1994 has formed only one prong of Russian strategy in the Northern Caucasus. The other has been to try to co-opt loyal Muslim authorities. The result remains a state of unrelenting civil war pitting Russians against Chechens, and Muslims against Muslims.

A CHURCH FOR ISLAM

In 1802 Fayz Khan (Fayḍ Khān al-Kabūlī) was laid to rest in a shrine at a mosque complex in Kabul. With the passing of this Muslim scholar, an era came to a close. A guide on the path of Islamic mysticism, he had inherited the wisdom of a lengthy chain of Sufi masters. Fayz Khan himself transmitted the teachings of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, who had formulated a critique of Islam in his native India of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Celebrated by his followers as the "Renewer of the Second Millennium," Sirhindi argued that "unlawful innovations" had corrupted Islam. He taught that the pursuit of Sufi knowledge, paired with rigorous devotion to the essence of the divine path, the *sharī'a*, showed the way to renewing the faith. Sirhindi's vision inspired the emergence of a new community. Drawn from members of the Naqshbandiyya, a Sufi brotherhood established in the fourteenth century, his devotees formed an offshoot, the Mujaiddi order, which lost one of its most authoritative figures with Fayz Khan's death in Kabul.¹

Mourning for this holy man spread beyond the local faithful, for

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NOMADS INTO MUSLIMS

Through regulation of the Muslim family, the tsarist regime gave impetus to novel understandings of the Islamic tradition. Unsatisfied with contradictory pronouncements from various intermediaries, the bureaucracy sought out sources that revealed the shari'a, not as a malleable system of ethics and moral injunctions, but as a rigid code of law that Russian officials could administer without the aid of Muslim informants. Emerging out of interactions between litigants and the bureaucracy, a more uniform and disciplined Hanafi legalism derived by Oriental studies experts from a narrow set of texts channeled police power into the mosque community on behalf of clerics and litigants who succeeded in appealing to such visions of law. This new emphasis on the certainty of scriptural norms yielded unsettling effects. The redefinition of what was authentically "Islamic" in terms of a limited selection of texts and fixed rules raised questions about the religiosity of tsarist subjects who understood the faith differently, and even called into question Catherine the Great's original vision for the unruly eastern frontier.

This chapter explores the conquest of the steppe east of the Orenburg frontier as a turning point in imperial policy toward Islam. Beginning in the 1730s a number of elites from the three Kazakh tribal federations, or hordes, inhabiting the north Caspian steppe had sworn oaths of loyalty to Russia based on the Islamic faith. From the eighteenth century, the regime had supported the spread of Islam among these nomads. Catherine recognized that the Kazakhs had not embraced Islam in the same manner as the Tatars on the Volga River but was convinced that, with regular access to mosques and Islamic schools and with the assistance of the Tatars, they might adopt a more "civilized" way of life, turning to trade, agriculture, and a disciplined monotheism.¹ Catherine had wagered that her passage of Islam would ultimately transform the steppe, turning pastoralists into farmers and raiders into loyal artisans and merchants. However, the cultivation of Islam was a central element of steppe frontier policy only before the tsars came to fully control the region. Seen through the lens of the emergent Hanafi orthodoxy, the peoples of the steppe now appeared in a different light. Their religion, to the extent that one could be identified according to the new criteria, scarcely resembled the faith of the other Muslim peoples of the empire. Here the regime confronted yet another difficulty. Like the Uniate Church, which the emperor Paul (r. 1796-1801) is said to have dismissed as "neither fish nor fowl," the religion of the Kazakh nomads did not fit easily into the classificatory schemes of the Russian authorities. Was the regime bound to tolerate a faith that was alien to this people? Had toleration in the steppe amounted to treasonous conversion of would-be Christians to Islam?

Tsarist expansion in the nineteenth century lent a new cast to Russia's centuries-old encounter with the steppe. As tsarist forces extended a line of fortresses from Orenburg and Omsk toward the Syr Darya river in Transoxiana in the 1840s and 1850s, the state began to assume responsibility for the administration of the nomadic peoples




Figure 5 A Russian official and his family with Kazakh elders. Courtesy of George Kennan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-128111.

of the steppe. The extension of tsarist rule over the grazing lands of the Kazakhs brought into the steppe Cossacks, soldiers, Slavic colonists, and administrators like the Russian official shown in Figure 5 with his family and an assembly of Kazakh notables in front of a nomadic tent. Once divided into three confederations, the Kazakhs now found themselves ruled from the Orenburg governor-generalship, Siberia, and the khanate of Kokand, which expanded north from the densely populated Ferghana and Syr Darya valleys. In the 1860s, further Russian offensives brought some two and a half million Kazakhs under tsarist rule. The arrival of the Russian administrators and settlers initiated a period of turmoil in the steppe. Natural disasters—such as droughts and apocalyptic storms—heightened competition for access to grazing lands. Kazakhs struggled to survive these harsh conditions; many of them were forced to give up herding

permanently. Relations with the Russians were also tense. Herding, a chaotic affair managed haphazardly by administrators, put many Kazakhs at risk for survival. Elite families adapted to the new situation, and the sons of notables gained access to Russian educational institutions. At the same time, for many Kazakhs, more was at stake than their herds and pastures. Disputes about religion and yet another feature of the steppe world turned upside down the incorporation in the empire.²

Officials rethought their approach toward Islam in the steppe as they took on the direct administration of this space. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, they began questioning the fundamental assumptions behind Catherine's policies. First, Russian ethnographers and Kazakh informants cast doubt on the nomads' affiliation with Islam. They claimed that the state had erred in introducing the faith among a people who lacked any understanding of religion or who had only little sympathy for Islam. Many of these same observers called on the state to support the conversion of Kazakhs to Christianity rather than Islam. Second, officials who had been involved with both the Kazakhs and Muslims from the Orenburg and Volga regions now concluded that Catherine's policy had been mistaken in treating Islam as a bulwark of the state.

Without abandoning support for Islamic institutions elsewhere in the empire, tsarist authorities revised their policies of religious toleration for the steppe. They opted to treat the Kazakhs as a special case, distinguishing them from both Muslims in the neighboring Orenburg region and the settled Muslim populations of Central Asia. Once convinced that the Kazakhs were not truly Muslims, Russians looked to Kazakh customary law (*adat*) and the clan elders who administered it to perform many of the same tasks that they had elsewhere assigned the shari'a and Muslim clerics. These new administrative ideas also found resonance in the Northern Caucasus, where in the 1860s the Russians finally overcame the mountaineers

and established administrative control. There, too, officials seized upon the possibility of using ostensibly secular custom in place of the shari'a to link local communities to tsarist administration.³

In the steppe, officials confronted communities deeply divided by questions of religious identity. Kazakhs identified themselves as Muslims in some contexts, but 'ulama from beyond the steppe and even some Kazakhs themselves faulted the migratory lifestyle that kept these nomads from constructing their own mosques and schools. In the eyes of their critics, they neglected prayers, education, fasting, pilgrimage, and other Islamic duties. Many mullahs viewed the Kazakhs as a people badly in need of instruction about the strict fulfillment of the shari'a norms deemed orthodox in the madrasas of the Volga region and Transoxiana.

Faced with competing claims from the Kazakhs themselves about their religious identities, tsarist officials aligned themselves with like-minded Kazakhs who shared their goal of directing the Kazakhs away from Islam. From midcentury, the state became a central actor in a struggle already under way among the Kazakhs between proponents of the shari'a and guardians of custom, adat. Some Russophone Kazakhs defended Islam as an instrument to bring "enlightenment" to the steppe; others questioned Catherine's use of Tatar teachers and missionaries to pursue her goal of civilizing these nomads. Kazakhs who rejected Islam and Tatar influence became the allies of administrators who sought to establish their own authority in the regulation of everyday life in the steppe. In conjunction with these native informants and the factions of Kazakh elders who backed them, regional governors advocated state support for secular customary law, in place of the shari'a, as a more reliable and useful alternative to government reliance on Muslim men of religion. At the same time, the regime assumed a role in shaping customary law by linking the office of the judge (*biy*) to government administration. Officials supervised elections and appointments to the position

and confirmed or overturned their judgments. From the 1860s, officials became deeply involved in the affairs of these communities. They frequently shaped the outcome of these struggles by endorsing elders who opposed mullahs and their calls for submission to Islamic law.

The incorporation of the Kazakhs into the empire redrew the boundaries of religious toleration. Tsarist law granted non-Orthodox communities "freedom of religion," including the right to arrange marriage and family matters according to the rules of their faiths. In the steppe, however, local officials challenged Kazakh recourse to Islamic law and severely restricted access to mullahs and holy men from the Volga and Urals regions as well as from Transoxiana. Between the 1850s and 1890s, officials tried to suppress transregional religious contacts without publicly renouncing the basic principles of toleration, which they continued to value as a means to gain leverage in neighboring Muslim lands. For the sake of imperial order, moreover, the Russians feared the confrontations that an open abandonment of toleration might incite.

Governors undermined the general statutes on toleration with administrative decrees that closed mosques and schools. But in doing so, they deprived themselves of the regulatory apparatus that accompanied toleration throughout the rest of the empire. Their treatment of religious institutions and Muslim networks in the territory impeded the formation of links between Muslims and the state. At the turn of the century, these administrative measures alienated Kazakh elites and commoners alike. Joined by Muslims throughout the empire, they responded with increasing demands for legal rights, including access to mosques, Islamic schools, and the ability to live in accordance with the shari'a. Together with the colonization of their pasture lands by Slavic settlers, such policies weakened the local presence of the regime, making its hold on the steppe increasingly precarious.⁴ Fearing unrest and the unsupervised activities of Mus-

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lim clerics, at the turn of the century the government responded returning, but only partially, to pairing toleration with hierarchical oversight.

Russia's challenges in the steppe resembled those of other modernizing states confronting nomadic populations. Between the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, the tsarist state acted much like its Muslim rivals. In the Ottoman empire and later in Afghanistan, centralizing regimes limited the autonomy of mobile communities. They imposed taxes and military duties, and promoted sedentary agriculture. The expansion of officially sponsored religious institutions—what the Ottoman administrator Osman Nuri Paşa called the “civilizing fold of the *Şeriat* [Islamic law]”—was critical to the penetration of the state into autonomous tribal areas.⁵

The imposition of legal norms elaborated by official religious establishments in these states, as in the north Caspian steppe, rested on claims about religious orthodoxy and authenticity. Like the Kabyle in North Africa, Kazakhs were regarded by neighboring Muslims (and in modern ethnographic literature, by themselves) as imperfect Muslims.⁶ Such thinking shaped French, British, and Russian colonial policies on behalf of the secular “custom” of the tribe and against Islamic law, but they should not be taken at face value as evidence of Kazakh irreligiosity or impiety.⁷ The controversies surrounding Kazakh religion reveal instead the ascendance of a more exclusive understanding of Islamic orthodoxy in the minds of ethnographers, officials, imperial informants, and intermediaries. In practice, such normative notions did not always gain state backing. Nor did they preclude religious change and the continual elaboration of distinctively Kazakh Muslim identities. As Allen Frank has shown, Kazakhs experienced a kind of “Islamic transformation” under Russian rule in the nineteenth century.⁸ Kazakh notables initiated contacts with neighboring Muslim scholars, recruiting them to train their children. Kazakh parents sent their children to regional

centers of Islamic learning and piety, such as Semipalatinsk and Orenburg, or to madrasas in Kargala, Astrakhan, and Troitsk. They consumed Islamic literature, including poetic works relating to the lives of major Islamic figures, printed in inexpensive editions in Orenburg. Many even began to rework their ancestral affections, remembering Muslim ancestors in place of others. Despite contentious disputes among tsarist officials and shifts in policy, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Pax Russica continued to sustain conditions that fostered the spread of new forms of Islamic piety in the steppe.

Civilization through Islam

Under Catherine, state elites associated Islam with civility. As part of her plans for the pacification of the southeastern borderlands, the state sponsored the construction of mosques and Islamic schools staffed by Tatar teachers.⁹ The establishment of institutions rooted in a monotheistic and cosmopolitan religion appeared to offer an economical and enlightened way to settle and civilize the Kazakhs. Besides blocking the influence of the Ottoman sultan, the cultivation of Islam would turn the Kazakhs away from cattle-stealing and slaving raids on other restive frontier subjects, including the Bashkirs, Kalmyks, and Russians.

Through the mosque and the school, imperial rule was to “instill in [the Kazakhs] humanity and better manners.”¹⁰ The agents of imperial rule were to include men of religion recruited from the towns and villages of the Volga region and the Orenburg territory, including the first mufti of the Orenburg Assembly. The regime called on its Muslim subjects to show the Kazakhs the benefits of an industrious and moral life under tsarist protection. But Kazakhs were not simply the passive objects of this imperial strategy of Islamicization. From the late eighteenth century, they petitioned Russian authori-

ties to permit Muslims from the Volga and Orenburg regions to live among them as religious scholars.¹¹

Catherine expressed certainty that new mosques would "attract other nomads inhabiting [the area] near our borders." She suggested that the cultivation of Islam "might with time be more effective in imposing discipline than more severe measures." The empress also proposed the construction of "Tatar schools on the example of those in Kazan" and caravansaries alongside mosques, which were to take on a "decorous" appearance with the construction of stone fences around them. According to this plan, future mosques were to be built in the most accessible locations to accommodate up to fifteen hundred people. The local governor, Osip Igel'strom, called for the appointment of mullahs "from among the loyal people of the Kazan Tatars" to "various Kazakh clans [*rody*]" as a means to inculcate "loyalty to us and to dissuade them from raiding and pillaging on our borders." In the following year, Catherine called "very useful and necessary" the division of the steppe into three parts, with towns to be constructed in each, together with "mosques for their main clans, schools, and markets."¹²

Alexander I continued Catherine's policy of treating Islam as a means to transform Kazakhs into imperial subjects. Licensed mullahs and other official men of religious learning and piety played a pivotal role. Scholars and merchants from Kargala, the Tatar village near Orenburg, supplied the imperial regime with a host of intermediaries. At frontier trading posts and in the mobile Kazakh encampments, these Tatars translated for Russian officials, recorded various transactions, arbitrated disputes among Kazakhs and Russians, and negotiated diplomatic agreements.¹³ From Ufa, the Orenburg mufti issued roughly a dozen fatwas enjoining Muslims to take up agriculture. Most important for tsarist authorities, licensed imams like Mukhammed Mukhamedov administered oaths on the Qur'an to Kazakh elders, binding them as "loyal subjects" to the tsar.¹⁴

Tsarist strategy bore fruit at the beginning of the nineteenth century when a Chingisid khan named Bukei fled one of the Kazakh tribal confederacies, the Small Horde, with several thousand tents and settled between the lower tributaries of the Volga and Ural rivers, where many took up "useful" trades like commerce and agriculture. Though the government divided supervision of these communities between the military governor of Astrakhan and the Orenburg Frontier Commission, St. Petersburg accorded the khan broad autonomy in organizing the internal affairs of the communities, which later came to be known as the "Bukei" or "Inner Horde." There the founding of Islamic institutions accompanied patronage of agriculture, artisanry, and trade as well as the development of a bureaucratic administrative structure. Muslims from outside the Horde contributed to this process, and the khan devoted special attention to the recruitment of Tatar mullahs. In 1811 Bukei petitioned the foreign minister, Count N. P. Rumiantsev, seeking legal status for three Tatar clerics. Having escaped captivity at the hands of other Kazakhs in the region of Bukhara and having married Kazakh women, Tatars had taken up posts as mullahs among Bukei's Kazakhs. The numbers of such mullahs rose to 126 by the late 1840s.¹⁵

Bukei's son Dzhangir founded a hierarchical organization of mullahs patterned on the Orenburg Assembly, an institution to which the khan was connected by marriage to the daughter of the first mufti.¹⁶ The tsarist government confirmed one of these clerics as an akhund to head this institution. Besides examining the qualifications of candidates who aspired to positions as licensed mullahs, the akhund propagated religious knowledge among the Kazakhs. Patents bearing the stamp of Dzhangir and the chief akhund instructed mullahs to "build mosques and schools" and "celebrate weekly and annual holidays." Dzhangir's directives emphasized the importance of literacy and enjoined the daily performance of prayer and the keeping of fasts. The khan ordered these official mullahs to lead the peo-

ple in prayer and to deliver "exhortations to the simple Kazakhs" in accordance with a model to be given them by the akhund. They were to instruct the "simple and ignorant Kazakhs in all rules of our religion," assign Muslim names to newborns, and perform circumcisions, marriages, and burials.

Marriage practices were to come under particular scrutiny. The khan directed his mullahs to challenge customary practices like that of bridegrooms going "to their fiancées before the wedding, according to the former Kazakh custom." Dzhangir's new rules governed exchange of kalym and the remarriage of widows (now made dependent upon the consent of both mother and father). In the same spirit, the mullahs of the Inner Horde were to persuade the wealthy to pay alms (*zakat*). They were to dissuade the "simple and ignorant" from committing violence and theft and urge them "to honor, respect and always be loyal to the Sovereign Emperor and his officials."¹⁷ Like the Orenburg mufti, the khan and his akhund were to cultivate Islam as an institution of social discipline and as a way to keep order in the family and sanctify Kazakh ties to the Russian tsar.

Though the Inner Horde was settled on Russian imperial territory, Dzhangir ruled like a Muslim sovereign. The ceremony marking his elevation to the position of khan of the Inner Horde in 1824 in the town of Ural'sk was orchestrated by tsarist authorities but consecrated by the swearing of an official religious oath and the kissing of the Qur'an under the supervision of a Muslim cleric. When he issued rules in 1836 regulating market behavior, Dzhangir warned that "drunkenness cannot be tolerated among Muslims according to our religious law," advising Russians and others to "behave themselves decently, without allowing insults, quarrels, and fights" arising from this vice. His officials even collected an Islamic tax (*zakat*), though it did not meet with universal approval. Mullahs complained to Dzhangir that elders resisted all charity, and that "the simple

ple, due to the ignorance characteristic of the Kazakh, do not

The khan also cultivated ties to the Russian bureaucracy and university. He sent the children of elites to Russian schools, though he promoted Islamic education for these students. In 1842 Dzhangir proposed the appointment of a scholar from Kargala, Sadreddin Aminov, to provide young Kazakhs selected for study in the gymnasiums of the imperial capital with a preparatory education at the headquarters of the khan in "Arabic, Persian, Tatar, and Russian" as well as in "elementary sciences and the Muslim law." Dzhangir himself acted as patron of book publishing. On a trip through Kazan in 1844, he persuaded Professor Kazem-Bek to publish a Hanafi legal text—the *Mukhtasar al-vikayet*, a publication that the khan hoped to distribute among the Kazakhs and Kazem-Bek intended to make useful for the Orientalists of Europe.¹⁸ The Inner Horde became both a consumer and a supplier of Kazem-Bek's renowned publications and other books from the printing presses of Kazan University, while Dzhangir collected dozens of Turkic, Persian, and Arabic manuscripts for the library of the university, where he was awarded the title "honored member." By 1840 the elite surrounding the khan included figures like twenty-eight-year-old Kubbul'syn-khodzha Karaulov. Claiming descent from a saintly lineage, Karaulov represented a new generation formed by an imperial military education under Nicholas. At the Nepliev Military Institute he had studied "French, German, Russian, Arabic, Persian, and Tatar; sciences—history, geography, arithmetic, Russian literature, the basic principles of mathematics, physics, and natural history."¹⁹

Nicholas I, too, encouraged the Kazakhs to adopt the orthodox norms championed by the regime's Islamic institutions. Orthodox Christian missionaries and some local officials objected to state involvement in the promotion of Islam among the Kazakhs, but cen-

tral government officials remained convinced of the connection between the development of sedentary life and the cultivation of what they believed to be normative Islamic practices. In 1851, A. Evreinov, a tsarist official, showered praise upon Dzhangir for promoting the transition from pastoralism to farming and trade.²⁰

Muslims, Manichaeans, and Pagans

The extension of tsarist administration across the southeastern frontier and the incorporation of the Kazakhs confronted the state with complex challenges to arrangements worked out in St. Petersburg and Ufa for the organization of Islam. Not only did officials face the difficulty of integrating a vast population of clan-oriented pastoralists, but the religion of these newest subjects unsettled the conceptual certainties that underlay the hierarchical structures of religious toleration. Tsarist officials faced conflicting theories about the Kazakhs' religion, which they understood to be closely tied to the nomadic way of life.

Judging Kazakh society against impressions of Islam formed in the emergent centers of orthodoxy like Istanbul and Kazan, officials and experts under Nicholas I and Alexander II searched in vain for the conventional markers of Islam as they knew it. The Kazakhs seemed to lack both mosque and clergy. Ethnographers applied comparative schemes that relied on normative and objectified notions of religion.²¹ Most of them even rejected the self-identification of many Kazakhs as Muslims, regarding them instead as a people indifferent to religion. Local officials seized on what they supposed to be the absence of religion among the Kazakhs as evidence that this people stood ready for a form of state-directed transformation unthinkable among other subjects in the grip of "Muhammadanism." Some scholars argued that they differed from pagans only because Catherine's steppe policy had exposed them to Islam. From midcentury,

officials joined bishops in the Orenburg region in lobbying for extension of the policies inherited from the empress. They argued that patronage of Islam had outlived its day as a strategy to pacify the southeastern frontiers. In the meantime, provincial officials moved closer to the position of Orthodox prelates, who disparaged Islam as a force that opposed state interests.

Early in the reign of Nicholas I, provincial officials had reacted with alarm to mass renunciation of Orthodox Christianity and the flight to Islam among baptized inhabitants (or their descendants) in Turkic and Finno-Ugric language communities.²² Officials prohibited any confessional change, other than baptism into the "preeminent and predominant" Orthodox Church, which enjoyed the exclusive right to proselytize, and they accused the "Muhammadan heresy" and the Orenburg Assembly of inciting this religious change. They were confirmed in their attitudes in the 1830s when news of Shamil's war against tsarist rule in the Northern Caucasus reached the Volga and Urals regions.

From the 1850s, relations with the Ottoman empire and developments elsewhere in the Islamic world figured into arguments against continued Russian state patronage of Muslim institutions.²³ The experiences of European powers reinforced tsarist elites' anxieties about "fanaticism" and "hatred of Christians" as the forces animating Muslim rebellion and misrule everywhere. Resistance to French rule in Algeria, the 1857 "mutiny" in British India, and Muslim rebellion in the Qing empire all attracted the attention of the reading public. At the same time, Pan-Slav intellectuals depicted conflicts with the Ottomans, as in the Crimean War of 1853-1856 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, as symptoms of a universal struggle between Orthodox Christianity and Islam.

Within Russia, the development of new academic disciplines came to play a role in the reformulation of religious policies. Ethnographers and geographers built upon the work of their forerunners in

the natural sciences. The proliferation of classificatory descriptions of the lands, peoples, flora, and fauna of the empire in the 1830s and 1840s differed from earlier projects not only in their range and scope but also, more importantly, in their orientation. Often sponsored by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the authors of such studies believed that scholarly knowledge would facilitate more systematic and efficient forms of police administration and economic development. Institutionalized in the Imperial Russian Geographical Society in the 1840s, ethnography cast the heterogeneous confessions of the empire in a new light. Ethnographers offered their studies to administrators, but ethnographic description was susceptible to reinterpretation in the tsarist chancelleries. Ethnographic knowledge was only one of several variables available to policymakers. The perspective of imperial informants and, above all, police concern with order were more frequently decisive in shaping policies.

The first major study devoted exclusively to the Kazakhs appeared in 1832 and became the primary point of reference for imperial administrators. Aleksei Levshin's *Description of the Kirgiz-Kazakh, or the Kirgiz-Kasak Hordes and the Steppes* expressed skepticism about the true character of Kazakh religion. "What is your religion?" Levshin recounted asking two Kazakh informants. "We do not know," they replied. He claimed that "the majority of their compatriots" offered the same response, leading him to conclude that it was indeed difficult "to decide what the Kazakhs are: Muhammadans, Manichaeans, or pagans?" The Kazakhs had an understanding of a "Supreme Being," he observed, and many of them "worship according to the Qur'an," but "others mix the teaching of Islam [Islamism] with the remnants of ancient idolatry." Still others believed that human life is overseen by a "good deity" named "Khudai" and an "evil spirit" known as "Shaitan, the source of evil."²⁵

Despite the confused amalgamation of three distinct religious sys-

in these beliefs, for Levshin the true measure of Kazakh religious ignorance lay in their resort to various "spirits," "sorcerers," "fortune-tellers." Observers of Kazakh life in earlier periods, like German naturalist Peter Simon Pallas, had recorded the promise among the Kazakhs of men who worked cures and predicted future. But observers had not portrayed these individuals as central to Kazakh religion. Indeed, in Pallas's account they largely stood aside Kazakh religion; they enjoyed their position in the steppe due to the paucity of "Muhammadan clergy" there.²⁶ For Levshin, however, Kazakh belief in magical forces represented a contamination of religion generally. Just as he maintained that no legitimate religion should bear traces of "magic" or "superstition," Levshin refused to recognize as anything other than "Manichaean" his informants' reference to *Khudai* (perhaps from *Khodā*, "God" in Persian) and *Shaitan* ("Satan").

Levshin nonetheless decided that the "Muhammadan religion" was the most important element in this "mixing up of various confessions." Though he saw Kazakhs as lacking the "fanaticism" that he identified with Muslims elsewhere, he believed that traces of Islam among the Kazakhs accounted for their hostility toward "unbelievers," including Christians, Buddhists, and Shi'ites (even though he claimed the Kazakhs had only a dim understanding of the differences separating Sunnis and Shi'ites). Discounting the concern of many Kazakhs for daily prayers and fasting, Levshin focused instead on polygamy as the essential tenet of Islam that Kazakhs had embraced most fully.²⁷

Having cast doubt on the coherence and seriousness of Kazakh religious convictions, Levshin's contradictory but influential *Description* bolstered critics of tsarist policy. Given the scarcity of "zealous Muslims" among them, he reasoned, "Islam might completely die out," were it not for the "clerics" who acted as its sole proponents. He stressed that these clerics were outsiders to Kazakh society. Some

came from the towns of Bukhara, Khiva, and Turkestan. Others held appointments sponsored by the Russian government as scribes for khans and clan chieftains. Levshin's assertions about Kazakh indifference to religion in general and Islam in particular outlived the author; and his portrayal of itinerant and state-sanctioned mullahs as the treacherous purveyors of an alien—and politically subversive—tradition among credulous pastoralists had a lasting impact. Imperial officials and Orthodox churchmen used his claims as empirical evidence against state support for Islam. Under Nicholas I, Levshin's work became paradigmatic in academic circles. Yet claims based on ethnography alone failed to displace established administrative practices.

More important than ethnographers were Kazakh informants. With the establishment in the early 1840s of Russian schools in frontier settlements and the entry of Kazakhs into the regular ranks of the military, sons of notables emerged as both intermediaries and allies of Russian proponents of an activist state role in the transformation of the steppe. In mediating interactions between indigenous elites and officialdom, some informants presented evidence of local customs and mores that made Islam appear foreign to the Kazakhs. But this society and the informants who spoke for them were divided. Even Kazakhs who had advanced through the ranks of Russian education and military service were split on the question of Islam. Some portrayed the religion as a danger to tsarist rule; others championed the link between the spread of Islam and the development of Kazakh society. Whereas military officer and ethnographer Chokan Valikhanov insisted on the irreligiosity of his people, Mukhammad-Salikh Babadzhanov focused on the Inner Horde and the leadership of Dzhangir to chart the parallel advance of "progress" and Islamic education.

In a letter of December 1860 published in the *Northern Bee*, a St. Petersburg daily, Babadzhanov, an advisor to the administration of

Inner Horde, avowed that "in the soul of every Kazakh is a Muhammadan of the Sunni sect." This fact went unnoticed, he argued, because of his co-religionists' "shaky knowledge of the rules of religion, which they combined with popular habits." Tatar mullahs had been importing literacy and knowledge since the 1830s, but Babadzhanov criticized as "brutality" the pedagogy of these mullahs, whom he treated as interlopers. He reserved his praise for Dzhangir and the school that the khan established at his headquarters. There, in addition to the "rules of the Muhammadan religion," Kazakh children studied the Russian language. For the improvement of the "moral life" of the horde and the "development of their mental capabilities," he credited its khans: Bukei had resolved to lead "our Kazakhs" from the steppe to the territory of Astrakhan, "where they required a gentle disposition," and Dzhangir, "by his own example of zeal and fervor for the study of Tatar reading and writing, the rules of Islam, and the Russian tongue and script, demonstrated to the Kazakhs that study is degrading to no one and is never too late." Islam, Babadzhanov argued, brought "enlightenment" to the Kazakhs and made them better Russian subjects.²⁸

While Babadzhanov defended Islam among the Kazakhs in the press of the capitals, officials in Orenburg challenged the claim that Islam had advanced the cause of enlightenment in the steppe. The ambitious Vasilii V. Grigor'ev sought to make his mark by reorienting policy away from its reliance upon Islam. A newcomer to the frontier, Grigor'ev arrived in Orenburg in 1852 after training as an Orientalist in Odessa and St. Petersburg. He had served in the Department of Religious Affairs of Foreign Confessions within the Ministry of Internal Affairs before assuming other ministerial posts; he also served as one of the principal figures in the Imperial Russian Geographical Society.²⁹ Upon arrival in Orenburg, Grigor'ev received orders to investigate charges of corruption leveled against the leadership of the Bukei Horde. When authorities in St. Petersburg directed

him to investigate Dzhangir's family after the khan's death in 1864. Grigor'ev distinguished himself as a vigilant guardian of the state's interest against figures in local government whom he dismissed as neglectful in their supervision of the horde.

The scholar had not served long in his new assignment before he managed, despite the khan's reputation as a "loyal agent of civilization and defender of Russian principles in the horde," to uncover the damage caused by him and his family, who, in the words of Grigor'ev's biographer, constituted "an evil" inflicted upon Russia that surpassed the damage wrought by all of their predecessors put together. "Vestiges of immorality" were Dzhangir's legacy. Worse than laying personal claim to the more than one million acres occupied by the horde, Grigor'ev maintained, Dzhangir had served "his own interests" in converting the Kazakhs to "Muhammadanism" about which they had no idea before him.³⁰ He had succeeded in "impregnating" the "upper class" with "the ignorant Muslim pride that is hostile to Christianity and enlightenment." In pursuit of this end, Grigor'ev charged, Dzhangir had cultivated "a whole army of mullahs," "the class of the population of the horde, which is the most immoral and hostile to the Russian government." Combining self-interest and "fanaticism," the "cunning" Dzhangir had been the first of the Kazakh khans to compel the collection of the Islamic zakat in addition to the formerly voluntary Kazakh tax, the *sugum*.³¹

Grigor'ev's contribution to frontier administration lay in his assertion that some good could come of Dzhangir's "evil." Disillusioned by the khan's misrule, Kazakhs had come to rely on "conscientious Russian bureaucrats." This development led Grigor'ev to infer, according to his biographer, that "the horde would be capable of quietly accepting any transformation, all possible rapprochement [*sblizheniie*] with the imperial system, as long as it is carried out carefully and with skill."³²

A Kazakh informant reinforced Grigor'ev's argument. Chokan

now combined his linguistic skills and Russian military cadet training to become the most prominent interpreter of Kazakh society in the 1860s. He earned the confidence of the writer Fyodor Dostoevsky, who praised him as "the first Kazakh with a fully European education" and expressed his "love" for him. The son of a notable from the Inner Horde who had entered imperial service in the 1840s, Valikhhanov collected intelligence and produced ethnographic reports about the peoples of the steppe and oasis towns of Central Asia for the military and Asiatic Department of the Ministry of War Affairs. He seems to have regarded Alexander Kazem-Bek as his colleague Khusain Faizkhanov complained in a letter to the khan in 1863 that "Kazembek is translating the opinions of Muhammad and making himself out to be an aristocrat." He used his status as both a claimant to the line of Chingiz Khan and a scholar of the European discipline of ethnography to argue for a wholesale reorientation of tsarist policy toward the nomads. Valikhhanov called for direct state intervention in the steppe and total commitment to the active "spread of European enlightenment." In a memorandum composed in late 1863 or early 1864, he urged against support for Islamic institutions and personnel among the Kazakhs: "Islam cannot help the Russian or any other Christian government, [and] one cannot count on the loyalty of a mercenary Muslim clergy." Drawing on his recent study "Traces of Shamanism among the Kazakhs," Valikhhanov maintained that Islam remained an alien and marginal force that "has still not eaten into our flesh and blood." Though Islam threatened "the division of the people in the future," he explained, a "period of dual faith [*dyvoeverie*]" still prevailed in the steppe, "like that in Rus' during the time of the venerable Nestor." Resembling Russians in ancient times, the Kazakhs remained pagans at heart.³³

Valikhhanov's rise coincided with the fundamental restructuring of imperial institutions in the "Great Reforms" after Russian defeat in

the Crimean War. Following the abolition of serfdom, the government of Alexander II planned major judicial reforms.³⁴ These included the establishment of courts that would expand the reach of imperial law on a more uniform basis throughout the empire. Valikhanov opposed the encroachment of imperial law, however, by appealing to a long-standing principle in the restive borderlands. He suggested that the practice of administration through "customary law" might be a pragmatic alternative to the state promotion of Islam and a promising vehicle for the gradual integration of the Kazakhs into mainstream life in the empire.

The officially sanctioned practice of customary law had a lengthy history in the administration both of Orthodox peasant communities and of indigenous groups inhabiting the borderlands. As early as the second quarter of the eighteenth century, tsarist authorities had directed the tribute-paying peoples of Siberia to adjudicate disputes among themselves before their "elders." Lawmakers later concluded that peoples who differed so much from Orthodox peasants in their beliefs, manners, appearance, and general way of life must have distinctive legal norms as well. The state conferred the right to live according to customary law upon peoples who seemed to occupy a lower level of social organization and who appeared to need protection from more cunning human predators, like Russian colonists and administrators. A decree of 1783 awarded the various peoples inhabiting Irkutsk Province "the freedom to settle civil affairs among themselves orally" before their "elders or elected [people]."³⁵ Of course, the state maintained its monopoly on the administration of judicial affairs in which it had an interest, and it defended its prerogative to define crimes punishable by the general laws.

In practice, local officials became deeply embroiled in determining which form customary law took in each community. Like their contemporaries in the British East India Company, Russian authorities sought out those indigenous notables and texts that appeared to

preserve knowledge about local "laws and customs." In Bengal, administrators translated and compiled texts in search of a compendium of rule-based "Hindoo" and "Muhammadan" law to aid British colonialists in policing indigenous legal personnel.³⁶ Tsarist bureaucrats pursued similar sources. In Siberia, they solicited authoritative texts from indigenous contacts. Russians hoped these records would help them sort out appeals and the conflicting assertions advanced by "dissatisfied" interpreters of customary legal norms. Tsarist officials were from the outset implicated in the elaboration of customary law. By entertaining petitions from dissatisfied litigants, they created an appellate mechanism, making governors and police key actors in the definition and implementation of customary legal norms.³⁷

Mikhail Speranskii's Siberian statute of 1822 made the discovery of these legal norms a collaborative project between bureaucrats and indigenous informants.³⁸ Officials collected information from "distinguished natives," and a state committee sifted through them to ascertain which of the "laws and customs" seemed most appropriate for the administrative purposes of the regime. Finally, at a stage three steps removed from the native assembly, the governor-general confirmed or rejected the committee's selection of legal materials. The laws "characteristic to each tribe" were then to be administered by "elders" and others chosen by the community. Tsarist officials oversaw their work and applied the rules derived from this joint effort.

Among the Kazakhs, Valikhanov acted as a key protagonist in defining the "customary law" that emerged from fierce competition among elders and other Kazakhs. In the early 1860s the central ministries discussed introducing a new system, a form of mixed court, the "justice of the peace court" (*mirovoi sud*). Originally intended for peasants and townspeople following the abolition of serfdom, it consisted of an elected justice of the peace who presided over civil

Kazakhs as the basis for judicial reform among Siberian peoples, producing an equally harmful outcome. "Popular law" was dismissed as "nothing other than the babble of foolish

men," denounced as self-interested the assertions made to justify the reform by "a privileged class of the Kazakh people." First, he argued that the campaign to solicit information from Kazakhs was "entirely flawed." "Indifference," "ignorance and incomprehension of their interests," and mistrust of the government had all contributed to taint responses to the committee's questions about Kazakh customs. Second, not all respondents agreed. The "popular law" wanted their "court of biys" to remain in its "ancient form," while "the office-holding, titled, and wealthy Kazakhs clamored for recognition as 'justices of the peace' or 'judicial officials.'" Although Russian officials on the investigating commission welcomed the elders' appeals for the "reform" of Kazakh law, Valikhanov rejected their responses to official queries as "base motives."⁴²

Valikhanov offered instead "statistical and historical facts" about Kazakh legal institutions with the aim of protecting the interests of the largest group of *inorodtsy* in the empire (numbering nearly eight hundred thousand as subjects and another two hundred thousand as vassals) who had not yet pledged allegiance to St. Petersburg). He contended that the "most ancient" court of biys "fully corresponds to the present [stage of] development of the Kazakh people." Despite forty years of Russian influence, Valikhanov noted, the court of biys had remained "as it was for hundreds, maybe for a thousand, years before the Kazakhs rarely complained about the decisions of these courts or appealed to Russian law, he claimed. The few cases involving complaints against the rulings of biys and resort to imperial courts had involved elites who were "stamped with popular disdain, completely immoral people, who hoped through Russian bureau-

suits and tried petty criminal cases on the basis of the imperial customary legal norm that he judged most appropriate. But Valikhanov composed a memorandum arguing for the retention of the Kazakh court of elders based on customary law, instead of a mixed court. Invoking John Stuart Mill, Valikhanov urged that in the pursuit of reform and advised attention to the study of "mental, moral, and political qualities" of the people to be reformed. "The conditions of the tribal organism, of environment, climate, soil should always be at the forefront," he insisted, "for all human documents and motives are conditioned by the combined influence of physical and social factors."³⁹

Recent European history had illustrated the perils of applying theories that ran contrary to the spirit of a people. Russian history had produced its negative models of this kind of reform: "It is without reason that our contemporary historians attribute all of our social ills and anomalies to the shattering and anti-national spirit of the Petrine reform." But Valikhanov dissociated himself from "narrow [theory] of nationality [*narodnost'*]" that celebrated particularism for its own sake. He argued instead that "the acquisition of European, universal enlightenment and the energetic struggle with obstacles that hinder attainment of this goal should form the end goal of every people capable of development and culture."⁴⁰

An avid student of ethnographic theory, Valikhanov was sensitive to the complex interdependence of culture and biology. He maintained that "culture can change the organism of a person for the better, like cultured nurturing improves the stock of domestic animals." "In order to make the Kazakhs capable of the apprehension of European ideas of change," Valikhanov advised, "one must first develop his skull and nervous system by means of education." Introduced in the Kazakh steppe in 1824, Speranskii's reforms had lacked such an understanding, according to Valikhanov. The most recent committee established in 1852 to solicit "popular opinion" from "dis-

crats to rectify by illegal means a case lost in a popular court.⁴³ Over, Valikhanov claimed, even Russian litigants and defendants preferred the court of biys to Russian judicial procedure; ten year alone, dozens of such cases had been handled in this manner in the district of Kokchetav.⁴⁴

He argued that the justice of the peace court proposed by reformers for the Kazakh steppe was not the equivalent of the court of biys as many officials (and some Kazakh elites) had alleged. Unlike the justices, biys were not elected or appointed by anyone and did not receive a fixed salary, meet official qualifications, or serve in a fixed jurisdiction for a set term. Rather, Kazakhs assumed the title *biy* on an informal basis.

The Kazakh scholar likened their authority to that of "poets, scholars, and lawyers" in Europe. There the people regarded Shakespeare and Goethe as great poets, basing their judgment on informal popular opinion, "not on the decrees of governments or on the formal elections of the people." A *biy* acted as a judge only when litigants freely turned to him because he enjoyed a "good reputation" (*khoroshee renommée*). The court of biys differed further from the projected justice of the peace court in that it convened only irregularly. In contrast to the new courts, Valikhanov noted, a *biy* offered an individual ruling only when litigants belonged to his clan (*rod*) and consented to this procedure. The main virtue of the court of biys was the "absence of formality and all official routine." Valikhanov contended that its informality precluded various kinds of "intrigue." Litigants were free to choose their own biys, without the burden of official elections that could be manipulated by clan allegiances and the greed of Russian officials. "Formalism and bureaucratic routine," he maintained, would bring only "stagnation" to a people for whom these strange laws were still ill-suited. Reform should instead correspond to the "material needs" and "national character" of the population whose improvement was at stake.⁴⁵

charged previous lawmakers with violating this principle in assigning Muslim mullahs the management of cases involving Kazakh marriage and divorce. In all but the district of Kokchetav, Valikhanov asserted, Kazakhs had responded to inquiries about customary law with the request that "cases about marriages and divorces, now under the charge of the mullahs, be returned as previously to the court of biys." He repeated his contention that the Kazakhs had been Muslim "in name alone" and had formed a "particular Sunni schism" (*itskii raskol*) in the Muhammadan world" before becoming subjects of the Russian empire. They had never accepted "Muslim law," which "were introduced to the steppe by government initiative."⁴⁶

Valikhanov expressed dismay at a policy of "affirming Islam, where it was not fully accepted by the people itself." He accused "the great reformer" of acting as the "apostle of Muhammad" in the Siberian steppe because he named mullahs and proposed the construction of mosques and Tatar schools. Marveling at how such a figure had become the "disseminator of such an ignorant and savage teaching," Valikhanov surmised that the only possible explanation lay in the fact that it had been unseemly in Speranskii's day to recognize as Russian subjects a people that had "no religion" or to acknowledge officially a group of "schismatics, even if Muslim." He lamented that Speranskii had judged support for their conversion to Christianity impolitic.

In the meantime, Valikhanov pointed out, the Orenburg frontier administration had begun to take measures to counter the "development of Islam" and had prohibited Tatars from acting as mullahs or residing there for extended periods of time. In Siberia, by contrast, local administration had perpetuated Speranskii's "protective system" in relation to Islam, thanks to which the religion had made "gigantic steps" among the Kazakhs of the region. He believed that "half-literate mullahs from among the Tatars and fanatic emigrants

from Central Asia, who present themselves as saints," had engaged in "our moral corruption" with the support of the government must know," Valikhanov warned, "what kind of people among the steppe occupy priestly offices, to whom is entrusted the moral state of the Kazakh people and [their] legal proceedings with respect to such a difficult social question as marriage." Inveighing again the Tatars who made up the majority of these mullahs ("swindlers without exception"), he condemned the "dark reign" of a "people ignorant in the highest degree, hardly able to read and write, but infected with dark fanaticism and savage superstition." Appealing to the authority of one of the most renowned Russian Orientalists of the midcentury, he noted that Professor Il'ia N. Berezin had shown through study of the Qur'an and the hadith, that "Islam and education are incompatible, even hostile notions, one supplanting the other." Valikhanov dismissed the possibility of a "reformation in Islam," a religion formed on the "wild barbaric prejudices of nomadic Arabs of the sixth century, the traditions of spiritualists, Yids [*zhidy*], and the assorted hocus-pocus of Persian magicians of the same period."⁴⁶

Worse than the Islam of Turks or Persians, he insisted, Tatar Islam was a form of "Puritanism." "Tatars reject poetry, history, mathematics, philosophy, and all natural sciences," Valikhanov alleged, "regarding them as temptations for the weak human mind, and confine themselves to Muslim scholastics and casuistry alone." From the Tatars, Kazakhs had learned to read books and poems written in the Tatar and Chagatay languages. In turn, this exposed the Kazakhs, Valikhanov speculated, to the teachings of Shamil, the formidable opponent of tsarist rule in the Caucasus, and other kinds of "fanatical chaos."⁴⁷

Valikhanov urged the government to turn from concern with prosecuting cattle and horse theft and "generally disciplining the Kazakh people" to their education and to the scrutiny of the mullahs and

as corrupting them. He also proposed another means of reforming Kazakh marital practices. To curb "the rude custom" of giving Kazakh girls in marriage from a very young age and without their consent, the government had assigned the regulation of marriage and divorce to the mullahs. He argued that this mistake be corrected and the practice reformed even without the mediation of Muslim clerics. The government could instead compel sultans and administrators to maintain "strict supervision," "under threat of responsibility," so that fathers did not marry off their daughters before a certain age and without their approval. He claimed that "police supervision and the spirit of the age" would be time to effect the desired changes and added that the large numbers of complaints and petitions about Kazakh marital disputes demonstrated that even "the Muslim shari'a was completely useless against the force of deeply rooted custom." In the interest of speeding the "harmful influence of any ultracircular direction on social development of peoples," and combating the mullahs and "fanaticism," Valikhanov concluded that the state should remove marriage from the control of Muslim authorities and, "in accordance with the people's demand, leave cases concerning marriage and divorce as before to the court of biys, all the more so since the Muhammadans marriage is not a sacrament."⁴⁸

Valikhanov's goal of preserving the sway of "custom" against the encroachment of Islamic law called for a departure from imperial practice. In each confessional community, the state had reinforced the power of ecclesiastical authorities over family affairs. Among the Kazakhs, however, local clan elders maintained that cases involving marriage and divorce should belong to the court of biys. In anticipation of a reorganization of law courts among the Cossacks and nobility of western Siberia, the administration of the governor-generalship had recruited Valikhanov to gauge opinion among local elites about possible reactions to the projected reforms. As their re-

mullahs, be returned to the court of biys." Clan-based notables Valikhanov in turning to the state to solicit assistance from the mullahs' challenge to the fragile authority of the biys. Appointed to distant tradition, they sought to reverse contemporary and check the power of the spokesmen for shari'a-based le-

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Legislation of October 1868 initiated the formal integration of the steppe into the administrative structure of the empire. Valikhanov's claims about the predominance of Kazakh law and the authority of biys in administering legal norms in and other disputes. But contradictory principles animated makers in composing this provisional statute for the military administration of the territory. On the one hand, the division of the steppe into four administrative regions—Ural'sk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk—and their further subdivision into districts, aimed at weakening the "clan principle" among the Kazakhs. As one Russian official and expert on Kazakh customary law observed, the legislation divided the population into townships and settlements "with the goal of separating Kazakh clans, because the unification of one large clan under the power of one clan chieftain was recognized as harmful in the political sense." On the other hand, the customary law said to be rooted in the same "clan principle" lay at the heart of the new policy orientation. The elders who interpreted and administered this law were to serve as adjuncts to imperial rule in their role as the guardians of all matters falling under the category of "civil affairs" as well as a large number of those belonging to "criminal law" in the tsarist system.⁵¹

The 1868 statute assigned marital and family affairs to the court of biys, where they would be adjudicated "according to popular customs," endorsing patriarchal customary law at the expense of the

plies reveal, Valikhanov's efforts did as much to shape as to the opinion that reached officials.

The Kazakh sultans and biys of the districts of Kokchetav, Akmolinsk, Atbasar, and Baian-Aul expressed the same demand for nearly identical language, as Valikhanov had articulated in earlier memoranda on the reform of Kazakh customary law courts. They voiced their desire "to preserve intact the customs of our ancestors which satisfy completely our kin-based way of life." They asked the government leave their "court of biys and assemblies, which have existed among us since time immemorial, in all their force. In the 'spirit of the new statute on the organization of courts and judicial proceedings,' however, these informants conceded that "some additions and changes" might be "useful." In each district, they insisted on the broadest jurisdiction for the judicial authority of biys and their application of "custom," though some deferred to the authority of imperial courts in judging many offenses enumerated in the tsarist criminal code.

Though advanced in the name of custom and a traditional "kin-based way of life," the informants' demands concerning marriage and divorce revealed widely varying practices. Elites in the district of Akmolinsk asserted that disputes involving marriage and divorce belonged to the court of biys, though they included the provision that licensed mullahs might participate in appeals. In Atbasar, by contrast, sultans and biys sought support for the displacement of mullahs and Islamic law altogether in language that betrays the imprint of their interviewer, Valikhanov: "Since marriage does not constitute a sacrament among us, but is a simple agreement, we ask then that disputes about marriage and divorce, now adjudicated by licensed mullahs, be left to the adjudication of biys according to [our] own steppe laws and customs." Respondents from Baian-Aul also requested that lawmakers intervene on their behalf. They requested that "disputes about marriage and divorce, which have been up to this time in the

pher, observed this "striving toward the shari'a" in many areas. Kazakhs such as the elder Umurbek of Aulieatinsk district told him that "we are slaves of the shari'a, [and] we do not stand up for adat." Others had adapted elements from tsarist law, adat, and the shari'a. Court registers examined by Grodekov listed rulings issued "according to adat," "according to full adat," "according to the shari'a," and for a particularly weighty judgment, simply "according to the law." He also reported the proliferation of mosques and the swearing of oaths at the graves of Muslim saints and elsewhere "according to the shari'a and the law." At the same time, he observed some variation and selectivity in Kazakh appropriation of Islamic law. A notable near Tashkent apparently made enemies when he demanded that his wife wear a veil and occupy a separate space in their dwelling. His opponents also criticized his ban on singing at his daughter's wedding. They accused him of taking this practice from Muslims (referred to here as "Sarts") in the neighboring city. Moreover, officials received more and more petitions from Kazakh communities to permit the introduction of Islamic law among them.⁵⁴

Tsarist authorities blamed Muslim missionaries. In the Volga and Urals regions, Church and state officials had already marked Muslim men of religion as potential subversives. In their minds, the recurring episodes of apostasy from the Orthodox faith reflected the work of the "Muhammadan clergy." Priests and police joined in condemning itinerant as well as licensed mullahs when convert communities coordinated mass renunciations of their baptismal rites (or those of their eighteenth-century ancestors) and declared allegiance to Islam.⁵⁵

Though St. Petersburg had long sent Tatar mullahs to the steppe as missionaries, spies, merchants, and intermediaries, local officials now viewed such figures as interlopers. Following Valikhanov, other Russophone informants offered scholarly evidence supporting frontier officials' assertions about the predatory activities of Tatar mul-

shari'a. Where marital disputes were concerned, the law instituted a unique mechanism of appeal that linked the practice of customary law to administrative authority. Like earlier legislation on other forms of customary law (as well as on the handling of Muslim inheritance disputes under the Orenburg Assembly), article 163 permitted the "side dissatisfied with the decision of the customary court" to turn with a complaint to the district chief, who then assumed the power to decide the case. Litigants who declined to accept this judgment could also present complaints to the governor. Appeals arising from marital and other disputes linked Kazakh custom to tsarist law. Ethnographers and administrators praised Kazakhs who turned to imperial law; and they lauded the influence of the general laws on customary law. Even so, the number of appeals never satisfied these officials.⁵⁷

In the last decades of the century, there emerged from various locales evidence that proponents of Islamic law were gaining ground in the struggle between shari'a and adat. The scholar Wilhelm Radloff found proof of this religious change in Kazakh songs. He termed the didactic songs that he collected "book songs" because Kazakh singers recited them from texts, whereas others were sung by heart. According to Radloff, the composers of these songs had been mullahs, and through these songs they had introduced Persian and Arabic words and grammatical constructions into the Kazakh language. Acting as the "messengers of Islam," these songs had spread the religion "like a slowly creeping poison." Through them, he charged, the small number of literate Kazakhs had become "alienated from the spirit of the people [*Volkgeist*]." The songs enjoined acceptance of the Prophet's message and emphasized ritual purity, the giving of alms, the centrality of prayer, recitation of the Qur'an, and the avoidance of sin in a world where humans were mere "guests."⁵⁸

In the late 1880s, N. I. Grodekov, an administrator and ethnogra-

lahs. The ethnographer Shakhimardan Miriasovich (Ivan Ivanovich) Ibragimov depicted itinerant mullahs from Kazan, as well as those from neighboring khanates, as exploiters of the credulous Kazakhs. The unlicensed "pretenders" had gained greater influence among them than the small numbers of official clerics permitted by the administration, Ibragimov suggested, because of their constant attentiveness to the ritual and other needs of the folk. He added that the Kazakhs had special regard for holy men whom they recognized as descendants of the Prophet, alongside sultans, as representatives of a hereditary elite.⁵⁶

Imperial authorities and ethnographers also singled out Sufi guides (ishans) as particularly harmful agents of exploitation and deception whose selfish interests made them political adversaries of the state. In 1867 provincial officials identified the village of Sterlibashevo in Ufa Province as a "Muhammadian center" and the home of a charismatic "saint" who attracted followers from among Bashkirs and Tatars as well as Kazakhs. The tsarist conquest of much of Transoxiana, which the Russians called Turkestan, brought with it a Trojan horse, "Muslim clericalism." "This merging of the Kazakhs, who have long been indifferent to any faith, with Bashkir and Tatar clergy is very harmful," warned one official, "especially if one considers that in the recently acquired region of Turkestan fanaticism is even more developed among the people than among the Bashkirs and Tatars." Peter Pozdnev, too, argued that the Sufi guides of the Naqshbandi brotherhood in Orenburg Province exerted a dangerous influence on the Bashkirs, Kazakhs, and Turkestanis. Emphasizing tensions between mystics and more worldly Muslims, he charged that ishans "excite fanaticism in the people not only against Russians and non-Muslims generally, but also against Muslim rulers and clergy, when they regard it necessary for their own interests." As examples he cited episodes in 1868 when "dervishes" had supposedly turned Kazakhs in the Orenburg region against the imperial state. In the

same year, he charged, they had discouraged Kazakhs in the district of Akmolinsk from accepting insignia distinguishing those assuming official posts.⁵⁷

Pozdnev also referred to evidence gathered by "experts" on Kazakh life in the governor-generalship of Turkestan (established in 1867), who characterized ishans as "parasites" who not only caused great harm to the Kazakhs in "the economic sense" but also had an impact that was "disadvantageous in all respects for the successes of civilization." In the official newspaper of Turkestan, G. A. Arendarenko presented an alarming picture of Sufi influence on Kazakh followers (*murids*).

The influence of ishans on their murids is reflected on the whole cast of life of the latter: they wear turbans, perform prayers conscientiously, strictly observe fasts, establish mosques together in nomad encampments, send their children to town religious schools, where in a decade they cram them full with all the nonsense of Muslim learning, [and] turn them into sanctimonious hypocrites, and thus the Kazakh people degenerates generation after generation as a result of this ruinously perverted upbringing.

In language often used to describe Tatars—and in the western provinces, Jews—Arendarenko also accused Sufis from Central Asian towns (referred to here by the ethnonym "Sart") of combining their missionary activities with a vile form of predatory self-interest. With their "typical greediness, with the insatiability characteristic in such proportions only of the nature of a Sart," Arendarenko charged, the Sufi Sart "squeezes everything from his victim, beginning with domestic [items], naturally, [ranging from] the best animals to comely Kazakh girls, whom ishans either take for themselves as wives or give to relatives as calmly as [they would give] a horse."⁵⁸

General N. A. Kryzhanovskii, the official entrusted with the Oren-

burg frontier region, reasoned that he could curb the "influence of the Muhammadan clergy on the Kazakhs" by removing them from the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Assembly, an institution that his other provincial officials regarded as a serious rival to their authority. Already in October 1852, Count Perovskii, the governor of Orenburg and Samara Provinces, had instructed the Assembly not to involve itself in Kazakh affairs. The statute of 1868 also reiterated Kryzhanovskii's insistence on shielding Kazakhs from its grasp.⁵⁸

But Kazakhs continued to appeal to Ufa for direction in religious matters. In 1866 Orenburg officials learned that Kazakhs still turned with marital disputes to the Assembly, which accepted their cases citing a provision of the *Digest of Laws* that established the right of each "tribe" or "people" to enter into marriage according to its own laws and customs without the interference of Church or state officials.⁶⁰ Moreover, in September 1869 Kryzhanovskii complained to the minister of internal affairs that official mullahs from various areas had been sending denunciations to the Orenburg Assembly about Kazakhs who refused to perform religious rites. Besides clerics who asked the Assembly to help them discipline the irreligious in their charge, nonclerics also petitioned for the intervention of the Assembly. These Kazakhs insisted on the mediation of their disputes by Islamic scholars on the basis of the shari'a.⁶¹

Tsarist authorities were forced to rely on threats prohibiting the mufti and officials in the Assembly from receiving such appeals or maintaining contact with the scholars and men of religion who served Kazakh communities. At the same time, critics of state policy argued that the advance of the shari'a at the expense of the ostensibly secular patriarchy of adat furnished evidence for the need to abolish the Orenburg Assembly. In 1884 the missionary and Oriental studies scholar Nikolai I. Il'minskii wrote to the procurator of the Holy Synod, Konstantin P. Pobedonostsev, to alert him to the danger that he saw in the Assembly as a "Muslim cultural center in Russia."

caused it to "unify and join" all the Muslims of the empire, he had cited recent German unification as a "model" for this kind of unity. Though Kazakhs had been removed from the jurisdiction of the Assembly, Il'minskii complained, "their heart is drawn to it by habit."⁶²

Missionaries such as Il'minskii continued to insist that Islam had only sunk roots among the nomads, though it was only in the 1880s that the Imperial Orthodox Missionary Society extended its network into the steppe. To their disappointment, missionaries entered competition from Tatars and other Muslim subjects from the Orthodox suspected of pursuing their own missionary agenda. Robert Geraci has demonstrated that missionaries even suspected the Kazakhs of making Muslims out of the Russian colonists and Cossacks whose isolated settlements lacked churches. Faulting Russian officials, one of these missionaries, Father Nikol'skii, pointed to an administrator who, donning Kazakh clothes, promoted the performance of Islamic rites, though Kazakhs were in fact "not fully Islamized." It was thus "a Russian Orthodox man," he complained, who "with a peaceful conscience, decides to teach the Kazakhs the correct fulfillment of religious, Muslim laws."⁶³

An Islamic Restoration

Steppe policy came under fire from another angle as well. Some observers argued that official assumptions about Kazakh indifference to religion had led authorities to neglect the possibility of religious change. Believing that customary law would perform the disciplinary functions that religion fulfilled elsewhere in the empire, officials had failed to erect an institutional apparatus for state control of steppe religion. Shakhimardan Ibragimov and other critics of Tatar mullahs and Turkestan holy men pointed out that, contrary to the stated aim of steppe policy, the scarcity of licensed mullahs had

made Kazakhs more reliant on itinerant prayer leaders whom the state could not monitor or control. Citing evidence from the district of Karakoralinsk, Ibragimov noted that state-approved religious leaders had taken to delegating ritual and other responsibilities to "private figures." This development in effect broke down the distinction, long esteemed by officials, between a "Muhammadan clergy" and a "laity." In turn, it had given rise to frequent complaints about marital disputes that ended up before tsarist authorities. Karakoralinsk officials complained that "illegal" marriages had proliferated. Performed without rites administered by the proper authority—and without the necessary registration in the official record—these unregulated marriages violated imperial law, as did unions between underage children or between older adults and young children. The court cases brought to light by Ibragimov suggested that the disputes that grew out of these arrangements sowed familial conflict and thus social discord and moral disorder in the steppe.⁶⁴

Accounts like Ibragimov's provoked yet another policy shift. Lawmakers were forced to rethink their strategy of leaving Kazakh religion without hierarchical regulation. This reorientation brought steppe administration closer in line with the imperial practice of establishing hierarchical institutions in each confessional community in the empire. Indeed, in 1872 the tsarist state had created official Islamic hierarchies for the Sunnis and Shi'ites of Transcaucasia; and their efforts to form similar regulatory bodies in the Northern Caucasus continued.⁶⁵ At the same time, tsarist expansion deeper into Central Asia and the establishment of the governor-generalship of Turkestan brought several million more Muslims under tsarist rule and intensified official misgivings about the Islamic contamination of the steppe from this new territory.

Following the introduction of a new statute on the organization of Turkestan in 1886, the steppe nomads came under separate jurisdictions, including two governor-generalships, the Orenburg region,

and western Siberia. Comparison of the state of "the religious affairs of the natives" in each territory revealed widely varying approaches to Kazakh religion.⁶⁶ Reasserting the prohibition against the involvement of the Orenburg Assembly, a commission of Akmolinsk and Omsk officials proposed to make local authorities arbiters of appointments to, and removals from, officially regulated clerical posts. Echoing Ibragimov, they maintained that

supervision of the activity of mullahs officially confirmed in their own posts, and thus acting freely and openly, is much more convenient than supervision of the activity of persons not officially authorized for this and thus operating under the cover of secrecy and under the protection of figures who turn to them.⁶⁷

The proposal permitted Kazakh communities to elect only one mullah per district, a unit encompassing several thousand tents stretching over hundreds of square kilometers. It also imposed numerous constraints on these candidates. Mullahs had to be chosen exclusively from among "Kazakhs, [who are] Russian subjects" and who had not been tried in court or placed under investigation. Moreover, the plan afforded imperial officials, from the local district chief to the governor, broad, though ill-defined, discretionary powers in confirming or rejecting appointments. Mullahs were not to enjoy any special privileges, such as a state salary or exemption from taxation, and communities that chose to assume their mullahs' obligations required the permission of the regional administration to do so. Governors also assumed the authority to make the construction of mosques, the establishment of religious schools, and monetary contributions to these institutions contingent upon their approval.

Clerical supervision of marriage stood out as an area of special concern. The commission of Akmolinsk and Omsk officials objected to inconsistencies in imperial law that in some locales left mullahs

in charge of Kazakh marriages, including the keeping of official registers. They proposed that oversight of Kazakh marriages be transferred, along with record keeping, to Russian officials, citing a similar policy for Old Believers, dissidents from the Orthodox Church, as a precedent. Commissioners saw this measure as a necessary step toward the introduction of order to Kazakh marriage, but they noted that these goals did not include a defense of the indissolubility of Kazakh marriage. In their view, Kazakhs based the institution of marriage on coercion and violence rather than the consent of the bride, and this the commissioners condemned. Their aim, they noted, was "the protection of the woman in the Kazakh family" from her male relatives.⁶⁸

Disregard for the woman's consent was the chief fault of Kazakh marriage, according to this commission. It concluded that "the majority of Kazakhs regard their own daughters and widows as valuable goods and trade them." Kazakhs did not acknowledge "that the law offers her the right of free choice of a husband."⁶⁹ The commission explained that Kazakh women rarely complained about their lot, though some took their cases to the customary law court. At the woman's insistence, these cases sometimes ended up before a Russian official, the district chief, who would then abrogate this type of marriage on the grounds that it had not been recorded in the official register.

Complaining that mullahs colluded in the practice of dismissing the rights of Kazakh women, and that this violated Islamic law, the commission backed officials who sought to compel mullahs to perform marriages only in cases where the bride offered her consent and witnesses certified to this. It also supported the demands voiced earlier by a number of elders in Valikhanov's survey of legal practices and institutions by severely curtailing the role of mullahs in administering marital affairs. In place of the mullahs, elders and township

administrators were to maintain registers of births, marriages, and deaths.⁷⁰

Despite the mediating role of Kazakh elders, the commission proposed provisions to make Kazakh marriage practices conform in a number of key points to imperial marriage law (based in its fundamentals on Orthodox canon law). The draft prohibited elders from concluding marital agreements on behalf of males younger than eighteen and females younger than sixteen, or in cases where both parties had not offered their consent, or when parents or others had attempted to coerce the bride and bridegroom. Finally, elders were obliged to confirm that a legal divorce or the death of a first husband had made previously married women eligible for remarriage. In the eyes of the commission, such marriages would take effect only when the necessary witnesses and participants had signed the agreement before the elder.

The proposal added that the marrying parties were permitted, if they so desired, to turn to a local mullah or other Kazakhs "for the reading of a prayer." Russian officials did not view this rite as obligatory, noting that "in and of itself [it] has no meaning for recognition of the legality of the marriage." The commission also threatened any non-Kazakhs who performed religious rites at marriages or any other occasions with criminal persecution for "the assumption of power not belonging to oneself." As with marriage, Kazakh divorce would belong to the realm of customary—not Islamic—law.⁷¹

Lawmakers remained divided on the role of the state, however. In 1887 a steppe administrator named Egorov elaborated on the recommendations made by Ibragimov and the commission of regional officials. He claimed that the Russian government had always maintained "the principles of religious toleration, to which the successful spread of Russian rule in Asia owed [so] much." Egorov's memorandum of 1887 identified "two main systems" in policy toward the reli-

gious affairs of inorodtsy. The first had prevailed in the European provinces, Siberia, and the Caucasus. According to this scheme, the government had assumed responsibility for naming and confirming "ecclesiastical figures" and for determining their rights, obligations, authority, and jurisdiction. In the second system, which the government had improvised more recently for the new imperial possession of Turkestan, the state had regarded the religious matters of inorodtsy as "their private relations." It did not confer upon the "clergy any official significance" or assign them any rights or duties.

Criticism of the "first system," the policies in place in territories integrated into the empire in earlier periods, shaped the drafting of a new statute for the steppe under the conservative Alexander III (r. 1881-1894). Its authors had come to regard Islam as a generic foe of state interests. In lending the Muslim "clergy" an "official character," the government had enabled "the strengthening and intensification among the inorodtsy of dogmas tolerated in the Empire, among which Muhammadanism by its essence has an anti-state and hostile character in a Christian land."⁷³

The influence of an official clergy had been particularly "unfavorable" on the Kazakhs, who had adopted only the few "Muhammadan rites and views" that did not conflict with "the immemorial customs of the Kazakh people, representing the product of its tribal, clan, and historical life." Immune to "fanaticism," they remained Muslims only "superficially and in name." The Kazakhs had no indigenous clergy, this memorandum asserted, and the state need not supply them with one, given that "any literate Kazakh" might bear the title *mullah* and recite the prayers that made up "almost all of the religious ritual among them." Egorov concluded that the appointment of official mullahs in the steppe would only strengthen Islam there and thus be "harmful for state interests."⁷⁴

Unlike bureaucrats in Kazan, Samara, Orenburg, Ufa, Astrakhan, and elsewhere who had to contend with a century-old official Is-

hierarchy, steppe authorities made use of the broader latitude for their disposal to devise new institutions and policies. Critics seized upon the institutionalization of Islam as the single greatest obstacle to the "Russification" of the steppe and the "removal [from it] of Muslim foundations." They claimed that only Islam stood in the way of transformation promised by colonization and the closer integration of the steppe and its population into the administrative and cultural life of the empire.

With the gradual penetration into the steppe of Russian settlements and the growth of the Russian population, under the influence of Russian administration, courts, trade, and industry, and with the spread of Russian schools and especially with the introduction of military service, the Kazakhs should without doubt, in time, become Russian, become imbued with Russian views and understandings, [and] turn in large part to a settled way of life and Christianity.⁷⁵

The memorandum recommended that proposed legislation forego any regulation of Kazakh religious affairs, using as a model the 1867 statute for the Turkestan governor-generalship, which denied Kazakh mullahs any "official significance."

Contrary to the recommendations of this last memorandum, the statute that became law in 1891 made appointments of Muslim clerical figures on a uniform basis. The statute on the administration of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semireche, Ural'sk, and Turgai reaffirmed the policy that limited inhabitants there to one mullah (chosen from among this same population) per township unit, a territory drawn to enclose between one and two thousand tents (*kibitki*). As Kazakh critics pointed out, this policy often permitted only one mullah for a territory the size of France. Communities

required permission from the governors to construct mosques whose upkeep only consenting members of the community made responsible. Such support would have to come without aid of Muslim endowments, because the statute prohibited these territories.⁷⁶

The government thereby reasserted a measure of state supervision by making mullahs subject to the approval of local governors. However, the approach expounded in the internal memorandum of 1890 still had a meaningful, if indirect, impact. Its formulation of a problem of religious toleration accorded with the outlook of tsarist officials in the steppe governor-generalship: the local administration should deal with the religious affairs of "Asiatic inorodtsy" not in the form of law, but by means of administrative orders, not to be openly promulgated in the manner established for laws.⁷⁷ Secret orders were necessary, it explained, "because any restrictions on religious freedom and constraints on the clergy may easily be understood and interpreted as the persecution of Islam and religious intolerance which [would be] awkward for our influence in neighboring Muslim countries of eastern and southern Asia."⁷⁷

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, stealthy "administrative orders" played an increasingly important role. They became the primary means for closing mosques and Islamic schools and for taking clerics under police surveillance and arrest. Governors and local police claimed to leave intact the narrow legal basis for toleration, but they simultaneously used the cover of administrative fiat to restrict the practice of Islam without openly undermining the geopolitical goals that they associated with toleration.

Officials shifted toward a policy of close regulation and surveillance of a small number of state-approved mullahs among the Kazakhs in the 1890s, but debates continued about the relative weight of custom and religion. In 1890 the official *Kazakh Steppe Paper* ran an editorial that asked, "Is the court of elders necessary for the

tribe?" The editorial answered in the affirmative, maintaining that the resolution of disputes before "a court of biys and senior elders" was a natural extension of Kazakh domestic life, where "all cases, insults, fights, and other squabbles" were resolved by reference to this institution. "Each biy and elder regards it as a sacred duty at the hearing of a case to render the litigants completely impartial justice," it argued. The editorial contrasted the calm and order of the court of biys to the raucous procedure of "our lowest police instances," which the Kazakhs regarded as "wild" and "feared like fire," and argued that only this type of court was "thinkable" under such conditions, instructing its readers to "rejoice, that the Kazakhs are attached to their own popular customs to such an extent that for the adjudication and resolution of affairs they resort to them, and not to the shari'a." The editorial offered the optimistic assertion that members of the horde turned to the mullah and the shari'a only in cases involving inheritance and divorce, whereas they brought all other disputes and suits before "distinguished figures" who adjudicated these cases "according to popular customs."⁷⁸

Other Russian observers rejected this portrait of the vitality of customary justice among the Kazakhs. In 1892 an expert on Muslim legal affairs who had worked a number of years in administration in the Caucasus pleaded in the *Journal of Civil and Criminal Law* against officials' tendency "to idealize the patriarchal charm of the customary court." N. A. Dingel'shtedt maintained that the "privilege" of living "according to adat" had left "the people and the Kazakhs in particular dissatisfied with their own court." Since 1867, he argued, the people had found neither impartial justice nor anything "customary" in these courts. In place of "ancient adat," Kazakhs confronted "some kind of mixture, where there are fragments of both the shari'a and Russian laws, but [where] the main element is represented by arbitrariness."⁷⁹

Dingel'shtedt departed from received opinion among officials in

the steppe and Turkestan governor-generalships when he declared that the "customary court had had its day" and that the courts of justice of the peace should at last replace it. Dingel'shtedt was among the few Russian authorities who viewed the period since the establishment of tsarist administration as a time of uncertainty and discord in which novel conflicts troubled Kazakh communities. Many Kazakhs had adapted to new forms of sedentary life, while regulations and administrative practice had unwittingly transformed their courts, which were now "customary in name alone." Where Kazakhs once invited a *biy* to resolve disputes among them, elections introduced by tsarist legislation produced "government *biys* confirmed by the governor and decorated with a special badge." Dingel'shtedt portrayed this change as "an almost total betrayal of custom." Much more important, he maintained, it had caused "the decline of justice," so that "several million people dream with melancholy of finding not so much the lost *adat* as a fair court and justice."⁸⁰

By the end of the nineteenth century, growing numbers of Kazakhs sought permission to opt out of the "customary" justice criticized by Dingel'shtedt. Rejecting a form of customary law in which Russian bureaucrats played a dominant role, these demands also centered on changes in tsarist policy toward religion. Numerous Kazakhs called for a separate institution headed by a mufti in the steppe from at least 1888, when discussion of projected changes to the statute on the administration of the steppe regions provoked debate both within and outside the bureaucracy.

Petitioners calling themselves the "Ural and Orenburg Elders" demanded the right to apply a uniform and systematic Islamic law under a muftiate. These Kazakh elders imagined this institution explicitly as a guardian of the *shari'a*. It would also perform some functions related to ecclesiastical control, but its chief task would be to combat the reign of "custom" where it conflicted with the *shari'a*. The elders

led their request by appealing to immemorial tradition. "For we, the Kazakh people of the Muhammadan faith," their petition explained, "had made use of the decisions of muftis and kadis whose khanates in whose vicinity we lived."⁸¹ They had turned to Islamic jurists and judges of Tashkent, Turkestan, Samarkand, and Khiva for the resolution of religious questions. After the Kazakhs "became subjects of His Imperial Majesty," they no longer had a mufti of their own, though they had expected the regime to provide them with one. The absence of an Islamic jurisconsult had resulted in "defects in our *shari'a* matters." Though the temporary statute had permitted the selection of official mullahs for each administrative township, the petition complained, these mullahs "do not merit the appointment" because their educational preparation had not been certified by a mufti.

But it was the anarchic state of marriage and the family that chiefly concerned these petitioners. Widows used the permission of state authorities to remarry without regard for the waiting period established by Islamic law. Women had also been turning to these officials to receive divorce papers "without any inquiries on the basis of the *shari'a*." Similarly, they charged, individual family members were inserting officials in the middle of inheritance cases in order to secure sanction for the denial of inheritance shares to their brothers. The elders also challenged practices long defended by many Kazakhs and others as central to immemorial custom: they castigated the continuation of a controversial practice (often criticized in Russian official and public circles) whereby relatives compelled a widow to remarry into the family of her deceased husband and give up control of the inheritance left to her and her children.⁸²

Their religious affairs suffered, the elders pointed out, because the decisions of the licensed mullah in each township had "no power, due to the mullah's lack of rights." The temporary statute had weakened "the power of his decisions," referred to here as "fatwas," by al-

lowing cases to be transferred to a civil jurisdiction in the event both litigants remained dissatisfied with the handling of their case according to the shari'a. Meanwhile, biys decided cases contrary to the shari'a, even though, their petition conceded, "cases decided custom, but needing adjudication according to the shari'a, should be decided in agreement with the spirit of the one and the other." To solve these difficulties, the petitioners called for a "single, learned person empowered to resolve controversies of every kind among our mullahs and to interpret the meaning of the shari'a," citing the examples of the early Islamic community, when the Prophet adjudicated all disputes among his followers, and of Abu Hanifa, the founder of the eponymous school of legal interpretation to which most Muslims of the empire belonged. Finally, the Ural and Orenburg Elders tried to support their case for their own muftiate by demonstrating that the condition of Islam among the Kazakhs had much improved. They enjoyed the services of "quite good mullahs, mardasas, [and] mosques," their children studied, and worthy ishans led followers in the Sufi path, "so that the fulfillment of religious rites is much better than before." "Charity and good works" on behalf of the poor deserved a place among this people as among others.⁸³

Officials dismissed this and similar demands from Kazakh notables for a steppe muftiate. As police resorted to administrative measures to close Kazakh mosques and arrest clerics, Kazakhs issued more frequent demands for a reevaluation of their legal status and mobilized petition campaigns in defense of mosques and mardasas. In the early twentieth century, Kazakhs pointed to assaults on laws guaranteeing "freedom of religion" as a violation of their "rights." In addition to the encroachment of Slavic settlers on their grazing lands, restrictions on Kazakh access to clerics and Islamic education increased tensions in the steppe.

andoning its search for allies among steppe Muslims in the mid 1860s, the state had departed from established practice in territory under the Orenburg Assembly, in the Crimea, and, 1872, in Transcaucasia. At the same time, this new direction of practice more in tune with new policies in the Northern Caucasus and with nearly contemporary European strategies, such as those of the French toward the Kabyle in North Africa and of the British toward the Punjabis in British India. Like the Russians in the Northern Caucasus, the French and British tried, without success, to reinforce the secular custom of the tribe with the goal of supplanting—and guarding against—Islamic law. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russians, too, were affected by changing European ideas about the incompatibility of Islam with what contemporaries understood to be progress and civilization. Tsarist administrators came to see that state reliance on Islam, coupled with a new objective in the steppe—the cultural assimilation of the Kazakhs, their transformation into Russian speakers and Orthodox Christians.

Steppe officials were partially constrained by the basic principles of religious toleration in the tsarist law code. As even the opponents of Kazakh mosques and Islamic schools admitted, the toleration of Islam (albeit limited) in the steppe remained a useful means to influence opinion in neighboring Islamic lands that might, with time, be persuaded to submit to the empire with the promise of protection for the Muslim faith. Moreover, officials remained bound to the practice of affirming orthodox Islam outside of the steppe. Steppe authorities denied Kazakhs full toleration as Muslims because their religion did not appear to correspond to the normative definition of Islam as these bureaucrats knew it: pastoralists could not be true Muslims because they lacked mosques and a clergy like Muslims in Kazan or Istanbul.

Through each of these policy shifts, official thinking remained

flexible. When evidence emerged of growing Kazakh attachment to the shari'a, recourse to itinerant mullahs, and potential unrest to restrictions on mullahs and Islamic law, the state fell back on an improvised policy of regulating Muslim institutions, though the use of clandestine administrative tools. By the end of the nineteenth century, steppe police found themselves once again involved in monitoring appointments to mosques and schools and even in adjudicating disputes among Muslim Kazakhs.⁶⁴ Although these arrangements restored some continuity to tsarist policy toward Islam, they failed to achieve close ties to local communities like authorities had forged in other Muslim regions of the empire. Such measures weakened the ability of the regime to police the Kazakhs and direct the course of colonization there. In Kazakh communities that had only a single mullah, children could not study the fundamentals of religion, and the shari'a did not govern the Muslim family. There the state planted shallow roots, scattering seeds of volatility on the horizon.

CIVILIZING TURKESTAN

In mid-June 1865 the residents of the oasis city of Tashkent received alarming news about the approach of foreign troops. According to Muhammad Salih, an eyewitness in the town, the "Nazarenes" appeared suddenly from the north, unleashing fire on the city walls and causing panic among its hundred thousand inhabitants. As the Russian troops lay siege, in each quarter of the city the men of influence—the elders, religious scholars, and well-born notables—gathered at the mosques and other public places to decide how to respond to the unexpected arrival of the Christian forces. Salih, a religious scholar and historian, recalled that Russian envoys soon appeared on the scene as well. They initiated contact to negotiate the surrender of this trading and artisanal center, the largest city in Transoxiana.

The Russian commander, General Mikhail G. Cherniaev, quickly concluded separate treaties with the elites of each quarter. Agreements with the religious scholars followed. These treaties stipulated that as a condition of the submission of the city the new rulers would ensure that the people remained steadfast in religion. To safeguard

ISLAMIC HISTORY
AND CIVILIZATION

STUDIES AND TEXTS

EDITED BY

WADAD KADI

VOLUME 35



MUSLIM RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS IN
IMPERIAL RUSSIA

*The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the
Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780-1910*

BY

ALLEN J. FRANK



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PREFACE

Work on this book began in Kazan in September of 1994, when Devin DeWeese, with whom I was traveling on a project to visit and document Muslim shrines in the Volga-Ural region, came upon the title *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* in the card catalog of Kazan University's Islamic manuscript collection. Hoping it could be a hagiographical source, Professor DeWeese ordered the manuscript, and brought it to my attention. Following a brief scan of the unusually large work, it soon became clear to us that the work was actually a major regional history. Mirkasym Usmanov and Javdat Minullin kindly arranged to make a microfiche copy of the manuscript for us, which Professor DeWeese brought back to the Central Asian Archives of the Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies at Indiana University.

After returning to Takoma Park, I was able to examine the microfiche copy more carefully, and came to the realization that this work was that rare source that was voluminous, but at the same time, in which every sentence seemed to contain citable information. Moreover, the manuscript turned out to have never been cited in any published work. It was that rarest of sources that seemed to perfectly meet one historian's tastes, interests, and intuition so fully that it seems could have been written expressly for him.


A number of friends have helped shape the writing in this book in different ways. My teacher Devin DeWeese not only brought the manuscript to my attention, but he also has helped shape my understanding of Inner Asian Islam over the years. Virginia Martin, Christian Noack, Willard Sunderland, Dilyara Usmanova, and Paul Werth were of tremendous help in obtaining copies of essential published sources in the libraries of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kazan, and Almaty.

I am quite indebted to Michael Kemper, who patiently read several drafts, and who provided invaluable helpful suggestions both in editing my translations and in the overall writing and direction of the book. In addition, his theories on "Islamic Discourse" in the Volga-Ural region underlie much of my approach in the book. As always, I am especially grateful to my wife Faye-Ann for her support and patience.

INTRODUCTION

The century and a half, from 1767 to 1917, was a period of rapid and sustained growth for the Muslim institutions of Inner Russia and Siberia, a vast region encompassing the Middle and Lower Volga Valleys, the southern Urals, western Siberia, and the northern reaches of the Kazakh steppe. This region's Muslim population was Turkic-speaking. Although their modern descendants mainly divide themselves between the Tatar, Bashkir and Kazakh "nations," during the imperial period these communities divided themselves not along "ethnic" lines, but rather chiefly along corporate, tribal, and above all, religious lines. The rapid growth in the region's Islamic institutions, namely mosques, *madrasas* and *maktabs*, and the *'ulamā*, was the result of a constellation of circumstances, including the formal recognition of Islamic institutions by the Imperial Russian government during the reign of Empress Catherine II, and the growth of a dynamic Muslim commercial, and later industrial, bourgeoisie. While the importance of the imperial authorities, and imperial laws, in bringing about the blossoming of Muslim institutions was undeniable, the imperial role was perhaps most prominent in framing in general terms the Muslims' own specifically Islamic view of their community and its institutions. These sorts of discussions, touching upon social, religious, and political issues affecting the Muslim communities at large, have been termed "Islamic Discourse." The German scholar Michael Kemper has explored and described the Volga-Ural region's "Islamic Discourse" from the end of the eighteenth century, with the establishment of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, down to the end of the nineteenth century.¹ In Kemper's monograph the term "Islamic Discourse" has a restricted meaning. Kemper bases the definition of the term on the works of Reinhard Schulze, and in this context it implies the debates and discussions of social, political and religious issues expressed through traditional Islamic literary genres and institutions, such as Sufism and Sufi treatises, theology, law, and historiography. Kemper uses the term "Islamic" in

¹ Michael Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte in Tatarien und Baschkirien, 1789–1889: Der islamische Diskurs unter russischer Herrschaft*, (Berlin, 1998).



a stricter, more useful sense, signifying the cultural idiom of Islamic culture as a whole, to which the Volga-Ural *‘ulamā* were trained in, and consciously made reference to. In this context, “Islamic” is not simply a synonym for Muslim, rather it is a reference to a shared body of traditions and canons and genres common to the Islamic world as a whole.

Kemper’s study demonstrates well the intellectual autonomy of these Muslim scholars, whose debates took place within a firmly Islamic context, and who relied on a common Islamic frame of reference and canon to hone and transmit their ideas, and to challenge and critique their colleagues. This autonomy, which modernist scholars mistakenly characterize as “isolation,” has perhaps contributed substantially to the neglect among twentieth-century scholars of Islamic ideas in the intellectual history of Volga-Ural Muslims.

The foundation of Islamic discourse, and of these communities’ very identity as Muslims, was local Islamic institutions. In imperial Russia virtually none of these institutions were funded by the state, either at the imperial, provincial, or even local level. Rather, Muslim religious institutions were virtually always funded by private funds, usually at the village level, and by the congregations themselves. All but the smallest and poorest villages had their own mosque, or multiple mosques, their own schools, and their own *‘alims*. In this sense, these institutions were universal features of Islamic life in Imperial Russia. The following figures testify to the breadth of Islamic institutions in Russia at that time. According to published official statistics, in 1883 the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, the main imperial oversight establishment for the Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia, had 4,093 mosques, 7,341 *‘alims*, and 2.14 million Muslims under its authority.²

Scholars have tended to take these local institutions for granted, in part because these institutions were so universal, they were understood to be “standard equipment” for any Muslim society. Since their existence was something that could be assumed without explicit statement, many studies have treated these institutions in the most general terms. However, for the communities in question, which were overwhelmingly rural and economically hard-pressed under the best conditions, the institutions were never taken for granted. For these

² *Al’faiznye spiska armiano-grigorianiskikh tserkvoi i magometanskikh mechetei v imperii*, (Moscow, 1883).

communities, the dividends that these mosques, schools, and *‘ulamā* afforded was nothing less than Islamic status; in effect, it was these institutions that made them Muslims, especially in the conditions of Imperial Russia, where Muslim communities were often scattered among larger non-Muslim populations, and where simple profession of Islam, as in the case of the “Baptized Tatars” did not necessarily grant a community official Islamic status in the eyes of the state.³

The aim of this study is to explore both the material and human aspects of these institutions at the village level and, in broader terms, to gauge their significance to the Muslim communities that supported them and discover what patterns emerge from the sources. The scope of available sources for Islamic institutions in imperial Russia are only beginning to be uncovered. These include, to be sure, Russian archival sources, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, within the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, increasing numbers of studies of local history, in which the authors touch upon local Islamic institutions. However, the richest and most detailed sources are without doubt local histories produced within these Muslim communities themselves before 1917.

This study is based primarily on a single manuscript history, the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā*, written in 1910 by Muḥammad-Fāṭih b. Ayyūb al-Īlmīnī and assisted by his son Muḥammad, both *imāms* in the village of Ilmin (officially Verkhazevka), a Tatar village in Osinov Gai township (*volost’*), in Samara province’s Novouzensk district (*uezd*). The author’s prime focus is the four Tatar villages of Osinov Gai township, of which there were four large villages comprising in 1910 nineteen mosques. However, al-Īlmīnī does not limit his inquiry to Osinov Gai township; rather, he takes as the geographic limits of his history the valleys of the region’s largest rivers, the parallel-flowing Malyi Uzen’ and Bol’shoi Uzen’, from their headwaters in the Obshchii Syrt uplands to their mouths in the Kamysh-Samar Lakes located in the Kazakh steppe. As a result, the history discusses not only the

³ Baptized Tatars were the descendants of Muslims who were converted to Orthodox Christianity in the first half of the eighteenth century, and who were officially Christian, but in effect were crypto-Muslims throughout the nineteenth century, and until 1905, when the Russian state lifted laws forbidding apostasy; on this group, cf. Paul W. Werth, “The Limits of Ascription: Baptized Tatars and the Revision of ‘Apostasy,’ 1840’s–1905,” *The Russian Review* 59 (2000), 1–19; cf. also Paul W. Werth, *Subjects for Empire: Orthodox Mission and Imperial Governance in the Volga-Kama Region*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1996.

Islamic institutions of Osinov Gai township, but also includes the other Muslim communities along these rivers, located in the trading centers of Novouzensk and Aleksandrov Gai in Novouzensk district, in the lands of the Ural Cossack Host, and in the Talovka and Kamysh-Samar districts of the Kazakh Inner Horde.

We are fortunate that the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* has come down to us, not only because it is in its own right one of the finest examples of the region's Islamic historiography, but because al-Īlmīnī conceived of it as an *exhaustive* history, both in its geographic and chronological limits. Novouzensk district was located deep in the steppe and was colonized rather late. The first two Muslim villages in Osinov Gai township were founded in 1780 and 1800 respectively, and the last two were both founded in 1841. As a result, the roughly 110-year history of Islamic culture in this district was largely within the mnemonic reach of the elder al-Īlmīnī (born ca. 1843) and his elders who served as his sources. Thus, the author is able to furnish us with for the most part detailed accounts of each of the district's nineteen mosques and *mahallas*, and detailed biographical sketches of over 65 local *imāms* and 35 *mu'adhdhins*. As we shall subsequently see, the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* provides us with an understanding of the functioning and role of Islamic institutions in a number of nearby villages in a manner unparalleled in other sources. It allows us to see how mosques and *madrasas* were built, how money was raised for their construction, how *imāms* and *mu'adhdhins* were chosen, dismissed and occasionally disgraced, what their origins were and how they were connected to their congregations, how they were supported, what roles they played in the community, and what the community expected of them. It lets us see how education was administered and funded, and above all it reveals to us the small, but nevertheless crucial, details of the humble, yet vital and vibrant, local Islamic institutions that had developed at the village level over several centuries of Russian rule. In addition, the authors' scrutiny goes beyond their own communities to the various Muslim communities on the steppe, the Kazakhs, Bashkirs, and Muslim Cossacks, and the interactions between these related, yet exclusive Muslim communities.

Nevertheless, while this study will focus on the institutions of Novouzensk district and the Kazakh Inner Horde, these regions will be examined within the broader imperial context, comparing al-Īlmīnī's information with other published studies to provide us with a clearer picture of the various aspects of Russia's Islamic institutions.

A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY ON MUSLIM RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE VOLGA-URAL REGION

A major reason for the general lack of attention in most previous studies given to Islamic institutions has been the prominence of modernist and nationalist ideas in underpinning previous approaches to the history of Volga-Ural Muslims. In Soviet and nationalist works, as well as in the works of Western specialists who have accepted the Soviet and nationalist interpretations uncritically, the dominant theme has been how Russia's Muslims "modernized" their societies by adopting forms of discourse adapted from western models (i.e. ethnic nationalism, national identity, class consciousness) and adopting western institutions (i.e. European-style education, secular political leaders, etc.). These processes are commonly referred to by the generic term "reformism" and by the cliché "national awakening."

Whether stated by these historians or not, the other side of the coin involves the discarding of equivalent traditional modes of discourse and institutions, which for Volga-Ural Muslims were Islamic. Thus, for scholars whose conceptual framework for these communities is so firmly rooted in Eurocentric modernist values and convictions, their assumption has been that by the beginning of the twentieth century, Islamic institutions and Islamic discourse, which they were ill-equipped or unwilling to understand, had become "reactionary" or "backward." In this context, the main theme was how these institutions had become irrelevant, or even harmful, to Muslim society, and how the modernist ideas displaced them. According to such a conception of history, the old institutions quietly disappeared, and as a result, required no further comment. However, whatever forms the internal debate within Volga-Ural Muslim society may have taken, ultimately it was not decided internally. The decisive event was the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War. To say that the Bolsheviks were committed to secularization is an understatement, and the Bolshevik leadership, together with Tatar Bolsheviks such as Mirsaid Sultangaliev, were committed to turning Volga-Ural Muslims into Tatar and Bashkir *nations* and were bent on uprooting the Islamic institutions that had developed in the imperial Russian period.⁴

⁴ An obvious example of this is the anti-religious treatise by the Tatar Communist Mirsaid Sultangaliev instructing communists how to conduct anti-religious propaganda among Volga-Ural Muslim peasants; cf. Alexandre Bennigsen, *Les mouvements*

Although the exigencies of the Civil War and the economic problems of the 1920's delayed the Soviet assault on Russia's Islamic institutions, the onset of collectivization and cultural revolution resulted in a full-scale assault on the institutions. Not only were thousands of mosques closed, but all Islamic education was banned, all *madrasas* were closed, tens of thousands of Islamic books and manuscripts were burned. Most decisively, perhaps thirty thousand members of the *'ulamā* were executed or exiled to labor camps in Siberia.⁵ By the late 1930's this dynamic Islamic culture had for all intents and purposes ceased to exist, as had the jadids and most of the Tatar Bolsheviks such as Sultangaliev, who found themselves victims of the very policies they had applied to their ethnic kinsmen.⁶

Nationalist, not to mention Soviet, historians, have been uniformly silent about the fate of the *'ulamā* under the Soviets, although they have consistently drawn their readers' attention to the repression of modernists and nationalist figures, with special emphasis on Tatar communists such as Sultangaliev.⁷ The reason for this silence, culminated or not, in all likelihood is that the assumption among both nationalist and Soviet historians has been that by 1917 the Islamic institutions and the *'ulamā* of the Volga-Ural region had simply withered away before the progressive and peaceful advance of modernism and nationalism on the one hand, or proletarian class consciousness on the other. This unspoken assumption has been a useful one in that it has freed these historians from addressing the question of how widely nationalist and modernist ideas actually were accepted among Volga-Ural Muslims before 1917.⁸ Since the *'ulamā* in Russia had

nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie: le 'Sultangalievisme' au Tatarstan, (Paris, 1960), 106–107.

⁵ A relatively complete account of the shutting down of mosques in Chuvashia has been published by L. Braslavskii; cf. L. Ju. Braslavskii, *Islam v Chuvashii*, (Cheboksary, 1997), 109–145.

⁶ A. A. Alov and N. G. Vladimirov, *Islam v Rossii*, (Moscow, 1996), 60–62.

⁷ To be sure, since the collapse of the Soviet Union some discussions of the elimination of the *'ulamā* have occasionally appeared in scholarly, and especially in popular works in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, although it remains to be the topic of a systematic historical inquiry.

⁸ In both Soviet and nationalist treatments the opponents of jadidism are generically referred to as “qadimists”. Qadimists are typically treated as reactionary supporters of tsarism, and the understanding is that without the support of the tsarist system, “qadimism” in 1917 simply went the way of the Romanov dynasty and the rest of the tsarist system; for a more informed treatment of the jadidist-qadimist polemic cf. Stéphane Dudoignon, “Qu'est-ce que la 'Qadimiya'? Éléments de soci-

ceased to exist, and both exiled nationalists and Soviet Tatar historians held the historiographic field and spoke in the same modernist idiom, the absence of the *'ulamā* was understood as a result of the impersonal actions of peaceful historical forces, when in fact the elimination of the *'ulamā* was anything but impersonal, let alone peaceful.

It is an unfortunate fact that the historiographic corpus of Muslim religious life in Imperial Russia, that is, the studies of Russia's Muslim institutions, had until quite recently been the exclusive bailiwick of Soviet and nationalist authors whose own separate, yet fundamentally similar, agendas have been to minimize the role of these Islamic institutions and inflate the supposed presence of class consciousness and national identity in Volga Ural Muslim society. It should be noted that Western historians, even those claiming credit as “anti-Soviets” and advertising their sympathies for Islam have accepted most uncritically both the Soviet and the nationalist conceptions of the role of Islamic institutions in imperial Russia. Let us examine then the major Soviet and nationalist currents in the historiography of Muslim religious life in imperial Russia.

SOVIET STUDIES

The first generation of Soviet historians who addressed Muslim religious life were themselves often at least partially educated in village *madrasas*, the traditional Muslim institutions of higher learning. Among such figures, the works of Dzhamaliutdin Validov are particularly important, since he leaves us a somewhat extended, albeit biased, discussion of traditional (pre-jadidist) education.⁹ The most prominent Tatar historian of this period, Gaziz Gubaidullin, the first Tatar Marxist historian, devoted particular attention to the class and ethnic history of the Tatars, but attention to religious life and Islamic institutions are noticeably absent from his narratives.¹⁰ For these early

ologie du traditionalisme musulman en Islam de Russie et en Transoxiane,” *L'Islam de Russie: Conscience communautaire et autonomie politique chez les Tatars de la Volga et de l'Oural depuis le XVIII^e siècle*, Stéphane Dudoignon et al. eds., (Paris, 1997), 207–225.

⁹ Dzhamaliutdin Validov, *Ocherki istorii obrazovannosti i literaturny tatar (do revoliutsii 1917 g.)*, (Moscow and Petrograd, 1923).

¹⁰ A. Gubaidullin, “Iz proshlogo tatar,” *Materiialy po istorii Tatarstana II*, (Kazan, 1925), 71–111; cf. also G. Gubaidullin, *Tarikhi sabbifilär achilganda* (Kazan, 1989) and his *Istoriia tatar* (Moscow, 1994). Gubaidullin's chronologies, narrative structure,

Soviet historians, as well as for all subsequent Soviet Tatar and Bashkir historians, Islam became identified as simply an "ideology", that is, an intellectual system used by the ruling class to maintain its class privileges and hegemony over the working class. As such, any manifestation of religious discourse could be reduced to "really" being political or class discourse in a "religious disguise".

In Soviet times the study of imperial Russia's Muslim religious institutions themselves were specifically entrusted to specialists in Scientific Atheism, who were primarily concerned with revealing the "true" class nature of religion, or depicting religious behavior on the part of the working class as false consciousness or plain ignorance. Hostility and contempt for the religious heritage of the Tatars and Bashkirs were not only unconcealed by these scholars, but were *de rigueur*, and the dismissal of religion as a legitimate historical category was the centerpiece of their methodology. Nevertheless, the works of these anti-religious scholars sometimes contain important source material on numerous aspects of Muslim religious life in imperial Russia. For example, Zarif Mözaffari's monograph on Sufism, published in 1931, is perhaps the most important published source since 1917 on the Sufis of the Volga-Ural region and the Kazakh steppe in late imperial Russia¹¹ and N. Matorin's small monograph on religion in the Middle Volga region is a particularly useful source on Muslim hagiolatry.¹² Among the major works of a synthetic nature are Liutsian Klimovich's study of Islam in imperial Russia as a whole, including the Volga-Ural region. Klimovich devotes special attention, based on Russian archival sources, to the major Muslim institutions in imperial Russia, including the muftiate and the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly.¹³ Following the Second World War, Volga Ural Islam and its institutions were largely ignored by Soviet scholars until the era of Mikhail Gorbachev. Nevertheless one of the main anti-religious studies of Islamic institutions in the Volga-Ural region dates from the late 1970's. This work, by Z. Ishmukhametov, is the only monograph to systematically examine the role of Islamic insti-

and general conclusions form the foundations of the historical narrative in several Western works, especially those of Rorlich and Bennigsen.

¹¹ Zarif Mözaffari, *Ishannar-Dürishlär*, (Kazan, 1931).

¹² N. Matorin, *Religiia u narodov Volzhsko-Kamskogo kraia prezhde i teper'*, (Moscow, 1929).

¹³ Liutsian Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii*, (Moscow, 1936).

tutions in the development of Muslim society in the Volga-Ural region during the imperial period.¹⁴

Following the Second World War Tatar and Bashkir historiography fell into line with the "Friendship of Peoples" policy of history writing that was prevailing in the Soviet Union at that time. The premise of this historiography was that throughout history the working classes of the various peoples inhabiting the territory of the present-day USSR were involved in a partnership, or "friendship" with the working class of the Russian people.¹⁵ This partnership manifested itself through a mutual commitment to class struggle and to defending the future territory of the USSR from foreign invaders. In these works, discussions of religious institutions are entirely lacking. Rather, these are essentially impersonal histories, emphasizing ethnic formation and class struggle. From this time Soviet Tatar historians began to contort their works to conform to this new historiographic line, and the result was that historical inquiry began to shift away from the Golden Horde, the erstwhile ethnic and political crucible of the Tatar nation in the works of Gubaidullin, which now became identified as a reactionary, feudal robber state of foreign conquerors, against which the Russians and numerous junior members of the Soviet family of nations struggled. It was at this time, in the late 1940's, that Soviet Tatar historiography began to move into two different areas: the history of the pre-Mongol Volga Bulgarians and historical ethnography. This Soviet "Bulgharist" historiography for the most part was limited to secular aspects of the cultural, political, and ethnic history of the medieval Volga Bulgarians.¹⁶

In the realm of ethnography Soviet Tatar and Bashkir scholars sought to portray their respective nations' folk cultures as purely national phenomena, in which Islam was again considered a fleeting and superficial "ideology." In the limited space accorded to discussions of religious activities or religious life in ethnographies of the

¹⁴ Z. A. Ishmukhametov, *Sotsial'naiia rol' i evoliutsiia Islama v Tatarii*, (Kazan, 1979).

¹⁵ Cf. Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities*, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1969).

¹⁶ Among the chief works of Soviet and post-Soviet "Neo-Bulgharism" cf. Abrar Karimullin, *Tatary: etnos i etnonim*, (Kazan, 1988) and A. Kh. Khalikov, *Kto my - bulgary ili tatary? Kem bez—bolgariami, tatarlarmi?* (Kazan, 1992). For discussions of Soviet "Neo-Bulgharism" and its historiography cf. Allen J. Frank, *Islamic Historiography and 'Bulghar' Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia*, (Leiden, 1998), 178-196, and Victor A. Shnirelman, *Who gets the Past? Competition for Ancestors among Non-Russian intellectuals in Russia*, (Washington D.C., 1996).

Tatars and Bashkirs, and especially of the Kazakhs, discussions of religious life were restricted to brief accounts of "folk beliefs". In these accounts virtually all religious phenomena, such as for example the ancestor cult, demonology, pilgrimage, and especially agricultural calendar festivals, shamanism and virtually every other aspect of human activity that may have had religious significance to a Muslim, and may have been expressed in Islamic terms, were instead defined as "pre-Islamic." Whatever Islamic elements may have existed among these manifestation of popular religious consciousness were simply dismissed as a surface layer of Islamic "ideology" upon a phenomenon that was "really" pre-Islamic, and national. In these ethnographic depictions the religious life of imperial Russia's Muslim villagers was reduced to a childish world of belief in spirits, hobgoblins, and leprechauns, without any reference to the Islamic institutions and ideals that formed the core of these communities' identities. These ethnographers all but ignored the presence and fundamental role of Islamic institutions at the village level, which included mosques, *madrasas*, *imāms*, *mu'adhdhins*, hagiolatry, and Arabic, Turkic and Persian Islamic literature.

Just as Soviet ethnographic works reduced the religious traditions of rural Muslims to a jumbled potpourri of irrational "pre-Islamic" beliefs the intellectual history of Volga-Ural Muslims was similarly reduced to a dualistic struggle between the progressive proponents of secularism and enlightenment on one side, and the reactionary clerical supporters of Islamic scholasticism on the other. As a result, all Islamic scholars were placed in one of these two categories. If a literary or intellectual figure from the region was to receive any sort of appreciation, it was the "progressive" elements in his work, especially any evidence of "secularism", and best of all, anti-clericalism. This characterization was especially evident in treatments of Muslim education and in literary history in general. Although this approach was certainly the result of official Soviet directives concerning history writing by Tatar and Bashkir scholars, it also satisfied the need for Tatar and Bashkir intellectuals define the "national" histories of their respective peoples. In this scheme the fundamental historical phenomenon was the nation which while it "really" existed since ancient times, only achieved the awareness of being a nation as a result of an "awakening." National awakening could only be achieved by challenging the Islamic "ideology" which retarded the growth of national self-awareness. Islamic ideology was to be replaced by the

new progressive and "real" ideology of Tatar (or Bashkir) national identity. This approach was developed rather intensely in the last two decades of the Soviet Union's existence.¹⁷ Although it has been largely (but not entirely) stripped of much of its Marxist-Leninist and "Friendship of Peoples" elements, this evaluation of Islam and Tatar national identity has not only survived the fall of the Soviet Union, but has flourished in post-Soviet Russia, especially among Tatar intellectuals.

While the idea of secularism dominated Soviet Tatar and Bashkir historiography concerning Islam in the Volga-Ural region, it was above all the Volga-Ural region's orientalist who continued the study of Islamic culture in the Volga-Ural, despite the constraints of official Soviet historiographic principles. This work was primarily in the literary field, and involved the collection and study of the region's Islamic manuscripts, its historiography, genealogical traditions, and epigraphy. The most fundamental work of this era was the collection of Islamic manuscripts from the region's Muslim communities. The collection of Islamic manuscripts had already begun in the 1920's by Sayet Vakhidi; but the business of collecting these manuscripts only started up again in the early 1960's in Kazan and Ufa. This "archeographic" work resulted in the collection of thousands of Turkic, Arabic, and Persian manuscripts, a truly impressive body of sources that has only begun to be utilized by scholars.¹⁸ Of special prominence are the works of the Kazan historian Mirkasym Usmanov, who managed to publish numerous monographs and studies on topics that had been on ideologically unstable ground. Much of his work was based on manuscript materials, and included fundamental studies of Tatar historiography.¹⁹ Other important works have addressed

¹⁷ Typical of these sorts of works are Ia. Abdullin, *Tatarskaia prosvetitel'skaia mysl'* (Kazan, 1976), M. Iusupov, *Shigabudin Merdzhanii kak istorik*, (Kazan, 1981), A. I. Kharisov, *Literaturnoe nasledie bashkirskogo naroda*, (Ufa, 1973); for a discussion of these sorts of sources cf. Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte*, 12-14.

¹⁸ Cf. *Iuzhnorusskii arkhograficheskii sbornik I-II*, (Ufa, 1972-1973); M. A. Gosmanov, *Qur'ān galim ezemini* 2nd ed. (Kazan, 1994), M. A. Usmanov "Zur Geschichte der tatarischen Handschriften," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries* (vol. 1), Michael Kemper, Anke von Kügelgen and Dmitriy Yermakov (eds.), (Berlin, 1996), 49-68; M. A. Usmanov, *Itogi i perspektivy arkhograficheskikh rabot v Kazanskom universitete*, (Kazan, 1990).

¹⁹ M. A. Usmanov, "Istochniki knigi Sh. Mardzhani 'Mustafad al-akhbar fi akhvali Kazan va Bulgar' ch. 1, Kazan, 1885," *Ocherki istorii Povolzh'ia i Priural'ia* (Kazan, 1969), 144-154; *Tatarskie istoricheskie istochniki XVII-XVIII vv.*, (Kazan, 1972); M. A.

imperial Russia, but became further developed in Kemalist Turkey in the 1920's and 1930's.²²

The history of the Muslims peoples of the Volga-Ural region attracted the interest of a number of Western historians beginning in the late 1950's. Among these historians included Serge Zenkovsky, but Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay were especially prominent.²³ They focused on "national movements" and strongly adhered to nationalist and modernist approaches evident in the works of both the early Soviet authors, especially Validov and Gubaidullin, as well as to the nationalist conceptions of the émigré historians in Turkey. These Western historians relied exclusively on published secondary sources and there is very little attention given to the region's Islamic institutions and Muslim religious life, except for those figures determined to be "enlighteners" or "secularists", and who sought to define Volga-Ural Muslim society in national terms. Indeed, one of Bennigsen's first monographs lionizes the Tatar Communist Mirsaid Sultangaliyev, a fierce opponent of Islam in Tatar society, and an anti-religious activist, as a national hero.

Until recently most Western scholars dealing with Volga-Ural Muslims have remained fixated on religious modernism (jadicism) as basically the sole topic of inquiry for Volga-Ural Muslim society in the imperial period. A. Rorlich's national history of the Tatars is essentially a history of jadicism and of its role in creating a modern national consciousness among the Tatars. In her account, again based almost entirely on secondary sources, the narrative follows the "modernization" and Europeanization of the Tatar nation. Although recently more nuanced treatments of jadicism in the Volga-Ural region have begun to appear, the overwhelming focus of inquiry in

²² Among the most prominent of these works are 'Abdallāh Baṭṭāl-Ṭāymās, *Qāzān Türkleri—tārīkhī ve şıvāsī görüştler*, (İstanbul, 1924); the second edition work was reissued in Turkish in 1966 as Abdullah Battal-Taymas, *Kazan Türkleri* (Ankara, 1966), and a Tatar edition was published in 1996 as Gabelbari Battal, *Qazan türkleri*, (Kazan, 1996); Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkli (Türkistan) ve Takim Türkli*, (İstanbul, 1981); Aiaz Iskhaki, *İdel-Ural*, (Paris, 1933); this work was reprinted in Kazan in 1993.

²³ Bennigsen, *Les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie*, Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan Turicism and Islam in Russia*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967); Chantal Quelquejay, "Le 'Vaisime' à Kazan: contribution à l'étude des confréries musulmanes chez les tatars de la Volga," *Die Welt des Islams* N.S. VI (1-2), 1959, 91-112; for a critical discussion of this sort of historiography cf. Yuri Bregel, *Notes on the History of Central Asia*, (Papers on Inner Asia No. 28), (Bloomington, Indiana, 1996).

the history of local genealogical traditions, as well as local historiography.²⁰ Although the works of these Tatar and Bashkir orientalist display many of the nationalist ideas characteristic of Soviet Tatar and Bashkir historiography in general, they have nonetheless produced numerous pioneering studies that contributed substantially to a better understanding of Muslim religious life in imperial Russia, and have brought to light many important sources that would otherwise have remained in obscurity.

NATIONALIST HISTORIANS

Nationalist Tatar and Bashkir historiography emerged already during the late Imperial period, as romantic nationalism began to make inroads among Muslim intellectuals in the Volga-Ural region.²¹ However, it developed most fully in the 1920's and 30's among opponents of the Soviet regime who had managed to flee abroad during the Civil War, and who settled in Turkey and Germany. These historians adhered to primarily a nationalist conception of the region's history and much of their history had a anti-communist and at times anti-Russian direction. These historians were primarily concerned with national history, which they conceived of as political history and in terms of their political conclusions these historians differed markedly from their Soviet counterparts. Nevertheless, in terms of their underlying conceptions of Tatar and Bashkir history, both groups of historians were firmly devoted to a national conception of Tatar and Bashkir history, and both shared the same suspicion of the Islamic heritage of the Tatars and Bashkirs. Among nationalist historians, we have seen that these ideas were already current in late

Usmanov, (ed.) *Vozvzaniia i perepiska vozhakov Pugachevskogo dvizheniia v Povolzh'e i Priural'e*, (Kazan, 1988); *Zhalovaniye akty Dzhuchieva ulusa XIV-XVI vv.*, (Kazan, 1979).

²⁰ Cf. R. Shaikhiev, *Tatarskaia narodno-kraevovedcheskaia literatura XIX-XX vv.* (Kazan, 1990), Marsel' Akhmetzianov, *Tatarskie shedzhere*, (Kazan, 1991), R. G. Kuzev, *Bashkirskaia shedzhere* (Ufa, 1960), I. G. Gabaidinov, *Tarikh Nama-i Bulgar Tadzheldina Jalaygulova*, (Ufa, 1990).

²¹ Among such works published in the later imperial period the most notable are Ahmad Zaki Validi, *Türk Tâiâr Târîkhî*, (Kazan, 1912), the abridged third edition of 1917 was reprinted as *Qisqacha Türk-Tatar Târîkhî*, (Kazan, 1992); Hâdî Atlâsî, *Sibir târîkhî* (Kazan, 1912), Hâdî Atlâsî, *Qazân khânligi*, (Kazan, 1914), reprinted as *Seber tarikhî, Soyenbiki, Qazan khânligi*, (Kazan, 1993); 'Abdallāh Baṭṭāl, *Tāiâr Tārîkhî*, (Kazan, 1912).

the West had until quite recently been focused on religious modernism.²⁴ Nevertheless, some more critical and better informed treatments of jadidism, and Islamic modernism in general in the Volga-Ural region, have begun to emerge among Western historians. In this category, the works of the French scholar Stéphane Dudoignon, and of the German historian Christian Noack deserve special mention.²⁵

POST-SOVIET STUDIES

The collapse of the Soviet system and of its ideological restraints on scholarship did not result in a fundamental reevaluation among Tatar and Bashkir scholars of the role of Islam or Islamic institution in their national histories. Indeed, Tatar historians embraced secularism and national history more firmly than ever. Part and parcel of this emphasis on the national aspect has led post-Soviet Tatar historians to view jadidism and Islamic modernism as manifestations of the Tatar national genius.²⁶ Although the fundamental nationalist and secular conceptions of Tatar and Bashkir history now current in Russia are not about to be challenged, at least locally, a number of scholars have made important contributions to our understanding of Muslim religious institutions in imperial Russia, especially at the local level. The Bashkir scholar Danil' Azamatov has published a number of works on the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly,²⁷

²⁴ A. Rorlich's study of the "Volga" Tatars is essentially a hagiography of jadidist figures, in which the national conception of Tatar history is fully and uncritically embraced; cf. A. Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars: a Profile in National Resilience*, (Stanford, California, 1986).

²⁵ Cf. Stéphane Dudoignon, "Qu'est-ce que la 'Qadimiya'?" Stéphane Dudoignon, "Djadidisme, Mirasisme, Islamisme," *Cahiers du Monde Russe* XXXVII (1-2), 1996, 13-40; Christian Noack, "Les musulmans de la région Volga-Oural au XIX^e siècle. L'arrière-plan social et culturel du mouvement d'émancipation," *L'Islam de Russie*, 89-114; Christian Noack, *Muslimischer Nationalismus in Russischen Reich. Nationsbildung und Nationalbewegung bei Tataren und Baschkiren, 1860-1917* (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europas, Band 56). (Stuttgart, 2000).

²⁶ A recent example of this idea is D. M. Iskhakov, *Fenomen dzhadidizma: vvedenie k sotsiokul'turnomu omyshleniu*, (Kazan, 1997).

²⁷ Danil' D. Azamatov, "Russian Administration and Islam in Bashkiria (18th-19th centuries)," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries* [vol. 1] 91-112; Danil' D. Azamatov, "The Muftis of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly in the 18th and 19th centuries: the Struggle for Power in Russia's Muslim Institution," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*. Vol. 2: *Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations*. Anke von Kügelgen, Michael

Marsel' Akhmetzianov had published an important collection of Tatar genealogical treatises,²⁸ the Bashkir historian Marsil' Farkhatov published a monograph treating in detail Islamic education in the Southern Ural region,²⁹ using Russian archival materials, the Kazan historians Ravi' Khairutdinov and Radik Salikhov have published numerous works on mosques and on other Muslim institutions in Kazan province.³⁰ In addition a number of works addressing local Muslim traditions and institutions such as Arsk district in Tatarstan, Chuvashia, and Nizhnii Novgorod and Perm' provinces have also appeared.³¹ And this brief list is by no means exhaustive.

In the West a number of recent studies, based on locally-produced Islamic manuscript material, have emerged to challenge the Soviet and especially nationalist depictions of Islamic cultural life in the Volga Ural region during the imperial period. As we have noted, the German scholar Michael Kemper has explored and described the region's "Islamic Discourse" from the end of the eighteenth century, with the establishment of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, down to the end of the nineteenth century. In addition to Kemper's important study, I have examined the role of the region's historiographic and hagiological traditions in creating a regional Islamic identity based on sacred history and geography that emerged during the late eighteenth century, and was closely linked to the emergence of imperial Russia's Muslim institutions, as well as to Islamic and Inner Asian conception of community.

For different reasons, previous studies of Islamic religious life in imperial Russia have favored a broad geographical approach examining the subject either on the imperial level, or on the basis on the ethnic-republican politics created during the Soviet era, which bore little relation to the boundaries that most Muslims perceived during

Kemper, Allen J. Frank eds., (Berlin, 1998), 355-384; D. D. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie v kontse XVIII-XIX vv.*, (Ufa, 1999).

²⁸ Marsel' Akhmetzianov, *Tatar shajihädläre*, (Kazan, 1995).

²⁹ M. N. Farkhatov, *Narodnoe obrazovanie v Bashkirii v poreformennyi period, 60-90e gody XIX v.* (Moscow, 1994).

³⁰ Radik Salikhov and Ramil Khayrutdinov, *Tatar khalkining tarikhii häm mädläni häyäkalläre (XVIII gasir ähtiri—XX gasir bashi)*, (Kazan, 1995); R. R. Salikhov, R. R. Khayrutdinov, and K. M. Nizamutdinov eds., *Ocherki istorii Vysokogorskogo raiona respublikii Tatarstan*, (Kazan, 1999).

³¹ Amir Fatikhov, *Gäyne ile*, (Barda, 1995); Kamil Nizamutdinov and Ilshat Khäliulin (eds.), *Archa töbäge tarikhii—Istoria Arskogo kraia* (Kazan, 1996); U. Iu. Idrisov et al., *Iz istorii Nizhegorodskikh musul'manskikh obshchin v XIX—30-ki godakh XX veka*, (Nizhnii Novgorod, 1997); L. Iu. Braslavskii, *Islam v Chuvashii*, (Cheboksary, 1997).

the imperial period. Local studies, on the other hand, while welcome have lacked a comparative approach. The present study will concentrate its attention on the Muslim communities inhabiting a single river valley straddling the modern-day border between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, while at the same time keeping the discussion within a comparative framework encompassing the Islamic institutions of Russia proper and Siberia during the imperial period. Our attention is drawn to this river valley, specifically the valley of the Bol'shoi Uzen' River, thanks to the efforts of two *imāms* from the region, Muḥammad-Fāṭḥ al-Ilmīnī and his son Muḥammad, who in 1910 completed an extensive narrative history of this valley. This source, entitled *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ālā*, was written in Arabic-script Turki and forms the basis of the present study.

CHAPTER ONE

THE *TAWĀRĪKH-I ĀLĪ ĀLĀ*

1. ISLAMIC HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE VOLGA-URAL REGION

In the course of their 350 years as Russian subjects the Muslims of the Volga-Ural region and Siberia developed extensive oral and especially written historiographical traditions. The main source for this study, a Turkic manuscript entitled the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ālā* (the Chronicles of the Altata Valley) represents one of the final, works from this tradition before the liquidation of the Islamic clerisy (*ulamā*), and the historiography they produced. Although native Islamic historiography is known to have existed in the Volga-Ural region before the Russian conquest of the Kazan khanate in 1552, no works from this period have come down to us, and the entire surviving historiographical corpus is one that developed under Russian rule. Generally speaking, Muslim narrative historiography of the Volga-Ural region and Siberia from before the 1917 Revolution can be divided into four general categories: 1) Chingisid court histories, 2) "Bulgharist" sacred historiography, 3) Tatar nationalist historiography and 4) local historiography. The first category consists of "Chingisid" histories, that is, histories compiled under the patronage of Chingisids who ruled the Russian-dominated puppet khanate of Kasimov. These works include the *Jāmī at-Tawārīkh* by Qādir 'Alī Bek Jālāyirī (1602) and the *Daftar-i Chingīz Nāma* by an anonymous compiler (c. 1680). The former work has come down to us in only three copies, and was partially commissioned by tsar Boris Godunov, while the latter work is essentially a more transitional work, and exists in around 40 manuscript copies.¹

The next major genre, "Bulgharist" sacred historiography, emerged

¹ On this Chingisid court historiography see: M. A. Usmanov, *Tatarskie istoricheskie istochniki XVII-XVIII vv.*, (Kazan, 1972), 9-133; Abdülkadir İnan, "Destan-i Cengiz Han kitabı hakkında," *Azerbaycan Yurt Bilgisi* III/28 (1934), 9-14, 131-135; Frank, *Islamic Historiography*, 12-20; Kemper, *Sufis and Gelehtre in Tatarien und Baschkiren*, 316-319; DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, 382-392.

functions. The first was the administration of Islamic law in Russia. Muslim communities were allowed to apply Islamic law in matters of marriage and divorce, inheritance, burial, and in the administration of specifically religious affairs. The Spiritual Assembly, through a council of *qāḍīs* nominally headed by the Mufti, functioned as a sort of Muslim Supreme court, which ruled on specific cases and issued *fatāwās*. The Spiritual Assembly also regulated the village *ʿulamā*. Specifically, an *imām* or *muʾadhdhin* nominated by a *maḥalla* needed to have his nomination approved by both the provincial authorities and the Spiritual Assembly.⁸ Moreover the candidate had to travel to Ufa to pass an examination which tested his knowledge of Islamic sciences. Upon passing the examination the *imām* or *muʾadhdhin* was granted an *ukaz* (license), and became known as an *ukaznyi imām* or *ukaznyi muʾadhdhin*.⁹ Beginning in 1828 the Spiritual Assembly also oversaw the compilation by village *imāms* of the *metricheskaya kniga* (*mītrīka daḡlārī*), that is, the register of deaths and legitimate births in a community which also functioned as a tax roll.¹⁰ Mosques and *madrasas* however were beyond the direct authority of the Spiritual Assembly, and were regulated by provincial civil authorities. In this area, the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly functioned as a consultative body to the provincial authorities, and its directives primarily had the force of recommendations to the provincial authorities.¹¹

Throughout its existence in the imperial period the legitimacy of the Spiritual Assembly's authority was not universally accepted by the Volga-Ural *ʿulamā* and this debate was one of the central features of the Volga-Ural *ʿulamā*'s Islamic discourse in the late eighteenth

355–384. On Russian legislation and attempts to reform the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly cf. Dilara Usmanova, "L'Assemblée Spirituelle musulmane au début du XX^e siècle: les projets de réforme face au pouvoir politique russe," *L'Islam de Russie: Conscience communautaire et autonomie politique chez les Tatars de la Volga et de l'Oural depuis le XVIII^e siècle*, Stéphane Dudoignon et al. eds., (Paris, 1997), 175–191.

⁸ At its inception the Spiritual Assembly had claimed the exclusive right to confirm *imāms* and *muʾadhdhins*, but already by 1791 the Ufa provincial authorities were able to confirm its right to regulate the process of confirmation of these figures; cf. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe upravlēniē*, 89.

⁹ *Ukaz* and *ukaznyi* are the nominal and adjectival forms respectively of the Russian word for "decree". In Turkic texts the Russian forms are commonly used, appearing as *ūqāz/ūkāz* and *ūqāznī/ūkāznī*. The equivalent Turkic terms are "man-shūr" and "man-shūrli". In the *Tavārīkh-i Ālī Ālā*, and in other Turkic texts, the Russian and Turkic forms are used interchangeably.

¹⁰ For a text of the law introducing the *metricheskaya kniga* cf. *Žakony Rossiiskoi imperii o bashkirakh*, 363–365.

¹¹ Idrisov et al., *Iz istorii*, 23.

figures, as well as education and the construction of mosques was subject to the approval of the provincial authorities, and on the imperial level, of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly.

1. THE ORENBURG MUSLIM SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY

A feature that distinguished the *ʿulamā* of Russia proper from other Muslim communities in the Islamic world was that after 1788 the religious affairs of these Muslim communities were regulated by a state controlled administrative apparatus staffed by Muslim clergy. There were two such organizations, which had jurisdiction over the Muslim communities of European Russia, and Siberia. The smaller of these organizations was the Tauride Muslim Spiritual Assembly, based in the Crimea. This organization had jurisdiction over the Muslim communities in the Crimea, the steppe regions north of the Black Sea, and in the former territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The other organization was the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, headquartered in the city of Ufa.⁶ This organization had jurisdiction over the Volga-Ural region, and Siberia. For much of the nineteenth century it also had jurisdiction over the northern Kazakh steppe, including the Kazakh Inner Horde. During almost its entire existence the *ʿulamā* of Novouzensk district was formally subordinate to this organization. The Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly was created in 1788 by order of Empress Catherine II. This organization was headed by a mufti, who was in fact an appointee of the Russian authorities. In principle he was supposed to be elected by representatives of the Muslim population, but in practice the Russian authorities were never to cede the power of selecting the mufti to the Muslims.⁷ The Spiritual Assembly had a number of

⁶ For a general discussion of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly cf. Kemper, *Sifis und Gedeirte*, 17–79; cf. also D. D. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie v kontse XVIII–XIX vv.*, (Ufa, 1999); for a discussion of the Assembly within the larger context of the imperial Russian state and society cf. Charles Robert Steinwedel, *Invisible Threads of Empire: State, Religion and Ethnicity in Tsarist Bashkiria, 1773–1917*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1999.

⁷ On the politics surrounding appointment of muftis cf. Daniil D. Azamatov, "The Muftis of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly in the 18th and 19th Centuries: the Struggle for Power in Russia's Muslim Institution," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, Vol. 2: *Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations* Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, Allen J. Frank eds., (Berlin, 1998),

and nineteenth centuries.¹² The anti-Mufti position was established and most strongly defended in the works of 'Abdarrahīm al-Ūtūz-Imānī (1756–1834), and anti-Mufti activity was carried out by a group of 'ālims known as the *ābīzes*.¹³ In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the most prominent anti-mufti movement was the Vaisov brotherhood, first led by Bahā'addīn Vaisov, and later by his son 'Inānaddīn, who after 1906 gradually took the movement in a more radicalized direction, culminating in the Vaysi-Bolshevik alliance in 1917.¹⁴

The significance of anti-Mufti thought and activity among the Volga-Ural 'ulamā is difficult to gauge with certainty since such currents were suppressed both by the Muslim supporters of the Mufti and by the Russian authorities. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the authority of the mufti and of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly was recognized by the 'ulamā as a whole. Michael Kemper has ably described the writings and activities of pietist 'ālims in the Volga-Ural region who not only sanctioned the authority of the mufti and of the Russian state, but who defined themselves and their communities in connection with these institutions.¹⁵ The broad popularity of "Bulgharist" historiography and "Bulghar" regional identity provides further evidence that Volga-Ural Muslims not only accepted the founding and functions of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly but that they judged it to have religious validity.¹⁶

This acceptance of the Spiritual Assembly's authority by the village 'ulamā is quite evident in al-Īlmīnī's history. Throughout his work al-Īlmīnī refers to the Spiritual Assembly using its Russian title, *Ūrñbürgħ Dākhūmūy Şubraya*, rather than by its official Islamic names, *Ūrñbürgħ Dīnī Mahkamāsī* or *Ūrñbürgħ Dīnī Naẓārātī*, suggesting that al-Īlmīnī viewed the Spiritual Assembly as part of the official Russian apparatus, which it certainly was. Nevertheless, it is clear from his narrative that al-Īlmīnī accepted the legitimacy of the Spiritual Assembly since he is quite forthright in noting the importance for

¹² Cf. Kemper, *Sifis und Gelehrte*, passim.

¹³ On Ūtūz-Imānī cf. especially Kemper, *Sifis und Gelehrte*, 172–212; on the anti-mufti movement among the 'ulamā cf. M. V. Gainutdinov, "Razvitie obnovlentskikh idei v tatarskoi obshchestvennoi mysli," *Problema preemstvennosti v tatarskoi obshchestvennoi mysli*, (Kazan, 1985), 41–42.

¹⁴ Kemper, *Sifis und Gelehrte*, 393–429; Frank, *Islamic Historiography*, 172–178.

¹⁵ Kemper, *Sifis und Gelehrte*, 50–66, 368–392.

¹⁶ Frank, *Islamic Historiography*, 35–46; Frank, "Islamic Shrine Catalogs," passim.

māms and *mu'adhdhins* in holding an *ukaz*. While al-Īlmīnī's emphasis on the legitimacy of the *ukaz* can be seen as his acceptance of the reality of Russian administrative dominance, and his support for the legitimacy of the Spiritual Assembly, when he does mention the mufti in his history, he unambiguously depicts him as a figure bearing spiritual authority. Another work located in the manuscript expresses support for the legitimacy of the mufti more forthrightly. This work follows the *Tawārīkh-i Altī Ātā* which purports to be by Muhammad b. Muhammad-Fāṭḥ al-Īlmīnī's examination for the post of *imām*. While it is unlikely that the section was the exam he actually took, since it deals more with issues of theology, and is rather informal in certain sections, it seems to be a literary work in its own right. Toward the end of this "examination", which is written in a question-and-answer format, Muhammad b. Muhammad-Fāṭḥ criticizes Tatar newspapers that questioned the right of the tsar to appoint the mufti, and also dismisses calls that muftis and other figures be appointed for fixed terms, noting that nowhere in Islamic sources are muftis and *qādis* appointed for specific terms. Thus, while Muhammad b. Muhammad Fāṭḥ defends the right of the tsar to appoint the mufti, he does so using specifically Muslim arguments.¹⁷

For the most part, the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly affected the *ulamā* of Novouzensk district to the degree that *imāms* and *mu'adhdhins* selected by the communities would travel to Ufa to take their exams. However while the Spiritual Assembly was created in 1788, al-Īlmīnī writes that when Muslim colonists first came to the area, between 1780 and 1800 they had no official (*manshūrī*) *imāms*; rather, the community "would elect as *imām* a person from among them who could read and write and would give the sermons and preach."¹⁸ At what point *imāms* began to be confirmed to their position by the Spiritual Assembly is unclear. The earliest date we have for an *imām* traveling to Ufa to take an examination is 1840, when 'Abdalkarīm Lemrībūlāṭ ūghlī was confirmed as *imām* of Altī Ata's First Mosque.¹⁹ However al-Īlmīnī tells us the first *imām* (i.e. an *imām* recognized by the Russian state with an *ukaz*) was elected in 1817. In one case it appears the official acceptance of an *imām* also involved a two-step process, involving first going to Ufa, and then going to Samara to

¹⁷ Kazan Univ. 124T-II, fol. 127b.

¹⁸ TAA fol. 8a.

¹⁹ TAA fol. 12a.

before 1788, only acquired it formal titular sense after 1788. In earlier (mainly Russian) sources from the seventeenth and eighteenth century, we see the term *ābiḡ* used as the equivalent of the nineteenth century *imām*. The etymology of the term is disputed,²⁴ but it already appears in seventeenth century sources. We see the term *ābiḡ* used as an equivalent to *imām* in Stenka Razin's appeal to the *ulamā* of Kazan in 1670, where he addresses the "chief *ābizes* who maintain the mosques" (*abyzom nachahym kotorye mehet' derzhat*).²⁵ The term also appears in the Remezov chronicle, compiled in Siberia around 1700, in which the author relates how in the sixteenth century Kuchum, the Tatar khan of Siberia, went to Kazan and returned with "Chuvashes, *ābizes* and Russian prisoners."²⁶ The term is mentioned by the Academician G. Miller in 1734 as being equivalent to the later term of *imām*. He notes that among the Muslims of the Tobol'sk region the *ābiḡ* was the equivalent of a "simple priest."²⁷ It also appears as a title in Russian ecclesiastical legislation in the eighteenth century.²⁸ The term was widely used in the eighteenth century, especially in Bashkiria, and it bears mentioning that the opponents of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly's legitimacy were collectively known as the *ābizes*.²⁹ If indeed these figures were the traditional equivalent of an *imām*, then it stands to reason they would have been directly threatened by the new licensing requirements of the Spiritual Assembly. In any case, this term is nowhere to be found in the *Tauārtkh-i Ālāi Ālā*. The term nevertheless continued to appear in

²⁴ The origins and etymology of this term are unclear. In Turkic texts from the Volga-Ural region it has the meaning of "scholar" or "learned person" and is spelled *ābiḡ*, *ābis*, or *ābiḡ*. The latter spelling suggests it may be derived from the Arabic term *hāfiḡ*, "one who has committed the Qur'ān to memory," as L. Budagov has noted; cf. Lazar Budagov, *Svāmīl'nyi slovar' turetsko-tatarskikh narechii*, I, (St. Petersburg, 1869), 4. In Kazakh, as well as in a series of South Siberian Turkic languages, including Altay, Shor, and Teleut, where it appears as *ābis*, the term signifies "Russian priest," and W. Radloff theorizes that it may be derived from the Turkic form *ābabis*, "our father"; cf. V. V. Radlov, *Opit slovaria turkskikh narechii*, I, (St. Petersburg, 1893), 629–630. The latter etymology is cited in a Soviet ethnography on the Volga Tatars, as evidence of the "popular" and Turkic origin of the word, dismissing the Arabic etymology as clerical and reactionary; cf. *Tatary Povolzh'ia i Priural'ia*, (Moscow, 1967), 210–211.

²⁵ *Istoriia Tatarii v materialakh i dokumentakh*, (Moscow, 1937), 379.

²⁶ *Sibirskie letopisi*, (St. Petersburg, 1907), 319–320.

²⁷ Elert, *Sibir*, XVIII veka, 76.

²⁸ *Polnoe Sobranie Postanovlenii i rasporiazhenii po vedomstvu Pravoslavnogo isповедaniia Rossiiskoi imperii vol. III 1746–1752*, (St. Petersburg, 1912), 490.

²⁹ Gainetdinov, "Razvitie obnovencheskikh idei," 41–42.

receive confirmation from the civil authorities. This was the case in Ilimin's Third *mahalla*, when 'Ubaydallāh Temīrbūlāt ūghlī was nominated *imām* under rather contentious circumstances. In another case, when 'Abdaṣṣamād Burhānaddīn ūghlī was nominated to become *imām* of Iske Ōzen's Fifth Mosque, we are told that he was examined not by the Spiritual Assembly in Ufa, but by the provincial authorities in Samara, who then issued an *ukaz* naming him *imām* and *khatīb* and *mudarris*.²⁰ All of the *mudarris* apparently traveled to Ufa to take their examinations and receive their *ukazes*.

The Novouzensk Muslims would on occasion appeal to the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly to resolve disputes. Al-Īlīmī mentions one case of a notable named 'Abdaljalīl Sayfalmulūk ūghlī. After his death, some relatives living in Ilimin challenged the will and sent it to the Spiritual Assembly in Ufa for arbitration. The Spiritual Assembly ruled that the late 'Abdaljalīl's will was not in conformity with the *sharī'a*, and ordered it redivided. However, because 'Abdaljalīl had drawn up a civil will (*zāvīshcheniia*) and had it notarized, his will remained in legal force, and the property was divided up according to his civil will.²¹ Thus, it appears that in Muslim communities, *sharī'a* was used as the basis for inheritance, but had to yield before a notarized civil will.²² In another case Muslims in Ilimin's Third *mahalla* appealed to the Spiritual Assembly in a dispute whereby the local bailiff (*ispravnik*) had ordered their mosque closed because it had been built without having obtained the necessary permit. After some time had passed, two notables traveled to Ufa and settled the matter, after which they were granted authorization to use the mosque, and were also issued a register (*mātrīka daftar*).²³

2. TITLES AND POSITIONS

Imām, mullā and ābiḡ

It is likely that the term *imām*, while well known as a religious title in all Muslim societies, and certainly familiar to Volga-Ural Muslims

²⁰ TAA fols. 73b, 92b–93a.

²¹ TAA fol. 42b.

²² For a discussion of the role of the *ulamā* in administering Islamic inheritance law among the Bashkirs cf. N. V. Bikbulatov and F. F. Fatykhova, *Semeny byt bashkir XIX–XX vv.* (Moscow, 1991), 149–161.

²³ TAA fol. 70a.

Russian sources in the nineteenth century as an equivalent to *imām*, although it remains unclear whether the appearance of this term in Russian sources reflected the actual usage of the local Muslim population. For example, the term appears as late as 1861 in a Russian ethnographic account of the Siberian Tatars in describing the activities of their *imāms*.³⁰

The most commonly used term in accounts of the Volga-Ural *ʿulamā* is *mullā*. The term is used indiscriminately by Russian and Western authors, with little indication as to why one Muslim was called a *mullā* and another was not. This tendency is especially evident in accounts of Tatar religious figures among the Kazakhs, where we commonly read about "Tatar *mullās*." Islamic sources tend to be more specific, distinguishing between Sufis, *muʿallims*, and *imāms*. To be sure, the term *mullā* appears in petitions to Catherine II's Legislative Commission as a clear equivalent to *imām*,³¹ but in Russian sources it seems to be used as a catch-all term for any Muslim with a degree of religious authority. The term *mullā* clearly had a religious sense, and was obviously in widespread use among both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Volga-Ural region. For example, the term *molla* was widely used by "unbaptized" Maris and Udmurts, especially those in Bashkiria, to refer to their own pagan priests.³² Nineteenth century Russian official documents, especially those dealing with the administration of the *ʿulamā*, use the term *mullā* exclusively. However, the term was apparently a source of confusion among Russian officials, since in 1891 the Department of Religious Affairs for Foreign Creeds issued a document for local officials clarifying the significance of the term *mullā*. According to the document *mullas* were all religious figures (*dukhovnye litsa*) who were not members of the higher clergy (i.e. not *muftis* or *qādis*) and not members of the lower clergy (*muʿadhdhins*). Thus by process of elimination, the term *mullā* was at least officially an exact equivalent for *imām*.³³

In Muslim sources, including in the *Tawārīkh-i Āltī Ātā*, the term

³⁰ Iushkov, *Sibirskie tatary*, 36.

³¹ S. F. Tashkin, *Inorodtsy Povolzhsko-Prinialʹskogo kraia i Sibiri po materialam Ekaterinskoi zakonodatelʹnoi komissii I*, (Orenburg, 1921), 230.

³² H. Paasonen, "Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Religion und des Cultus der Tschernissen," *Keleti Szemle* II (1901), 32; N. I. Isanbaev, *Marisko-turkskie iazykoopye kon-takty, chastʹ vtoraiia*, (Ioshkar-Ola, 1994), 102–103; Sándor Csúcsa, *Die tatarischen Lehnwörter des Wolgaischen*, (Budapest, 1990), 242.

³³ Idrisov et al., *Iz istorii*, 17.

mullā is very broadly used as an honorific given to learned members of the community. Virtually every *imām*, many *muʿadhdhins*, and even some learned notables all bear the title *mullā*. Thus, among Muslims the conference of the term did not necessarily imply that the bearer was a member of the *ʿulamā* or had any sort of official religious status. Another honorific that was used more restrictedly was the term *dāmmullā*. The term was restricted to the most erudite and exemplary teachers. In the *Tawārīkh-i Āltī Ātā* bearers of this title included both renowned teachers in such centers of Islamic learning as Kazan, Qarghali, and Yalpaqta, as well as a few notable teachers in Novouzensk district. Such teachers included Muḥammad Ibrāhīm ūghlī, *imām* of Safarqā's Second Mosque, ʿAbdalkarīm Ḥaḍrat, teacher and *imām* in Iske Ōzen's Third *mahalla*, and ʿAṭāʾallāh Āljūnbāy ūghlī, a prominent Sufi and *imām* in Safarqā's First *mahalla*.

Ākhūnds

At the district (*uezd*) level the highest figure in the Russian empire's Muslim religious hierarchy was the *ākhūnd* (or *ākhūn*), although the significance of this title changed over time. In the Volga-Ural region the term was in use as early as the seventeenth century. One of the most prominent *ʿālims* from this period was Yūnus Ākhūn b. Īwānāy al-Kāchāwī (b. 1636).³⁴ In the eighteenth century the term was used to refer to specialists in the administration of the *shariʿa*. It was *ākhūnds* who in the 1730's were the first Muslim religious figures to be regulated by the Russian authorities in Ufa, setting the precedent for the more ambitious projects to regulate the *ʿulamā* in the 1780's.³⁵ The importance of the title *ākhūnd* in Siberia was clearly stated by the academician G. Miller. Describing the Tatar village of Shul'gina in 1734, he notes that this village was the home of the current *ākhūnd*, who was the most respected member of the clergy in Tobol'sk district. The *ākhūnd* had oversight over all of the *abīzes*, whom Miller identifies as "simple priests." He also notes that the *ākhūnd* in this village wielded a degree of civil authority in the village as well.³⁶ The significance of the title *ākhūnd* began to change following the

³⁴ Marjānī, *Mustafād al-akhbār* II, 186–188.

³⁵ Frank, *Islamic Hagiography*, 26–28.

³⁶ A. Kh. Elert (ed.) *Sibirʹ XVIII veka v putevykh opisaniakh G. F. Millera Istoriia Sibiri. Pervostochniki VI* (Novosibirsk, 1996), 76.

founding of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly. In the initial statutes of the Spiritual Assembly, drafted in 1789, there were to be two *ākhūnds* per district (*uezd*) with a substantial Muslim population.³⁷ Technically the mosques and *imāms* of a given district were subordinate to the district *ākhūnd(s)*.³⁸ A document from the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly from 1855 describes the title as simple an equivalent of the Russian Orthodox title "*blagochinnyi*", who in the Orthodox hierarchy was a rural priest to whom a number of parishes were subordinate.³⁹ During the second half of the nineteenth century the position gradually lost much of its authority and if, during the eighteenth century, the *ākhūnd* wielded influence in the administration of Islamic law, within the structure of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly the position of *ākhūnd* appears to have eventually been stripped of much of its autonomy. By the second half of the nineteenth century *ākhūnds* served as essentially a liaison for the Spiritual Assembly by disseminating official decrees to the local *imāms*. In fact by 1909 the scholar Ridā'addīn Fakhraddīn ūghlī was expressing doubt whether the title of *ākhūnd* had any official significance at all.⁴⁰

Given their apparent *pro forma* authority, it is not surprising that al-Īlmīnī makes only passing notice of local *ākhūnds*. Nevertheless, all the *ākhūnds* he mentions were simultaneously *imāms* of a given *maḥalla*. He mentions three *ākhūnds* who resided in the area. The first was a Ahmad-Farīd Ākhūnd ash-Shirvānī, whom al-Īlmīnī identifies as Farīd Mullā, the *ākhūnd* for the Ural Cossack communities bordering the Kazakh Inner Horde.⁴¹ The other two *ākhūnds* were located in Novouzensk district. The first was 'Abdaljalīl 'Abdalkarīm ūghlī, who was the first *imām* in Safarqā's First *maḥalla*. 'Abdaljalīl Ākhūnd came

³⁷ *Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR V*, (Moscow, 1960), 566; cf. also Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovoie sobranie*, 92–93; concerning *ākhūnds* in Siberia, in the middle of the nineteenth century Iushkov writes that the *ākhūnd* was elected by the local population and confirmed by the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly. Furthermore, he writes that the *ākhūnd* was required to be able to understand Arabic and Persian and interpret the Qur'ān; cf. Iushkov, *Sibirskie tatary*, 35–36.

³⁸ Azamatov, "Russian Administration and Islam in Bashkiriya," 103–104.

³⁹ Idrisov et al., *Iz istorii*, 28.

⁴⁰ Kemper, *Sigis und Gekürte*, 41; for a discussion concerning bureaucratic debates within the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly cf. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovoie sobranie*, 93–96.

⁴¹ TAA fol. 4a; this figure resided in the Ural Cossack village of Forpost Chizhinskii Pervyi; cf. Farīd Iakhin, *Tatarskaia literatura periodicheskoi pechatii Ural'ska (1905–1907 gg.)* (Kazan, 1992), 11.

to Safarqā in 1841 with the first colonists as their *imām*, and only subsequently became *ākhūnd*.⁴² Another *ākhūnd* in the district was 'Umar Ākhūnd, the first *imām* of Iske Ōzen's Second Mosque, which suggests that he was active at the beginning of the nineteenth century, or perhaps even in the late eighteenth century. Al-Īlmīnī's tells us that 'Umar Ākhūnd maintained a rather well-known *madrasa*, and that he used to conceal his *shāgirds* who were draft evaders from the Russian authorities, suggesting that at that time not all *ākhūnds* were the ciphers of the Russian authorities.⁴³ Curiously, the *ākhūnds* that al-Īlmīnī mentions for Novouzensk district were active in the first half of the nineteenth century, if not earlier. We are not told who the *ākhūnds* for Novouzensk district were in the latter half of the nineteenth century, or for that matter in the twentieth century. Al-Īlmīnī's silence on the matter suggests that by the second half of the nineteenth century the title *ākhūnd* had indeed become debased to such a degree that it had lost any significance, even for a supporter of the Spiritual Assembly like al-Īlmīnī.

The pillar of the community's Islamic establishment, and the religious leader of the community was the *imām*. As we have seen, the post of *imām* was in a formal sense a position officially recognized by the Russian authorities after the creation of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly in 1788. The Russian missionary Ia. Koblov has left us with what is certainly one of the most sober and clear descriptions of the role of the *imām* in imperial Russian Muslim society. Koblov's work, which he bases on his observations of Muslim communities in Kazan province, is remarkable for the respect it reveals toward the authority of the *imām* within the community. He describes the *imām* as differing little from the members of his congregation. Unlike the Russian clergy, the *imām* was elected by his community, had no estate or other corporate privileges to distinguish him from other villagers, and for the most part his clothing and his house did not differ markedly from those of the other villagers.⁴⁴ Similarly, Koblov makes an important observation in terms of education: the *imām* studied in the same schools and the same texts as his congregation did. This means that the *imām* and the congregation shared the same general knowledge and education, the key difference being one of

⁴² TAA fol. 31a.

⁴³ TAA fol. 86b.

⁴⁴ Ia. Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullahkh: religiozno-bytovoi ocherk*, (Kazan, 1907), 8.

degree, that is, that the *imām* had a deeper knowledge of the same texts, traditions, and ideas.⁴⁵ Thus, the *imām* and his congregation shared a common religious idiom, which Koblov describes as “a commonality of interests, convictions, and outlook that united the *mulla* [i.e., *imām*] and the congregation.” In this important respect, the relationship between the *imām* and the congregation that supported him, and that he served, was very much an equal relationship between Muslims. This implied that the standards the *imām* enforced were standards for all Muslims to follow, including the *imām* himself. The community was entitled to remove an *imām* who failed to meet these standards personally or professionally; that communities occasionally did so was not only evident in Koblov’s discussion of Kazan province, but, as we shall see, in Novouzensk district as well.

In strictly occupational terms, the primary obligation of the *imām* was to be present at the mosque for the five daily prayers. In addition, the *imām* was responsible for giving names to newborns, and performing the appropriate prayers and rituals, performing weddings, and giving the wedding sermon, and performing burials. *Imāms* were expected to teach the congregation’s children, and were also expected to determine the fasts and lead the celebrations of *‘Īd al-Aḥḥa* and *‘Īd al-Fiṭr*.⁴⁶ The *imām* also had certain civic duties that the Russian authorities required of him. This was to perform weddings and collect the wedding tax, perform birth rituals, divorces and funerals, administer Islamic inheritance law, and keep a record of births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and inheritance in official registers that he was obligated to submit to the state. However he also had a broader role in enforcing Islamic norms and rules in the society, and was in large part responsible for enforcing an Islamic code of public conduct in the community. This responsibility especially involved punishing at least the flagrant use of alcohol and tobacco, and in this he was certainly supported by the community.⁴⁷ Indeed, Koblov especially credits the moral authority of the *imām* for the discipline that was evident in Muslim communities at that time.⁴⁸ The *imām* was a role model for the community, and consequently the community closely monitored his behavior and actions, expecting him

⁴⁵ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 8–9.

⁴⁶ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 7.

⁴⁷ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 9–10.

⁴⁸ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 9.

to adhere to the norms and rules he enforced.⁴⁹ Koblov was clearly impressed by the general dignity and bearing of *imāms*. In addition to noting the neatness and cleanliness of *imāms* in public, he writes:

He [the *imām*] is always suffused with the teaching of Islam, and is always serious and imposing. All of this is evident even in his external motions and his comportment. In conversation the *mulla* is not garrulous or hurried, and sudden movements or loud laughter are foreign. First he attentively hears out the person he is speaking with, and then with the awareness of his own worth, rather than simply talking, he solemnly states [*izrekať*] his answer.⁵⁰

Given their dignified and learned bearing, it is not surprising that villagers frequently appealed to *imāms* to mediate family and other disputes, and that the decisions of the *imāms* were generally respected.⁵¹

3. IMĀMS IN NOVOUZENSK DISTRICT

In their biographical dictionaries Marjānī, Fakhraddīn ūghlī, and Ramzī focused only on the most prominent and influential *‘ālims* in the Volga-Ural region, and given the scale of these biographers’ works, such an approach was unavoidable. Moreover these historians also sought to publicize the high degree of learning and erudition of the Volga-Ural *‘ulamā*, as well as to document some of the major issues of the region’s “Islamic discourse” in the nineteenth century. Al-Īlmīnī however limits his focus to a single district and while he too seeks to make known the high level of erudition and Islamic learning of his district’s *‘ulamā*, another of his goals is to provide an exhaustive history of the district’s religious figures. As a result, al-Īlmīnī’s account of Novouzensk district’s *‘ulamā* is by no means an idealized one, and he presents us with a highly informative series of profiles of individual *imāms* in which he discusses their origins and education, the process of their selection, and in a few cases, of their dismissal as well, their duties and activities, and their relations with the community at large. The *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ālā* provides us with what is certainly the most complete picture available of the life of the main pillar of the Volga-Ural *‘ulamā*, the village *imām*.

⁴⁹ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 12.

⁵⁰ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 13.

⁵¹ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 11.

Al-İlmînî provides considerable information on 59 *imâms* who were active in Novouzensk district between around 1800 and 1910. He discusses an additional six *imâms* who administered neighboring jurisdictions in Nikolaevsk district, Ural'sk province, Saratov province, and in the Kazakh Inner Horde. Al-İlmînî based his account on oral sources and personal reminiscences, and his data for the *imâms* of Novouzensk district is probably not completely exhaustive. Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt that the authors exhausted his sources and that his account of the *imâms* of Novouzensk district is fairly complete, especially for the latter part of the nineteenth century. In any case, his account is certainly the most detailed survey of village *imâms* in any district of imperial Russia known up to now. The only comparable published work is Riḍâ'addîn Fakhraddîn üghlî's history of Qarghalı (Seitovskii Posad), where he lists the eighty *imâms* who administered that settlements nine mosques between 1741 and 1897. However, Fakhraddîn üghlî's discussion of those *imâms* consists of essentially an annotated list.⁵² The *Tawārīkh-i Âlî Âtā* provides a wealth of information on the origins and training of these *imâms*, as well as the details of their selection, activities and their general relations with the community. But perhaps the most enjoyable aspect of reading al-İlmînî's account of his fellow *imâms* is his skill and attention in depicting their personalities and their very human qualities and failings.

Typically one *imâm* served a single *mahalla* and it seems that only those *imâms* who administered a *mahalla* with a mosque were formally registered with the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly and the provincial authorities as an *ukaznyi mulla*. Nevertheless Muslim communities that lacked mosques were also served by *imâms* who would hold Friday prayers and administer the feasts in private homes. This was the case in the town of Novouzensk from about 1840 until a mosque was built there in 1895, as well as in the merchant settlement of Aleksandrov Gai. The latter settlement had a series of four *imâms* between 1841 and 1910, including Ahmad-Şafâ Muḥammad-Fâṭih üghlî, but no mosque.⁵³ In Novouzensk the first leader of the congregation was Ḥamîd Mirzâ Yînikēyef (Enikeev), a member of the Muslim gentry and of the *Žemskaja Uprava*, who also “would administer the spiritual

⁵² Fakhraddîn üghlî, *Sâ'id*, passim.

⁵³ TAA fols. 102b–103b.

matters of the Muslims in the city.”⁵⁴ However al-İlmînî notes that the merchants who made up the Muslim population were heedless in religious affairs and that in effect there was no *imâm* until the arrival of İhsân Mullâ, a merchant from the village of Musa in Saratov province's Kuznetsk district.⁵⁵

In *mahallas* with mosques it was not uncommon for there to be two *imâms*, with the second *imâm* being termed a *sharîk* (partner). This was the case in three *mahallas* in Novouzensk district, the First and Second in Ilmin, and the First in Iske Özen. Often the *sharîk* was the junior *imâm*, but nonetheless he too possessed an *ukaz*, and was formally constituted as one of the *mahalla's imâms*. Usually the *imâm* or the congregation would name the *imâm's* son as his *sharîk*, as was the case in Ilmin where Mullâ Maḥmūd served as *sharîk* to his father Abū Bakr İbrâhîm üghlî, and succeeded him as *imâm* in that *mahalla*.⁵⁶ In Ilmin's First *mahalla* Muḥammad served as *sharîk* to his father Muḥammad-Fâṭih, reportedly by request of the *mahalla*.⁵⁷ In Iske Özen's First *mahalla* however, the *imâm*, a certain 'Abdaljalîl, nicknamed Būrân Mullâ (i.e., stormy Mullâ) was often in rather sharp opposition to his *sharîk*:

This *mahalla's* Mullâ 'Aynaddîn 'Abdalghafūr üghlî was known as Qūtūqū Mullâsî, and he was the *sharîk* to the above-mentioned [Būrân Mullâ]. This Mullâ 'Aynaddîn was good tempered and had a mellifluous voice, and while reciting the Qur'ân he made a rhythmic sound like the playing of music. But the stormy one and the agreeable one were not able to coexist. They would hold counsels, and fights and alterations would take place. The musical *imâm* remained, and although [at first] they would harmoniously carry out the Friday prayers together, with time they carried out the Friday prayers in different places. The tyrannical were on Mullâ Būrân's side, and the devout were on Mullâ 'Aynaddîn's side. They remained silent, and the tyrannical ones remained silent, and they had nothing to do with one another. Therefore, Mullâ Būrân's activities were accepted.⁵⁸

After the death of this 'Aynaddîn Mullâ Būrân Mullâ was able to choose his own *sharîk*:

⁵⁴ TAA fol. 95b.

⁵⁵ TAA fol. 96b.

⁵⁶ TAA fols. 67a, 68b.

⁵⁷ TAA fol. 43b.

⁵⁸ TAA fol. 83a.

Finally, with the death of Mullā 'Aynaddīn, Būrān Mullā remained alone, and Būrān Mullā was still youthful. However, let there be thanks, his sole daughter reached maturity and because when he had studied under the *ḥaḍrat* in Zimmichā and had become his son-in-law, he would often go to Zimmichā, and he would also get along well with the *shāgirds*. At that time a *shāgird* from Ālī Ātā named Ḥusnaddīn Mawlūd ūghlī gave his heart to him, and he planned to give his daughter to him [Ḥusnaddīn] and declared him his *sharīk*. This one did not refuse, and accepted. He brought this *shāgird*, gave him his daughter, and got a *prigovor* of partnership, and he received a license.⁵⁹

With time this Ḥusnaddīn died, and this time the *maḥalla* chose the *sharīk*:

While he was alone, his raging continued, and while he was bad within the community, he had his good side too. Old Būrān would not accept advice and had disputes. At that time 'Azīzallāh was without a position. The community consulted and said "Come, let's make 'Azīzallāh *sharīk*. Let Būrān rage." They met and placed the matter before 'Umar Ḥājīr. He too saw reason, because 'Azīzallāh Mullā was 'Umar Ḥājīr's son-in-law. After this he received a *prigovor* and went to work. Būrān Mullā placed himself in opposition, and responded with a complaint, and [the matter] was drawn out for several years.⁶⁰

In time however, the two *imāms* were able to reach a compromise, and in 1910 were jointly administering the congregation.

The training and education of imāms

The *imāms* in Novouzensk were for the most part selected from within their communities. Out of the fifty-nine, twenty-six were actually from one of the villages of Novouzensk district. In addition, sixteen were from either neighboring regions, such as Nikolaevsk district, or from the "home" villages of Penza and Saratov provinces. The latter figure includes *imāms* who came to the region together with the original colonists. Eight *imāms* came from altogether different provinces, including four from Kazan province, two from Ufa province, and one each from Ural'sk and Astrakhan provinces. In addition to these, there were six *imāms* whose place of origin is unknown or not provided. In ethnic terms, forty-three *imāms*, a large majority, were from

⁵⁹ TAA fol. 83ab.

⁶⁰ TAA fol. 85a.

Mishar areas. Four *imāms* were apparently Kazan Tatars, and two were Bashkirs.⁶¹

Imāms were the most educated members of the community, and to a degree an *imām*'s authority and reputation depended on his education. The vast majority of Novouzensk district's *imāms* were educated in the Volga-Ural region. Only three *imāms* were reportedly educated outside of the Volga-Ural region. Two of these, 'Abdassamād Burhānaddīn ūghlī, *imām* of Iske Özen's Fourth Mosque, and 'Alī Ḥamīdallāh ūghlī Tōqtārof, *imām* of Iske Özen's Fifth Mosque, both studied in Bukhara, with the latter one spending fourteen years there, from 1880–1894. Certainly the most well traveled *ālim* from Novouzensk district was Muḥyiddīn Ḥājīr Ḥasan ūghlī, who was *imām* to Alī Ātā's First *maḥalla* from around 1817 until 1848. Muḥyiddīn studied in a number of well known *madrasas* in Orenburg and Qishqar⁶² at the end of the eighteenth century and he subsequently studied in Syria, Egypt and Istanbul.⁶³

Every *imām* received at least some training in the Volga-Ural region, and most of them were educated somewhere outside of the Novouzensk region. Scholars from Novouzensk district studied in many of the best-known centers of Islamic education in imperial Russia. The single most popular *madrasa* for Novouzensk district's *imāms* was that of 'Abdannaṣīr b. 'Abdassalām az-Zīmnichawī, who lived in the village of Zīmnichā (Zimnitsa) in Saratov province's Khvalynsk district. Four *imāms* reportedly studied with him, including Khalīl Muḥyiddīn ūghlī, who succeeded his father as *imām* of Alī Ātā's Fifth Mosque in 1848. As we have seen above, one of these *shāgirds*, 'Abdallāh 'Abdalkarīm ūghlī, but known as Būrān Mullā, even married the half-sister of 'Abdannaṣīr, thereby becoming his brother-in-law. Another *imām*, 'Abdarrashīd Ahmad-Ṣalā ūghlī of Ilmin's Fourth Mosque, studied under an unnamed *khalīfa* of 'Abdannaṣīr az-Zīmnichawī in

⁶¹ Idrisov et al. provide some biographical data on fifteen *imāms* who held positions in southern Nizhnii Novgorod province between 1900 and 1916. Of these it appears that most were local, although one was a Bashkir, and thus had come to the region from elsewhere; cf. Idrisov et al. *Iz istorii*, 72–73.

⁶² This figure was also known as 'Abdallāh Ḥaḍrat, who was active in the second half of the eighteenth century in the village of Qishqar, where he was buried; cf. Amirkhān ūghlī, *Tawārīkh-i bulghāriya*, 55.

⁶³ Idrisov et al. found that most of the *imāms* in their sample from Nizhnii Novgorod province were educated in the local *madrasas* in the southern part of that province, however two of these *imāms* were educated in Kazan; cf. Idrisov et al. *Iz istorii*, 72–73.

the same village.⁶⁴ Published sources provide little information on 'Abdannaşir b. 'Abdassalām az-Zımnichawī. Riḍā'addīn Fakhraddīn üghlī lists him among the *shāgirds* of 'Abbās b. 'Abdarrafi' b. Yūnus, who died in 1838 and resided in the village of Musa in Saratov province's Khvalynsk district.⁶⁵ 'Abdannaşir's dates can only be approximated, but since Khalīl Muhyiddīn üghlī returned from his studies before 1848, we can conclude that 'Abdannaşir was active already during the first half of the nineteenth century.

The single most popular destination for the future *imāms* of Novouzensk district was the city of Kazan, where twelve *imāms* reportedly studied. Already during the first half of the nineteenth century the *imām* of Ilimin's Second Mosque, 'Abdalḥakīm Bāybīk üghlī studied in that city with Dāmullā Muḥammad-Karīm (d. 1865/66),⁶⁶ after having studied in Saratov province with 'Abbās b. 'Abdarrafi' in the village of Musa (Mosevka) and 'Abbās' student 'Abdannaşir b. 'Abdassalām az-Zımnichawī. Later in the second half of the nineteenth century two other *imāms*, Nī'matallāh Muḥammad-Şiddiq üghlī of Altı Ata's First Mosque, and 'Ubaydallāh Temürbülāt üghlī of Ilimin's Third Mosque studied under Şilāhaddīn b. Ishāq (b. 1842/43), who served as *imām* in the Sixth Mosque in Kazan's Yānga Bistā district (Novaia Tatarskaia Sloboda).⁶⁷ Other *imāms* studied in the same mosque in Yānga Bistā district under Ḥusnaddīn b. 'Umar, who became *imām* there in 1837, as well as under a later *imām* 'Abdalqayyūm.⁶⁸ One *imām*, Abū Bakr Ibrāhīm üghlī, who resided in both Ilimin and Altı Ata, reportedly studied under Shihābaddīn Marjānī (1819–1889).⁶⁹

Five *imāms* studied in the *madrasas* of Qarghalı and Orenburg. Already in the eighteenth century Muhyiddīn was studying in Orenburg

⁶⁴ Al-İlmīnī does mention another *mudarris* in Zımnicha named Jaliladdīn Hadrat, who taught Khalīl Muhyiddīn üghlī's grandson, a certain Ahmad Ishāq üghlī; perhaps this Jaliladdīn is the same *khalifa* of Abdannaşir az-Zımnichawī.

⁶⁵ Fakhraddīn üghlī *Āthār* I (6), 191.

⁶⁶ On this figure cf. Fakhraddīn üghlī, *Āthār* II (13), #397, 410–412. One of this better-known students was the Sufi poet Shamsaddīn Zakī; cf. also Amirkhān üghlī, *Tawārīkh-i Bulghārīya*, 79.

⁶⁷ Cf. Amirkhān üghlī, *Tawārīkh-i Bulghārīya*, 80; Fakhraddīn üghlī, *Āthār* II (13), 408.

⁶⁸ Cf. Amirkhān üghlī, *Tawārīkh-i Bulghārīya*, 77; Muḥammad Murād ar-Ramzī, *Talfiq al-akhbār wa-talqīn al-āthār fi waqā'iq Qazān wa-Bulghār wa-mulūk at-Taṭār* II, (Orenburg, 1908), 482.

⁶⁹ TAA fol. 41b.

and Qarghalı with a number of well known figures, including Waliddīn b. Ḥasan al-Baghdādī (Ḥājī Baghdādī) (1755/56–1831/32), the *imām* of Qarghalı's Eighth Mosque.⁷⁰ By the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Qarghalı again became a popular destination. Two *imāms* studied in Qarghalı under Ishāq b. Maḥmūd al-Qārgḥālī, an *imām* and *mudarris* in Qarghalı's First Mosque, who died around 1890. This figure was especially renowned for training many *imāms*.⁷¹ The *madrasa* of Khayrallāh Makhdūm b. 'Abdarrahmān (Gabbrakhmanov) (1866–1915), under whom three *imāms* from Novouzensk district studied, was especially popular. Khayrallāh followed Ishāq al-Qārgḥālī as *imām* of Qarghalı's first Mosque around 1893. He had studied under the teachers Fāṭḥ b. 'Aynaddīn and Mukhlisallāh b. Maqşūd al-Machkarawī, and was reputed to be one of the most erudite of all teachers in Qarghalı. Riḍā'addīn Fakhraddīn üghlī also relates that Khayrallāh was an important source for his own history of Qarghalı.⁷²

In addition to these fairly well known locations, the *imāms* of Novouzensk district studied in a number of places in the Volga-Ural region, including Penza, Bigi (Bigevo), and Tatarskaia Pendel'ka in Saratov province, Sterlibashevo, Urbaghar, in Kazan province's Chistopol' district.⁷³

Most *imāms* received at least part of their training in Novouzensk district, especially in the villages of Iske Özen and Safarqa where the *madrasas* and teachers were rather renowned, at least locally. Yet only three *imāms* are said to have been entirely educated in Novouzensk district, including both of the authors of the *Tawārīkh-i Altı Ata*, Muḥammad-Fāṭḥ al-İlmīnī and his son Muḥammad. Muḥammad was educated by his father and Muḥammad-Fāṭḥ himself was trained in Altı Ata with Kamāladdīn Isfandiyyar üghlī, the *imām* of the First Mosque, who himself studied in Iske Urga Aghar in Kazan province's Chistopol' district under a certain Fakhraddīn. However, another of Muḥammad-Fāṭḥ's sons, Ahmad-Şafā, who served as *imām* in Aleksandrov Gai, studied in Qarghalı with Ishāq b. Maḥmūd. The

⁷⁰ On this influential figure cf. Fakhraddīn üghlī, *Āthār* I (6), 272–275; Fakhraddīn üghlī, *Sa'ūd*, 30.

⁷¹ Fakhraddīn üghlī, *Sa'ūd*, 18.

⁷² Farkhsatov, *Narodne obrazovanie v Bashkirii*, 61; Fakhraddīn üghlī, *Sa'ūd*, 18.

⁷³ This is presumably a reference to Iske Urgan Aghar. I have been unable to determine the Russian name for this village.

other *imām* was ‘Abdal’azīz Qūrmāy ūghlī of Ilmīn’s Third Mosque. He reportedly served twenty years as *imām* and studied in Iske Ōzen in ‘Abdalkarīm’s prominent *madrasa*. Indeed, it is plausible that one of al-Ilmīnī’s motives for having written the history was to demonstrate to readers that Novouzensk district could on its own produce very well-educated and conscientious *imāms*, which his manuscript certainly demonstrates.

Selection and licenses

The selection of an *imām* typically involved the entire community. Already before the creation of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly *imāms* were elected by their communities and this arrangement remained in effect throughout the imperial period.⁷⁴ The selection of an *imām* in both the Orenburg and Tauride Muslim Spiritual Assemblies included two separate processes.⁷⁵ The first was the selection of an individual by the community and the second was the ratification of that selection by the province’s civil authorities and then by the religious authorities in Ufa. Let us first examine the official aspects of *imām* selection in imperial Russia.

To obtain official approval for its *imām* from the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly and from the provincial authorities, the community was required to file a petition along with a *prigovor* (that is, a “confirmation”) attesting to the choice of the *imām*. A *prigovor* was a document signed by more than two-thirds of the male heads of households of a *maḥalla* confirming a collective decision of the *maḥalla*. The *prigovor* was signed by these heads of households in the presence of the township *starshina* and the village *starosta* (headman). The *prigovor* was attached to a form written in both Russian and Tatar on which the petition was written. The form affirmed the following: 1) the number of male heads of households according to the latest census, 2) that the *maḥalla* had a single mosque, 3) the religious figures associated with the

mosque, e.g. *imāms*, *mu’adhdhins* and *khatībs*, 4) the reason for the vacancy of the position of *imām*, 5) the number of heads of households eligible to vote, 6) the number of heads of households who signed the *prigovor*, i.e. at least two-thirds of the total, 7) the name of the person they have selected, 8) that the congregation can afford to support its mosque and its religious figures. Furthermore the form had to assert that he was literate, that he had no outstanding debts, tax liabilities, or fines, and that the candidate was of sound moral character and conduct. In addition to the *prigovor*, the *starosta* and headman, and the township scribe had to sign the petition.⁷⁶ Idrisov et al. describe the same procedure for the Muslim communities of Nizhnii Novgorod province. However these authors note that the confirmation process was the responsibility of the provincial authorities, and that the approval from the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly was actually the preliminary part of the process. In addition to the *prigovor* mentioned above, the prospective *imām* also needed an attestation from the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly that the candidate possessed sufficient knowledge of the Islamic religion to fulfill his duties, although this attestation alone did not give the candidate the right to fulfill his duties until he obtained approval from the civil authorities. The last requirement, which only emerged late in the nineteenth century, was that the candidate pass an examination demonstrating a sufficient knowledge of the Russian language. However, the latter examination was simple and often was strictly *pro forma*.⁷⁷ The procedure in Nizhnii Novgorod province closely matches the procedure that al-Ilmīnī describes in Novouzensk district; al-Ilmīnī relates that on several occasions that a prospective *imām* was required to go first to Ufa, and then to the city Samara, where he would officially receive his *ukaz*. Al-Ilmīnī makes no mention of a Russian examination for *imāms*, and it appears that at least in Samara province (a province with one of the largest Muslim populations in the Volga-Ural region), the exam was largely a *pro forma* affair.

⁷⁶ A copy of the Russian version of such a petition, filed by a Bashkir community in 1877, is included in the appendices of Muḥammad-Salīm Umethbaev’s history of the Spiritual assembly; cf. his *Din-i muḥammadīyānīng Urūbūrhīsā dūkhāmīy shūrānya mahkamañing yūzyllīq boyrāmī ham ol qarīda bōlgān amīrlamīng āchōl yūzindan*, (Orenburg, 1912), 67–68; a facsimile of the Tatar text of a *prigovor* from 1821 for the village of Kar’evo in Perm’ province was recently published; cf. Najīb Nakkash and Fāyzelkhak Islayev, “Mulla saylaw tamgalari,” *Gasirlar avazi/Ekko vekov*, 1/2 1998, 108–113.

⁷⁷ Idrisov et al. *Iz istorii*, 53; Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 5.

⁷⁴ N. Firsov, *Inorodcheskoe naselenie prezhiatogo Kazanskago tsarstva v Novoi Rossii do 1762 goda*, (Kazan, 1869), 176.

⁷⁵ For a discussion of *imām* selection among Polish-Lithuanian Muslims, who were under the authority of the Tauride Muslim Spiritual Assembly, cf. Tamara Baira-sauskaitė, “Politische Integration und religiöse Eigenständigkeit der litauischen Tataren in 19. Jahrhundert,” *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries. Vol. 2: Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations* Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, Allen J. Frank (eds.), (Berlin, 1998), 320–325.

For Muslim Cossacks the appointment of an *imām* could be somewhat more complex. A recent article based on Russian archival sources by the Omsk scholar S. M. Andreev, provides some details describing how two communities of Muslim Siberian Cossacks near the city of Petropavlovsk selected their *imām* in the 1850's. In 1852 the Siberian Cossack settlement of Stanovskaia Stanitsa petitioned the commander of the Fourth Siberian Cossack Regiment, to which they were registered, to grant them permission to elect the Cossack Abdulvalit Siniukaev (according to the Russian spelling) to be their "*mulla*" (that is, *imām*) to their mosque and they asked that he be exempt from military service. The commander supported the petition and forwarded it to the Cossack Host's administration, noting that even though this community was small, they did have a need for an *imām*. The settlement of Imantavskaia, which was registered to the First Regiment, filed a similar petition the same year.

The Cossack authorities deferred a decision to the Department of Military Settlements (*Departament Voennykh Poselenii*), which passed a general law to address the issue of the selection of *imāms* for Muslim Siberian Cossack communities, since a similar request for selecting an *imām* had also been made by Muslim Cossacks in the Tobol'sk region. The new law appears to have been based on the general statutes concerning the selection of *imāms* for Russia's Muslims as a whole, while addressing the peculiarities of the Cossack administration. In this law, which was promulgated in March of 1853, Cossack and non-Cossack Muslims in a settlement with not less than 200 male residents could nominate individuals for the post of *imām*. The election had to take place before the regimental administration, and the residents had to present a "confirmation" (*prigovor*) signed by two-thirds of the settlements Muslim male population. The *prigovor* had to be confirmed by the Governor of Western Siberia, or if the nominee was a Cossack, by the commander of the Detached Cossack Corps (*Oldel'nyi Sibirskii Korpus*). In addition, the candidate had to also be confirmed by Orenburg Spiritual Assembly as being qualified to serve as *imām*. However, the law also explicitly stated its apprehension of the fanaticism of *imāms*, especially in frontier areas with large Muslim populations, such as the Kazakh steppe, and they sought to deny these rather small and far-flung communities their *imāms* and mosques by registering them to already existing *mahallas*, such as those in Petropavlovsk. Yet despite this law, in 1856 the Cossacks of Imantavskaia were allowed to select an *imām*, and they selected

the Cossack M. Zaitov. In May of the following year he passed the examination before the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, and was finally confirmed.⁷⁸

In the vast majority of cases where the Russian bureaucracy examined *imāms* for rural communities, it appears that these were rather routine matters, at least in bureaucratic terms. However in some instances either the civil authorities, as in the Siberian situation discussed above, or the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, would take an active interest in a case. One such case is that of the city of Nizhnii Novgorod's "Fair Mosque", which was founded in 1817, at the same time the Fair was founded. The mosque was attended by many wealthy merchants from Russia, Central Asia, Turkey, Iran, and the Caucasus who were doing business in the city. Unlike small village mosques, the leadership of this mosque were placed in a position of empire-wide economic and political influence. Before 1855 the personnel for the mosque had been primarily from Kazan province. Until that time the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly was more attentive to the requests of merchants from outside the region, and in 1847 a petition of 108 merchants to the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly to appoint a certain Gizzetulla Abdolvakhitov Devlekamov [sic] of Kasimov. As *co-imām* they requested Baimurat Mukhamov Adamov⁷⁹ of Kazan and as *mu'adhdhin* they requested a certain Kamaletdin Shamsutdinov from a village in Kazan province. All these figures had attended the Fair and had impressed the petitioners by fulfilling the positions of *imām* and *mu'adhdhin*. Upon receiving the request, the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly also informed the Military Governor of Nizhnii Novgorod, Major General Prince Mikhail Aleksandrovich Urusov. Thanking Devlekamov for his services, the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly nevertheless did not approve of his candidacy. Instead in 1848 they sent their own candidates, Khisamutdin Abdulkarimov of Sterlitamak district in Ufa province, and Iskander Makiutov⁸⁰ of Kasimov, and in effect overruled the request of the *mahalla*, except

⁷⁸ Andreev, "Kazaki-musul'mane," 6-7.

⁷⁹ This is a reference to Bāymurād b. Muḥarram al-Mangārī al-Qazānī (d. 1849), who served as *imām* in Kazan's Iske Tash Mosque; cf. Marjānī, *Mustafād al-akhbār* II, 102-103.

⁸⁰ This is apparently a reference to Iskandar b. Maḥsūd al-Kirmānī. The biographical sources, however, make no mention of his having been *imām* in Nizhnii Novgorod. According to Shihābaddīn Marjānī, Iskandar served as *imām* in the Siberian city of Petropavlovsk; cf. Marjānī, *Mustafād al-akhbār* II, 272.

that they did approve of Kamaletdin Shamsutdinov as *mu'adhdhin*, but they also sent Khabibulla Abdullin of Kazan province and Iunus Kantemir of Sterlitamak district as additional *mu'adhdhins*. Writing to the Governor of Nizhnii Novgorod, the Mufti 'Abdalwāhid b. Sulaymān (Suleimanov) stressed his choices were trustworthy and well-behaved, but added that the main purpose of sending them there was for their prayers for the health and well-being of the Imperial Family, in other words, because of their loyalty. After 1855 the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly no longer approved *imāms* for the Fair Mosque from outside the province, presumably as a result of the pressure of other Muslims who sought to limit the influence of the Kazanis. The Kazani *'ulamā* in Nizhnii Novgorod were strongly opposed to the new arrangement, and wanted to return to the old system of having the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly appoint the *imām* itself, presumably because local Muslims were more numerous than the Kazanis they would be able to elect one of their own. The Orenburg Spiritual Assembly appealed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the issue, but the Ministry ruled against the Kazanis. In all likelihood the Kazan *'ulamā*, having a truly imperial influence and presence, did not want to relinquish their control over either the influential Fair Mosque, or it congregation of foreign Muslims with their wealth and foreign contacts. At the same time, Idrisov et al. argue that the imperial authorities probably did not want to grant religious leadership over Muslims to the Kazan *'ulamā*, or even to the Middle Volga region, since the religious centers for Muslims were Ufa and Orenburg.⁸¹

While the published sources, limited as they are, reveal rather clearly the specifics of gaining official recognition, they tell us little about how a *maḥalla* would select its *imāms*, and what criteria were used, besides the attestations addressing the candidate's moral qualifications, what connection *imāms* had to the community before being selected, and what would happen when a *maḥalla* was divided over who should become *imām*. Knowledge of such details are crucial for understanding Muslim religious life in the Volga-Ural region, and we are fortunate that the *Tawārīkh-i Ālīi Ātā* contains such details in great abundance.

Although in principle an *imām* had to be elected by two-thirds of the community, in reality the election was rarely competitive. Typically,

several names may have been brought up in discussions, but only after the community had reached a decision would it begin to compile a *prigovor*. Judging from the data for Novouzensk district, it was very rare for there to be simultaneously two candidates for an imamsip. With respect to Kazan province, Ia. Koblov notes that at the beginning of the twentieth century there were a shortage of posts for *madrasa* graduates seeking to serve as *imāms*. Many young scholars would go to villages where a vacancy had appeared to solicit an appointment from the congregation. These figures would feast the villagers, spending substantial amounts of money.⁸² Typically, in Novouzensk district, *imāms* succeeded one another according to two basic, and occasionally overlapping, patterns. The first pattern was the hereditary succession, where an *imām* would be succeeded by a relative, usually by a son, but occasionally by a grandson, son-in-law, or by a more distant relative. The second pattern, and the more common of the two, was characterized by an *imām* being nominated by a wealthy notable. In some cases the *imām* would be related to the notable, being most commonly a son or a son-in-law, but just as often there was no kinship relation between the notable and the *imām* being nominated.

The pattern of hereditary succession was fairly common throughout the Volga-Ural region, and, as in Novouzensk district, depended both on the character of the individual *maḥalla* and the prestige and authority of the *imām's* family. A noteworthy example includes Qarghalī's Second Mosque, where four of the six *imāms* following Ūzbāk b. Subhānqul (d. 1820/21) included two of his sons, one grandson, and one great-grandson.⁸³ In Kazan's Sixth Mosque we see primarily two families holding the position of *imām* over the nineteenth century. An early *imām*, the prominent Sufi and scholar Faḍlallāh b. Sayfaddīn, who served as *imām* from 1792 until 1815, was succeeded by another *imām*, Amīrkhān b. 'Abdalmannān aṭ-Ṭāḡīshī, who held the position from 1815 until his death in 1828. In that year Amīrkhān was succeeded by Faḍlallāh's son Muḥammad-Wafā, who held the position briefly. He was followed by one of Amīrkhān's students, Šibghatallāh al-Qarghalī. In 1848 Šibghatallāh was succeeded by Amīrkhān's son Ḥusayn (1815/16–1893), who was to become a

⁸² Koblov, *O maqomietanskikh mullahkh*, 6.

⁸³ Fakhraddīn ūghlī, *Sa'ūd*, 19–20.

⁸¹ Idrisov et al. *Iz istorii*, 24–27.

prominent historian, and in 1875 Husayn retired, and his son Zarīf succeeded him.⁸⁴

In Novouzensk district the hereditary pattern of succession was consistently maintained in a number of *maḥallas*, notably in all five of Altī Ata's *maḥallas*, and in Safarqa's Second *maḥalla*. Why the succession of *imāms* was so consistently hereditary in Altī Ata is unclear, but it appears to have resulted in the *ʿulamā*, and particularly the *imāms*, having greater influence than in neighboring villages. It is perhaps noteworthy that Muḥammad-Faṭḥ al-Īlmīnī, whose history is of course a history of *imāms*, mosques, and *madrasas*, was himself from the village of Altī Ata and was educated by its *imāms*.

In speaking of hereditary *imām* succession, it should not be assumed that such an arrangement was based on any specific legal precedent, right, or even tradition. Rather, it appears to have resulted from a constellation of circumstances, and was perhaps most attributable to the moral and religious stature of the *imām* and his family, the familiarity of the community with these individuals, and the relationship of the *imām* to the local notables. In fact, only in two *maḥallas* did the succession from father to son remain unbroken. The first was in Altī Ata's Second *maḥalla* where the first *imām*, Ayyūb ʿUmar ūghlī, was succeeded by his son Ibrāhīm, who was still *imām* in 1910.⁸⁵ In the same village's Fourth *maḥalla* the first *imām* was ʿAbdalwalī. This figure, we are told, consulted first with his other sons about whom to select as his successor, and they agreed on his son Wildān. Muḥammad Wildān in turn was succeeded by his son Yaʿqūb, who received his *ukaz* in 1909, but in his case it was the *maḥalla* who selected him, rather than his father.⁸⁶

In the other cases, the succession of *imāms* did not exclusively pass from father to son, but nevertheless remained within the same family. In Altī Ata's Third *maḥalla* the original *imām* was a certain Ḥubbī Muḥammad who was succeeded by his two sons, first the elder son Ḥusnaddīn, and then the younger one Naṣraddīn, who became *imām* in 1866 or 1867. After Naṣraddīn's death, the *maḥalla* chose his son,

Sharafaddīn, who was still *imām* in 1910.⁸⁷ In Safarqa's Second *maḥalla* a local notable named Qudūr Bābā was able to appoint his own son Ibrāhīm as *imām* after splitting off the *maḥalla* from a larger one. After Ibrāhīm retired from his position to follow the Sufi path, he was able to have his son Muḥammad selected to be his successor. After the death of Muḥammad the *maḥalla* selected a certain Muḥammad Yūsuf Kamāladdīn ūghlī, who on his mother's side was related to the former *imām*.⁸⁸

In Altī Ata's First *maḥalla* the position of *imām* was shared between two related families. The first *imām* was a figure named Dīnūsh Muḥammad, who was from that generation of *imāms* from the early nineteenth century who were not confirmed by either the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly or the provincial authorities. After the death of Dīnūsh Muḥammad the *maḥalla* chose Isfandiyyār, who had just lost his position as *imām* in the village of Qulātqī on the right bank of the Volga in Saratov province. Isfandiyyār accepted and after he died in 1835 he was succeeded by his son Kamāladdīn (who was Muḥammad-Faṭḥ al-Īlmīnī's teacher). After Kamāladdīn Isfandiyyār ūghlī died in 1881 the *maḥalla* debated who to choose as their next *imām*:

So, [Kamāladdīn] left no male child, only daughters remained and one daughter was married to Muḥammad-Nīʿmatallāh, the son of the Muḥammad-Šiddīq who was noted in the section on Dīnūsh Muḥammad. Once, on an odd-numbered day, after the Friday prayers, the *muʾadhdhin* said to the assembly in the [Friday-] sermon, "Oh people, now our Ḥadrat has died. May God the Exalted give joy to his soul. Now we are in need of an *imām*. There are *shāghirds* who studied in the village. Whoever it may be we have to make one (of them) our *imām*." After he spoke, the assembly was quiet for a time, and then an elder named Mawḥid Sayyid-Jaʿfar ūghlī [said], "Look, Ishmurād's son studied and returned." While he said he seemed a good *shāghird*, nobody answered. Although all in all my age was still young at that time, and I was still a boy living with his father, I opened my mouth as if there were few [persons] in the land that had the same authority that I had, [and exclaimed]: "Hey *maḥalla*, I also have something to tell. Look, Muḥammad-Nīʿmatallāh the son-in-law of the Ḥadrat [Isfandiyyār], was born and raised in this *maḥalla*, and his disposition and qualities are known to all of you. If he stays with us, it will not be necessary to take someone from there for that position. You know he is the great-grandson

⁸⁴ Husayn Amīrkhan ūghlī, *Tavārīkh-i Bulghārīya*, 74–76; cf. also Kemper, *Sufis und Celeste*, 56–57; cf. also Ravil Amīrkhan, "Qazanlı Amīrkhanlar," *Qazan ulla* 1997 (10), 137–155.

⁸⁵ TAA fol. 16b.

⁸⁶ TAA fols. 22b–23a.

⁸⁷ TAA fols. 18ab, 20a.

⁸⁸ TAA fol. 33ab.

of Old Dīnūsh Mullā." After I had spoken they said, God bless you, it is good. We are all agreed to this." At that time they left the mosque and gathered next to it, and the scribe took paper and pencil and noted down the names of those who had given their agreement.⁸⁹

Thus, the new *imām* was both the son-in-law of the late Kamāladdīn and, since his mother was the granddaughter of Dīnūsh Mullā, he was also this figure's great-grandson. By choosing Nī'matallāh Muḥammad-Šiddīq ūghlī, a figure whose qualities were well known to the *maḥalla*, they also were able to select an *imām* who was related both to the original *imām* and the two generations of *imāms* who followed him.

In another case we have an example of a *maḥalla* deliberately choosing an *imām* who was not a descendant or a relative of preceding *imāms*. In Altı Ata's Fifth *maḥalla* the first *imām* was Hājī Muḥyiddīn Ḥasan ūghlī, who became *imām* around 1817. He was succeeded in 1848 by his son Khalīl. Khalīl remained *imām* until his death in 1909. Al-İlmīnī writes that he had designated his grandson Aḥmad Ishāq ūghlī to be his successor. When he first wrote his history it appears al-İlmīnī fully expected Aḥmad to succeed his grandfather, but without further elaboration he noted in a supplement added in 1909 or 1910 that the *maḥalla* had instead chosen an *imām* from Ilmin's Second *maḥalla*, Abū Bakr İbrāhīm ūghlī.⁹⁰

Although in principle the *maḥalla* had the authority to choose the *imām*, in practice the most common manner for a person to become *imām* was through the support of a local notable. On the basis of the available sources we can only speculate how the local notables could influence the rank-and-file members of the *maḥalla*, but it should not be hard to imagine that a combination of wealth, prestige, and authority enabled notables to gain support for their plans and desires. Al-İlmīnī mentions two other villages outside of the district where local notables were able to convince the *maḥalla* to select their own sons as *imāms*. The first case was in the Cossack village of Yalpaqtaḥ where the wealthiest Muslim Cossack, a certain Khūjāntāy Bābā who had the mosque built, was also able to have his own son, 'Aḥā'llāh, named *imām*. In the village of Qūlatqī (Staraiia Kulatka), a local headman (*glava*) there, named Mīrzā Ayyūb Sulṭānof, first made İsfāndiyār the village's *imām*. Later, he sought to replace İsfāndiyār with his own son:

⁸⁹ TAA fol. 13ab.

⁹⁰ TAA fols. 26b, 28a.

At that time the son of this Ghlāvā Āfāndī, Ḥabīballāh Āfāndī, took learning from this same İsfāndiyār. Later he studied in a number of large places such as Kazan, and he returned. Ayyūb Mīrzā sought to appoint his own son [as *imām* of Qūlatqī]. One time he invited the people of the *maḥalla* to a feast and requested a *prigovor* from the *maḥalla* for his son. The congregation respected the Chief's suggestion and they all were in agreement. They gave the *prigovor* and intended to establish him as *imām* and were sure in this affair.⁹¹

In the town of Novouzensk we can see a similar example of a notable replacing an existing *imām* with a relative. In this case a wealthy notable from Ural'sk named 'Aynallāh Hājī was able to convince the *maḥalla* to elect his brother-in-law Kamāladdīn Jamāladdīn ūghlī:

Meanwhile one of the *bāys* from Jāvīq [Ural'sk], the well known *bāy* 'Aynallāh Hājī, spoke among the people of Novouzensk while he was at a feast in Novouzensk. Because it was an old community he noted that progress was evident from all sides. "It would be fine if there were a mosque." When what he had said sank in, this 'Aynallāh Hājī said "If you agree to my estimation, I will build the mosque, when a separation [of the *maḥalla*] with a *prigovor* and a permit is acquired and when a time for building is determined." After he had spoken, İhsān Mullā [the acting *imām*] asked the community, and the community agreed and they began gathering a *prigovor* [for the mosque]. The Hājī said "By this agreement I shall build the mosque and you will accept my son-in-law Mullā Kamāladdīn and make him *imām*." Having mentioned the *imām*, the community wondered "Do we hesitate or is it not [indeed] very good? What should we do?" Hājī Āfāndī comforted them, saying "Do not worry about appointing the *imām*," and they put the *prigovor* in effect.⁹²

Thus, we can see that although the *maḥalla* already had an *imām*, İhsān Mullā, they nevertheless decided to take up 'Aynallāh Hājī on his offer; and while İhsān Mullā was active in building the mosque, in the end they made him leave the town and brought in 'Aynallāh Hājī's brother-in-law.⁹³

In a number of *maḥallas* the selection of *imāms* was for all intents and purposes dominated by certain notables.⁹⁴ This was especially true for *maḥallas* that had been separated off and created as a result

⁹¹ TAA fol. 10a.

⁹² TAA fols. 99b–100a.

⁹³ TAA fol. 101a.

⁹⁴ This characteristic is also documented for Nizhnii Novgorod province, and was often the subject of complaints and petitions there; cf. Idrisov et al., *Iz istorii*, 53–55.

of the initiative and expenditures of these notables. This was the case in Ilmin's Fifth *maḥalla*, which, under the leadership of the notable Sākmān Bābā, broke off of the First *maḥalla* whose *imām* was Muḥammad-Fāṭih al-Ilminī. This Sākmān Bābā convinced the members of the *maḥalla* to select a certain 'Alī Tōqtārōf to be *imām*, saying that the latter's connections with wealthy merchants would make it easy for the congregation to build the mosque.⁹⁵ In Iske Ōzen one of the wealthy notables was 'Iḷajaddīn Mifīḥāddīn Ḥājī ūghlī, who took a leading role in creating that village's Fifth *maḥalla*. It appears that since 'Iḷajaddīn shouldered the entire financial burden for building the mosque, there was no opposition when he selected as *imām* 'Abdassamād Burhānaddīn ūghlī of Kazan, who had been the teacher of 'Iḷajaddīn's son. Later this 'Abdassamād would marry 'Iḷajaddīn's daughter.⁹⁶

The most detailed account of the role of a notable in the selection of the *imām* appears in the section on Ilmin's Third *maḥalla*. Here two notables played an active role in raising up *imāms* whom they liked and deposing *imāms* with whom they were dissatisfied. The first of these two notables was a certain Khūdāybirdī Zūrbāsh, the *mu'adhdhin* to Ilmin's Third Mosque, who came into conflict with the *imām* 'Abdal'azīz Shāhī Ahmad ūghlī:

Then, Mullā 'Abdal'azīz *imām* appointed as *mu'adhdhin* this congregation's Muḥammad-Jān 'Abdarrafi' ūghlī. He was an intelligent and capable person. But let us not conceal the calamities. Muḥammad-Jān did not become the *mu'adhdhin*. An older person named Khūdāybirdī Tōqtārōf came from 'Ayn Burā. They called him Zūrbāsh [lit. "Big Head"]. This person received the authorization to the Third Congregation. He had a degree of training and he was a very proud, envious and malfasant person. Every day he would quarrel and argue with Mullā 'Abdal'azīz. One time Mullā 'Abdal'azīz reproached Zūrbāsh behind his back, calling him 'Izāzil and Iblīs [i.e. Satan].⁹⁷

With time the conflict grew worse, and soon Zūrbāsh was able to force 'Abdal'azīz from his duties as *imām*, and together with a *khūfī* named Dāwūd he began to perform the prayers at the 'Id holidays in place of the *imām*:

⁹⁵ TAA fol. 78b.

⁹⁶ TAA fols. 92b–93a.

⁹⁷ TAA fol. 70ab.

But this Zūrbāsh persevered in his initial obstinacy and at every meeting and gathering he vexed Mullā 'Abdal'azīz, and every day he disputed and slandered him behind his back. Many people repeated what he had said. He made Mullā 'Abdal'azīz disappear from sight and he intended to take his place. Once, during a holiday, Dāwūd Mullā and Zūrbāsh went out to read for the holiday. The following song was sung concerning these eloquent people:

Khūdāybirdī and Dāwūd performed
And the people gave permission
They conducted this holiday
Our Mullā stayed away and agreed to this

So, at this point, the congregation convened and they made this congregation's Mullā Muḥammad-Jān 'Abdarrafi' ūghlī the *mu'adhdhin*.⁹⁸

After his dismissal from his post as *mu'adhdhin*, and the circulation of such satiric verse concerning him, Zūrbāsh sought to replace 'Abdal'azīz:

But Zūrbāsh persevered in his obstinacy. He still intended to remove Mullā 'Abdal'azīz and replace him with another *mullā*. He had heard that there was someone who had studied in the village of Musa in Saratov Province's Khvalynsk district, and in Kazan's Yāngā Bistā under Husnaddīn [b. 'Umar]. He was reportedly learned and as smart as a lawyer. He was known as Bāqī Mullā Shāh-i Mardān ūghlī. His kinsmen made this evident and at every assembly they said this, and gave praise and applause. But other people had information that corresponded to the truth. They said "Khūdāybirdī Āghā, we heard that this person is an extremely unprospering drinker of wine." And although they would respond to Zūrbāsh, he would persevere in his own version, saying that that story was a lie.⁹⁹

As a result of his efforts, and the support of his kinsmen, Zūrbāsh was able to obtain a *prigovor* for Bāqī Mullā, and the notables angled to be able to engage their daughters in marriage to the new *imām*:

Now, they gave a *prigovor* to Bāqī Mullā and sent word to the village of Musa. In particular, at that time Putā Bābāy had a very beautiful daughter named Faṭīma. He intended to give her in marriage and become the Mullā's father-in-law. Time passed, and one day Bāqī Mullā arrived. By sight he looked to be about sixty-seven years old. He was of average height, open-faced and broad-shouldered. He had dark brown hair and whiskers like those of tsar Aleksandr Nikolaevich

⁹⁸ TAA fol. 71a.

⁹⁹ TAA fol. 71ab.

[Aleksandr II]. He was of the following sort: he was a dissembler and a hypocrite, but also a witty and eloquent person. At that time they had gathered two hundred rubles and went to Ufa for the examination. Every rich man went to the examination with the hope of giving his daughter in marriage. Soon news came from Samara.¹⁰⁰ [Bāqī Mullā reported] "I lost my money in the hotel room." Mullā Muhammad-jān told the people "I told you first. You didn't accept it. You'll see. If you tell those who are interested where the people's money went there will be friendship on that side and the matter will come to trial." Zūrbāsh and Sālih and the other tyrants all dissembled; they paid out still more money.¹⁰¹

Eventually, Pūtā Bābāy was to be disappointed when Bāqī Mullā chose the daughter of another notable:

Finally, one evening, during a council at the house of Ālmāy Qūrmāy ūghlī, the village notables gathered. . . . This Ālmāy had a lovely wife named Sāliha. He also had a very unpleasant daughter named Ḥakīma. At this assembly he offered his daughter [in marriage] to the Mullā. The Mullā considered the assistance of the community, even though he was in love with the daughter of Pūtā. He didn't see them both in the same way. While he was silent, and remaining in thought, Sāliha brought out her daughters ornaments [*āsmālār* i.e. Mishar women's chest ornaments made of coins]. It was about one hundred rubles of silver coins. "If you accept her with these, they will stay [with you]" [she said]. After she had said this he thought it over and said "God will decide whether I will choose the daughter of Pūtā or not." Then, saying "Praise God, it is his sustenance that urges into marriage," he accepted, and at that gathering committed to the wedding, and he took his gifts and left.¹⁰²

With time Bāqī Mullā still had not received his *ukaz*, and after a while, al-Īlmīnī tells us that "things reached a nadir and they permitted tobacco and the drinking of wine and spirits began to dominate." Pūtā Bābāy and several other notables who had become tired of Bāqī Mullā's fecklessness gathered and decided to void Bāqī's *prigovor* and find a new *imām*. He selected the son of a notable from Qushum.¹⁰³ This young man, named 'Ubaydallāh Temīrbūlāy ūghlī,

was studying in Kazan when Pūtā Bābā gave him the *prigovor*. The events of leading to the replacement of the old *imām* were as follows:

However, some of Bāqī Mullā's supporters, such as Sālih, were not part of the *prigovor*, and when it needed to be made official, [Bāqī Mullā's opponents] acted on the matter. They sent the *shāghid* 'Ubaydallāh Temīrbūlāy ūghlī to Ufa, and he took the exam. While he was waiting for the *ukaz*, Mullā Bāqī roused himself and filed a petition saying "Pūtā's *prigovor* is false," and he made such a case. However, even though Bāqī Mullā had wisdom, he had no money, while Pūtā had both wisdom and money. Therefore [Pūtā] sent some money to 'Ubaydallāh; he sent it to Samara, saying "As long as your *ukaz* doesn't come, don't leave Samara," he commanded. "If the money doesn't come, I will send a copy," he ordered. Mullā 'Ubaydallāh himself said "I stayed in Samara thirty-two days. I sent off the *ukaz* [to Pūtā] and boarded a steamship and went home. Bāqī Mullā got off the steamship and raced to Samara. I did not know him and he did not know me," he said. "But since the case was closed, he was unable to do anything and he returned". Also, I heard Pūtā Bābāy say, "By the time I received Mullā 'Ubaydallāh's *ukaz*, I had spent 750 rubles."¹⁰⁴

Relations with the community

Al-Īlmīnī's account of the conflicts surrounding the *imāms* and notables in Ilmīn's Third *maḥalla* illustrates well some of the typical details of the *imāms*' relationship with the community. Many, if not most, *imāms* were of local origin, and consequently had deep kinship roots and other connections to the communities they served. *Imāms* from outside the region often established roots in the communities as well, usually as a result of marriages with the daughters of local notables. Moreover we have just seen the important role local notables played in selecting *imāms*. But for all *imāms* their relationship with the community as a whole was crucial not only for maintaining their position, but for their livelihoods as well. As we have seen, at least in principle it was the duty of the *maḥalla* to provide for their *imām*, and in cases where the *maḥalla* as a whole became dissatisfied with their *imām* they could, and occasionally did, replace one *imām* with another.

Generally speaking *imāms* were very influential and prestigious figures in the community, and it was important for pious notables, or for any other members of the community, that their relationship

¹⁰⁰ Apparently the confirmation of Bāqī Mullā as *imām* involved additional business in the provincial capital of Samara.

¹⁰¹ TAA fols. 71b-72a.

¹⁰² TAA fol. 72a.

¹⁰³ In Russian, Kushumskii Poselok, in Ural'sk province, and the confluence of the Kushum and Ural Rivers.

¹⁰⁴ TAA fols. 73b-74a.

with the *imām* be a good one. Discussing the Siberian *‘ulamā*, I. Iushkov noted that older members of this group were often greatly revered, and were often asked by secular officials, such as *starshinas* and *nachal’niks* to mediate disputes.¹⁰⁵ *Imāms* were occasionally the recipients of the notables’ largess, such as ‘Umar Ayyūb ūghlī, the *imām* of Alū Ata’s Second Mosque, who received gifts of grain from a certain ‘Abdannaşr ūghlī, reportedly “a person of moderate wealth.”¹⁰⁶ In Safarqa, two brothers known as the Twin Hājīs, Shamsaddīn and Sayfaddīn, the sons of ‘Abdarrahīm, would annually assemble the village’s *‘ulamā*, elders, and notables on their abundant lands and would have a banquet where they would drink kumiss and slaughter livestock.¹⁰⁷

Financial support of imāms

Imāms in imperial Russia earned their livelihood in a number of ways. Ia. Koblov provides somewhat detailed information for the Volga-Ural region as a whole, which corresponds to some degree with the data we have for Novouzensk district. Koblov notes that the average annual income for a rural *imām* was between 200 and 700 rubles, although urban *imāms* could earn as much as 3,000 rubles a year. The reason for the disparity was partly that villagers often made offerings in-kind to their *imāms*, while urban Muslims made offerings in cash. Muslims typically paid *imāms* for services, but also made offerings on important holidays, as well as an annual *tihe* (*‘ushr*). The amounts naturally varied, but a rural *imām* could expect ten kopecks for performing the naming ceremony for a newborn (an urban *imām* could expect 50–60). Performing burial rites and funeral prayers for villagers would earn an *imām* 50–60 kopecks. Income received during holidays was more substantial. On the day of ‘Id al-Fiṭr Muslims were obligated to give the *imām* twenty kopecks. Rural *imāms* would earn between 50 and 100 rubles, in addition to in-kind offerings, while in cities the amount was between 400 and 500 rubles. During Qurbān Bayrāmī a portion of the meat from the slaughtered animal was given to the *imām*, as well as the hide.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Iushkov, *Sibirskie tatary*, 36.

¹⁰⁶ TAA fol. 16a.

¹⁰⁷ TAA fol. 30b.

¹⁰⁸ This custom is also documented among the Bashkirs and Siberian Tatars; cf. Iushkov *Sibirskie tatary*, 49; Batshev, “Derevnia Zianchurina,” 19.

The cash value of the hides could reach to between 80 and 100 rubles. The *imām* would also receive cash offering at this time, but in smaller measure than for ‘Id al-Fiṭr.¹⁰⁹

‘*Ushr* was a payment in kind collected from the autumn harvest, and could constitute a substantial part of the *imām*’s income. Koblov notes that *‘ushr* was only collected in rural areas, and even then not uniformly. The offering was supposed to amount to a tenth of the harvest, but usually amounted to less than that. But he adds that in Kazan district the *‘ushr* was paid in grain, and could be substantial. When a parishioner died the *imām* customarily received a portion of his property. Typically the *imām* would receive the person’s best suit of clothing, or from a wealthy person’s estate, livestock.¹¹⁰

Other sources mention two taxes that an *imām* was entitled to receive. The first was *zakāt*, consisting of one fortieth of the household’s income, and the other was *‘ushr*, which corresponded to a tenth of the grain harvest.¹¹¹ Al-Īlmīnī does not mention *zakāt*, and he only mentions *‘ushr* as being provided by wealthy notables for support of the *madrasa* and its instructor.¹¹² Al-Īlmīnī has relatively little to say about how *imāms* supported themselves materially. Presumably *imāms* from outside of the region were more dependent on their local benefactors than *imāms* with roots and family in the village. For example, when Abū Bakr Ibrāhīm ūghlī came to Ilmin from the town of Bigi in Saratov province and became the *imām* of the First mosque, he married ‘Alīma ‘Abdajālīl qizī, the daughter of a local notable. Concerning this notable’s largesse we read:

Meanwhile, he married ‘Alīma, the daughter of ‘Abdajālīl Sayfalmulūk ūghlī, the richest notable of the village. He [‘Abdajālīl] honored him and called him Mullā Son-in-Law, bought him land, and put a wooden house over it. Amongst the congregation they prepared building materials and in the necessary quantity everything else that was needed. They put up a wooden gate and nothing was lacking for the property or the house, and he blessed the house in a assembly, and forty sheep were gathered. In cash it would have been about a hundred rubles. [Also] one cow, and there was no end to the items.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 14–16.

¹¹⁰ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 16.

¹¹¹ M. I. Obukhov, *Mekteby Ujmskoi gubernii*, (Ufa, 1915), 7.

¹¹² Idrisov et al. state that one of the *imām*’s duties was to collect these taxes; cf. *Iz istorii*, 53.

¹¹³ TAA fol. 41b.

‘Ubaydallāh Temīrbūlāt ūghlī, the *imām* whom Pūtā Bābāy had brought from Qushum to replace Bāqī Shāh-i Mardān ūghlī in Ilmin’s Fourth *maḥalla* offered him his daughter Ḥalīma and became his chief benefactor:

... he [Pūtā Bābāy] gave his daughter Ḥalīma in marriage to ‘Ubaydallāh Mullā. Across from the mosque he moved a middle-aged person from the lot to a large property, and on that lot he built a wooden house. He built all the structures that were necessary, covered their roofs with boards, and built a gate. Ibrāhīm ‘Ubaydallāh ūghlī, the son-in-law of Pūtā Bābāy, says: “The first year Pūtā Bābāy had five *desiatinas* for the *mullā*, and he sowed wheat on it. The *mullā* didn’t spend a single kopeck. From the five *desiatinas* there were 100 sacks of wheat, or 800 poods, and in the end he stored it in a barn. The next year from seven *desiatinas* there were again 100 sacks of wheat, and again the Mullā didn’t spend a kopeck. It was with the help of the Bābā. ... Later, every year he received twenty or twenty-five sheep. It was at his [Pūtā’s] expense.”¹¹⁴

Similarly, ‘Ilājaddīn Bābā, the founder of Iske Ōzen’s Fifth *maḥalla* married his daughter Karīma to ‘Abdaṣṣamād Burhānaddīn ūghlī, the *imām* he had brought from Kazan. He built for the couple a new house on a lot facing the mosque, and he even established a garden for him.¹¹⁵

Al-‘Ilmīnī gives little information on how *imāms* earned their keep beyond the largess of notables. He tells us that Naṣraddīn Mullā Ḥubbī ūghlī, the *imām* of Altī Ata’s Third Mosque owned a small mill and in summer derived income from that.¹¹⁶ Other *imāms* grew quite wealthy from specialized skills and training, such as the *imāms* of Altī Ata’s Fifth Mosque, Muḥyiddīn Ḥasan ūghlī and his son Khalīl. These *imāms* were master healers (*ṣāḥib-i naḥas*), and Kazakhs, as well as Muslim Cossacks and even some Russians would seek them out. Russians would make offerings of fifty rubles or more to him, but his main wealth came from Kazakhs, who would bring felt, horses, or sheep, and some would even give an eighth of their property.¹¹⁷ Khalīl amassed considerable wealth in this way. Al-‘Ilmīnī even mentions one *imām* who became a major landowner, owning a thousand *desiatinas* of land. This figure, the Sufi Maḥmūd ‘Ubaydallāh

¹¹⁴ TAA fol. 74a.

¹¹⁵ TAA fol. 93a.

¹¹⁶ TAA fol. 18b.

¹¹⁷ TAA fols. 26a, 27b.

ūghlī Akchurin reportedly acquired some of his lands by unethically exploiting the needs of the *maḥalla* during a drought.¹¹⁸

However, this sort of action on the part of an *imām* was not common, and in fact al-‘Ilmīnī condemns it strongly as an action unbecoming the dignity of an *imām*:

... the path of the people of distinction should be the path of decency. During years of drought like those, decency was the feeding the poor abundantly in such times. To take the morsel that was in the hands of the poor was not the path of decency. There are those in fact who mentioned this. In that case it is not generous.¹¹⁹

Koblov notes that is was common for *imāms* to supplement their income with other economic activities, including grain cultivation and trade.¹²⁰ As we have seen, some *imāms* in Novouzensk district owned substantial amounts of land, while others, such as Abū Bakr Ibrāhīm ūghlī of Ilmin’s First Mosque were active merchants.¹²¹

Marriage Patterns

The marriage patterns of *imāms* are certainly important evidence in helping us determine the place and prestige of the *imām* in village society. Marriages between *imāms* and the daughters of local notables were commonplace, and al-‘Ilmīnī makes mention of several such unions. As we saw above, the notables in Ilmin’s Third *maḥalla* competed with one another to convince the *imām* Bāqī Mullā to accept their daughters in marriage and the *imām*’s decision to pass over Pūtā Bābāy’s daughter was certainly a cause in Pūtā Bābāy’s actions in selecting a new *imām*. Indeed Pūtā was finally able to marry another of his daughters to the *imām* he had selected and had brought from Kazan. The notable Miftāḥaddīn ‘Abdarrā’ūf ūghlī of Iske Ōzen married his daughter Sharīfa to the *imām* of Altī Ata’s Fourth Mosque, Wildān ‘Abdalwalī ūghlī.¹²² ‘Abdarrashīd Aḥmad Ṣafā ūghlī, the *imām* of Ilmin’s Fourth Mosque, was married to the granddaughter of ‘Abdaljalīl Bāy, one of Ilmin’s most prominent notables.¹²³

¹¹⁸ TAA fol. 39ab.

¹¹⁹ TAA fol. 39b.

¹²⁰ Koblov, *O māgometanskikh mullakh*, 16–17.

¹²¹ TAA fol. 42ab.

¹²² TAA fol. 23a.

¹²³ TAA fol. 76a.

The *imām* of the city of Novouzensk, Kamāladdīn Jamāladdīn ūghlī, himself married into a family with a long history of marriage connections with *imāms*. As we saw above, he owed his position in large measure to the actions of his brother-in-law, ‘Aynaddīn Ḥājī, who was a wealthy merchant in the city of Ural’sk. There is strong evidence to suggest that ‘Aynaddīn’s father was Muḥammad‘arīf b. Ḥājī Shāh-Walī, who appears in a genealogy as resident in Ural’sk and as having an unnamed daughter married to the *imām* in the city of Novouzensk. This genealogy, which traces the descendants of an eighteenth century *imām* in the village of Yortkūl, in Kazan province, named Mullā Ja‘far b. Ya‘qūb, lists male descendants, who primarily became *imāms* and merchants, and female descendants, who quite frequently were married to *imāms* in other villages and provinces.¹²⁴

In a number of *maḥallas* the marriage connections between *imāms* and the families of notables became rather complex, and involved successive generations. For example the *imām* of Ilmin’s Second Mosque, ‘Abdalḥakīm Baybīk ūghlī had two daughters, one named ‘Afīfa and the other Farīda. He married Farīda to the *imām* of Altī Ata’s Second Mosque, Ibrāhīm Ayyūb ūghlī, and he married ‘Afīfa to his successor as *imām* of Ilmin’s Second Mosque, ‘Uthmān Arslān ūghlī. ‘Uthmān suffered an untimely death, and concerning ‘Afīfa we read the following:

However, after surviving Mullā ‘Uthmān, this ‘Afīfa Khānīm married a well-known person from this congregation named Khoja Ihsān ‘Abdar-rahmān ūghlī. Since he was someone who was good-natured and lavish with his bounty, before their deaths with all of their own wealth they displayed all of their fine upbringing, and nobody found fault with their deeds. Thus, their fated lives came to an end and both of their pure souls were received in a short time in the Garden of Paradise. ‘Afīfa Khānīm was survived by two daughters from Mullā ‘Uthmān. One was named ‘Aynannawāl and the other was named Ḥāsiya. Dāmullā ‘Atā‘allāh Ḥaḍrat’s [the *imām* of Safarqa’s First Mosque’s] elder son, Mullā Hādī Afāndī, married ‘Aynannawāl and they gave the second daughter to Mullā Sharafaddīn Mullā Naṣīraddīn ūghlī, the *imām* of the Third Mosque in Altī Ata.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ This genealogy, called the *Ūtak shājarāse*, was recently published by Marsel Akhmetzianov; cf. R. R. Salikhov, R. R. Khayrutdinov, and K. M. Nizamutdinov eds., *Ocherki istorii Vysokogorskogo raiona respublikī Tatarstan*, (Kazan, 1999), 98–101.

¹²⁵ TAA fol. 66a.

Another rather complicated network of marriages involving the daughter of a notable and a number of *imāms* is evident in the village of Iske Özen. A wealthy landowner named Ḥājī ‘Umar Ḥasan ūghlī had a daughter named ‘Afīfa (not to be confused with the ‘Afīfa ‘Abdalḥakīm qızı just mentioned above), whom ‘Umar married to Sirājaddīn Walid ūghlī, the *imām* of that village’s Fourth Mosque, popularly known as Sarāy Mullā, and they had a daughter.¹²⁶ After Sarāy Mullā passed away ‘Afīfa was still young, and eventually married an *imām* named ‘Azīzallāh Aḥmad Shāh ūghlī:

Originally Mullā ‘Azīzallāh came from among the Bashkirs. When he was a *shāgird* in Kazan he came to Ūzīn Ḥaḍrat¹²⁷ with the intention of studying Persian. He had a pleasant countenance and a joking voice, and in his time he was skilled in reciting the Qur’ān. During the summertime he would guard the gardens and no one would enter or pass through the gardens. ‘Umar Ḥājī had a daughter named ‘Afīfa, who had survived Sarāy Mullā and who was both young and beautiful. Sometimes she, together with other girls and women, would go to the garden. (But I do not say this in an accusatory manner.) The girl caught the *mullā*’s eye and the *mullā* caught the girl’s eye, and since they seemed a good match, ‘Umar Ḥājī advised and gave this girl to the *shāgird*. When the *imām* of the Third *maḥalla*, Rahmatallāh Mullā, died, he [‘Azīzallāh] became *imām* of the Third Mosque. And he lived thus for several years. However, his native land was the village of Zaypa near Isterībāsh,¹²⁸ where his parents lived; and because they were pained and often complained, he forsook the mosque, went there, and they made him *imām*. ‘Umar Ḥājī’s daughter didn’t go [with him].¹²⁹

Eventually ‘Azīzallāh returned from Zaypa and was reinstated as *imām*, but died soon after. At this point the *imām* of the village’s Fourth *maḥalla* Muṭ‘allāh Nī‘matallāh ūghlī then married ‘Afīfa and became a son-in-law to ‘Umar Ḥājī.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ TAA fols. 85a, 89b.

¹²⁷ This is a reference to ‘Abdalkarīm Ḥājī Tīmerbūlat ūghlī, *imām* of Iske Özen’s Third Mosque, and one of the region’s most prominent *madrasa* instructors.

¹²⁸ Possibly the village of Zeipekulevo in Sterlitamak district, Ufa province; cf. F. S. Khisamutdinova, *Bashkirskaiia okonimīia*, (Ufa, 1991), 157.

¹²⁹ TAA fol. 85ab.

¹³⁰ TAA 86b. Here al-Ilminī’s account is somewhat confused. He identifies Muṭ‘allāh’s wife as “‘Azīzullāh’s Zabība”, it is possible that he could be referring to ‘Azīzallāh’s daughter; but because al-Ilminī notes that Muṭ‘allāh married her after ‘Azīzallāh’s death and that as a result Muṭ‘allāh became ‘Umar Ḥājī’s son-in-law makes it seem likely he is actually referring to ‘Afīfa, and that “Zabība” appears here by mistake.

Relations with the mahalla

Although the *imām* was an influential and prestigious figure, the *Tavārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* makes it quite clear that relations between *imāms* and the *mahalla* were not always smooth. For Kazan province, Ia. Koblov notes that it was not uncommon for a community to remove its *imām* for violating community standards of behavior, and especially for drunkenness. He gives as an example a community in Tetiushi district that successfully petitioned the authorities to allow them to replace their intemperate *imām* with a temperate one.¹³¹ In their disputes the *mahalla* or the *imām* would occasionally bring in the authorities and al-Īlmīnī mentions a number of cases where disputes resulted in the *mahalla* reprimanding, or even dismissing the *imām*, or in the *imām* resigning. One dispute that even involved the Governor of Samara province resulted in the resignation of the *imām*. This dispute, involving Abū Bakr Ibrāhīm ūghlī and the First *mahalla* of Ilmin, occurred as a result of Abū Bakr's neglect of his duties:

In the end Mullā Abū Bakr himself was neglectful regarding the mosque and the *madrasa* and he became a merchant. Two brothers from the Second *mahalla*, 'Abdallāh and Ihsān, the sons of 'Abdarrahmān, had recently come into their wealth and at that time he arranged a partnership with them and went into business. He did not engage in communal prayers and every day during the month of Ramaḍān, during the afternoon and evening prayers, young men with walking horses would engage in selling Chinese cloth on the edge of the ice. He saw this and came with other good horses and on the edge of the ice fifty *taranlasses* and sleighs were assembled. The people of the congregation looked badly upon this and although they filed a complaint, nothing was done; but in the affair they had reached their limit. Finally, one time the Governor came for some reason. At that point two people from the congregation, Sa'daddīn Miftāhaddīn ūghlī, Sākmān and Safar-'Alī Ramaḍān ūghlī, went to the Governor and revealed it to him, and after someone was sent to invite the Governor, he paid a visit. The above-mentioned father-in-law [of Abū Bakr], 'Abdaljalāl Bābā confirmed both of these people's statements to the Governor. However, the Governor delegated the case to his bailiff [*pristof*] and departed. The next day the bailiff arrived. When he carried out his investigation Mullā Abū Bakr apologized for his failure to educate the congregation, but he had nothing to say concerning the complaint of the elders that during the *namāz*, and especially during the evening prayer in the month of Ramaḍān that the people were awaiting that

¹³¹ Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh*, 12.

he went out on the ice and traded in horses and cattle, and finally he remained obstinate, abandoned the congregation and set off on his own.¹³²

The accusation that an *imām* was failing to perform his duties was apparently a serious one. Al-Īlmīnī related a case from the 1860's in Ilmin's Fifth *mahalla* when the *khāfi* in the *madrasa*, Muḥammad-Jān Raḍīq ūghlī, and apparently some members of the *mahalla* as well, began to accuse the *imām*, Jalāladdīn Yāhūda ūghlī, of failing to administer the communal prayers. This accusation was apparently one among others and as a result the *imām* took decisive action against Muḥammad-Jān:

The *mullā* ['Abdaljalāl] was no longer able to endure their [the congregation's] obstinacy and he filed a complaint with the bailiff. He [the bailiff] was summoned at an appointed time and he came. He received the most reputable elders of the village. They went to the *madrasa*, performed the prayers, and directly returned, and he made a formal charge against Mullā Muḥammad-Jān. The elders thought it over, and they were annoyed by Mullā Jalāladdīn, but they were humbled and Muḥammad-Jān was given to judgment, and although he was spared a fine, he was beaten forty times.¹³³

Thus, we can see that the *imām* Jalāladdīn prevailed, despite the misgivings of the elders in this case.

Problems with the same *mahalla* also dogged a later successor of Jalāladdīn, 'Alī Ḥamīdallāh Toqtarof. This 'Alī was apparently very abusive of one of his wives, and his rather rash actions led the village elders to encourage his wife to press charges against him:

Later, he married a widow, the daughter of the wife of the *mū'adhdhin* of the Third Mosque, 'Abdannaṣīr, and his [first wife] moved into her house. He built a house and a *madrasa* and made her suffer injury and oppression. He put this old woman in a basement room and would give her food and water through the room's window. He would not allow the old woman to leave and finally the old woman died. He married the daughter of a person named Hidāyatallāh Muḥammad-Jān from the First Congregation, and he remained in that old woman's house. The [first wife] who had been oppressed and outraged to an

¹³² TAA fol. 42ab; elsewhere al-Īlmīnī writes that Abū Bakr was actually dismissed from his position, cf. TAA fol. 78a.

¹³³ TAA fol. 78a. Evidently, a *khāfi* did not enjoy the same legal status as a member of the Muslim "clergy," since officially registered *ākhāns*, *imāms* and *mū'adhdhins* were immune from corporal punishment.

extreme degree turned to neutral *imāms*, and it was mutually referred to an arbitrator. The *imāms* advised them both and made them reach an accord, and after that the old woman [i.e. the first wife] suffered beyond all bounds. In the course of her reproaches, the old woman mentioned the kindnesses she had done. "Mullā 'Alī, I lived as your wife for 14 years, I gave your 14 year-old [son] a good upbringing. Is this the punishment I get for this good deed?" After she had asked this, even though Mullā 'Alī was small, he said "Let this be your reward," and he slapped her a few times and this old woman was knocked down. The elders rescued her and drove Mullā 'Alī from there. His child, Muṭ'allāh did not leave with him, but remained with his grandmother. The elders who had saved the old woman guided her and had her file a complaint. First it was tried at the township court, but when Mullā 'Alī was not satisfied, it was investigated at the Pokrovsk district court [in Novouzensk]. The punishment was lessened, and he was ruled to be incarcerated for five days, and Mullā 'Alī was banished from his home. He moved into the house of his father-in-law, who was the father of his young wife, and stayed there a while. Later he bought himself a house from the First *maḥalla* and was allowed in that congregation. Later, with his father-in-law he recorded what had taken place, but it did not change anything.¹³⁴

The Muslim community of Aleksandrov Gai, although it lacked a mosque, nevertheless had a series of *imāms*, some of whom experienced difficult relations with the community. One of these *imāms*, a certain Ḥasan from the village of Atlashevo in Saratov province's Khvalynsk district, was apparently convicted of some crime and exiled to Petrovsk in Siberia. What this crime was al-Īlmīnī does not reveal; he only lets us know that Ḥasan somehow "led the people astray."¹³⁵ Ḥasan's successor, Fayḍ Rahmān from Sterlibashevo, was apparently a competent enough *imām*, but he was unable to get along well with the community:

He [Fayḍ Rahmān] was very courageous, and on a holiday during the sermon he heard a word emerge that was contrary to proper manners, and he could not endure it. They began an argument in the assembly and he lost patience with those arguing. He submitted petitions [*arīḍat*] regarding their dispute and said in a report that they [the congregation] had insulted the tsar and his family, and said that it merited being ruled on by a high tribunal. A police investigator [*zhāndāmsvī taffishchi*] came, asked questions and received answers, and he [the *imām*] facilitated the investigator's task; and [the investigator]

¹³⁴ TAA fol. 79ab.

¹³⁵ TAA fol. 102b.

ruled to assemble the community and they were exonerated. However Fayḍ Rahmān did not retain his former good favor, and to some degree he had disgusted people with the complaints.¹³⁶

In addition to such disputes that resulted in various forms of official action, very frequently there were simply personality clashes between certain *imāms* and members of the *maḥalla*. One *imām*, 'Abdarrashīd Aḥmad-Ṣafā ūghlī of Ilin's Fourth *maḥalla*, apparently had trouble getting along with the wealthy members of his *maḥalla*:

This person was extremely keen and knowledgeable, and was most intelligent. However, because among the people he was very proud, he was unable to deal with the *bāys*. This is because the *imāms* before him treated them with the consideration due their status. Perhaps this was hypocrisy. He was only around twenty-two years old. He became haughty and intended to burden the wealthy with humility. As for the wealthy, because he was truly haughty toward them, and because of his own rudeness, they were unable to judge him fairly. They could never visit with him.¹³⁷

Duties and activities

As much as al-Īlmīnī tells us about the *imāms* of Novouzensk district, he tells us relatively little about their daily activities and duties. Of course, the basic duty of the *imām* was to conduct the daily prayers as Friday prayers at the mosque and the *khulba*, and as we have seen, failure to observe and lead the prayers was grounds for censure or even dismissal of the *imām*. The *imām* was also responsible for seeing that the month of Ramaḍān was observed at the right time, and in the correct fashion and that the holiday feasts (*'id*) were properly observed. Al-Īlmīnī mentions one *imām*, again Abū Bakr Ibrāhīm ūghlī who had studied for an extended period in Bukhara, and after returning from there declared that the Friday Prayer was done incorrectly in Russia, and filed a suit to that effect.¹³⁸

In addition, the *imām* was supposed to administer the *madrasa* and see to the teaching of children. This was a formal duty of the *imām*,

¹³⁶ TAA fol. 103a.

¹³⁷ TAA fol. 75b.

¹³⁸ TAA fol. 79b; unfortunately the manuscript provides no additional information on this controversy; for a discussion of the role of theological debates surrounding the issue of Friday prayers in the region's Islamic discourse cf. Kemper, *Sufis und Gedehte*, 294–299.

and as we saw, the *imām* Abū Bakr Ibrāhīm ūghlī was reprimanded for failure to do so.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, many *imāms* neglected the *madrasas*, devolving their authority to *muʾadhdhins*, *khālfās*, or even leaving education to the initiative of the *maḥalla* (see the discussion of *madrasas* below). Generally only the most dedicated *imāms* were conscientious teachers. Other duties included presiding over the various life-cycle rituals, such as giving names to children, performing marriages, and performing funeral services. That *imāms* carried out such duties is well established for the Volga-Ural region, and al-Īlmīnī lists “festivals, marriages, Friday prayers and Festival prayers,” among the duties of *imāms*.¹⁴⁰ I. Iushkov reports that in Siberia, *imāms* earned their livelihoods primarily by means of honoraria connected with these activities, and according to an old custom *imāms* were entitled to receive two percent of the bride price paid by the groom to the bride’s father.¹⁴¹

Another common duty carried out by *imāms* was medicine, even though this did not form part of their official duties. In Novouzensk district the most well-known healers were the *imāms* of Alī Ata’s Fifth *maḥalla*, Muḥyiddīn and his son Khalīl who were renowned in the Kazakh steppe and in parts of Siberia even. The father, Muḥyiddīn had reportedly learned the art of the *sāhib-i naḥās* from a certain Shaykh ‘Abdannaṣr Āfāndī in Istanbul. Concerning this *imām* we read:

The significance of what we call *sāhib-i naḥās* is that many sick people profit from their breath. People that are struck by spirits [*jīns*] are healed when he just looks into their faces. He lived a very long life. At no time were the sick turned away from his door. He worked for many years performing incantations for the afflicted who were in need, and he was very experienced in healing. All his life he performed incantations for the sick and especially the Kazakhs would give him a lot of presents. [...] Being more than a hundred years old, weakness finally came to his eyes, and in a state of blindness he would still perform incantations. He would cure all of the patients he performed incantations for.¹⁴²

His son Khalīl succeeded him as both *imām* and master healer:

¹³⁹ TAA fols. 41b–42a.

¹⁴⁰ TAA fols. 76b, 80a.

¹⁴¹ Iushkov, *Sibirskie talary*, 36–37.

¹⁴² TAA fols. 25b–26a.

So, after Mullā Muḥammad Khalīl Āfāndī succeeded his father [as *imām*], he also succeeded his father in treating the afflicted. Patients were cured and would return home. After his fame spread along the Sarī Ōzen [Malʾi Uzenʾ] River, it also reached many places along the Jayīq [Ural] River and in Siberia. Ural and Siberian Cossacks would write and send the letters through the mail. He received as patients Russians and notables who were not cured by doctors, and he performed incantations and cured them. They increased their offerings. Some of them would make offerings of fifty rubles and even more. Others would send offerings. Kazakhs were satisfied with sending felt, some of them horses and some of them sheep, or even one eighth [of their property].¹⁴³

Together with his official duties, al-Īlmīnī defines the true responsibility of the *imām* “commanding the good and prohibiting the evil”. The *imām* was responsible for the overall spiritual well-being of the *maḥalla* as an Islamic community, and ultimately was judged on this criteria. Al-Īlmīnī discusses a number of *imāms* who “cleaned up” religiously permissive communities. The second *imām* of Ilimin’s Second Mosque, ‘Abdalḥakīm Baybīk ūghlī is said to have “commanded the good and prohibited the evil to the common people.”¹⁴⁴ Al-Īlmīnī continues:

Concerning religion, many wine drinkers repented and begged God’s forgiveness, and in the mosque the five daily prayers were like Friday prayers and the Friday prayers were like ‘Id. He altogether eliminated the evil innovation [*bidʿat*] called *sumat jūyī* [i.e. the circumcision feast]¹⁴⁵ which had appeared about a hundred years before. They say the vilage of Ilimin was like Paradise.¹⁴⁶

It was especially in merchant settlements of Novouzensk and Aleksandrov Gai where Muslims were a minority among Russians, that al-Īlmīnī describes the role of *imāms* as being crucial in retaining the Islamic character of the communities. Concerning Aleksandrov Gai during the first half of the nineteenth century al-Īlmīnī writes:

At that time religious affairs were done carelessly. They retained a condition whereby the communal prayers were discouraged. The deeds

¹⁴³ TAA fol. 27b.

¹⁴⁴ TAA fol. 65a.

¹⁴⁵ Here it is certain that al-Īlmīnī is condemning the excessive feasting that followed the ritual of circumcision, rather than the ritual and status of circumcision itself.

¹⁴⁶ TAA fol. 65ab.

rejected the obeying of [religious] matters and they were overtaken by wine-drinking and other calamities. It appears they persevered in these deeds for some time. But let there be thanks, in later years they kept these conditions to themselves, educated the children, and during the noble month of Ramaḍan, carried out the *ṭarāwīḥ* prayers communally, and set forth to the task. Among them there was an *imām*. The first to carry out these deeds was Saṅʿatallāh Mullā. His ancestry was from Kazan Province. He himself was a master of piety, and in accordance with his abilities he defended the good and prohibited the evil. He showed patience with annoyances and gave thanks for kindnesses. At that time he began to give a pious appearance to the village of Almali [i.e. Aleksandrov Gai].¹⁴⁷

4. MUʿADHDHINS

Without question, in scholarly literature the most neglected Islamic figure in the Volga-Ural has been the *muʿadhdhin*. D. Azamatov relates that *muʿadhdhins* had three main duties. These were 1) assembling the faithful for prayer, 2) summoning the *imām* for services, and 3) announcing the beginning of services.¹⁴⁸ These were the chief tasks of the *muʿadhdhin*, or as he was popularly called, the *ādhānchī*, but the fact that like the *imām*, the *muʿadhdhin* had to have an *ukaz* and had to pass an examination for his post in Ufa at the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly suggests that his duties may have involved more than the five daily calls to prayer; and indeed the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ālā* confirms this suggestion.

In all al-Īlmīnī identifies thirty *muʿadhdhins*. Unlike *imāms*, who frequently came to Novouzensk district from other provinces and other communities, *muʿadhdhins* were almost always from the same village where they served. There was only one exception to this rule, Raḥmatallāh ʿAbdalkhayr ūghlī, *muʿadhdhin* to Altı Ata's Fifth *maḥalla*, who had originally come from the village of Rishit (Reshetino) in Penza province's Chembar district.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, unlike an *imām*, who could serve a *maḥalla* that lacked a mosque, *muʿadhdhins* were always affiliated with a specific mosque.

¹⁴⁷ TAA fol. 102b.

¹⁴⁸ Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magermelanskoe dukhovnoe upravlenie*, 89.

¹⁴⁹ TAA fol. 26b.

Origins and selection

In their origins *muʿadhdhins* were generally from the wealthier families of the community. Typical in this respect were Ibrāhīm Qudur ūghlī, who served as *muʿadhdhin* to Safarqa's First Mosque, and Jamāladdīn ʿAbdalghafūr ūghlī, whose uncle, Sayfalmulūk was a wealthy notable who actually built the mosque in Ilmin's Fourth *maḥalla* where Jamāladdīn served. Similarly, a grandson of Jamāladdīn's father, ʿAbdalghafūr, was himself *muʿadhdhin* to the same mosque.¹⁵⁰ Several other *muʿadhdhins* were the sons or brothers of *imāms*, or had married into wealthy families. However, al-Īlmīnī mentions at least one *muʿadhdhin* who was of more humble origins, namely ʿIsā ʿAbdannaṣr ūghlī, who in 1866 was appointed *muʿadhdhin* of Altı Ata's Second Mosque. Nevertheless, we are told that at the time of his appointment he possessed substantial wealth himself.¹⁵¹ Another wealthy *muʿadhdhin* was ʿAbdannaṣr Sayfalmulūk ūghlī, who served Ilmin's Third Mosque.¹⁵²

The procedure for selecting a *muʿadhdhin* appears to have been somewhat simpler than the selection of an *imām*. Nowhere does al-Īlmīnī mention a *prigovor* being issued for the appointment of a *muʿadhdhin*, although he does mention that a contract [*ittiḥāq kāghidhī*] was drawn up for the *muʿadhdhin* ʿAbdannaṣr Sayfalmulūk ūghlī.¹⁵³ Upon reception of the *maḥalla*'s agreement, the prospective *muʿadhdhin* would then have to travel to Ufa to pass the exam and receive his license [*ukaz*]. Since this journey represented a substantial expenditure of funds, it stands to reason that it was usually wealthier members of the community who became *muʿadhdhins*. While the office of *muʿadhdhin* was not formally hereditary, in a number of *maḥallas* the office passed from father to son. Curiously, it was only in Altı Ata, where as we have seen the office of *imām* was almost exclusively hereditary, that the office of *muʿadhdhin* likewise was hereditary. In that village's First, Third, and Fifth *maḥallas* the office of *imām* passed at least once from father to son. Such a hereditary transfer was evidently the exception rather than the rule, but there is evidence that it may have been the preferable, albeit not standard, form of succession.

¹⁵⁰ TAA fols. 33a, 76b.

¹⁵¹ TAA fol. 16ab.

¹⁵² TAA fol. 69a.

¹⁵³ TAA fol. 69a.

In Ilmin's Second *maḥalla* we are told that after the death of the first *mu'adhdhin*, 'Abdalghafūr, the *maḥalla* chose a successor from another *maḥalla* because 'Abdalghafūr had left no son.¹⁵⁴ The expectation of succeeding his father also appears in an account related to al-Ilminī by Khudāybirdī Nādirshāh ūghlī, the old *mu'adhdhin* of Altī Ata's First Mosque¹⁵⁵

Since the position of *mu'adhdhin* was a prestigious one, those members of the community with wealth, with wealthy or influential relatives, with an education, or with a combination of these three characteristics were often desirous of obtaining it. Al-Ilminī related a wonderfully illustrative account of how the *maḥalla* chose the *mu'adhdhin* for Altī Ata's Fourth Mosque:

Now, we have reached the death of Shāhī Mu'adhdhin [when] Mullā Wīldān was *imām*. A *mu'adhdhin* was needed and there were two virtuous individuals in the *maḥalla*. One of them was Shāhī Ārīq ūghlī and the other was Biktūmur 'Abdaljalīl ūghlī Māhinūrof. Both of them wanted the post. Shāhī Bābā's age surpassed sixty years, while Biktūmur was only thirty. The affairs of Mullā 'Abdalwalī's sons proceeded. At one point Ṣadīrqāy Bābā and the other responsible elders convened an assembly in the evening and they decided that they intended to choose a *mu'adhdhin*. Both of those mentioned, together with their families, were summoned. Neither of them said anything and they came, placed a dish or a tray in front of each person and everyone received gifts without limit from both of them. They stood on a chair and in turn performed the *ādhān*. In performing the *ādhān* the old man Shāhī performed better than Biktūmur. Nevertheless, those responsible intended to appoint Biktūmur. 'Abdalwalī's brothers-in-law, Shamsaddīn and Sharafaddīn Ayyūb ūghlī from the village of Ātlās were also at that assembly. They were merchants and they looked at Shāhī and joked "Shāhī, you have lost, it has been decided in favor of Biktūmur. You have reached the bottom of your plate [of life] and Biktūmur has more than half left!" In the end Biktūmur was chosen. He carried out the work of *mu'adhdhin* for forty years. In 1908 his notebook of life was filled and his fine soul was resigned to God.¹⁵⁶

However, in some cases a community would spare no expense to attract a specific *mu'adhdhin* whom they felt would benefit the community. One such *mu'adhdhin* was Hādī, the son of 'Aḥā'allāh Alīnbāy ūghlī the *imām* of Safarqā's First Mosque. Hādī had originally been

¹⁵⁴ TAA fol. 65b.

¹⁵⁵ TAA fol. 11a.

¹⁵⁶ TAA fol. 24ab.

made *mu'adhdhin* in Safarqa, in his father's *maḥalla*. He held that position fifteen years, and had even married the granddaughter of a wealthy local notable; nevertheless he was induced to leave Safarqa:

After the son of Safarqa's 'Aḥā'allāh, Mullā Hādī, had been *mu'adhdhin* for fifteen years, his heart stretched from this congregation to some degree. This is because the village of Būrjān, which was a Bashkir village and his father's home, located in the Nikolaevsk district at the headwaters of the Qaralīq River, this village invited him to be *mu'adhdhin* to them. They considered him to have dignity and much intelligence and these Bashkirs gave him fifty-three *desiatinas* of land at no cost and in perpetuity. He became very excited that he would be the owner of an additional fifty-three *desiatinas*, in addition to the two hundred he already owned. [At first] he stayed and kept his position here, but when he went to the Bashkir people, these Bashkirs were delighted and they built him a wooden house and gave it to him. After they finished his house and its lot, he moved there with his family. He received official authorization to move to that village and in 1908 he was granted his license.¹⁵⁷

Since becoming a *mu'adhdhin* required passing an exam, it should not be surprising that before their appointment *mu'adhdhins* generally needed to acquire a degree of learning. It appears from consulting the *Tawārikh-i Altī Ata* that few *mu'adhdhins* had, or needed, the degree of training that *imāms* required. Many *mu'adhdhins* were educated locally, though this need not imply that they were poorly educated. The *mu'adhdhin* of Altī Ata's Fourth Mosque, 'Ināyatallāh 'Ubaydallāh ūghlī Valītof studied under the *imām* Maḥmūd Āqchūrīn in Safarqa and was reportedly very skilled in Qur'ān recitation.¹⁵⁸ Ibrāhīm Qudūr ūghlī of Safarqa's First Mosque studied in Iske Ōzen in the renowned *madrasa* of 'Abdalkarīm Timurbūlāy ūghlī.¹⁵⁹ Others were trained in renowned *madrasas* outside the district, such as Husnaddīn 'Ubaydallāh ūghlī, of Ilmin's Second Mosque. He studied in Zimmicha, then in Qarghalī with Ishāq b. Maḥmūd.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, 'Abdalwahhāb

¹⁵⁷ TAA fol. 66ab; the practice of offering land to its religious figures appears to have been common among the Bashkirs of Nikolaevsk district; Azamatov cites a document he located in the archive of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly relating how in 1881 the Bashkir villages of Kunakbaevo and Kuzebaevo granted their *imām* Iarmukhammad Galiev (according to the Russian spelling) 100 rubles and fifty *desiatinas* of land; Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe mognometanskoe dukhovnoe upravlenie*, 107.

¹⁵⁸ TAA fol. 24b.

¹⁵⁹ TAA fol. 33a.

¹⁶⁰ TAA fol. 65b.

Dhū'l-Qarnayn ūghlī of Alī Ata's Third Mosque studied Sufism in Sterlibashevo under Iṣhān Nī'matallāh Bektimur ūghlī Isterlibāshī.¹⁶¹ Shāh-Sultān Ḥājī Nī'matallāh Ḥājī ūghlī, *mu'adhdhin* of Ilmin's Fourth Mosque, studied in Ilmin, and later in Bakhchisaray, in the Crimea, with Ismā'īl Bey Gasprinskii.¹⁶² Nevertheless, some *mu'adhdhins* had little or no formal training at all, such as Muḥammad-Ḥāfiẓ Nī'matallāh ūghlī in Safarqa's Third *maḥalla*. Yet despite his lack of learning we are told that he worked well with the *imām*, Maḥmūd.¹⁶³ Al-Ilmīnī describes the *mu'adhdhin* of Ilmin's Second Mosque, 'Abdalghafūr, as "very quiet, ignorant, and pious." He then adds "He studied a commentary on the *Sura-yi Yā Sīn* and other short *sūras* on the basis of a Turki commentary and learned them by heart."¹⁶⁴

Duties and activities

Beyond their primary function of performing the *ādhān*, *mu'adhdhins* often played a very active role in the communities as religious leaders. It was most common to find *mu'adhdhins* teaching in the *madrasa*, especially in *maḥallas* where the *imām*, for whatever reason, was not engaged in teaching. Some *mu'adhdhins* were themselves learned and became skilled and effective teachers. For example, in Alī Ata's Fifth *maḥalla*, where the *imāms*, Muḥyiyyiddīn and his son Khalīl were occupied as healers, the *madrasa* was entirely the responsibility of the *mu'adhdhin* there, Raḥmatallāh 'Abdalkhayr ūghlī. Raḥmatallāh was especially skilled in Qur'ān recitation and "pure Turki", and many of his students became skilled in these subjects, but he also had a foundation in Persian and Arabic as well.¹⁶⁵ Another *mu'adhdhin* who earned a reputation for his teaching was Ismā'īl Bey Gasprinskii's student, Shāh Sultān Nī'matallāh ūghlī, who taught the *uṣūl-i jadīd* in Ilmin until being expelled by the *imām*, 'Abdarrashīd Aḥmad-Şafā ūghlī.¹⁶⁶

Mu'adhdhins occasionally acted as deputy *imāms*, taking over the religious duties of the *imām* in case the latter had died or been forced

¹⁶¹ TAA fol. 18ab.
¹⁶² TAA fol. 76b.
¹⁶³ TAA fol. 39b.
¹⁶⁴ TAA fol. 65a.
¹⁶⁵ TAA fol. 26b.
¹⁶⁶ TAA fols. 76b-77a.

to leave. However the ability to take over an *imām*'s duties was only conferred to those *mu'adhdhins* who had this right specifically included in their licenses.¹⁶⁷ One such *mu'adhdhin* was Fakhraddīn Yahūdā ūghlī, who was popularly known as Āqsāq Ādhānchī. Upon the death of his brother, the *imām* Jalāladdīn, he administered Ilmin's First *maḥalla*, until the congregation became exasperated with his hostile behavior toward the *maḥalla* and they appointed an official *imām*.¹⁶⁸ Ibrāhīm Qudur ūghlī was serving as *mu'adhdhin* of Safarqa's First Mosque when his father, a wealthy notable, created the village's Second *maḥalla*, and Ibrāhīm served in his official capacity of *mu'adhdhin* as acting *imām* until formally becoming *imām* of the Second Mosque.¹⁶⁹ In Ilmin's Second *maḥalla*, after the death of the *imām* there the duties of the late *imām* were shared by the *mu'adhdhin* Ḥusnaddīn 'Ubaydallāh ūghlī and the *imām* from the Third Mosque, 'Ubaydallāh Temīrbūlāt ūghlī:

The affairs of the congregation were left to this Mullā Ḥusnaddīn *mu'adhdhin*. While the *mu'adhdhin* Ḥusnaddīn performed the business of religious services [*ibādat*], and he also showed patience in the task of carrying out business pertaining to the law, the *imām* of the Third Mosque, Mullā 'Ubaydallāh Temīrbūlāt ūghlī, carried out business what had to be recorded in the register [*daftar*].¹⁷⁰

Other *mu'adhdhins* were active fund-raisers for mosque construction projects. Two *mu'adhdhins* in Alī Ata, Sha'bān 'Isā ūghlī and Shāhaddīn 'Ishmurād ūghlī, of the Second and Third Mosques respectively, had wealthy relations in Safarqa, and as a result were instrumental in arranging the financing of their communities' mosque construction projects.¹⁷¹

5. SUFIS AND SUFISM

The origins of Sufism in the Volga-Ural region are obscure, and for all practical purposes unknown. Michael Kemper, who has produced

¹⁶⁷ Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe upravlenie*, 89.
¹⁶⁸ TAA fol. 41ab.
¹⁶⁹ TAA fol. 33a.
¹⁷⁰ TAA fol. 66b; that is, the *metricheskia kniga*, in which *imāms* were obligated to record the births, deaths, and marriages in the *maḥalla*.
¹⁷¹ TAA fols. 17a, 20b-21a.

the most thorough examination of Sufism in the Volga-Ural region to date, has underscored the Central Asian roots of Sufism in the Volga-Ural region, and notes that before the end of the eighteenth century several figures identified as Yasavians can be identified both in the Middle Volga and Astrakhan regions. Here, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Mujaddidī Naqshbandī *shaykhs* strongly reinvigorated the local Sufi brotherhoods. These local *shaykhs* were the *murīds* and *khālīfas* of two dominant figures, Niyāzqul at-Türkmanī (d. 1821), a powerful *shaykh* based in Bukhara,¹⁷² and Fayḍ Khān al-Kābulī (d. 1802), a *shaykh* based in Kabul.¹⁷³ The disciples of these two *shaykhs* and their disciples came to dominate Sufism in the region throughout the nineteenth century. What existing lineages these Mujaddidī *shaykhs* displaced is difficult to determine. Non-Mujaddidī Naqshbandī lineages appear to have existed in the nineteenth century, but how long they survived is difficult to determine. Based on the local biographical sources, all of the major Sufis in the nineteenth century were affiliated with Mujaddidī lineages.

In addition to *silsilas* connected to Niyāzqulī at-Türkmanī and Fayḍ Khān al-Kābulī, by the end of the eighteenth century, the Naqshbandīya Khālīdiya, another Mujaddidī order, began to make some headway in the Volga-Ural region as well, complementing the well-established Mujaddidī lineages rather than supplanting them. The adepts of this order were often from among the many scholars from the Volga-Ural who had studied in Daghestan, and who had studied among local Sufis.¹⁷⁴ The Khālīdiya order was especially strongly represented in Daghestan, but by the latter half of the nineteenth century began to make its way to Russia through a Turkish *shaykh* based in Istanbul, named Diyā'addīn Gümüşkhānawī, whose most famous local follower was Zaynallāh Rasulev of Troitsk (1835–1917). Zaynallāh, certainly the most influential *shaykh* of the late

¹⁷² On this pivotal Bukharan figure cf. Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte*, 91; Bakhtiyor Babadzhonov, "On the History of the Naqshbandīya Mujaddidīya in Central Mawarā'annahr in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia* [vol. 1], 398–399; Anke von Kügelgen, "Die Entfaltung der Naqshbandīya Muḡaddidīya in mittleren Tansoxanien von 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ein Stück Detektivarbeit," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia*, vol. 2, 110–111, 131–136; for legendary Muslim accounts on the origin of Sufism in the Volga-Ural region cf. Frank, "Islamic Shrine Catalogs," 273–274, and Frank, *Islamic Historiography*, 72–76.

¹⁷³ On this figure cf. Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte*, 92–93.

¹⁷⁴ On the early development of the Khālīdiya order in the Volga-Ural region cf. Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte*, 88–89.

imperial period, was also a *khālīfa* of 'Abdallhākīm Chārdāqlī, a *khālīfa* of Sharafaddīn Isterlītāmāqī, who himself had studied under Niyāzqulī at-Türkmanī.¹⁷⁵

Among the major Sufi figures and lineages in the Volga Ural region before 1917 we can count Walīd b. Muḥammad al-Amīn al-Qarghālī (d. 1802/03), who studied under Fayḍ Khān al-Kābulī. Walīd served as *imām* in Qarghālī's Third Mosque, and trained a number of influential figures, including 'Ubaydallāh b. Ja'far al-Kizlāwī (d. 1822/23). 'Ubaydallāh was the first of the so-called Kizlāw *ishāns*, an enduring dynasty based in the villages of Kizlāw, and later in Almat and Paraw.¹⁷⁶ Another influential *shaykh* was Ja'far b. Šālīh al-Qūlātqī, known as Ja'far ath-thānī (d. 1862). He also traced his lineage to Walīd b. Muḥammad al-Amīn al-Qarghālī, through his teacher, 'Abdalkhālīq al-Bulghārī al-Bālī Kūllī (d. 1862). Ja'far ath-thānī al-Qūlātqī was established in the village of Qūlatqī (Staraiia Kulatka), in Saratov province's Khvalynsk district. His most famous student was certainly Bahā'addīn Vaisov, the founder of the Vaisov movement, but he had other followers, some of whom became especially well established in Astrakhan. His followers in the latter city include 'Abdannašīr b. Murād 'Alī Shaykh (d. 1874), who reportedly taught the *Tarīqa-yi Naqshbandīya* there "for many years." Another of his followers in Astrakhan was Najmaddīn b. Shaykh Aḥmad al-Bulghārī al-Bāltāyī (d. 1895), a saint (*sāhib-i karāma*) and master healer (*sāhib-i naḡas*), as well as his Najmaddīn's own disciple, 'Abdallhādī b. Shaykh 'Abdaljabbar b. 'Abdalmannān al-Qazānī (d. 1905).¹⁷⁷ Another major and enduring Sufi center was the village of Sterlibashevo in Ufa province. The founder of this center was Ni'matallāh b. Biktūmur al-Isterlībāshī (1773–1844), who studied in Bukhara under Niyāzqulī at-Türkmanī. He founded what was to become one of the most popular and influential madrasas in the Volga-Ural region. His sons Ḥārith and Harrāth, studied in Bukhara under Niyāzqulī's son, 'Ubaydallāh.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Hamid Algar, "Shaykh Zaynullah Rasulev: the Last Great Naqshbandī Shaykh of the Volga-Urals Region," *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change*, Jo-Anne Gross (ed.), Durham and London, 1992), 114.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte*, 94–95; an uncatalogued untitled manuscript *silsila* of the Kizlāw *ishāns* is in the Ibragimov Institute of Literature, Language and History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences in Kazan, inv. no. 39–2097.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte*, 95; on the followers of Ja'far ath-thānī in Astrakhan cf. Jahānshāh an-Nīzhgharūī, *Tārīkh-i Astarkhān*, 42–43, 47.

¹⁷⁸ Tukaev, *Tārīkh-i Isterlībāsh*, 4.

Nearer to Novouzensk district there were a number of fairly well-known Sufi centers and *shaykh*s. On the right bank of the Volga, in Saratov province's Kuznetsk and Khvalynsk districts the best known centers were Qulatiqi and Zimnicha. As we have seen *imāms* from Novouzensk district maintained close connections with both of these villages. During the late nineteenth century the Cossack village of Yalpaqtał also became a Sufi center of some repute, not only locally, but on a regional level as well. Kazakhs from the Inner Horde were especially well represented among the followers of the so-called Yalpaqtał *ishāns*, as well as among *murīds* in Zimnicha.¹⁷⁹

Novouzensk district proper does not appear to have emerged as a center of Sufism, although a number of *imāms* either became Sufis upon retirement, or in some cases were licensed by the Sufi masters to teach and taught their own *murīds*. The village with the most active Sufis was Safarqa. Two active Sufis resided there, the *imāms*, 'Aṭā'allāh Ālṭınbāy ūghlī, of the First *maḥalla*, and Maḥmūd 'Ubaydallāh ūghlī Āqchūrīn of the Third *maḥalla*. 'Aṭā'allāh's father, Ālṭınbāy, lived in the Bashkir village of Būrjān on the Kamelik River in Nikolaevsk district, and reportedly earned a license [*idhn-i irshād*] from Kizlāw Ḥaḍrat, presumably a reference to 'Ubaydallāh al-Kizlāwī, who was mentioned above as the founder of the so-called Kizlāw *ishāns*.¹⁸⁰ Ālṭınbāy's son 'Aṭā'allāh maintained a rather large mosque, but it is not clear whether he was initiated into a Sufi order by his father and taught or practiced Sufism while he was occupied as a teacher and *imām*. In any case, later in his life he did turn to Sufism:

In his later years he became a Sufi under Ismā'īl Qirīmī, and although he was a loyal *murīd* and was diligent, Ismā'īl's country was far away and his [Ismā'īl's] life was not sufficiently long, and so he was not able to fulfill his wishes. Later, he approached Zaynallāh Ḥaḍrat of Trūyskī [Troitsk], who, like Ismā'īl Qirīmī, was a *khalīfa* to the Gümüshkhanawī [*shaykh*] Ahmād Diyā'addīn. He completed the path with this *ḥaḍrat* [Zaynallāh] and became his two-winged [*dhū'l-janāḥayn*] *khalīfa*.¹⁸¹ He instructed *shāgirds* in the exoteric and esoteric, and he summoned his loyal *shāgirds* to the true path.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Sufism in Yalpaqtał will be described in detail in Chapter Eight.

¹⁸⁰ TAA fol. 31b.

¹⁸¹ Literally this phrase means "possessor of two wings," implying expertise in both esoteric and exoteric sciences.

¹⁸² TAA fol. 32a.

Thus, we can see that 'Aṭā'allāh initially studied in the Crimea under another Khālidiya *shaykh*, Ismā'īl Qirīmī, before training in Troitsk with the well known figure Shaykh Zaynallāh Rasulev. Maḥmūd Āqchūrīn did, however, finish his studies with Ismā'īl Qirīmī, and was licensed [*murakkhaş*] by him and, we are told, he devoted more attention to training his *murīds* than to the *madrasa*, and as a result incurred the displeasure of some of the wealthy in the *maḥalla*.¹⁸³

A number of *imāms* in Novouzensk district became *murīds* to another Sufi, 'Abdalmannān Bigī, who taught *murīds* in the village of Bigi, in Saratov Province's Kuznetsk district. Little is known of this figure, and al-İlmīnī provides no information on his *sisila*, although he does tell us that he spent some time in the town of Novouzensk.¹⁸⁴ 'Abdalmannān does appear in a Soviet anti-religious monograph published in Kazan in 1931. In this work he is mentioned under the name Ghāpdelmān Ishan; we are told that he was active in the first decade of the twentieth century in the village of Bigi, that he was small in stature, but highly revered and reputed to be able to perform miracles. Unfortunately the work gives us no information as to his affiliation, beyond the fact that he was a Naqshbandi.¹⁸⁵ The *imām* of Safarqa's Second Mosque, Ibrāhīm Qudur ūghlī, retired as *imām*, leaving the position to his son, and he went to study Sufism under this 'Abdalmannān, and reportedly received this *shaykh*'s blessings [*fātiḥa*].¹⁸⁶ Similarly, in addition to being a successor of Ismā'īl Qirīmī, Maḥmūd 'Ubaydallāh ūghlī later in his life also became a close *murīd* to this 'Abdalmannān.¹⁸⁷

In addition to these figures who were licensed to train their own *murīds* within their lineage, there were a number of other Sufis in the region. The *mu'addhin* of Alū Ata's Third Mosque, 'Abdalwahhāb Dhū'l-Qarnayn ūghlī was a *murīd* of Nī'matallāh b. Bīktimur al-İstārfībāshī.¹⁸⁸ Finally, al-İlmīnī tells us that one of the *imāms* in Iske Özen, Ḥusnaddīn Mawlūd ūghlī, late in his life became a *murīd* to a certain 'Inānaddīn Ḥaḍrat, perhaps a reference to 'Inānaddīn

¹⁸³ TAA fols. 35b–36b.

¹⁸⁴ TAA fol. 99b.

¹⁸⁵ Zarf Mozaflari, *Ishamar-Darushlar*, (Kazan, 1931), 81–82.

¹⁸⁶ TAA fol. 33ab.

¹⁸⁷ TAA fols. 38b–39a.

¹⁸⁸ TAA fol. 18ab.

Vaisov (d. 1918), the son of Bahā'addīn Vaisov (d. 1889), who, as we saw, had been a follower of Ja'far ath-thānī in Qulātqī.¹⁸⁹

Al-Ilmīnī does not appear to have himself been a Sufi, although he did have rather close relations with a locally prominent Sufi, 'Aṭā'allāh Ālṭinbāy ūghlī Ṣafarqawī. At the same time, he cannot be said to be hostile to Sufism, but rather finds faults only with those *imāms* who let Sufism interfere with their duties as *imāms*; at the same time he decries the suspicion and prejudices of the Russian authorities toward Sufis.¹⁹⁰ In fact, it appears that Maḥmūd's status as a Sufi was used by his opponents in the village to turn the Russian authorities against him, and at one point during a dispute with the authorities the Russians sent the secret police to keep Maḥmūd under surveillance as a result of their suspicion of Sufis.¹⁹¹

The Muslims of Novouzensk district and of the Kazakh Inner Horde became exposed to Sufis from other parts of the Islamic world by the exile of a number of Daghestani Sufis to their region "around 1890." Concerning the appearance of these *shaykhs* in Samara province al-Ilmīnī writes as follows:

... two *shaykhs* appeared from among the Cherkess [i.e. North Caucasus highlanders] in the region of Daghestan. They were *khalīfas* of the Cherkess 'Abdarrahman Thughūrī. One of them was Shaykh Muḥammad and the other was Shaykh Ilyās b. Maḥmūd.¹⁹² Muḥammad Afāndī had twelve thousand *murīds* and Ilyās Afāndī had eight thousand. It seems in their own country they were renowned and complete masters. At that time, after the 'Id of Ramaḍān, every one of their *murīds* would make a pilgrimage to congratulate their *shaykh*. . . . They would come and on one day there were three hundred *murīds*. Later, the Russian officials became astonished and made inquiries. Some Cherkess hypocrites informed them [the authorities] that their intentions could in no way be good. When they said they were conspiring to raise a rebellion [*būna*], right away a denunciation was given to the governor in Temir Khan-Shura. The Governor was an Armenian and since he was an enemy of the Cherkess, he had them seized and imprisoned and sent their cases to be prosecuted. These were some of the peo-

¹⁸⁹ TAA fol. 83b. Indeed, the Vaysi brotherhood was active in regions of the Kazakh Inner Horde covered in al-Ilmīnī's history; cf. M. Sagidullin, "K istorii Vaisovskogo dvizheniia," *Ocherki po istorii mestnogo kraia*, (Kazan, 1930), 244.

¹⁹⁰ TAA fol. 38b.

¹⁹¹ TAA fol. 38b.

¹⁹² That is, Ilyās b. Maḥmūd at-Tsudaqārī, who became the teacher of Muḥammad b. Muḥammad-Fāṭih al-Ilmīnī.

ple [prosecuted] who were known for learning and ascetic practice: first, Shaykh Muḥammad, second Shaykh Ilyās Afāndī, third Dīwāna Muḥammad, fourth Uzūn Ḥājī, fifth Sulayman Ḥājī, sixth Rajablū, seventh Mūsā Ḥājī, eighth 'Abdallāh Ḥājī, and there were others.¹⁹³

The Sufi master of Ilyās b. Maḥmūd and Shaykh Muḥammad, 'Abdarrahman Thughūrī (d. 1882), is a fairly well established figure in Daghestani history. In Nadhīr ad-Durgilī's Arabic-language biographical dictionary, *Nuḥḥat al-adhlān*, his full name appears as Shaykh al-Ḥājī 'Abdarrahman b. Aḥmad ath-Thughūrī. He received his *ijāza* (license) from Muḥammad al-Yarāghī, a major figure in Daghestani Khālidiya Sufism who died in 1838, and who initiated Shamil himself into his Sufi brotherhood.¹⁹⁴ 'Abdarrahman ath-Thughūrī was also a follower of the major figure in Daghestani Sufism Shaykh Jamāladdīn al-Ghāziḡhumūqī (d. 1866), but is best known as a poet.¹⁹⁵

The Russian authorities had sentenced these Daghestanis to exile in Siberia, but, al-Ilmīnī tells us, upon reaching Astrakhan they hired skilled lawyers who managed to have the place of exile changed from Siberia to Samara province, and it was the governor of the latter province who decided to establish them in Novouzensk district.¹⁹⁶ Ilyās b. Maḥmūd, together with several other Daghestanis eventually went with Muḥammad al-Ilmīnī to spend a year in the *madrasa* of 'Aṭā'allāh aṣ-Ṣafarqawī in Safarqa, and both of these figures became Muḥammad al-Ilmīnī's teachers.¹⁹⁷ Whether Ilyās taught Sufism in Safarqa is unclear, but as we have seen 'Aṭā'allāh himself was a *murīd* to both Zaynallāh Rasulev of Troitsk and the Khālidi *shaykh* Ismā'il Qjirimī.

¹⁹³ TAA fol. 96b.

¹⁹⁴ On Muḥammad al-Yarāghī and his role in the Daghestani jīhad movement cf. Michael Kemper, "Einige Notizen zur arabischsprachigen Literatur der *ghilāḍ*-Bewegung in Daghestan und Tschetschenien in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 19th Centuries* vol. 2, Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, and Allen Frank (eds.), (Berlin, 1998), 66-73.

¹⁹⁵ Amri R. Shikhsaidov, "The Biographical Genre in Daghestani Arabic Literature: Nadīr ad-Durgilī's *Nuḥḥat al-adhlān fī tarāḡim 'ulamā' Dāḡistān*," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 19th Centuries* vol. 2, Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, and Allen Frank (eds.), (Berlin, 1998), 59; on Muḥammad al-Yarāghī cf. 60.

¹⁹⁶ TAA fols. 96b-97a.

¹⁹⁷ TAA fol. 97a.

CONCLUSION

In Novouzensk district, as in the Volga-Ural region as a whole, the *‘ulamā* formed the backbone of Muslim religious life. The region's "Islamic Renaissance" owes much to the regulation and standardization of Islamic religious institutions under Catherine II, which led to the joint regulation of the *‘ulamā* under the auspices of both the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly and local provincial authorities. The central figure in the Volga-Ural region's religious establishment was the *imām*, and specifically the village *imām*, since the overwhelming majority of Muslims, and the overwhelming number of mosques, served rural congregations. The *imām*'s activities included both civil and religious duties. As a civil functionary, jointly confirmed by the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly and the provincial authorities, the *imām*, after 1830, was required to compile the births, marriages, and deaths in his congregation and submit a copies of these documents to the provincial authorities and to the Spiritual Assembly in Orenburg. On the basis of his loyalty oath, the *imām* was also held at least partially responsible for the behavior of his congregation. However, it is clear from the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* that the *imām* primarily viewed himself as a religious figure, and was primarily occupied with religious duties, and as the leader of the Islamic community. The *imām*'s chief religious duties included, naturally, performing the prayers, and enforcing Islamic religious standards within the community. The *imām* was also responsible for teaching children and, ideally, for instructing older students in a *madrasa*. These requirements have been already established in the published literature, and as a result, we have a fairly clear idea of the *imām*'s public requirements, and as a result, of his ideal behavior. The importance of the material for Novouzensk district is that here we have an almost exhaustive description of the actual relations between *imāms* and the communities they served, and studying such an account allows us to speak with authority about the standards and realities facing *imāms* in these communities.

In Novouzensk district *imāms* maintained very close ties with local wealthy notables. Nearly all *imāms* were themselves from wealthy families, or married into wealthy families. However the region's economy, based on a wheat monoculture cash-crop, caused rapid social mobility, both up and down, and at least in Novouzensk district, there is no basis to speak of the *‘ulamā* as constituting any sort of

entrenched social class. Nor is there grounds to state, as Soviet scholars have done, that *imāms* were necessarily subordinate to the interests of the local Muslim elites. The material from Novouzensk district makes it clear that an *imām* could expect a fair degree of autonomy in how he managed his duties. While some *imāms* were clearly installed by notables, many others were chosen by the *mahalla* at large, and for their religious qualities. Some *imāms* even came into sharp conflict with the wealthy in their *mahallas*, or with the *mahalla* at large. On the whole *imāms* were fairly independent figures, who clearly conceived of themselves as their communities' religious leaders, and as such possessed no small degree of prestige in their communities. While their level of education varied, it was on the whole fairly advanced. Relatively few *imāms* were *hājīs*, nevertheless, many had studied in major regional Islamic centers such as Qarghalī and Kazan, and a number had even studied in Bukhara and Egypt, and as a result, were exposed to the larger Islamic world of which they were a part. Nevertheless, locally-trained *imāms*, such as the authors of the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* themselves, could boast a high level of training and erudition too.

The *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* also gives us insights into the functions and selection of *mu'adhdhins*, whose study is badly neglected in the secondary literature. The level of education of these figures was somewhat lower than that of *imāms*. The post of *mu'adhdhin* was also a prestigious one, however, and often attracted notables. The primary duty of the *mu'adhdhin* was to perform the five daily calls to prayer (*ādhān*), however, many *mu'adhdhins* complemented the *imām* by performing duties the *imām* could not or would perform, and when an *imām* would die or otherwise leave his position, it was common for the *mu'adhdhin* to at least temporarily take of the *imām*'s duties.

Novouzensk district was not a center of major Sufi activity in the Volga-Ural region. Nevertheless there were some locally prominent Sufis practicing in the village of Safarqa. The local Sufis were integrated into the region's major lineages. Older figures, such as the Bashkir *imām* Āltınbāy from Nikolaevsk district, was a *murīd* of one of the Kizlāw *ishāns*, who traced their lineages back to the Naqshbandī Mujaddidī figure Fayḍ Khān al-Kabūlī. However the region's dominant lineage, at least by the end of the nineteenth century, was the Naqshbandī Khālidiya order. Local *imāms* became *murīds* of the Crimean Sufi Ismā'īl Qjirimī, a follower of the Istanbul master

Diwā'addīn Gümüşkhānawī, while there was also the presence of a number of Daghestani Sufis in the region after 1890 who traced their lineages to the Khālidiya figure Muḥammad al-Yarāghī, who was a prominent figure in the Daghestani *jihād* movement of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER FIVE

MOSQUES

I. SOURCES

The focus of attention in the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* is above all the mosques of Novouzensk district. The mosque was not only the most visible symbol of the community's Muslim status, but also evidence of its formal existence as a *maḥalla*. As we have seen, the chapters discussing individual villages are divided headed by the name of a mosque, and much of the narrative is devoted to the various details concerning the building and maintenance of these mosques. The discussion of mosques in the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* merits attention not simply as a case study of mosque construction and fundraising in the Russian empire's Muslim communities, but also because while mosques remained quite literally at the center of Muslim life in the Russian empire, historians have largely ignored the role of the mosque in the religious life of Volga-Ural Muslims.

Of course, the region's Islamic historians were well aware of the mosque's important role as a religious institution. The village histories published before 1917, as well as many more manuscript histories, very much focused on details concerning the establishment of local mosques. This interest in the histories of individual mosques is equally evident in the historical compendium *Mustafād al-akhbār fī ahwālī Qazān wa Bulghār* of Shihābaddīn Marjānī, who included in the second volume of this work fairly detailed histories of mosques in the city of Kazan, and in several prominent Muslim villages in Kazan province.

The most extensive general discussion of mosques in Russia proper remains the article of the anti-Muslim missionary, E. Malov.¹ Malov wrote this article to encourage the Russian authorities to enforce existing laws limiting mosque construction, arguing that mosques

¹ E. Malov, "O tatarskikh mechetiakh v Rossii," *Pravoslavnyi sobesvednik* 1867 (12), 285-320, 1868 (1), 3-45.

Bashkirs has been to categorize many aspects of religious life as being "pre-Islamic survivals," revealing more genuine (and ethnographically interesting) national traits. Precisely the same stereotypes are visible in the works of both Soviet and Western scholars; however, where Soviet ethnographers generally admitted that the Tatars and Bashkirs, at least in pre-Soviet times, were Muslims, many scholars have maintained that Kazakhs, and other Muslim nomads, were not "really" Muslims. Simply put, the Kazakh nomads were at heart "noble savages," unsullied by Muslim "fanaticism," and that their animistic "state of nature" was only disrupted by the penetration of fanatical Tatar merchants and "wild" Central Asian Sufis bringing what amounted to a "foreign ideology" to the nomads.¹ In Russian sources, and especially in missionary sources from the nineteenth century, we begin to encounter the false charge that Catherine II was responsible for the "Islamization" and "fanaticization" of the Kazakhs when she embarked on a policy of converting the "animist" Kazakhs to Islam through the use of Tatar "*mullās*." Already in 1902 the Orenburg historian A. Dobrosmyslov rejected this charge as baseless, and demonstrated that while Catherine facilitated the exposure of Kazakhs to the Islamic establishment of the Volga-Ural region, it was in large measure a response to Kazakh requests, and that the Kazakhs were certainly Muslims at that time.² Nevertheless Western scholars have adhered to the missionary-inspired charge that Catherine converted the Kazakhs to Islam. For example, the anthropologist Elizabeth Bacon chastises Catherine II for holding a "mistaken assumption that the Kazak[h]s were Muslims," and seeks to prove that in fact Kazakhs were not Muslims.³

¹ According to this stereotype, the the Kazakhs's true essence was shamanistic. This proposition is widely encountered in accounts Kazakh religious life, especially among some Russian-educated nineteenth century Kazakhs; cf. A. I. Levshin, *Opisanie kirgiz-kazach'ikh ili kirguz-katsatikh ord i stepei*, (Almaty, 1996) [First ed., 1822], 313-320; Khodzha Mukhammed-Salikh Babadzhanov, *Sochineniia*, 64-84, (Almaty, 1996); Chokan Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, I, 208-215, IV, 48-75; this idea was especially embraced by missionaries as well; cf. N. Spasskii, *Potrebnosti pravoslavnoi missii dlia Bukharskoi ordy* (Moscow, 1895), passim; N. Il'minskii, *Vospominaniia ob I. A. Albysarim*, (Kazan, 1891), 159-160; I. Altynsarin, *Izbrannye sochineniia*, (Almaty, 1957), 315-327. This has found its way in some general Western studies as well; for example, Thomas G. Winner, *The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia*, (Durham, North Carolina, 1958), 9-13.

² A. Dobrosmyslov, "Zaboty imperatritsy Ekateriny II o prosveshchenii kirgizov," *Trudy Orenburgskoi Uchenoi Arkheologii Komissii* IX (1902), 51-63.

³ Cf. Elizabeth Bacon, *Central Asians under Russian Rule* Ithaca, New York, 1968, 41-42.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE KAZAKH INNER HORDE AND THE URAL COSSACK HOST

The previous chapters have focused primarily on the Muslim communities of Osinov Gai township in Novouzensk district. As we have seen, the Islamic institutions in these four villages were essentially local variants of similar institutions and institutional structures in the provinces of Russia's Volga-Ural region. The arid steppe lands to the east and southeast of Novouzensk district, that the authors include within the territory of the Bol'shoi Uzen' Valley, also supported a number of nomadic and semi-nomadic Muslim communities whose Islamic institutions differed markedly from those of Osinov Gai township. These differences were both historical and structural, and were most prominent during the first half of the nineteenth century, when the Islamic institutions of the Kazakh Inner Horde functioned independently (at least administratively) from the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly. Furthermore, on the steppe frontier, in the Kazakh Inner Horde, the Ural Cossack Host, and the frontier merchant settlements catering to the steppe trade, Islamic institutions and Islamic religious life in general, differed markedly from what has been discussed in the previous chapters. As we shall see, the *Tauarikh-i Alfi Alā* can be an instructive antidote to some clichés and assumptions that have typified much of the scholarship surrounding the religious life of the Kazakh nomads, and of the Tatar merchants in their midst.

1. KAZAKH STEREOTYPES AND KAZAKH ISLAMIC TRADITIONS

The study of Islam among the Kazakhs, and among Inner Asian steppe nomads in general, has tended to be dominated by a number of fallacious stereotypes and assumptions that been especially tenacious in scholarly works, and especially in works by Western scholars. Islamic sources, such as the *Tauarikh-i Alfi Alā*, can be helpful in dispelling some of these stereotypes and clichés. We have noted above how a feature of Soviet ethnography concerning Tatars and

Many Western scholars, drawing their conclusions exclusively from secondary and tertiary works, still adhere uncritically to the idea that Kazakhs only became Muslims under Russian rule. Martha Brill Olcott tells us that "the Kazakhs were not devout Muslims," but in the very next sentence she writes "the Kazakhs were nomads and heathens." Concerning Catherine II's policy of encouraging Islamic education among the Kazakhs Olcott writes:

Since Christian missionaries clearly had not succeeded [in Christianizing the Kazakhs in the eighteenth century], it was hoped that Islam would serve as a civilizing force for the wild and unpredictable Kazakhs. Ironically, Islam had the opposite effect. By the middle of the nineteenth century it served as a new and more potent focus of anti-Russian sentiment.⁴

It is unclear what missionaries Olcott is referring to here, but the principle reason for their lack of success may have been that there were no Christian missionaries among the Kazakhs in the eighteenth century. Orthodox missions to the Kazakhs only emerged in the nineteenth century.

Hasan Paksoy's "analysis" is in many ways more radical than Olcott's. He determines the Islamization of the Kazakhs to have occurred at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Paksoy states the Kazakhs' equestrian skill and consumption of kumiss to be evidence of their superficial grasp of Islam. Alexandre Bennigsen too has denied that the Kazakhs were Muslims, and Catherine Clay makes the same erroneous claim regarding the Bashkirs, categorizing them as "animists."⁵

This stereotype has been strengthened by the unfortunate characteristic of Central Asian scholarship in the West whereby scholars like Paksoy, Olcott, and others base their research mainly on secondary literature, and recycle unsubstantiated clichés and arguments. When they do in fact consult primary sources (and invariably these are published primary sources), they cite them very selectively, and in some cases disingenuously. For example, in the article where he

⁴ Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 46–47.

⁵ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs* (Stanford, California, 1987), xxi; H. B. Paksoy, "Nationality or Religion: Views of Central Asian Islam," *American Association for Central Asian Research [AAR]* Bulletin VIII, No. 2, Fall 1995, 4–5; Catherine B. Clay "Ethnography and Mission: Imperial Russia and Muslim Turkic Peoples on the Caspian Frontier in the 1850's," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 18:2 (1994), 23; cf. also Bennigsen, *Les mouvements nationaux*, 29.

assures us that Kazakhs were not "really" Muslims at the end of the nineteenth century, Paksoy cites Wilhelm Radlov's *Iz Sibiri*. However, he neglects to relate that within this same work Radlov actually reports extensively on Islam among the Kazakhs, and among other things, writes quite convincingly on the presence of Islamic themes in Kazakh oral epics, and the great importance of Islamic identity and Islamic rites to Kazakh nomads.⁶

There has however been some recent scholarship that has sought to examine on the basis of indigenous sources how Islam "mattered" among Kazakhs before 1917 and how they used Islamic images and Islamic concepts within their own community's internal discourse. Substantial contributions in this area include Devin DeWeese's monograph on Islamization among the steppe nomads and the position Islamization legends and the figures connected with them came to hold in the folklore of the steppe nomads, including the Kazakhs, as well as his work on sacred descent groups among the Kazakhs.⁷ S. A. Asanova has devoted a recent article to printed Kazakh religious literature from the early twentieth century which addressed in strong Islamic terms Kazakh social and economic problems exacerbated by Russian policies. Asanova also addresses the Islamic elements central to the poetry of numerous popular Kazakh bards at that time.⁸ Ashirbek Muminov has written a number of articles on such Islamic institutions among the Kazakhs as pilgrimage and sacred descent groups.⁹ In addition, a number of useful monographs discussing Islamic institutions among the Kazakhs have also appeared.¹⁰

⁶ V. V. Radlov, *Iz Sibiri*, (Moscow, 1989), 302–304; the interesting topic of Islamic legends in Kazakh oral literature remains to be studied. N. Katanov reviewed many published version of these works in the Kazan journal *Deiatel'* in 1898 and 1899; for a bibliography of such published works cf. U. Subkhanberdina and D. S. Seyfullina, *Qazaq khatıñning shehıresı 1807–1917*, (Almaty, 1996).

⁷ Cf. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde*; Devin DeWeese, "The Politics of Sacred Lineages in 19th-Century Central Asia: Descent Groups Linked to Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi in Shrine Documents and Genealogical Charters," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31 (1999), 507–530.

⁸ Cf. S. A. Asanova, "Dukhovnaia kul'tura kazakhskogo naroda na rubezhe vekov (obzor religioznoi i khudozhestvennoi literatury)," *Kazakhstan v nachale XX veka: metodologiya, istoriografiia, istochnikovedenie*, (Almaty, 1993), 125–137.

⁹ Cf. Ashirbek Muminov, "Veneration of Holy Sites of the Mid-Sirdar'ya Valley: Continuity and Transformation," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries* [vol. 1], 355–367; cf. also his "Die Qo'zas—Arabischen Genealogien in Kasachstan," *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*. Vol. 2, 193–210.

¹⁰ Cf. R. M. Mustafina, *Predstavleniia, kul'by, obriady u kazakhov*, (Almaty, 1992); V. N.

2. ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE INNER HORDE

During the nineteenth century there were two sorts of Islamic institutions among the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde. The first type were the indigenous institutions which the Kazakhs brought with them in 1801 when they crossed to Ural River and migrated into Russian territory. The second type were institutions which the Kazakh leadership within the Inner Horde sponsored and developed after 1801.

In much of the literature on the Inner Horde authors have almost universally made statements to the effect that upon crossing the Ural River in 1801 the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde possessed virtually no Islamic institutions, that is, religious specialists such as *mullās*, or mosques. However, Kazakh nomadic society at this time was certainly an Islamic society, albeit of a very specific sort. An important feature of Kazakh religious life was the existence of “sacred” clans, which were lineal descent groups claiming descent from Muslim saints, or even from the Four Caliphs and the Prophet Muhammad himself. These communities, known as *qozhas* (the Kazakh form of the Persian word *khawāja*), formed exclusive endogamous communities with an important and authoritative role as religious figures and mediators. Strictly speaking these *qozhas* were not Kazakhs, since their ancestry placed them outside of the genealogies of the Kazakh tribes and clans constituting the three Kazakh Hordes. Sacred communities distinguished from the larger Islamic community by virtue of their ancestry were not unique to the Kazakhs, but exist throughout Central Asia.¹¹

Little has been published about the specific role of the *qozhas* in the Junior Horde or of their genealogies. Muminov identifies two separate groups of *qozhas* in the Junior Horde. The first was the Turkpen clan of the Seit-Qozha group. Ultimately these *qozhas* claimed *sayyid*

Basilov and Dzh. Kh. Karmysheva *Islam u kazakhov* (Moscow, 1997); G. E. Taizhanova, *Kazakhi: Istoriko-etnograficheskoe issledovanie*, (Almaty, 1995), 227–268, and especially Qalmuqan Isabay and Sapar Bayzhan-Ata, *Qazhigha barghan qazaqtar*, (Almaty, 1996).
¹¹ Sacred lineages are best documented for the Kazakhs and Turkmen; cf. Muminov, “Die Qoʻzas—Arabische Genealogien in Kasachstan,” S. Demidov, *Turk-menskije ovlady* (Ashkhabad, 1978), V. Basilov, *Kulʼt svyatykh v islame*, (Moscow, 1970), V. Basilov, “O proiskhozhdenii Turkmen-ata,” *Domusulʼmaniske verovanii i obrady v Srednei Azii*, (Moscow, 1975), 138–168; for discussions of such sacred lineages in the post-Soviet era cf. David Tyson, “Shrine Pilgrimage in Turkmenistan as a Means to Understand Islam among the Turkmen,” *Central Asia Monitor* 1997 (1), 15–32; Bruce Privratsky, “Turkistan: Muslim Landscapes and Kazak Ethnicity,” *Journal of Central Asian Studies* 2/1 (1997), 46–60.

status, that is, descent from the Prophet Muhammad; but the Turkpen clan is also said to be descended from two Central Asian saints, Qozha Orarliq and Qozha Ghijduvanliq.¹² While the Turkpen clan was primarily located in Khorezm, the so-called Kereit *qozhas* were more widespread within the Junior Horde. Muminov gives no information about this group’s ancestry, but unlike other *qozha* communities, he notes that the clans of the Junior Horde would often nomadize with “their own” Kereit *qozhas*, and that these *qozhas* would identify themselves as “*qozhas* of such-and-such a Kazakh clan.”¹³

As for the Inner Horde proper, in 1841 Khanykov estimated the total number of *qozhas* to be less than 200, and he noted that the *qozhas* “did not belong to any clan,” unlike the Kereit *qozhas* described by A. Muminov;¹⁴ and a Russian missionary source from 1895 identifies the Inner Horde’s *qozhas* as *sayyids*.¹⁵ M. Ivanin reported the number of *qozhas* to have been 178 in 1850.¹⁶ *Qozhas* in the Inner Horde were also exempt from the official *zakāt* tax, or from other levies, and it is for this reason that Russian observers have identified the *qozhas* as part of the Kazakh “aristocracy.”¹⁷ However, according to Ivanin’s census data from 1850, where he provides figures for the size of each tribe’s herds, as well as those of the *qozhas* and Chingisids, the difference in wealth between the *qozhas* and the rank-and-file tribes was not extreme. The livestock per capita for *qozhas* and the two largest tribes in 1850 was as follows:

	<i>qozhas</i>	Berish	Baybaqtı
camels	5.5	3.1	1.1
horses	14.9	7.9	10.6
cattle	7.6	7.4	5.8
sheep	57.6	55.1	38.4
goats	10.3	9.0	3.8 ¹⁸

A. Evreinov, a keen observer of religious life in the Inner Horde, relates that the *qozhas* claimed ancestry from a “Muslim jurist” (*zakonuchitelʼ*) and he identifies the *qozhas* as a sort of aristocracy, indicating

¹² Muminov, “Die Qoʻzas—Arabische Genealogien in Kasachstan,” 199–200.

¹³ Muminov, “Die Qoʻzas—Arabische Genealogien in Kasachstan,” 200.

¹⁴ Khanykov, “Ocherk sostoianiia vnutrennei kirgizskoi ordy,” 37.

¹⁵ Spasskii, *Potrebnostʼ pravoslavnoi missii*, 3.

¹⁶ M. Ivanin, “Vnutrenniaia ili Bukeevskaia kirgizskaia orda,” *Epokha* 1864 (12), 10–11.

¹⁷ Ivanov, *Dzhanger kham*, 141.

¹⁸ Ivanin, “Vnutrenniaia ili Bukeevskaia Kirgizskaia Orda,” 11.

that they ranked slightly below the Chingisid *sultans*. He notes that both *qozhas* and *sultans* were addressed by Kazakhs as "Allyiar" (i.e. *Allābyār*) and that the *qozhas* were exempt from taxation.¹⁹ Evreinov notes that in 1851 there were a total of 195 individuals with *qozha* status in the Inner Horde, divided into four separate descent groups (*potomstvo*). The largest of these groups were descended from a certain Khodzha-Zhdai, and consisted of 115 people divided into four "generations" (*koleni*). The Murza-khodzha descent group had 53 members and three "generations," the Khodzha Farsi group had fifteen members, and the last group, descended from one Khan-khodzha, had 12 members in two "generations."²⁰

Although there is little explicit evidence regarding what sort of religious role *qozhas* may have had in the Inner Horde, we know that at least one *qozha* family figured prominently in the political life of this Kazakh polity. Members of the Babadzhanov family were prominent figures in the administration of the Inner Horde under Jahāngīr Khan and in the decades following his death. Karaul Babadzhanov represented the interests of Jahāngīr Khan in numerous matters during the first half of the nineteenth century, especially concerning land disputes. Indeed Karaul Babadzhanov used his privileged status to educate his sons in Russian educational establishments. The most well known member of this family was Muḥammad-Šāliḥ Babadzhanov, and it is in a sense ironic that this privileged *qozha* and *sayyid*, who served on the provisional ruling council (*vremennyi sovet*) after the abolition of Chingisid authority in the Inner Horde in 1848 was himself a vocal russophile. Like his contemporary Chokan Valikhanov, Muḥammad-Šāliḥ Babadzhanov was a strong advocate of the cultural and political, if not religious, russification of the Kazakhs,²¹ and was an equally strong critic of Tatar religious and cultural influence among the Kazakhs.²² Indeed, his hostility to the Inner Horde's Islamic establishment may reflect the displacement of

qozhas' dominant religious position in the Inner Horde by a non-*sayyid* *ulamā* of Tatar and Kazakh origin. The role of the Babadzhanov family in the Inner Horde should not be viewed, however, as an anomaly among Muslim elites under Russian rule. It is in a sense quite similar to that of Inner Asian Bakrid and *sayyid* families from among the Tatars who, upon becoming Russian subjects in the medieval era, integrated themselves into the Russian nobility, joining their interests to those of the Russian state, but at the same time remaining firmly attached to their Islamic genealogies.²³

In addition to the indigenous nomadic institution of *qozha* clans, there also existed a different sort of Islamic establishment that the khans of the Inner Horde actively supported. This other religious establishment consisted of such elements as *imāms*, mosques, and a legal infrastructure that was more easily recognized by Russian observers as being "Islamic." Initially this Islamic infrastructure was staffed in large measure by Volga Tatar *ʿālims*. As we have seen, the influence of Volga Tatars in the commercial life of the Inner Horde was substantial, yet their influence also great in the religious lives of the Inner Horde's Kazakh population. Volga Tatars had been actively involved in the religious life of the Kazakh since the middle of the eighteenth century, but nowhere on the Kazakh steppe was the profile of Tatar religious figures higher than in the Inner Horde. During the second half of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century Tatars were present throughout the Kazakh steppe attached to the entourage of powerful Kazakhs as *mullās*, scribes, and intermediaries between the Kazakhs and the Russian authorities (often these *mullās* were also agents of the Russian authorities in Orenburg), and in the Inner Horde, their role was especially prominent.²⁴ Although the role of Volga Tatar figures in the religious life of the Kazakhs in the Inner Horde will be discussed in more detail below, it is worth noting that the issue of the Tatar presence in the Inner Horde was a cause of great alarm among many Russian

¹⁹ Evreinov, "Vnutrenniia ili Bukeevskaia kirgiz-kazach'ia orda", 65.

²⁰ Evreinov, "Vnutrenniia ili Bukeevskaia kirgiz-kazach'ia orda", 96.

²¹ While there is no evidence that Muḥammad-Šāliḥ renounced his own Muslim faith, he did express support for an increased Russian Orthodox missionary presence in the Inner Horde; cf. Khodzha Mukhammad-Salikh Babadzhanov, *Sochineniia*, (Almaty, 1996), 71.

²² On Muḥammad-Šāliḥ Babadzhanov cf. N. P. Islev "Vvedenie. Zabytyi etnograf iz Naryn-Peskov," in: Khodzha Mukhammad-Salikh Babadzhanov, *Sochineniia*, (Almaty, 1996), 7–30.

²³ On the Russian nobles and industrialists claiming descent from the caliph Abū Bakr and the Muslim saint Baba Tükles cf. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde*, 396–407; cf. also Iskhakov, D. M. "Seidy v pozdnezolotoordynskikh tatarskikh gosudarstvakh," *Tatarica* 1 (1997), 42–95.

²⁴ Cf. Allen Frank, "Tatarskie mully sredi kazakhov i kirgizov v XVIII–XIX vekakh" *Kul'tura, iskusstvo tatarskogo naroda: istoiki, traditsii, vzaimosviatzi Kazan'*, 1993 124–131.

administrators and missionaries,²⁵ as well as among the Russian-oriented members of the Inner Horde's Kazakh elite,²⁶ and indeed Russian apprehension toward Islam and Tatars among the Kazakhs is a major theme in virtually all Russian writing concerning the Inner Horde.

The creation of a Tatar-dominated Islamic religious establishment in the Inner Horde is most often attributed to Jahāngīr Khan, but it is clear that Jahāngīr's father, Būkāy Khan (d. 1815) had a strong attachment to Islam, and began introducing Islamic institutions to the Inner Horde soon after his migration across the Ural River in 1801.²⁷ Būkāy was the first Kazakh ruler to exact *zakāt* payments from his Kazakh subjects, as well as from Qaraqalpaqs under his rule.²⁸ Upon being elected khan in 1812 he swore his loyalty oath on a Qur'ān,²⁹ and his choice of his final resting place by the tomb of the Muslim saint Sayyid Bābā in the *Sayyidlār zhyrātī* cemetery in the village of Krasnyi Iar in Astrakhan province clearly demonstrates his status as an Islamic sovereign, and the transformation of his tomb into a Muslim shrine and place of pilgrimage suggests that to some degree Būkāy himself became subsequently identified among local Muslims as a pious figure possessing religious power.³⁰ Al-Īlmīnī notes that some semblance of a Tatar religious establishment was already in place during his reign. The first *imām* of Altı Ata's Fifth Mosque

was Muhyiddīn Hājji b. Hasan,³¹ who served as *imām* among the Kazakhs at this early period. As we have seen, Mullā Muhyiddīn Hājji became *imām* in Altı Ata in 1817. Before becoming *imām* in Altı Ata, he had been *imām* to Būkāy Khan. Subsequently, he traveled to the Hijaz and went on the *hajj*. After a year or two he returned to live again among the Kazakhs, but then returned to the Hijaz, and then went and studied in Syria and Egypt, before settling in Istanbul for a period of time. He then returned after fifteen years to become *imām* to Jahāngīr Khan.³² Until his death in 1848 Muhyiddīn Hājji was frequently visited by Kazakhs seeking his help as a healer.

Būkāy Khan's son, Jahāngīr Khan (r. 1824–1845) was especially active in creating an Islamic establishment in the Inner Horde, and one which had close ties to the Islamic establishment in the Volga-Ural region. It is evident that in creating his own Muslim religious administration for the Inner Horde he sought to mirror the structure of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, and also to promote Islamic institutions and Islamic consciousness among his Kazakhs. Evaluations of Jahāngīr's motives for creating this administration vary, and often reflect their authors' own interpretations of the role of Islam in Kazakh society. Most Russian authors in the imperial period perceived Islam, and especially the cultural influence of Tatars among the non-Russians, as threats to the security of the Russian state. For example the Russian missionary Spasskii saw the establishment of Islamic institutions by Jahāngīr as a way to bring Tatar influence onto the steppe by instilling "Muslim fanaticism" among the Kazakhs, distance them from Russia.³³ V. V. Grigor'ev, the chairman of the Orenburg Border Commission in the 1850's, charged Jahāngīr with making the Kazakh elite hostile to Christianity and [Russian] education. Jahāngīr allegedly used these Tatar *mullās* to spread hostility toward things Russian among the Kazakhs, and in effect alienated the Kazakhs from the Russian peasantry. Grigor'ev also alleged that Jahāngīr was benefiting personally by spreading Islam to the Kazakhs.

³¹ His father later became *imām* in the village of Olı Mingār, and was buried there.

³² TAA, fol. 24ab. Al-Īlmīnī's chronology is based on the account of Muhyiddīn's son, who succeeded his father as *imām* in Altı Ata; if he did in fact serve Jahāngīr Khan, he may have become *imām* in Altı Ata after 1817.

³³ Spasskii, *Potrebnost' pravoslavnoi missii*, 5.

²⁵ Spasskii, *Potrebnost' pravoslavnoi missii* passim; for official Russian reactions to the Tatar cultural influence on the Kazakhs cf. T. Tazhibbaev, *Prosvetshenie i shkol'y Kazakhstana vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka*, (Alma-Ata, 1962), 55–62.

²⁶ See for example Khadzhi Mukhammed-Salikh Babadzhanov, "Zametka kirgiza o kirgizakh," *Sverniiaia pchelā* (4), January 5th, 1861, 13–16.

²⁷ The chronology for the khans of the Inner Horde in Olcott's *the Kazakhs*, is rather garbled, and bears mentioning if only because her work is so often cited in studies of Kazakh history. Olcott writes that "after 1817 the aging Bukey [sic] ruled jointly with Khan Jangir, who succeeded to sole rule after 1823." (p. 49). In fact, in 1817 Būkāy Khan was no longer aging, because he had died two years earlier. Jahāngīr never ruled jointly with anyone, and Būkāy was succeeded by his brother Shighāy, who ceded the throne to Jahāngīr in 1825.

²⁸ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 130.

²⁹ Khanykov, "Ocherk sostoiiaia Vnutrennei kirgizskoi ordy," 46.

³⁰ Jahānshāh an-Nizhghārūi, *Tārīkh-i Astarkhān*, 47; indeed, as late as the 1990's Būkāy Khān's tomb has been a pilgrimage site for local Muslims, cf. V. M. Viktorin, "Muzhavirat i kul't sviatykh mest—aul'ia v Nizhnevolskom variante islama (tsivilizatsionnyi, formatsonnyi i etnicheskii podkhody k izucheniiu)," *Islam, obshchestvo i kul'tura: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii 'Islamskata tsivilizatsia v predelarii XXI veka k 600-letiu islama v Sibiri'*, (Omsk, 1994), 41.

Grigor'ev's charges were repeated in later works by Russian historians and travelers.³⁴ Similar arguments denouncing Jahāngīr and the Tatar *imāms* who served him reappear in Soviet Kazakh historiography. S. Z. Zimanov describes the khan's religious administration as "a body for ideological work" (*organ ideologicheskoi obrabotki*). For Zimanov Islam was nothing more than a system for facilitating the class oppression of the Kazakhs, a view that closely parallels those of L. Klimovich and Z. Ishmukhametov concerning the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly. Zimanov's depiction of the clergy as social parasites is completed by informing us that the greed of these *imāms* was so great that Jahāngīr himself was forced to limit their extractions from the Kazakhs.³⁵ Zimanov stresses the "Tatar" nature of the Inner Horde's Islamic establishment, implying that it was somehow foreign to the Kazakh nomads.

Jahāngīr's biographer, Ivan S. Ivanov, casts his motives in a more nuanced light. Concerning Jahāngīr's own piety and devotion to Islam, he cites the German traveler Goebel, who remarked that the khan would perform his prayers and other religious obligations in his house, despite the coming and going of visitors on official business.³⁶ In response to Jahāngīr's Islamophobic critics, Ivanov replies that in the establishment of a Muslim religious administration, and by summoning Tatar *imāms* and building a mosque in his capital, Jahāngīr was acting in conformity with the imperial policies of his time, which did indeed involve mosque construction in Kazakh areas, and the creation of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly.³⁷

Tatar and Kazakh Islamic sources are on the whole much more informed in their evaluations of Jahāngīr Khan. Riḍā'addīn Fakhraddīn ūghlī grants Jahāngīr a full entry in his multi-volume biographical dictionary and credits him with creating and developing the Islamic institutions of the Inner Horde.³⁸ However, elsewhere in his work Fakhraddīn ūghlī credits Jahāngīr's wife Fāṭima, who was the daughter of the first Orenburg Mufti, Muḥammad-Jān al-Ḥusayn, with being the motive force behind the creation of an Islamic establishment that so closely paralleled the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual

Assembly. Fakhraddīn ūghlī describes Fāṭima in especially glowing terms, crediting her for "civilizing" the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde.³⁹ Jahāngīr Khan was also celebrated in Kazakh and Tatar poetry as well. The Kazakh poet Baytuq Aqin, who composed an elegy after Jahāngīr's death in 1845, praised him for, among other things, taking care of orphans and widows and building golden palaces,⁴⁰ and in his lifetime, Jahāngīr was the subject of a panegyric by the Tatar Sufi poet Abū'l-Manīḥ al-Qarghālī (1782–1833).⁴¹

The religious administration established by Jahāngīr functioned at two levels, and was apparently modeled after the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly in Ufa. If Jahāngīr's administration was a miniature version of the one in Ufa, it was also a more centralized one. When exactly Jahāngīr began the establishment of his religious administration is unclear, but probably it was in the early 1830's, since he received permission from the Orenburg Border commission to build a mosque in Khanskaia Stavka in 1831. At the beginning of his reign there were only about 15 *mullās* for the entire Inner Horde, and Jahāngīr himself lacked his own *mullā*.⁴² In fact, as al-Īlmīnī remarks concerning Muḥyiddīn Ḥasan ūghlī, these *imāms* among the Kazakhs were often there on a temporary basis, and the number of *imāms* among the Inner Horde Kazakhs must have fluctuated.

Initially Jahāngīr's religious administration was staffed almost entirely with *ʿālims* from the Volga-Ural region. The head of this organization was the *ākhūnd* Jābir Ḥamād ūghlī, (Dzhabar Khamatov in Russian sources), an Orenburg Tatar, who lived at the Khan's expense in Khanskaia Stavka.⁴³ Jābir Ḥamād ūghlī, who held the title of *ṭarkhān* (i.e. an official Russian title granting immunity from taxation), was the chief of the khan's *sharʿa* court, and was also responsible for examining candidates for the position of *imām*.⁴⁴ This *ākhūnd* served for more than twenty years, and was paid at the Inner Horde's

³⁹ Fakhraddīn ūghlī, *Āthār* 1:4, 186; Ivanin also has praise for Fāṭima, crediting her civilized upbringing with motivating Jahāngīr to sedentarize his people; cf. Ivanin, "Vnutrenniaia ili Bukevskaia Kirgizskaia Orda," 15.

⁴⁰ A. Zeki Velidī Togan, *Bügünkü Türkî Türkistan ve Eski Tarihî*, (İstanbul, 1981), 245.

⁴¹ Kemper, *Sufis und Gelirte in Tatarien und Baschkirien*, 138–139.

⁴² Evreinov, "Vnutrenniaia ili Bukevskaia kirgiz-kazach'ia orda," 71.

⁴³ Fakhraddīn ūghlī, *Āthār* 2:10, 137–138; *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia*, 234; Jābir is known to have been the author of at least one work, a genealogical and religious treatise published in Kazan in 1908 and entitled *Risāla-yi khānān*.

⁴⁴ Evreinov, "Vnutrenniaia ili Bukevskaia kirgiz-kazach'ia orda," 71; Zimanov, *Rossia i Bukevskaia khanstvo*, 124.

³⁴ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 64–66.

³⁵ Zimanov, *Rossia i Bukevskaia khanstvo*, 124.

³⁶ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 60.

³⁷ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 63, 223–224.

³⁸ Fakhraddīn ūghlī, *Āthār* 2:10, 135–139.

expense. In addition to the cash he received from Jahāngīr, Jābir Ḥamād ūghlī also owned a farmstead to the north-west of Khanskaia Stavka.⁴⁵ He was also responsible for coordinating the administration of *imāms* assigned to the Kazakh clans. The *ākhūnd* was also charged with teaching young Kazakhs in Khanskaia Stavka, and with appointing them as *imāms* "on the request of good and honorable Kazakhs."⁴⁶ How long Jābir Ḥamād ūghlī, functioned as *ākhūnd* in Khanskaia Stavka is unclear, but his name does appear among those of "Kazakhs" from the Inner Horde who left Russia for the *ḥajj* in 1862.⁴⁷

Jahāngīr also expanded the Islamic establishment at the local level. For every sub-clan (*tā'īfā*, and in Russian, *otdeleniē*) he appointed a *mullā*.⁴⁸ According to one estimate there were about 130 local *imāms* subordinate to the *ākhūnd*.⁴⁹ The duties and rights of the *mullā* were explicitly stated in an order (*prikaz* in Russian, and *firman* in Tatar) drawn up by the khan and the *ākhūnd* and issued to each *imām*. This documented was divided into ten separate points outlining the *imām's* duties.⁵⁰ In general terms the *imām* was responsible for a broad range of religious, educational, and civil matters. A translation of the document follows.

Open order of the exalted Jahāngīr Būkāy Khān ūghlī

To so-and-so of such-and-such a clan and such-and-such a sub-clan

On the recommendation of the good and honorable Kazakhs of (such-and-such), concerning your nomination by them to the position of *mullā*, I, having approved this request on the testimony of the *ākhūnd* (so-and-so) who serves before me, who has testified to your worthiness on the basis of having given you an examination, confirm you in this position and give you this open order, and upon the receipt of which, you are expected to treat the Kazakhs of the sub-clan according to the following rules:

⁴⁵ Evreinov, "Vnutrenniaia ili Bukeevskaia kirgiz-kazach'ia orda," 63.

⁴⁶ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 60.

⁴⁷ Isabay and Bayzhan-Ata, *Qozhig'ha barghan qazaqtar*, 121. In this source his name appears in the modern Kazakh spelling as Zābir Khammatov.

⁴⁸ This is the term used in both the Turkic and Russian documentation. The *mullā's* duties clearly corresponded to those of *imām*.

⁴⁹ Zimanov, *Rossia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo*, 124.

⁵⁰ Ridā'addin Fakhraddin ūghlī published one of these documents in the original Tatar in his biographical sketch of Jahāngīr Khan. It follows fairly closely in its particulars to a Russian version published by A. Evreinov; cf. Fakhraddin ūghlī, *Athār*, 2:10, 137-139; Evreinov, "Vnutrenniaia," 72-73.

1) to build mosques and *madrasas*, and if there are settled inhabitants in the community, to celebrate the weekly and annual holidays; to teach children, exhort the daily prayers to God as befits our religion and observe the Uraza (Ramadān) fast. On Fridays and the other annual holidays to give a sermon to the ordinary Kazakhs, the form of which will be especially provided to you by the *ākhūnd* constituted under me.

2) to explain all the rules of our religion to the simple and ignorant Kazakhs; to give appropriate names to newborns, to perform the *sunat* (circumcision) on boys, to marry the betrothed, to bury the dead, observing for this all the necessary rituals.

3) to be present at the exchange of *kahym* during the marrying of sons or the marrying off of daughters, and to exhort the parents to announce in front of witnesses that "one gave and the other received".

4) to forbid grooms to visit their brides before the wedding, in accordance with the former Kazakh customs.

5) upon the death of a husband, if the wife wishes to marry, to find out reliably whether she is pregnant; until the amount of time specified by our religion, not to marry her with anyone.

6) to not marry a widow without the consent of her father and mother.

7) to distribute the goods of the deceased to their relatives according to our law; if you cannot do this yourself, report to me and await a decision.

8) to impress upon and explain to wealthy Kazakhs that they pay *zakāt* from their moveable and immovable property.

9) to teach simple and ignorant Kazakhs not to commit violent acts upon one another, and to honor, respect and always be loyal to the Sovereign Emperor and his administration.

10) to make sure that the Kazakhs of this sub-clan do not carry out thievery and do not engage in illegal activities.

I have directed the clan leaders, *biys* and *starshinas* in this sub-clan to aid you in the carrying out of the above-mentioned duties, and you are annually obligated to report to me about your instructions.

The first *mullās* that Jahāngīr invited were Tatar *ukaznye* (*manshūrī*) *mullās* from the Volga-Ural region. However, under Jahāngīr the Muslim religious administration of the Inner Horde was independent of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, and as we have seen, the *ākhūnd* was authorized to himself appoint *mullās* to Kazakh communities.⁵¹ The charge that Jahāngīr sought to flood the steppe with Tatar *mullās* and effectively "Tatarize" the Kazakhs is contradicted

⁵¹ Zimanov, *Rossia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo*, 138-139; Babadzhanyan, "Zametka kirgiza o kirgizakh," 13-16; cf also Basilov and Karamysheva, *Islam u kazakhov*, 21.

by the evidence that from the beginning Jahāngīr sought to recruit *mullās* from among the Kazakhs' own communities as we have seen in his order to the *ākhūnd* to this effect. At first, many *mullās* were Tatars, but over the course of the nineteenth century the proportion of Kazakh *mullās* gradually increased.⁵² In fact, the replacement of Tatar *mullās* by Kazakh ones appears to have been well underway even during Jahāngīr's lifetime. Aleksandr Tereshchenko, who visited Jahāngīr Khan in the 1840's notes that by 1845 the *imām* of the mosque in Khanskaia Stavka, as well as most of the clan *mullās* came from among the Kazakhs. He also indicated that Jahāngīr had achieved this not only by bringing Tatar *mullās* to the Inner Horde, but also by sending both Kazakh children and adults to Tatar *madrasas*, especially in Orenburg province and to the renowned *madrasas* of Sterlitamak and Istārlibash, and even to Bukhara.⁵³ Indeed, the document published by Riḍā'addīn Fakhraddīn ūghlī names a Kazakh *mullā*, a certain Ūtūzbāy Tūrabāy ūghlī of the Tānā clan's Bassārī sub-clan, who was made *mullā* during Jahāngīr's lifetime. It is unclear how long the Islamic establishment created by Jahāngīr khān survived his death, but by 1883 it apparently ceased to exist as an independent organization. In that year a publication of the Ministry of Internal Affairs lists the mosques and *'ulamā* of the Inner Horde as being subordinate to the Muslim Spiritual Assembly in Orenburg.

Clearly, Jahāngīr conceived of himself as an Islamic sovereign, albeit one subordinate to Russia. As such, Jahāngīr considered it his duty to raise the Islamic consciousness of his people by offering them Islamic education, guidance in carrying out the chief rituals of their religion, and creating an infrastructure of mosques, *maktabs*, and Islamic law courts. Whether this infrastructure was staffed by Tatars or Kazakhs was immaterial from a strictly religious perspective, although it is clear that from the beginning Jahāngīr understood that staffing his religious establishment with as many Kazakhs as possible not only might bear political dividends, but would probably accelerate the introduction of Islamic customs and rites at the local level as well. The frequent accusations that Jahāngīr's Islamic establish-

ment fostered disloyalty toward Russia, or other anti-Russian feelings among the Kazakhs can be readily dismissed. These charges originated in the climate of emerging Russian nationalism and Islamophobia of the nineteenth century. In fact, Jahāngīr was strongly loyal to Imperial Russia, and, as we have seen, one of the tasks of his *mullās* was to encourage loyalty among the Kazakhs to himself and to the Russian sovereign.

Nevertheless, it appears equally evident that over the course of the nineteenth century Kazakh society in the Inner Horde was fundamentally transformed by Jahāngīr's policies of "Islamization." Numerous nineteenth-century Russian, and later Kazakh, commentators saw the adoption by the Kazakhs nomads of Islamic practices associated with Tatars as evidence of the "Tatarization" of the Kazakhs, and they concluded that the Kazakhs were in fact ceasing to be "Kazakhs" at all. Such a conclusion fails to take into account the internal Kazakh perspective. There can be no question that well before the Inner Horde came into existence, Kazakhs conceived of their society as Islamic, and for them, to be a Kazakh was also to be a Muslim. To be sure, the Kazakhs whom Jahāngīr had trained in the *madrasas* of Kazan, Orenburg, and Astrakhan sought to change their society upon returning to the Inner Horde, but from the internal perspective such a change was necessarily sanctioned by Kazakh society because it was after all at its core an Islamic society. If being a Kazakh implied being a Muslim, then being a better Muslim could not make the person, or the society, less Kazakh, and from this perspective the idea that an increased Islamic consciousness among the Kazakhs could imply "Tatarization", or some other form of cultural alienation, is doubtful.

Mosques

The first mosque to be built among the Kazakh of the Inner Horde was built between 1815 and 1818 for Shighāy Khān in his winter encampment at Naryn Peski by a Russian merchant named Alekseev.⁵⁴ Jahāngīr Khan had his own mosque built in his capital Khanskaia Stavka in 1835. This was probably the first permanent mosque in

⁵² Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 60, 224; Zimanov, *Rossia i Buken'skoe khandstvo*, 139.

⁵³ Aleksandr Tereshchenko, "Sledy Desht-Kipchaka i Vnutrenniaia kirgiz-kasatskaia orda," *Moskovitianin* 1853 (22), 66; Fakhraddīn ūghlī, *Āthār* 1:4, 186; Babadzhanov, *Sochineniia*, 73-74.

⁵⁴ In 1818 Shighāy petitioned tsar Aleksandr I for to bestow a medal on this merchant for his generosity; cf. Taizhanova, *Kazakhi*, 233.

the Inner Horde. It was designed by Jahāngīr himself and situated in a park across from his private residence. I. S. Ivanov, who visited the mosque in 1886, describes it as having an elongated rectangular shape, and a terrace in the front that was supported by six Ionian-style columns with a minaret situated in the middle of the roof.⁵⁵ The first *imām* was a certain Gubaidulla Basharov and the *muʿadhdhin* was Tazhiddin Gubdudzhaliyov (both according to the Russian spellings), both of whom were Tatars from Kazan province.⁵⁶ Curiously enough, two Russian authors who visited the mosque in 1886, left rather divergent descriptions of the structure. Aleksei Kharuzin, who was an unabashed critic of the Islamic and Tatar presence in the Inner Horde, describes the neo-classical architecture as being bizarre and the condition of the mosque as dilapidated, with the minaret on the verge of collapsing.⁵⁷ Ivanov, who viewed Jahāngīr Khan's role in the Kazakh Inner Horde as a positive one, described the mosque as "not only the most beautiful building in Khanskaia Stavka, but [as] a beautiful building in its own right."⁵⁸

By the end of the nineteenth century the number of official mosques in the Inner Horde had grown considerably. According to a Russian missionary account, in 1895 there were 99 "legal" [*ukazyne*] mosques on the lands of the Inner Horde.⁵⁹ In all likelihood, few of these were permanently staffed or attended, and most of these mosques were probably located in the semi-permanent winter encampments of the Kazakh, chiefly located along the Uzen Rivers and along the north Caspian coast. Al-Ilmīnī notes that in summer when Kazakhs were nomadizing with their herds they would not normally visit mosques.⁶⁰ Nevertheless some wealthier Kazakhs would occasionally designate one of their yurts as a mosque while they were out on the steppe.⁶¹ According to official statistics from 1883, in that year there were a total of 47 mosques in the Inner Horde, including nine in the Kamysh-Samar district and six in the Talovka district, both of which bordered Novouzensk district.⁶²

⁵⁵ Ivanov, *Dzhanger Khan*, 63.

⁵⁶ Zimanov, *Rossia i Bukharskoe khanstvo*, 124.

⁵⁷ Kharuzin, *Stepnye ocherki*, 22.

⁵⁸ Ivanov, *Dzhanger Khan*, 63.

⁵⁹ Spasskii, *Potrebnost' pravoslavnoi missii*, 5.

⁶⁰ TAA fol. 107b.

⁶¹ Spasskii, *Potrebnost' pravoslavnoi missii*, 6.

⁶² *Al'farinye spiski*, 326–327.

Al-Ilmīnī mentions three mosques in the Kazakh lands, one in Novaia Kazanka (Yāngī Qazānqa), and two in Talovka, together with one mosque in the Ural Cossack settlement of Yalpaqtał on the left bank of the Bol'shoi Uzen' River. Of these, al-Ilmīnī only provides details on the mosques in Novaia Kazanka and Yalpaqtał. In comparison with the mosques of the Altı Ata Valley, the mosques on the Kazakh steppe that are described were much larger. Furthermore, while the Altı Ata mosques were initially built out of mud brick, and later out of wood, both mosques on the Kazakh steppe were built out of stone. The mosque in Novaia Kazanka seems to have been especially large, with three floors, including an enlarged basement. The mosque in Yalpaqtał, similarly, was enlarged, with a basement being dug and furnished so the Muslim Cossacks would have a place to perform their prayers without being crowded out by Kazakhs. In Novaia Kazanka the *imām* was one Mullā 'Aṭā'allāh, a follower of Zaynallāh of Istārlıbash. As al-Ilmīnī notes "his attention to the Kazakhs is great, and his business with the [Tatar] congregation is less so."⁶³ The *imām* of the mosque in Yalpaqtał was a Ural Cossack, also named 'Aṭā'allāh. This 'Aṭā'allāh was the son of Khujāntāy Bābā, the wealthiest of the Muslim Cossacks, and the person who had the mosque built after moving from Glinianskii Forpost.⁶⁴ According to al-Ilmīnī, Ural Cossack *imāms* from Glinianskii Forpost, and later Yalpaqtał, were trained in Novouzensk district's most renowned *madrasa*, located in the village of Iske Özen's Third *maqalla*.⁶⁵

Islamic education

Islamic education among the Kazakhs has been received very little treatment in published works. Unlike among the Tatars, where, Islamic education has been a major topic of focus and polemics, historians have paid little attention to Islamic education among the Kazakhs. In part, this neglect stems from the overall treatment of Islam and Islamic institutions of Kazakhs, where these historians deny, simply fail to recognize, or minimize that Kazakhs, or other nomads such as the Bashkirs or Kyrgyz, were in fact Muslims. This

⁶³ TAA fol. 106b.

⁶⁴ TAA fol. 107a.

⁶⁵ TAA fol. 88b.

same general characterization applies to accounts of the Inner Horde.

This scholarly neglect of Islamic education on the Kazakh steppe during the imperial Russian period is unfortunate, because the development and growth of Islamic educational institutions among the nomads under Russian rule was an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of Islamic Inner Asia, both in terms of scale and consequence. Furthermore, the rapid development of Islamic education among the steppe nomads in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is a process that few historians have fully recognized or understood, but one which is quite evident in the region's Islamic sources. In any case, it becomes clear that over the course of the nineteenth century, and until the establishment of the Soviet Union, *maktabs* and *madrasas* became very widespread among Kazakh, as well as Kyrgyz communities, where previously they had not existed in such numbers. This process was accelerated after the Russian conquest of Central Asia, when Tatar and Bashkir teachers became more common among the steppe nomad communities (the presence of these figures will be discussed in more detail below), but the sources express clearly that the growth of Islamic education among the steppe nomads resulted from the initiative and efforts of the nomads themselves. Indeed, there is no question that the absolute predominance of Muslim schools was the rule throughout the Kazakh steppe in the imperial period. The dominance of traditional Islamic education was not only in force in southern Kazakhstan and along the Syr Darya River, where Islamic education had very ancient roots,⁶⁶ but even along the northern reaches of the steppe in Western Siberia.⁶⁷ Although Kazakh parents apparently found the appeal of Islamic education to have been self-evident, Russian officials, and later Soviet historians, appear to have been genuinely puzzled as to why the Kazakhs would have sought to provide their children with Islamic education. However, writing in 1882, Ianovskii, the governor of Astrakhan, stated with certainty that the Kazakhs preferred to educate their children in the Muslim fashion because Islamic education was simply more useful for them. He remarked that upon graduating, a young person would

be able to read the Qur'an and would be able to read Tatar religious books. Also, contact with Tatars and their language was felt to be desirable because it was mainly with this group that the Kazakhs conducted trade. In Russian schools, not only was the Tatar language ignored, but so was the Kazakh language.⁶⁸

As in the Volga-Ural region, official estimates for the number of Islamic schools among the steppe nomads vary widely, and on the whole cannot be treated as reliable indicators of the extent of Islamic education within these communities.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, even at the local level a substantial degree of education appears to have been available for nomads. Indeed, by the beginning of the twentieth century, *maktabs* were very widespread in Kazakh communities.⁷⁰ Among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz nomads, these *maktabs* could be very informal. They were usually temporary, typically opening in September and closing in March. In each *aul* (nomadic encampment) there were typically several such schools with five to fifteen pupils in each. Sometimes literate Kazakhs would teach their own children and those of relatives and neighbors at no charge. Generally there was no fixed rate in these schools. Usually the teacher would be paid by his pupils' parents in kind, with livestock, clothing, foodstuffs, or gifts, and often the *mullā* was fed as well. Cash payment was rare, although in one community the pupils paid three to ten kopecks per week.⁷¹ According to a Russian administrator in Perovsk district in 1867, the Kazakh *maktabs* were usually funded by a wealthy and prestigious nomad, who would hire a *mirza* (a literate native) to teach the children. The rate was usually a camel a year, or a horse for six months. The *mirza* would teach children from neighboring encampments as well, and especially the sponsor's relatives. The children of the latter would pay about 20 kopecks per month.⁷² In some nomadic Kazakh districts the education of children was organized by local chiefs. The chiefs would appoint a teacher for his community, and would house him in one of his yurts. The teacher would instruct all of the encampment's children and would be paid from 40 to 60 rubles annually. The

⁶⁸ Tazhibayev, *Prosvetshenie i shkoly Kazakhstana*, 122–123.

⁶⁹ Tazhibayev, *Prosvetshenie i shkoly Kazakhstana*, 55–58; D. Aitnambetov, *Dorevolutsionnye shkoly Kirgizii*, (Frunze, 1961), 12.

⁷⁰ A. I. Sembaev and G. M. Khrapchenkov, *Ocherki istorii shkol v Kazakhstane (1901–1917 gg.)*, (Alma-Ata, 1972), 84.

⁷¹ Tazhibayev, *Prosvetshenie i shkoly Kazakhstana*, 61.

⁷² Tazhibayev, *Prosvetshenie i shkoly Kazakhstana*, 57.

⁶⁶ Tazhibayev, *Prosvetshenie i shkoly Kazakhstana*, 56–57; Mustafina, *Predstavleniia kul'tury, obriady u kazakhov*, 24–28.

⁶⁷ Tazhibayev, *Prosvetshenie i shkoly Kazakhstana*, 121, 255, 277. For example, Tazhibayev notes how in Western Siberia, in a region with over 400,000 Kazakhs, the only Russian-Kazakh school was located in Omsk and it had only 20 pupils.

money was typically collected by the members of the encampment.⁷³

Among Kyrgyz nomads in the Semirech'e region informal *maktabs* are already documented in the 1830's. The Kyrgyz would convene *maktabs* in their yurts, or sometimes simply under trees. The instructors could be either Kyrgyz or Uzbeks, but after the Russian conquests, Tatars became increasingly common in the Kyrgyz encampments.⁷⁴ As in Novouzensk district, primary education were typically funded by the parents of the pupils. Usually a parent would pay in kind, with a sheep, a sack of flour, but the more students there were, the less parents had to pay. Teachers were also given gifts.⁷⁵ The Kyrgyz Soviet historian D. Aitambetov provides a firsthand account of this sort of education recorded from a Kyrgyz named Moldogazy Taranchiev, who attended such a *maktab* in Przheval'sk district from 1907 until 1914. This *maktab* had 25–30 pupils in attendance, and consisted of two yurts. The pupils lived in one of them, and the second was the *ashkhana* (kitchen), where the *mulla* and the cook resided. For every session, which typically began in October or November, and ended in April, the parents would supply one sheep, one sack of flour, one brick of tea, firewood, and perhaps a gift of clothing to the *mulla*. The children were taught to learn to read the Qur'ān.⁷⁶

Madrasas in the steppe regions tended to be established in permanent settlements. Furthermore, many young Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Bashkirs studied in *madrasas* in the Volga-Ural region, Western Siberia, and especially in Central Asia.⁷⁷ However, there were substantial *madrasas* within the Kazakh steppe as well, such as in Karkaralinsk and in the Semirech'e region, as well as along the Syr Darya River. Nevertheless, there were many *madrasas* in nomadic encampments that were simply convened in yurts.⁷⁸ Among the Bashkirs, perhaps as late as the early nineteenth century, *madrasa* instructors would nomadize in summer with their pupils. The Bashkir author Muhammad-Salim Umetbaev wrote in 1897 that at the time when the Bashkirs still nomadized, *mudarris*es would summer nomadizing with their students. Some of these nomadic *madrasas* could be rather

large. He notes that his father's teacher, Hamād Ḥaḍrat, would spend the summer nomadizing along the Qārlāmān River with "hundreds" of his *shāgirds*.⁷⁹

In the Inner Horde, Jahāngīr Khan actively supported the expansion of Islamic education among the Kazakh nomads. Education was a major task not only for the local *imāms* assigned to the nomadic Kazakh communities, but for the *ākhūnd* Jābir Ḥamād ūghlī as well. Until 1917 numerous Kazakhs from the Inner Horde went to study in various *madrasas* of the Volga-Ural region, both in the more distant centers of Kazan, Ufa, and Orenburg, and in the closer settlements of Astrakhan and Novouzensk district.⁸⁰ Kazakhs were especially numerous in the *madrasa* of Alti Ata's Second Mosque, as well as in the *madrasa* of the Cossack settlement of Yalpaqtaḥ.⁸¹ During the second half of the nineteenth century Islamic educational establishments dominated the Inner Horde's educational infrastructure. The availability of Islamic education in the Inner Horde was in part due to Jahāngīr's policies and its popularity was due to a genuine demand for Islamic education on the part of the Kazakhs themselves. The Soviet historian T. Tazhibbaev estimates that in the Inner Horde in 1889 about 2,000 Kazakh children were enrolled in *maktabs* and *madrasa*, or about seven percent of all Kazakh children, while only one half of one percent (0.5%) of Kazakh children were enrolled in Russian-Kazakh schools.⁸² It should be stated that Tazhibbaev's estimate of Kazakh pupils in Muslim schools is in all likelihood low, since it is based on incomplete Russian data, while the data for the Russian-Kazakh schools is complete. Indeed, the Russian alarm at Tatar cultural hegemony notwithstanding, the proportion of Russian-Kazakh schools in the Inner Horde was apparently higher than anywhere else on the Kazakh steppe.

Among the Kazakh nomads and Muslim Cossacks the education of children was often undertaken by itinerant Bashkir and Tatar *mullās*.⁸³ In a discussion of Kazakh Islamic education the Astrakhan

⁷³ A. K. Geins, *Sobranie literaturnykh trudov*, I (St. Petersburg, 1897), 257.

⁷⁴ Aitambetov, *Dorevolutsionnye shkoly v Kirgizii*, 10–11, 14–15.

⁷⁵ Aitambetov, *Dorevolutsionnye shkoly v Kirgizii*, 16.

⁷⁶ Aitambetov, *Dorevolutsionnye shkoly v Kirgizii*, 20.

⁷⁷ Tazhibbaev, *Prosvetshenie i shkoly Kazakhstana*, 276; Aitambetov, *Dorevolutsionnye shkoly Kirgizii*, 12.

⁷⁸ Sembaev and Khrapchenkov, *Ocherki istorii*, 82.

⁷⁹ Muhammad-Salim Umetbaev, *Yadigār*, (Kazan, 1897), 108.

⁸⁰ Zimanov, *Rossia i Bukeyevskoe khanstvo*, 138–139; Babadzhanyov, "Zametka kirgiza o kirgizakh," 15.

⁸¹ TAA, fol. 16a, 108a.

⁸² Tazhibbaev, *Prosvetshenie i shkoly Kazakhstana*, 121.

⁸³ Al-Īmīnī mentions numerous figures from Novouzensk district, such as his sons Muhammad and Ahmad-Ṣafā, who gave lessons to Kazakh nomads; cf. also Tazhibbaev, "Shkoly Vnutrennei (Bukeyevskoi) ordy," 129.

historian Jahānshāh an-Nizhghārūī has remarked that Kazakh parents were especially active in recruiting Tatar teachers to instruct their children in Islam,⁸⁴ rather than being preyed upon by the *mul-lās* as Russian missionaries and administrators have argued. The author of the *Tavārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* mentions several *imāms* and other scholars from these Tatar villages who would occasionally travel among the Kazakhs and Muslim Cossacks teaching their children. These include the *imām* of Altı Ata's Fifth Mosque, Muḥyiddīn Ḥasan ūghlī, who lived with the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde early in the nineteenth century, as well as both of Muḥammad-Fāṭḥ al-Īlmīnī's sons, Muḥammad and Aḥmad-Ṣafā, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Specifically, we know that in 1900 Muḥammad was nomadizing with a wealthy Kazakh named Īdilbāy Turghānof in the Inner Horde.⁸⁵ In addition, *imāms* and other learned figures from Novouzensk district were occasionally engaged as itinerant instructors in Bashkir and Ural Cossack nomadic communities.⁸⁶

Estimates of the number of *madrasas* and *maktabs* in the Inner Horde vary considerably for the second half of the nineteenth century. One estimate for 1872 reports there to have been 154 Muslims schools with 3,821 pupils. Another estimate (no year is given) reports 38 (official) or 56 (unofficial) *madrasas* and *maktabs* with 350 Kazakh pupils and 50 Tatar ones. A report from 1882 mentions 96 *madrasas* and *maktabs*. An estimate from 1891 reports 400 *madrasas* and *maktabs*. A newspaper report from 1899 estimates there to have been sixty *madrasas* and *maktabs* with 1,679 pupils.⁸⁷ It should be noted that the Russian bureaucrats and missionaries who made these reports often did so with the intention of impressing upon government circles the need to restrict Islamic education and reduce what they perceived as the "Tatarization" of the Kazakhs nomads, and therefore may have inflated their reports. Furthermore, as al-Īlmīnī makes abundantly clear in his discussion of Islamic education in Novouzensk district, *madrasas* and *maktabs* (al-Īlmīnī does not distinguish between the two, and uses only the term *madrasa*) opened and closed with high frequency, since their existence was dependent on both economic factors, such as sufficient rain for crops, as well as on human

⁸⁴ Jahānshāh an-Nizhghārūī, *Tārīkh-i Astarḥān*, 27.

⁸⁵ TAA fols. 25a, 103a.

⁸⁶ TAA fols. 12a, 16a.

⁸⁷ Tazhibbaev, "Shkoly Vnutrennei (Bukevskoi) ordy, 127; Spasskii, *Potrebnost' pravoslavnoi misii*, 5, 7.

factors, such the commitment of the local *imāms* to teaching and of the congregation to funding.

Al-Īlmīnī only mentions one *madrasa* on the territory of the Inner Horde; this is the *madrasa* in the town of Novaia Kazanka presided by the *imām* Mullā 'Aṭā'allāh. He notes that while the *imām* neglected the Tatar members congregation in favor of the Kazakhs, he nevertheless maintained a "perfect *madrasa*."⁸⁸ The Cossack village of Yalpaqtal also had a *madrasa* where most of the *shāgirds* were reportedly Kazakhs.⁸⁹

Sufism

On the whole, published sources tell us little about Sufism in the Inner Horde. Muḥammad-Sāliḥ Babadzhānov tells us that around 1849 a Kazakh Sufi named Aydzhar (according to the Russian spelling) was active in the Inner Horde. He was called "*ishan*" and had studied under a "famous" Tatar *mullā* in the village of Sterlitamak;⁹⁰ he goes on to say that Sterlitamak remained a popular destination for Kazakh students. Babadzhānov also writes how numerous Kazakhs went off to study in the "Islamic monastery" in Istārlibash.⁹¹ Al-Īlmīnī's inclusion of Yalpaqtal in his narrative is providential for our knowledge of Sufism in the Inner Horde because it was the center of a group of Sufis known collectively as the Yalpaqtal Ishans. As with many other aspects of Sufism in the Volga-Ural region and the Kazakh Steppe, the Yalpaqtal Ishans are poorly documented; however they are mentioned in a Soviet anti-religious monograph published in Kazan in 1931. Yalpaqtal was the center of these *ishāns*, but their followers were also to be found elsewhere in the Inner Horde, namely in the village of Talovka and in the capital of Khanskaia Stavka.⁹² According to Mozaffari, the Yalpaqtal Ishans were Naqshbandis and the sons of one Khayralla Ghālkāyef of Qarghali, the son of a certain Āmir Ishan Ghālkāyef of Sterlibashevo.⁹³ Mozaffari's Khayrallāh

⁸⁸ TAA fol. 106b.

⁸⁹ TAA fol. 108a.

⁹⁰ Perhaps a reference to Sharafaddīn b. Zaynaddīn al-Istārlitāmāqī, a prominent Sufi based in Sterlitamak, who died in 1845, and who maintained a popular *khānaqāh*; cf. Amīrkhān ūghlī, *Tavārīkh-i Bulghārīya*, 45.

⁹¹ Babadzhānov, "Zametka kirgiza o kirgizakh," 14–15.

⁹² Mozaffari, *Ishannar-Dāristhlār*, 95.

⁹³ Mozaffari, *Ishannar-Dāristhlār*, 72. Transcriptions of these names are based on the Latin-script Tatar of Mozaffari's work.

Ghalkäyef is without question a reference to Khayrallāh b. Zaynallāh b. 'Alīkāy, who appears in Riḍā'addīn Fakhraddīn ūghlī's history of Qarghalī. Concerning Khayrallāh's origins, Fakhraddīn ūghlī mentions a certain Zaynallāh as his father, and he notes further that he was not from Sterlibashevo, but was from the village of Arslan in Ufa district; in Qarghalī he was known as Khayrallāh al-Ārslānī. In 1886/87 he became the eighth *imām* of Qarghalī's Seventh Mosque, and still held that position in 1897. Fakhraddīn ūghlī also notes that one of his students was 'Atā'allāh b. Samī'allāh, the seventh *imām* of Qarghalī's Sixth Mosque.⁹⁴ Fakhraddīn ūghlī makes no mention of Khayrallāh's Sufi activities, let alone his affiliations. Furthermore, we have seen that Mullā 'Atā'allāh, the *imām* of Novaia Kazanka's mosque was a follower of a certain Zaynallāh of Istārlibash, and it is possible that this Zaynallāh of Istārlibash and Zaynallāh b. 'Alīkāy are one and the same figure, since Mozaffari notes that the Khayrallāh Ghalkäyef's father came from Istārlibash.

Al-Īlmīnī mentions three specific Sufis in his discussion of the Russian-Kazakh borderlands. One of these is the ill-fated second *imām* of Aleksandrov Gai, Hasan, who was exiled to Siberia for unspecified offenses. This figure was a *shāghird* of one Yālpāqtāl Ḥaḍrat, presumably one of the Yalpaqtal Ishans mentioned by Mozaffari. The other two Sufis mentioned by al-Īlmīnī, one in Novaia Kazanka, and the other in Yalpaqtal, are connected to Zaynallāh Ḥaḍrat of Sterlibashevo. The first of these Sufis was Mullā 'Atā'allāh, the *imām* of Novaia Kazanka. The second was one 'Ubaydallāh of Yalpaqtal, concerning whom al-Īlmīnī writes:

With the passing of time this Mullā 'Atā'allāh's⁹⁵ daughter reached maturity. The eldest son of Zaynallāh Ḥaḍrat of Sterlibashevo, Mullā 'Ubaydallāh, studied in Noble Bukhara and when he returned the aforementioned 'Atā'allāh gave his daughter to 'Ubaydallāh Āfandī. In short, both of them are living. [...] Now, concerning his *tarīqat*, this 'Ubaydallāh, is a *khalīfa* of [blank] Ḥaḍrat, and because in that country many of his *murīds* are Kazakhs, in making pilgrimages to see him they [Kazakhs] offer a horse or a camel, or fifty or a hundred rubles in cash; they give it as a pious offering and receive his blessing [*fātiḥa*]. Today he has around a hundred horses, and around a hundred camels and cattle. Since many of his *murīds* are Kazakhs, and

because much of his attention is devoted to them, although at times he deals with the Ural Cossacks, out of envy they [the Cossacks] don't deal with him.⁹⁶

It is unfortunate that al-Īlmīnī was unable to find out to whom 'Ubaydallāh was a *khalīfa*, since we lack any explicit evidence connecting 'Ubaydallāh with the Yalpaqtal Ishans discussed by Mozaffari. But since Mozaffari writes that the Yalpaqtal Ishans traced their origins to Sterlibashevo, then the fact that 'Ubaydallāh's father, Zaynallāh, was also from Istārlibash circumstantially suggests a connection.

Al-Īlmīnī also discusses a number of Daghestani Khālidiya Sufis who were exiled around 1890 to Samara province, and whom the governor of Samara settled in Novouzensk district. One of these was known as Shaykh Dīvāna Muḥammad, who, we are told, upon reaching Novouzensk, departed immediately and established himself among the Kazakhs, without even informing the authorities of his arrival.⁹⁷ Al-Īlmīnī refers to Daghestanis collectively as "*chārkā's*", and it is tempting to connect this "Chārkā's" Dīvāna Muḥammad with the so-called Chārkā's Ishanī, a Sufi active among the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde during the first decade of the twentieth century. Mozaffari writes that the *murīds* of this Chārkā's Ishanī were often in conflict with the *murīds* of the Yalpaqtal *īshāns*.⁹⁸

Islamic taxation

Islamic taxation, that is, the collection of specific taxes sanctioned by the *sharī'a*, seems to have been a rather new development in Kazakh nomadic society at the beginning of the nineteenth century. According to Levshin, already in the second half of the eighteenth century Ablay Khan, ruler of the Middle Horde, had tried unsuccessfully to collect *zakāt* from his subjects⁹⁹ and in 1789 the governor of Orenburg, Baron Igelstrom, rejected a petition from a certain Kaip, a sultan of the Junior Horde, to be allowed to collect *zakāt* from the Kazakh nomads under his rule.¹⁰⁰ During the nineteenth century we know that the khans of Khiva collected *zakāt* from the

⁹⁶ TAA fol. 107ab.

⁹⁷ TAA fol. 97a.

⁹⁸ Mozaffari, *Ishannar-Dārīshlār*, 94–95.

⁹⁹ Levshin, *Opisanie*, 363.

¹⁰⁰ Ivanov, *Dezhanger khan*, 129.

⁹⁴ Fakhraddīn ūghlī, *Safid*, 28–29.

⁹⁵ I.e. the *imām* in Yalpaqtal, 'Atā'allāh Khūjāntāy ūghlī.

nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples under their rule, primarily from Qaraqalpaqs, but also from Kazakhs as well. In the khanate of Khiva *zakāt* was a cash tax paid per head of livestock, and was usually paid on cattle and sheep. The actual tax was collected by tribal elders and was handed over to the khan's officials. There were different rates for livestock that was pastured exclusively on the territory of the khanate and for livestock pastured partially out on the Ust'-Iurt and Kyzyl Kum deserts.¹⁰¹

In the Inner Horde there is evidence that some form of *zakāt* was already being collected under Būkāy Khan. Ivanov cites an account that Qaraqalpaqs (that is, "Astrakhan Qaraqalpaqs") complained to a Russian traveler that they had to pay *zakāt* under both Būkāy Khan and Jahāngīr.¹⁰² Under Jahāngīr, whose practices concerning Islamic taxation are reasonably well documented, the *zakāt* appears to have been partly religious and partly secular; that is, the taxes were used (allegedly) both to support the needy, as it was prescribed in the *sharī'a*, but also to fund Jahāngīr's administrative and even personal expenses.

Jahāngīr first requested that he be allowed to levy and collect *zakāt* in 1827, during the visit to the Inner Horde of the Russian senator Engel', as well as Gens, the chairman of the Orenburg Border Commission in 1829. It appears that by 1830 Jahāngīr had been granted the authority to collect the *zakāt*. However, it appears that Jahāngīr took an already existing tax and simply relabeled it *zakāt* since in 1825, before Jahāngīr had petitioned to be allowed to collect *zakāt*, Fuks noted that he was already collecting a tax of 40,000 head of sheep from his subjects, which Fuks considered to be evidence of light taxation. Ivanov notes that the one percent tax on livestock was already in effect during the reign of Jahāngīr Khan, and only subsequently became known as *zakāt*.¹⁰³

Jahāngīr first initiated the *zakāt* as an in-kind tax on livestock. According to custom the rate was 2.5 percent of a Muslim's wealth. In his petition of 1829 to the Orenburg Border commission he set the rate at somewhat lower:

40-100 sheep	1 sheep
up to 200	2 sheep
up to 300	3 sheep
5 camels	1 sheep
30 cattle	1 two-year old cow ¹⁰⁴
40 cattle	1 three-year old cow ¹⁰⁴

In 1845, in a response to an inquiry on the part of the Orenburg Border Commission on taxation in the Inner Horde made after Jahāngīr's death, the administrator of the Horde, Sultan Adil, reported that the initial rate was as follows: one sheep out of every 40, one camel out of 30, one cow out of 30, one horse out of 100. Later the administration of the Inner Horde determined cash equivalents. A good horse was equivalent to one ruble, 50 kopecks per head of cattle, 15 kopecks per sheep, and one ruble per camel. However, Ivanov points out that the original cash rate was somewhat lower:

3-4 kopecks per sheep
2 kopecks per goat
15 kopecks per head of cattle
20 kopecks per horse
25-30 kopecks per camel

In principle every adult Muslim was required to pay *zakāt*, but Jahāngīr exempted five groups from the tax. These included 1) orphans younger than age 15, 2) *bīys*, clan leaders, and elders (because of the services they provided in administration), 3) *sultans* and *qozhas* (because of their origins), 4) *imāms*, 5) *tulenguts* (descendants of slaves manumitted by former khans), 6) *tarkhāns* and others granted tax exempt status by the khan.¹⁰⁵ However, some *tulenguts* may not have been exempt, or may have lost their exemption, because they are listed as one of the "clans" paying *zakāt* in 1845.¹⁰⁶ According to Evreinov the administration of the Inner Horde calculated the tax on the basis of an annual livestock census submitted by the *starshinas* (elders) of each clan. A cash value was assigned to the herd on the results of the census, and the clan's liability was one percent of the total value of the herd, which could be paid in cash or in kind.¹⁰⁷ This was considerably less than the two and a half percent determined

¹⁰¹ Iu. E. Bregel', *Dokumenty arkhiva Khivinskikh khanov po istorii i etnografii karakalpakov*, (Moscow, 1967), 39-41, 49.

¹⁰² Ivanov, *Dezhanger khan*, 130.

¹⁰³ Ivanov, *Dezhanger khan*, 147.

¹⁰⁴ Ivanov, *Dezhanger khan*, 133.

¹⁰⁵ Ivanov, *Dezhanger khan*, 140-141.

¹⁰⁶ Ivanov, *Dezhanger khan*, 142.

¹⁰⁷ Ivanov, *Dezhanger khan*, 148-149.

and corresponding fluctuations in the amount of tax collected. Thus, in 1844 *zakāt* amounting to 328,830 paper rubles were collected, while in 1845, following a severe *jūt* (ice storm), only 264,732 paper rubles in *zakāt* were collected.¹¹² The breakdown of *zakāt* collected per clan in 1845 was as follows:

Bersh	44,700
Nogai	33,150
Baibakty	31,500
Alacha	28,550
Cherkesh	21,250
Tana	15,000
Semirodtsy	13,860
Adai	11,600
Dzhappas	10,670
Kyzylkurt	9,100
Isyk	5,050
Isentemir	5,000
Maskar	3,900
Kita	3,000
Taz	2,000
Tiulengut	1,600
Total	239,830 ¹¹³

In a letter written in 1838 to Pokrovskii, the Military Governor of Orenburg, Jahāngīr described how the income from *zakāt* were spent, which at that time was still an in-kind tax. The income was used to cover a number of personal and administrative expenses incurred by the khan. According to Kazakh custom, the khan was obligated to feed, lodge, and entertain Kazakhs who came to him with petitions, as well as to receive clan leaders and give them gifts. As the Kazakh population grew, and conflicts among Kazakhs, and between Kazakhs and Russians, the number of petitioners increased, as did the expenses for khan when they were in Khanskaia Stavka. *Zakāt* was used to provide relief to the poor, and to help them reestablish their herds. The income was also used to maintain the chancery, as well as the mosque in Khanskaia Stavka and its servitors. Finally, the income was used for the benefit of the khan's personal expenses, his family, and his personal servants.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 140.
¹¹³ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 142.
¹¹⁴ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 135–136, 146.

by the *sharʿa*. However, because the systematic collection of the *zakāt* was relatively new in the Inner Horde, and the Kazakh nomads were not accustomed to taxation in any form, Jahāngīr had to be careful to minimize the possibilities of resistance among these nomads.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, the collection of *zakāt* was apparently an important grievance in the revolt of Isatay Taymanov in the 1830's.

Unlike the khans of Khiva, Jahāngīr did not make use of tax collectors to collect *zakāt*; rather the tax was brought to Khanskaia Stavka by elders or chiefs. However, in petitions some Kazakhs reported that they were obligated to deliver their *zakāt* to their *mul-lās*.¹⁰⁹ It was collected in spring after the migration from the winter pastures. The system for collection seems to have been rather imperfect, and it is certain that far less than one percent of the total value of the herd reached the khan's treasury, and in his report to the Orenburg Border Commission in 1845 Sultan Adil, the administrator of the Inner Horde, reported as much.¹¹⁰ Since Jahāngīr depended on clan elders to report the size of their own clan's herds, even if their personal herds were exempt, it can be assumed that many *biys* and elders could have under-counted the herds of their kinsmen. Furthermore, not only were the clan leaders allowed to keep the amount of tax over what had been determined by the administration on the basis of the same clan leaders' livestock censuses, but it was common for Jahāngīr to claim less taxes than what the clan elders brought in, thereby allowing them to keep the difference. In some cases this could amount to as much as a thousand rubles.¹¹¹ Furthermore, as we have seen, nearly the entire elite of the Inner Horde, consisting of the clan leadership, sultans, *qozhas*, and religious figures were entirely exempt from the tax. Indeed, it was these individuals who often owned substantially large herds of livestock themselves.

Nevertheless, the *zakāt* tax was the main source of income to Jahāngīr khan and his administration. Despite Jahāngīr's attempts to predict income with livestock censuses, albeit imperfect ones, the nature of the Kazakhs' pastoral nomadic economy resulted in large fluctuations in the size of the herd as a result of natural conditions,

¹⁰⁸ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 144, 146–147.
¹⁰⁹ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 134, 139, 155.
¹¹⁰ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 139.
¹¹¹ Ivanov, *Dzhanger khan*, 139.

Soviet authors, like some nineteenth century Russian officials before them, viewed the collection of *zakāt* by Jahāngīr as simply a religious pretext for extracting wealth from the Kazakh nomads of the Inner Horde. To be sure, it cannot be denied that Jahāngīr did indeed extract wealth from his subjects and that his personal finances were enriched by this tax. We need not accept at face value the correspondence of Kazakh administrators with Russian officials that the Kazakhs paying the religious tax felt "cleansed" of their sins, although such a possibility cannot be completely ruled out either. At the same time, we have seen that Kazakh nomads, in their petitions to the Russian authorities criticizing the tax, would overstate the extent of their liability. Nevertheless the collection of *zakāt* clearly had religious and political significance in the Inner Horde, and its imposition on the Kazakhs by Jahāngīr needs to be understood within the larger context of his actions as a consciously Islamic ruler. Regardless of his motives, Jahāngīr clearly conceived of himself as an Islamic ruler, albeit one subordinate to the Russian tsar. He sought to introduce the *sharīʿa* as the basis of Kazakh civil law, to introduce a degree of formal Islamic education and literacy to a nomadic population that had been traditionally deficient in these areas, and he sought to create a native Kazakh *ʿulamā* that would in time be able to serve their own people. The success of his program becomes evident when we see in the late nineteenth century that Russian missionaries and officials had become alarmed at the "Tatarization" and "fanaticization" of the Kazakh nomads of the Inner Horde, which is how they interpreted the spread of Islamic institutions and education among the Kazakhs. Whether or not the *zakāt* tax was popular, it did serve to confirm Jahāngīr's position as an Islamic ruler, since the ability to levy this tax was the prerogative of an Islamic ruler, even one subordinate to the Russian tsar. Part of it was used to fund Jahāngīr's *sharīʿa* court, his mosque, and the training of *imāms*, and despite the petitions of some Kazakhs (to Russian administrators) that the rate was too high, there is no evidence that any Kazakh ever challenged Jahāngīr's right to collect the tax, or their own duty to pay it.

While Jahāngīr is usually remembered by Russian commentators (and Western historians who rely on Russian sources) as the last Chingisid ruler in Inner Asia, Jahāngīr's remarkable policies to create a Kazakh Islamic establishment and his desire to gain legitimacy and credibility as an *Islamic* ruler serves as evidence to show how

Chingisid charisma *per se* had lost its authority in Kazakh society by the early nineteenth century, and had been effectively been replaced by Islamic credentials. This process had been underway throughout the course of the eighteenth century, and we can see that Jahāngīr's father had begun the policy of strengthening his Islamic credentials by introducing a form of *zakāt* and creating the foundation of an Islamic establishment. Perhaps most tellingly, he chose to be buried next to a Muslim saint, and his recognition as a Muslim saint and the transformation of his tomb into a pilgrimage site demonstrates that he was better remembered among Kazakhs for his Islamic qualities.¹¹⁵

3. ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS AMONG THE URAL COSSACKS

As we have seen above, Muslim Ural Cossacks lived partially in their own separate communities, and at other times within larger Russian Cossack communities. Within these separate Muslim communities, Muslim Cossacks often maintained their own Muslim institutions, with their own *imāms*, *akhūnds*, and mosques. The Islamic institutions of the Muslim Cossacks are for all intents and purposes undocumented in published sources,¹¹⁶ and for this reason the *Tawārīkh-i Ālī Ātā* offers a unique insight, from an Islamic perspective, into the religious life of imperial Russia's Muslim Ural Cossacks.

In 1883 there were at least nine mosques on the territory of the Ural Cossack Host, including four in the city of Ural'sk. How many of these could be called Ural Cossack mosques is probably far lower, since in many *maḥallas* Ural Cossacks formed a minority of the Muslim population. For example, in the town of Gur'ev, on the Caspian Sea, there was a mosque in 1883 serving 608 Muslims, but in that part of the Ural Cossack Host there were only 27 Muslim Cossacks in 1850.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, in some areas Cossacks did form a majority of the Muslim population. For example, in the city of

¹¹⁵ It is unclear whether the tomb of Jahāngīr khan, located near Khanskaia Stavka, became a pilgrimage site. Aleksei Kharuzin, who visited the tomb in 1887, described it as the most prominent tomb in the town's cemetery. He notes that it was made of wood and resembled a small chapel with a minaret. However, perhaps because his visit was so brief, he makes no mention of pilgrimage; cf. Kharuzin, *Stupnye ocherki*, 60–61.

¹¹⁶ Cf. however, Andreev, "Kazaki-musul'mane."

¹¹⁷ Nebol'sin, *Neskol'ko zamechanii*, 212.

Ural'sk, which had four mosques, Cossack Muslims formed slightly more than half of that city's Tatar population, which in 1883 was reported to be 991.¹¹⁸ Other mosques, such as that of Iletskaia Stanitsa, were located in an area with a very high concentration of Muslim Cossacks, and in all likelihood nearly all of the *maḥallas* there consisted of Cossacks. The same can be said of Ozernoi Poselok (Forpost) which was originally settled by Muslim Cossacks.¹¹⁹

Al-Īlmīnī discusses the Islamic institutions of two Muslim Cossack settlements, in Slomikhinskaia Stanitsa (Yalpaqta) and in the village of Forpost Chizhinskii Pervyi. The latter village was located in the *Chizhinskaia Distant'siia* section of the Ural Cossack Host. In 1850 this section was comprised of 892 Cossacks, including 103 Muslims, and 99 Kalmyk Buddhists. Writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, al-Īlmīnī notes that there was a *maḥalla* of Muslim Ural Cossacks on the "Nūghāy Qārdōn", where they have a mosque. While he neglects to tell us the location of their mosque, he related that they had a "renowned" *imām* called Farīd Mullā who was granted the rank of *ākhūnd*.¹²⁰ The name of this *imām* certainly corresponds to Aḥmad-Farīd Ākhūnd ash-Shirvānī, who was a prominent Muslim literary figure in Ural'sk province at the beginning of the twentieth century. He was a regular contributor to the Tatar periodicals of the city of Ural'sk and was one of the sources on the religious figures of Ural'sk province in Ridā'addīn Fakhraddīn ūghlī's biographical dictionary.¹²¹

We are given considerably more information on the Cossack Muslims in the settlement of Yalpaqta, which the Ural Cossacks established on the left bank of the Bol'shoi Uzen' River after their expulsion from Glinianskii Forpost in 1873. It is fairly evident that in this settlement Cossacks probably formed a minority of the Muslim community as a whole. We know that in 1850 there were only 329

Muslims in the seven settlements along the Mal'yi Uzen' River forming the *Vnutrenniaia Ural'skaia Linia*, while in 1883 there were 898 Muslims registered to the *maḥalla* of Yalpaqta. Furthermore, in Glinianskii Forpost, and later in Yalpaqta, there was a substantial community of Kazan Tatar merchants who were not Cossacks, as well as a semi-permanent Kazakh presence. In any case, al-Īlmīnī notes that the stone mosque in Yalpaqta was built, presumably in the 1870's, by the leader of the Muslim Cossacks, Khūjāntāy Bābā, who later had his son 'Atā'allāh appointed as *imām*. Yet while Ural Cossacks built the mosque and staffed it, it is evident that they had to share the mosque with other Muslims. Al-Īlmīnī writes how during Ramadān the Cossacks would be almost crowded out of the mosque by the numerous Kazakh worshippers, and as a result had to exact a levy to enlarge the basement so that they would have their own place to pray.¹²² In general though, al-Īlmīnī notes that the number and influence of the Muslim Cossacks in Yalpaqta was in decline in his time and he relates how a local Sufi *shaykh* would devote most of his attention to Kazakhs, rather than to Cossacks.¹²³

Because of their small numbers, Muslim Ural Cossacks do not appear to have developed their own educational institutions, at least in the areas described by al-Īlmīnī. Instead the Cossacks of the Mal'yi and Bol'shoi Uzen' Valleys received religious education and religious training from the teachers in Novouzensk district. We are told how the Cossack *imāms* of Glinianskii Forpost, and later of Yalpaqta attended the *madrasa* of 'Abdalkarīm Temirbulāt ūghlī in Iske Ōzen.¹²⁴ However, it seems to have been common for some teachers from Novouzensk district to give instruction to the Cossacks in their villages or in their nomadic encampments. In the middle of the nineteenth Kamāladdīn Isfandiyyār ūghlī, who was to become *imām* of Alfi Ata's First Mosque, traveled among the Ural Cossacks giving instruction.¹²⁵ At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries al-Īlmīnī's own son, Aḥmad-Ṣafā, who was to become *imām* in Aleksandrov Gai, also traveled among the Ural Cossacks giving instruction.¹²⁶ Cossacks did not only come to Novouzensk district for

¹²² TAA fols. 107b-108a.

¹²³ TAA fol. 107b.

¹²⁴ TAA fol. 88b.

¹²⁵ TAA fol. 12a.

¹²⁶ TAA fol. 103a.

¹¹⁸ E. I. Gerasimova, *Istoriia goroda Ural'ska v dorevolutsionnyi period (1613-1917)*, Afereferat . . . kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Akademiiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, Institut istorii, arkhologii i etnografii, (Alma-Ata, 1965), 10.

¹¹⁹ Nebol'sin, *Neskol'ko zametchanii*, 211; Iosif Debu, *Topograficheskoe i statisticheskoe opisanie Orenburgskoi gubernii v vneshnem iia sostoianii*, (Moscow, 1837), 185-186.

¹²⁰ TAA fols. 3b-4a; the village of Forpost Chizhinskii Pervyi does not appear among the mosques listed in *Al'faniye spiski*, suggesting that the mosque was only founded after 1883; indeed the village was founded as a Cossack settlements only in the 1870's.

¹²¹ Cf. Iakhun, *Tatarskaia literatura*, 11; Fakhraddīn ūghlī, *Āthār*, 2:11, 204.

religious instruction, but also to seek treatments from the region's most famous healers, Muḥyiddīn Ḥasan ūghlī and his son Khalīl. We are told that they were visited not only by Ural Cossacks, but even by Siberian Cossacks.¹²⁷

4. RELIGIOUS AND MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BORDERLANDS

As in many other parts of his history, al-Īlmīnī's depictions of the frontier reverse many widely held clichés and stereotypes of the religiosity of the various Muslim groups on the frontier, namely the Volga Tatars and Kazakhs. Typically, the Kazakhs are depicted in many works as "areligious" or "shamanistic" who were somehow "converted" to Islam by intensely religious, or "fanatical" Tatar merchants. Yet in his account al-Īlmīnī begins by describing the emergence of Muslim communities in Novouzensk and Aleksandrov Gai. The first Muslims to settle there were Volga Tatar merchants, and al-Īlmīnī is quick to point out the immorality of the merchants before the arrival of *imāms* and other figures of spiritual authority. The types of immorality al-Īlmīnī denounces include wine drinking, failure to perform the obligatory prayers, and cheating the naïve Kazakhs. Al-Īlmīnī is especially critical of the Muslim community in Aleksandrov Gai, of which his son, Aḥmad-Şafā was *imām*, and where the local notables refused to build a mosque, despite the entreaties of their *imām*. However, in both Novouzensk, and to a lesser degree, Aleksandrov Gai, the immoral behavior of the Muslims is gradually turned around and made good through the actions of conscientious Muslims. Al-Īlmīnī paints a similar picture of the Muslim community of Novouzensk, which he describes as a wide-open and permissive town until the appearance of several pious Muslims who gradually turn the Muslims of Novouzensk into a God-fearing community.¹²⁸

In the case of Aleksandrov Gai, as al-Īlmīnī shows us, there was a succession of *imāms* there before the arrival of his son, Aḥmad-Şafā in 1901:

The first to carry out these deeds [i.e. the duties of an *imām*] was San'atallāh Mullā. His ancestry was from Kazan Province. He him-

¹²⁷ TAA fol. 27b.

¹²⁸ TAA fol. 96a.

self was a pious man, and in accordance with his abilities he commanded the good and prohibited the evil. He showed patience with annoyances and gave thanks for kindnesses. At that time he began to give a pious appearance to the village of [Aleksandrov Gai]. San'at Mullā completed his predestined life, and upon his death, Ḥasan, from among the *shāghirds* of the Yālpāqāl Ḥadrat took his place as successor. Although perchance, he was from Ālāsh, in Saratov Province's Khvalynsk district, they say he very much led [people] astray and journeyed to Siberia, and was sentenced to stay in the city of Petropavlovsk. Let it be just. After him a well known *shāghird* named Fayḍ Rahmān arrived. He was from Istārlibash district [Ufa Province], and was educated in the same Istārlibash. He maintained diligence in religious affairs and he himself was brave and eloquent; because he had been in military service, he was familiar with the Russian tongue. This individual conducted the prayers communally five times a day. He celebrated the holidays [*ʿidlār*] and administered religious affairs. He was very courageous, and on a holiday during the admonition he heard a word emerge that was contrary to proper manners, and he could not endure it. They began an argument in the assembly and he [the *imām*] lost patience with those arguing. He [the *imām*] submitted complaints [*ʿarḍad*] regarding their dispute and said in a report that [members of the congregation] had insulted the tsar and his family, and said that it merited being ruled on by a high tribunal. A police investigator [*zhāndārmisqī tayfshchī*] came, asked questions and received answers, and he [the *imām*] facilitated the investigator's task; and [the investigator] ruled to assemble the community and they were exonerated. However Fayḍ Rahmān did not retain his former good favor, and to some degree he disgusted people with the complaints.¹²⁹

This passage provides us with a rather colorful recounting of the *imāms* who preceded Aḥmad-Şafā in 1901, and illustrates well how the relations between an *imām* and the community could vary considerably. Subsequently, we are told that the elders of Aleksandrov Gai selected Aḥmad-Şafā to serve as *imām*, implying that Fayḍ Rahmān was removed from his post as a result of the congregation's dissatisfaction with him.¹³⁰

In the account, the good moral qualities of the Kazakh nomads stand in sharp contrast with the poor moral qualities of the Volga Tatar merchants in their midst. The Tatar merchants in Novouzensk did not always treat the Kazakhs fairly, a fact al-Īlmīnī blames on a lack of Islamic consciousness among these merchants. He relates

¹²⁹ TAA fols. 102b–103a.

¹³⁰ TAA fol. 103a.

how the Tatar merchants would cheat the naive Kazakhs with various swindles, including offering them a "Muslim" *pood* of grain which weighed thirty pounds, but was the same prices as a full thirty six-pound "Russian" *pood*. As good, but naive, Muslims, the Kazakhs would choose the "Muslim" *pood*.¹³¹ The majority of those attending the mosques of Novaia Kazanka and YalpaqtaI consisted of Kazakhs, and al-Īlmīnī makes note of how in Novaia Kazanka the Kazakhs would crowd into the mosque in such numbers that kneeling down to pray became impossible, and everyone had to remain standing.¹³² Concerning the Kazakhs in the YalpaqtaI congregation, al-Īlmīnī writes the following:

Most of the Kazakhs come in for Friday prayers, but the rest of the time, since their houses and livestock are out on the steppe, they are out on the steppe. But during the Noble Month [Ramadañ] they come to perform seclusionary retreats involving religious devotions [*ʾitkāf*]. Most of those who retire for *ʾitkāf* are Kazakhs, and they say there are nearly three hundred of them who come for the *ʾitkāf*. Since the Ural Cossacks were being pressed in by these Kazakhs, with the permission of [ʿAlāʾallāh] *ḥadrat* [the *imām* of the YalpaqtaI mosque], and out of their own purses, they dug underneath the mosque and made a fine addition, taking two hundred rubles as a levy, and nowadays they [the Muslim Cossacks] perform their *ʾitkāf* in the lower part of the mosque.¹³³

Thus, it is clear that despite the special circumstances of being pastoral nomads, most of the Kazakhs nevertheless came in regularly for Friday prayers, and were especially diligent about performing the *ʾitkāf* during Ramadañ. Al-Īlmīnī's account seems to contradict a prejudice widely held among students of Kazakh history that supposes the Kazakhs were somehow "superficially" Muslim. Furthermore, al-Īlmīnī presents a more complex, and probably more accurate, depiction of religious life among Tatar merchants, who are represented as often lacking in sufficient Islamic, and consequently moral, consciousness, especially in dealing with the Kazakhs, whose own piety and Islamic consciousness is depicted as exemplary. Similarly, al-Īlmīnī's depiction contrasts with the fallacious view commonly encountered in secondary literature, whereby Tatar merchants are credited with somehow "converting" the nomadic Kazakhs to Islam.

¹³¹ TAA 95b-96a.

¹³² TAA fol. 105a.

¹³³ TAA fol. 107b.

In contrasting the piety of the Kazakh nomads with that of the Tatar merchants, it is unlikely that the Tatar al-Īlmīnī is utilizing the age-old literary device of idealizing "noble savages" (here the Kazakhs) as a way of criticizing his own community. Rather, the frequency of the contrast and its intensity, as well as incidental illustrations of Kazakh piety, suggest that it reflects real differences, not just heightened contrasts used to make a point. In his history of Astrakhan Jahānshāh an-Nizhghārūṭī makes precisely the same point that al-Īlmīnī makes regarding Kazakh piety and devotion.¹³⁴

Al-Īlmīnī's contrast of the good Islamic moral qualities of the Kazakh nomads with the poor qualities of the merchants is instructive in another respect. Namely, it reverses the commonly encountered cliché that Tatar merchants somehow "Islamized" the Kazakh nomads. This idea is found in a number of works by Alexandre Bennigsen, who credits Tatar merchants with bringing Islam to the "yet half-pagan population of Bashkiriā [!], western Siberia and the Kazakh steppe."¹³⁵ While the role of Tatar merchants on the Kazakh steppe was certainly important politically, the idea of Tatar merchants as missionaries appears to be ultimately based on a legal fiction, which Russian administrators, and later missionaries and historians, took at face value. During the first half of the nineteenth century Russian administrators on the steppe frontier did in fact become alarmed at the pervasive presence of Tatar religious figures among the Kazakhs. As a result they passed a series of laws forbidding Tatar *mullās* from nomadizing with the Kazakhs.¹³⁶ Of course, they could not ban trade between Kazakhs and Tatars, which was of course very lucrative, so the Tatar *mullās* used trade as a loophole to continue teaching among the Kazakhs. Jahānshāh an-Nizhghārūṭī commented on this legal maneuver in the following manner:

Even though at first the Kazakhs were a savage and ignorant people, they ignored such talk from the [Russian] missionaries; they were afraid and they started teaching their children to read in the Islamic fashion and to study the faith. They began to invite Tatar [*nūghāy*] *shāghirds* from nearby cities. After the missionaries learned of this situation, the government hindered the coming of the Tatar *shāghirds* and teachers

¹³⁴ Jahānshāh an-Nizhghārūṭī, *Tārīkh-i Astarkhān*, 27-28.

¹³⁵ Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire: a Guide*, (Bloomington, Indiana and Indianapolis, 1986), 9.

¹³⁶ Basilov and Karnysheva, *Islam u kazakhov*, 23.

among the Kazakhs. Later the teachers would no longer come wearing turbans and robes or under the name of teachers, and instead they would come as merchants. And when they [the Russians] asked among the teachers "If you are merchants, where are your goods?" they would take glass from their pockets and show them. In this way the Kazakhs generally spread learning to their children.¹³⁷

Thus, it appears to have been common for Tatar teachers to have circulated among the Kazakhs in the guise of merchants. Furthermore, al-Īlmīnī's account shows that even when the Kazakhs were "uncultured", they nevertheless had a strong attachment to Islam and a strong Islamic consciousness, which the unscrupulous Tatar merchants profited from to cheat the naïve Kazakhs.

The religious consciousness of both the Muslim Cossacks and the Kazakhs was demonstrated by their attraction to Tatar religious healers in Novouzensk district. The most famous of these were Mullā Muhyiddīn Ḥājī and his son Mullā Khalīl, both *imāms* of Altı Ata's Fifth Mosque, and both identified as *ṣāhib-i naḥas* (lit. master of breath). According to al-Īlmīnī, a *ṣāhib-i naḥas* was a person who healed people who were struck by *jinn*s just by looking in the patient's face (*jinn ṣūqmish kimsālār mujarrad yūzīn kūrmākle shifālanūrlar*).¹³⁸ Mullā Khalīl became quite wealthy as a *ṣāhib-i naḥas*. Kazakhs would often make offerings in kind, and would sometimes offer one eighth of their property. Mullā Khalīl was also sought out by Ural Cossacks, Siberian Cossacks, and even by Russian notables.¹³⁹

CONCLUSION

Al-Īlmīnī's account of Islam and ethnic relations between Muslim communities in the Inner Horde offers a look into how Muslim communities interacted on the Russian steppe frontier. On the one hand,

¹³⁷ Jahānshāh an-Nizhghārūī, *Tārīkh-i Astarkhān*, 27.

¹³⁸ TAA, fol. 25b. People characterized as *ṣāhib-i naḥas* were active in the Volga-Ural region in the nineteenth century, and their tombs often became shrines and pilgrimage sites; Husayn Amīrkhān ūghlī mentions two such figures, Safar b. Murād in the village of Talqish in the Chistopol' district of Kazan province, and Ishmuhammad b. Rastmuhammad Bābā, a Sufi in the village of Māmdal in Kazan province; cf. Amīrkhān ūghlī, *Tawārīkh-i Bulghārīya*, 45, 55. While the ritual of the *ṣāhib-i naḥas* bears certain similarities to Kazakh shamanic healing rituals, it bears mentioning that Muhyiddīn was trained in this specialty by Sufis in Istanbul and Syria.

¹³⁹ TAA fol. 26a.

the Muslim communities were clearly divided along ethnic and corporate lines, with Volga Tatars, Muslim Cossacks, and Kazakh nomads forming three separate and essentially exclusive communities. These divisions are especially evident in the land conflict over the Uzen' Interfluvium, which pitted Volga Tatars and Kazakhs against Ural Cossacks, both Russian and Muslim. In the case of the Cossacks and Kazakhs al-Īlmīnī's account demonstrates how both groups used Imperial Russian symbols or channels to bolster their positions; the Cossacks accused the Tatars of being pro-Turkish (hence anti-Russian), and the Kazakh leadership managed to expel the Cossacks from their lands through petitions filed with the Imperial authorities in St. Petersburg.¹⁴⁰

At the same time, it was a common Islamic faith, including an infrastructure of mosques, *madrasas*, and Sufism that united in a very real sense these separate, and at times mutually hostile, communities. This Islamic infrastructure on the steppe frontier was certainly dominated, but was in no way monopolized, by Volga Tatars. Cossack and Tatar religious figures studied in each others' *madrasas*, and healers, Sufis, and teachers, whether they were Tatar, Cossack or even Daghestani, were patronized by Tatars, Cossacks and especially Kazakhs apparently without regard to ethnicity. In this regard al-Īlmīnī's history is especially helpful in countering the clichéd view of Kazakh nomads as "superficial" Muslims lacking a strong Islamic consciousness. While the latter view may reflect wishful thinking on the part of Western historians, or of Turkic nationalists, al-Īlmīnī shows us a quite different picture. In his depiction the Kazakh nomads display a very strong Islamic consciousness, to the point of allowing themselves to be swindled by unscrupulous Tatar merchants who exploit the Kazakhs' Islamic consciousness to their own advantage. Furthermore, al-Īlmīnī was by no means a modernist *imām*, and as a result accepted the Kazakhs' devotion to the region's Sufis and healers, and their generous offerings, as an acceptable and sanctioned expression of Islamic consciousness. But he also underscores the Kazakhs' piety when during *Ramādān* they would come into Yalpaqtal for constant prayer and fasting [*itkāf*] in such numbers that they would crowd the Cossack Muslims out of the mosque.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Frank "Islam and Ethnic Relations in the Kazakh Inner Horde."

CONCLUSION

The religious institutions of the Volga-Ural region's rural Muslim communities were in a real sense their primary public institutions. Unlike local political institutions, which ultimately rested on non-Islamic foundations, religious institutions, irrespective of the Russian state's early support, and later non-interference, were fundamentally controlled by the local community. In this respect, these institutions, at least among rural Muslims, were autonomous in the fullest sense of the word. At the imperial level, the Russian authorities only very rarely interfered with these Muslim institutions, and at the provincial level, the regulation of Muslim religious institutions involved primarily bureaucratic procedures, which, if occasionally corrupt, nevertheless recognized the right of Muslim communities to administer their religious institutions. In this respect, we are bound to see the relationship between the Russian state and these Muslim communities a fundamentally cooperative, rather than confrontational. Previous treatments, especially in the West, describing the ebb and flow of a sort of *Kulturkampf* between Muslims and the Russian state, have been based primarily on Russian ecclesiastic and imperial-level sources (as well as later Tatar nationalist writings), and ignore that the bulk of the institutional relations between Muslims and the Russian state took place at the provincial and local level. The materials for Novouzensk district demonstrate that the relationship which existed between the provincial authorities and the local Muslim religious institutions was above all a cooperative one, in which each side mutually recognized and accepted specific prerogatives and responsibilities. This relationship was at least partially reflected in expressions of patriotism among Volga-Ural *ʿulamā*, which while expressed in Islamic terms, nevertheless rooted in evaluations of this cooperative relationship.

One result of the autonomy of these institutions was that it isolated, or rather insulated, rural Muslims from the Russian institutions around them. The Muslim villages of Novouzensk district provide an excellent example of this sort of insulation. Here, Muslims formed a small minority in an overwhelmingly non-Muslim district, but not surprisingly, most public discourse in the Muslim communities took

place in a completely Islamic framework, to the exclusion of non-Muslims. To be sure, some Muslims maintained personal and business relations with Russians, but the self-sufficiency of the Muslims' religious institutions, especially their educational institutions, eliminated the need for rural Muslims to expose themselves to Russian institutions.

To say, as many scholars, and especially nationalist Tatar scholars, have, that the Muslims' isolation from "the outside world" (read: from European ideas), perpetuated the dominance of archaic, obsolete, and intellectually lifeless institutions, reveals a lack of appreciation of the genuinely dynamic and cosmopolitan nature of these institutions. Not only did these institutions exposing a largely immobile Muslim peasantry to the larger Islamic world around them, but Islamic discourse, rooted and learned in local religious educational institutions, and expressing and articulating the intellectual and social life of Muslims, was a dynamic bond that united both the local community, and transgressed the ethnic and administrative boundaries of the Russian empire as a whole, and beyond. If the materials for Novouzensk district teach us anything, it is that as late as 1910 Muslims were satisfied with how their religious institutions functioned and saw no reason to reform an established system that met their needs and functioned adequately well. While some jadid schools did open in the district, they all ultimately failed. This failure was attributable not to opposition by "reactionary" *imāms*, but rather to a lack of demand on the part of the villagers.

The Sufi and scholarly networks that included Novouzensk district allowed the villagers to grasp the breadth and variety of the Islamic world. There were scholars from Novouzensk who had studied in Russian centers of Islamic learning, such as Kazan, Qarghali, and Ištārlibash, in Central Asia, in the Crimea, in Egypt, in Syria, and in Turkey. Similarly, Daghestani scholars and Sufis also resided among the Novouzensk Muslims. Students from throughout the Volga-Ural region, including Bashkirs, Muslim Cossacks, and Kazakh nomads studied in the district's *madrasas*. The *ʿulamā* of Novouzensk district were certainly well educated, and helped expose villagers to the region's Islamic discourse, and to the general discourse of the Islamic world as a whole. Furthermore, the district's wealth ensured that a number of *ʿālims* and notables would perform the *ḥajj* from time to time, and would inform the villagers about the diversity, unity and vastness of the Islamic world.

Our study of imperial Russia's Muslim institutions shows us that these communities were above all part of the *Islamic* world; while they were Russian subjects, the central features of their own public life were their Islamic institutions, specifically their mosques, *madrasas*, and their *ʿulamā*. Soviet and post-Soviet scholars have commonly claimed that the *ʿulamā* was somehow separate from Muslim society as a whole, and its arguments and statements represent the articulation of a narrow class interest. However, the examination of the kinship and marriage ties of the *ʿulamā* within Novouzensk district suggest that while the *ʿulamā* was for the most part closely linked to the local commercial and land-owning elite, the community recognized and sometimes removed *ʿālims* who placed their commercial interests before the interests of their community and some *ʿālims* would occasionally come into conflict with local notables. More importantly, the support and administrative structure of local religious institutions, including fund-raising, and the collections of *prigovor* and other collective documents, necessitated the direct participation of the community as a whole in these institutions. The *ʿulamā* were certainly the most educated members of society, but in no way could they administer mosques and *madrasas* without the support of the community as a whole.

Of course, the evidence from Novouzensk district, and from Nizhnii Novgorod province, makes it quite evident that the wealthiest members of society exerted the most control over the community's Islamic institutions, which they at times influenced, or even controlled. This influence was mainly financial and was expressed by financing a mosque, which allowed the patron to separate a *maḥalla*, or nominate an *imām*. In this respect, the question of how less-wealthy Muslim reacted to the domination of their local religious institutions by wealthy notables is an important one, since the *madrasas*, mosques and religious personnel in these communities were after all public institutions. Tensions between wealthy patrons seeking to appoint their own relatives as *imām*, and more humble Muslims are well documented in Nizhnii Novgorod province, and there are reportedly many petitions in the Nizhnii Novgorod provincial archive in which these Muslims denounce the high-handed actions of wealthy patrons, and who challenge the qualifications of *imāms* that the notables nominated.¹

¹ Idrisov et al. *Iz istorii*, 55.

At the same time, the evidence for Novouzensk district offers many examples of members of a *maḥalla* ceding the right to nominate an *imām* to a notable in order to lessen their own financial obligations toward building a mosque. In any case, the tensions evident between Muslim villagers in administering their institutions provide wonderful insights into the political life of these communities, which even at the local level, was carried out in Islamic terms, as Islamic discourse. In Novouzensk district, we can see how individuals, by means of institutional Islamic discourse, sought to maximize their influence, and minimize the influence of their rivals. This sort of internal political maneuvering is most evident in issues of fundraising, marriage patterns, and debates regarding the appointment of *imāms* and *muʾadhdhims*.

In any case, we can say that not every *maḥalla* was dominated by the wealthy, and that in at least a few *maḥallas* there were no notables at all; moreover, there were relatively few cases of a notable funding the entire expenses for building a mosque and confirming an *imām*. It was certainly not unusual for the members of a *maḥalla*, including the poorer ones, to contribute to the building of a mosque of the support of an *imām* either in kind or with their cash or labor. In this sense these institutions were public in a very real sense, and there is no evidence that Muslim alienation with their local religious institutions as such existed, at least among rural Muslims.

The political aspect of Islamic institutional discourse is especially evident in the materials for the Kazakh Inner Horde. Kazakh nomadic society, while no less of an Islamic society than that of Volga-Ural Muslims, was structured rather differently. Among Kazakh nomads, at least at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Islamic knowledge was mainly disseminated orally, without the benefit of *madrasas* or literacy. Lacking a formal *ʿulamā* as such, Kazakh society contained *qoʻzha* kinship groups, who, as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, and of Central Asian holy figures, in large measure fulfilled the function of the *ʿulamā* in a nomadic society. It was the khan of the Inner Horde, Jahāngir, who undertook a full scale reform of the Inner Horde's Islamic institutions, legislating the creation of a typical *madrasa*-trained *ʿulamā*, and the foundation of *maktabs* at the local level for the Kazakh nomads. This organization, structured after the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, into which it was integrated after Jahāngir's death, was evidently accepted by the Kazakh nomads, whose piety was admirably noted by more than one outside

Muslim observer. While this reformulation of Kazakh Islamic institutions was explained to the nomads in Islamic terms, and was accepted by them, it also bore political dividends for Jahāngīr. The Islamic institutions he created helped him administer the Inner Horde more efficiently, but at the same time, it also eroded the authority of the *qozhas* in Kazakh society.

The *Tawārīkh-i Ālīi Ātā* provides invaluable insights into the poorly documented Islamic institutions of the Ural Cossack Host and the Bashkir communities of the Chizha Valley and Nikolaevsk district. Shared Muslim status connected these nomadic communities with the Muslim peasants of Novouzensk district and a common Muslim identity was especially articulated by the *ulamā* serving these communities. Nevertheless, different corporate affiliations as Russian subjects simultaneously rendered these communities exclusive and separate, testifying to the complex interplay of communal, corporate, and religious identities among the Muslim communities of the imperial Russian steppe frontier.

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Abbreviations

IOAIE *Izvestiia obshchestva arkhologii, istorii i étnografii pri Kazanskom Universitete*.
 PSPP *Pol'noe sobranie postanovlenii i raspriadzhenii po vedomstvu pravoslavnago isповедeniia Rossiiskoi imperii*, (St. Petersburg, 1872–1912).

GLOSSARY OF RELIGIOUS AND HISTORICAL TERMS

<i>abııǵay</i> <i>abız</i>	female teacher for girls. in eighteenth century sources religious leaders functionally equivalent to <i>imāms</i> , but lacking official recognition.
<i>ādhan</i> <i>ākhund</i>	the call to prayer performed by a <i>mū'adhhdhān</i> . also spelled <i>ākhūn</i> ; in the Volga-Ural region and Siberia before the nineteenth century it signifies a high-ranking legal expert; after the eighteenth century it became a rank of a district level legal expert, but gradually lost its former prestige and authority.
<i>‘ālim</i> <i>arshin</i>	Islamic scholar and legal expert; singular form of <i>‘ulamā</i> .
<i>bāy</i> <i>chāqırām</i>	Russian unit of distance equal to 0.71 meters. wealthy member of a community; rich man.
<i>desiatina</i> <i>hadrat</i>	Muslim equivalent of <i>verst</i> (a Russian unit of distance equal to 1.06 kilometers). Russian unit of area equivalent to 2.7 acres or 1.09 hectares.
<i>hājji</i> <i>‘ūd</i>	honorific used as a name or an epithet for particularly learned or esteemed scholars. Muslim who has performed the pilgrimage to Mecca.
<i>imām</i> <i>ishān</i> <i>i'tkāf</i>	Islamic holiday and related celebrations. formal religious head of a <i>mahalla</i> possessing a mosque. Sufi master; also used as an honorific for Sufi masters. seductionary retreat involving religious devotions performed during the month of Ramaḍān.
<i>khāfiā</i>	junior instructor in a <i>madrasa</i> or <i>maktub</i> , often hired directly by the congregation.
<i>khalfā</i> <i>khafīb</i>	disciple chosen by a Sufi master to act as his successor. <i>imām</i> formally licensed to perform the <i>khuḭbā</i> , the communal Friday sermon.
<i>khuḭbā</i> <i>khulor</i> <i>madrasa</i>	the sermon performed on Fridays in a Friday Mosque by a <i>khafīb</i> . farmstead (as distinct from a village). higher school for the instruction of the Islamic sciences; in Novouzensk district and in certain other districts, the term is used more broadly to signify any Islamic religious school, whether primary or advanced.
<i>mahalla</i>	congregation of Muslims formally registered to and responsible for a single mosque headed by an <i>imām</i> .
<i>maktub</i>	primary school affiliated with a specific mosque and <i>mahalla</i> ; see <i>madrasa</i> .
<i>manshūr</i> <i>mītrāb</i>	Islamic form of <i>ukaz</i> ; also appears as adjectival form <i>manshūrli</i> . conical niche located inside of a mosque and indicating the direction of Mecca.
<i>minbar</i> <i>mū'adhhdhān</i>	<i>imām</i> 's pulpit in a mosque. officially licensed individual affiliated with a mosque who is responsible for performing the daily <i>ādhan</i> prayers (calls to prayer).
<i>mudarris</i> <i>mufā</i>	<i>imām</i> formally licensed as an instructor in a <i>madrasa</i> . head of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly after 1788, and head of the Muslim religious community of the Volga-Ural region and Siberia.

among Volga-Ural Muslims this term denoted an individual possessing a degree of religious authority and education; in Russian sources and among Kazaks of the Inner Horde it was used as an equivalent of *imām*.

disciple of a Sufi master.

elected or appointed head of a village or township.

prayer which Muslims are obligated to perform five times daily.

section of a village consisting of related families or, in Osinov Gai township, of migrants from specific villages and their descendants.

female teacher of girls; often the wife of an *imām*.

attestation formally signed by at least two-thirds of male heads of households in the same *maḥalla* selecting an *imām* or *mu'adhdhin* or for building a mosque.

bailiff of a district.

Muslim unit of distance equal to the distance between the thumb and index finger of an extended hand; span.

lit. "master of miracles;" a Muslim saint.

lit. "master of breath;" a type of healer.

Russian unit of distance equal to 2.13 meters or three *arshins*. male student studying in a *madrasa*.

genealogy.

imām jointly administering a *maḥalla* in partnership with a second *imām*.

Sufi master.

chain of Sufic initiation; in the Volga-Ural region the term could also signify a genealogy, especially for descendants of a holy ancestor.

civil title signifying an elected or appointed chief or headman of a village.

civil title signifying a township-level chief or headman.

district, a subdivision of a Russian province.

formal license granted by both the provincial authorities and the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly to *ākhūnds*, *imāms*, and *mu'adhdhins* who met the requirements for office; also used in the adjectival form *ukaznyi*.

collective term comprising *imāms* and *ākhūnds*; plural form of *ālm*; legal experts.

Turkic form of *ukaz*.

Islamic in-kind tax consisting of one tenth of a harvest or other wealth.

Russian unit of distance equal to 1.06 kilometers.

township; a subdivision of an *uezd*.

pious endowment for the support of a specific religious institution; in the Volga-Ural region *waqfs* usually consisted of real estate or capital.

an obligatory annual Islamic tax equivalent to one fortieth of a Muslim's wealth.

district-based administrative council in imperial Russia.

mulla

murīd

nachal'nik

namāz

ōch

ostabikā

prigovor

pristav

qārīsh

ṣāhib-i karāmal

ṣāhib-i naḥas

sezhen'

shāḡud

shajara

sharīk

shaykh

stilsila

starosta

starshina

uezd

ukaz

ulamā

ūqāz

ushr

versta

volost'

waqf

zakāt

zemskaia uprava

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Abdurrauf Fitrat with two unidentified persons, ca. 1920.

The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform

Jadidism in Central Asia

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Abdurrauf Fitrat with two unidentified persons, ca. 1920.

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TRANSLITERATION

There does not exist a universally accepted system for transliterating Central Asian Turkic into the Latin script. During this century, it has been written in five different alphabets in three scripts. I have resisted the temptation to transliterate all Uzbek according to modern Cyrillic-script spellings given that even modern Uzbek publishers do not follow this practice. Instead, I have transliterated the names of individuals active before 1920 according to the titles of their works directly from the Arabic script in which they were written, using the six-vowel system (*a, ā, e, i, o, and u*) and disregarding vowel harmony. For modern Uzbek written in the Cyrillic script, I have used the system adopted in Uzbekistan in 1995, with the exception of rendering *o'* as *ö*, *k'* as *kh*, and *g'* as *gh*. The two systems are thus rendered harmoniously, except that the vowels transliterated from the Arabic script as *ā* and *o* appear as *o* and *ö*, respectively, when transliterated from the Cyrillic. I have followed the same logic in transliterating Tajik from the Cyrillic script, whereas "Tajik" in the Arabic script has been transliterated as Persian. Ottoman Turkish has been rendered in modern Turkish orthography on the basis of the 1968 Redhouse *Türkçe İngilizce Sözlük*, and Tatar citations are vocalized using Tatar vowels and vowel harmony.

Abbreviations

NAMES AND DATES

Personal names took many forms in Central Asia in the period discussed here. Some people used Russian-style surnames (e.g., Khojaev), whereas others adopted Tatar-style last names (e.g., Behbudi, Awlāni); yet others used pen names (*takhallus*, e.g., Ayni), although most were simply known by their first name (e.g., Hamza, Munawwar Qāri). I have used the form of name most commonly used by the person in question and have alphabetized the bibliography accordingly. When the name of the same person might be transliterated differently in works appearing in different languages, I have grouped all entries by the same author together in the bibliography.

All common-era dates are given according to the Julian calendar, which was twelve days behind the Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century and thirteen days behind in the twentieth. The Julian calendar was in use in the Russian empire until February 1918; dates after February 1918 are in the Gregorian calendar, and the calendar is specified in cases where confusion might arise. Dates for periodicals published in the Ottoman empire are also given in the Julian calendar, which was the basis of the Ottoman fiscal calendar until 1917. I have used double dating only when the common-era year could not be determined with certainty for a publication dated in a *hijri* calendar.

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Ulugh Turkistān

Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia

tion

Iranian and Afghan students are not sufficiently acquainted with worldly knowledge. Our old maktabas and madrasas, reminiscent of the nesting places of dinosaurs, far from teaching worldly sciences, teach only *tafsir* and *hadith*, [which are] the basis of all knowledge. We do not have any teachers' training schools, no teachers, or any workshops to teach skills. We have many merchants with modern business skills. We have organized schools for the elementary education of girls . . . If this . . . continues, soon even our present schools will be destroyed.

Häji Muin b. Shukrullah, 1916

intimations of mortal danger faced by Central Asian societies, and found faith in the power of education to provide the solution. Each from one of the first pieces of modern Central Asian history exemplifies the reformist project of the first generation of Central Asian intellectuals, the “Jadids.” The unease about the future in a sense that traditions of the past were not only incapable of meeting new needs but were also failing to transmit the values of the past throughgoing reform of culture and society was needed if Central Asia were to survive the unprecedented challenges of the modern world. Though the Jadids saw themselves as reformers of their society, their nostalgic embrace of modernity led them to radically new conclusions about their society. Their attempts at rescuing tradition redefined it, and they sought to return to a “pure” Islam brought new understandings of what it meant to be a Muslim. The Jadids were successful in garnering considerable support for their project, but their call for reform also evoked vigorous opposition from established elites (the *qazans*) of their society. It was through the debate over the meaning of Central Asian culture that Central Asians came to imagine the modern world and their place in it. This book tells the story of this debate.

I seek the roots of this debate in Central Asia's experience of modernity, a global condition that brings with it new forms of organization of self and society, new forms of intellectual production, and new ways of imagining the world (and one's place within it). Modernity is not reducible to the cultivation of culturally specific norms or traits; nor is it synonymous with economic development. Rather, as an enormous body of interdisciplinary literature has argued in recent years, the modern condition transforms tradition (indeed, it makes it possible to conceive of tradition as tradition); it takes—and produces—numerous cultural forms, and it inheres in (economic) underdevelopment as much as in development. This conception of modernity therefore differs substantially from that of classic modernization theory, which saw modernization as a unilinear process that dissolved all opposition to it in its conquest of traditional forms.

The Jadid formulation of the predicament of Central Asian societies was as much a result of the profound transformation of Central Asia in the fifty years of imperial Russian rule as a response to it. When Russian forces abruptly conquered the khanates of Central Asia between the 1860s and the 1880s, there existed no theater, no printing press, and no benevolent societies. All of these means of cultural production arose in the half-century of Russian rule. Between the establishment of the governorate-general of Turkestan in 1867 and the Russian revolution of 1917, Central Asia became increasingly intertwined with imperialism (and hence global) economic networks; its social order was drastically reshaped, with the extinction of old elites and the emergence of new ones. Its political order was, of course, reconstituted. New groups, such as the Jadids, adopted and appropriated new forms of communication and sociability in their attempts to reform, creating, in the process, radically new understandings of tradition, religion, and the world.

The Jadids of Central Asia were far from alone in the Muslim world in this period in (re)evaluating their cultural heritage under the exigencies of modernity. Jadidism, as this movement for cultural reform is usually called, had much in common with similar modernist movements popular among intellectuals throughout the Muslim world. The aim of such movements was nothing less than to reconcile Islam with a modernity they very much admired. But whereas similar modernist movements in India, the Ottoman lands, Iran, Egypt, and Algeria have received extensive scholarly attention,¹ Jadidism, especially in its Central Asian

1. I have benefited from the following: Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964* (London, 1967); David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim*

intellectually unknown. The volume of Western scholarship on Central Asia is slim, and work on Jadidism in Central Asia is all part of it. Until very recently, specialist treatments of the subject were almost entirely lacking,² and one was left to retrieve brief passages widely scattered in broad-ranging syntheses that subordinated Jadidism to much broader themes.³ The pieces available on Jadidism suffered from the lack of access to sources that beset all study of Central Asia until the very late Soviet regime.⁴ Soviet scholars, while enjoying access to archival materials, were hampered by ideological constraints that often made their work unpalatable. The situation has changed in recent years, but not so much that many had hoped during the heady days of perestroika that the political context of scholarly production has been

1. *India* (Princeton, 1978); Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottomanism in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, 1962); Albert Hourani, *Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964); Hisham Sharabi, *On the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (London, 1962); Hisham Sharabi, *On the West: The Formative Years, 1875–1914* (Baltimore, 1970); Hisham Sharabi, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Society in Late Ottoman Syria* (New York, 1973); Mangol Bayat, *The First Iranian Revolution: Shi'ism and the Social Change, Mirza Malkum Khan: A Study in the History of Iranian Thought, 1905–1909* (New York, 1991); Nikkie R. Keddie, ed. and trans., *Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid al-Afghani* (Berkeley, 1968); Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani': A Study in Islamic Revivalism* (Berkeley, 1972); Homa Pakdaman, *Djeme al-Din Assad Abadi dit 'Abbas* (Berkeley, 1966); Malcolm H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Sayyid al-Afghani* (Berkeley, 1966); Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and Arabism* (London, 1976); Ali Merad, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1954* (Paris, 1972).

2. The description was a monograph on Bukhara by Hélène Carrère d'Encausse: *Révolutions chez les musulmans de l'empire russe*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1981), now available in French and English as *Islam and the Russian Empire*, trans. Quentin Hoare (Berkeley, 1988). 3. Zdenko Zelenkowsky, "Kulturkampf in Pre-Revolutionary Central Asia," *American Review* 14 (1955): 15–42; Richard N. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia: A Study in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley, 1960), 254–255 (one page on Jadidism in the context of "The Rise of Native National Consciousness"); Geoffrey A. Hosking, *Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (London, 1964), 91 (one dismissive reference to revolutionary Jadidism as "merely a Muslim reformist movement with no political content"). 4. Carrère d'Encausse, "The Stirring of National Feeling," and "Social and Political Movements," in Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (London, 1967), 172–206; Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks: A Cultural History* (London, 1967), 172–206; a brief account of Muslim reform, although based entirely on Russian sources, in Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 193–209.

5. Asian scholars have brought back into print numerous works of Jadid authors. For synthetic studies of the period remain rare; see "Jadidchilik nima?" *San'at*,

transformed in Central Asia in recent years, the severe economic dislocation of academic life (combined with new political demands from the newly independent states) in the post-Soviet period has meant that little new historiography has emerged on this important topic.⁶ Outside the former Soviet Union, interest in Central Asia has focused on the contemporary period, with Jadidism enjoying the attention of only a few scholars. Thus, although detailed research on tsarist Central Asia has begun to appear in recent years, much more remains to be done.⁷ This book is the first effort to comprehend Muslim cultural debates in Central Asia in a broad, comparative perspective.

REFORM, CULTURAL PRODUCTION, AND ELITE STRATEGIES

Much recent social thought has insisted that cultures, rather than being timeless givens, are products of historical change, their meanings contested and constantly in flux. New understandings of the world emerge through efforts by various groups in society to make sense of vastly new conditions they confront. In the case of Central Asia, the Jadids, in diagnosing the ills of their society and prescribing the cure (to use the medical metaphors they often favored), were usurping the moral and cultural authority of the established religious-cultural elites. Their prescription for reform contained a radical re-visioning of society and the roles of various groups within it as well as a redefinition of Central Asian culture and what was valuable within it. Not surprisingly, the Jadid project provoked considerable opposition.

1990, no. 12: 4–10; Pegali Qosimov, "Jadidchilik," in *Milliy uyghonish va o'zbek filologiyasi masalalari* (Tashkent, 1993), 12–39; Qosimov, "Sources littéraires et principaux traits distinctifs du djadidisme turkistanais (début du XX^e siècle)," *Cahiers du monde russe* 37 (1996): 107–132.

6. On the politics of the rewriting of history in contemporary Central Asia, see the very astute analysis by Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "Djadidisme, murasime, islamisme," *Cahiers du monde russe* 37 (1996): 33–36.

7. Two substantial works appeared while this book was being written: Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "La question scolaire à Boukhara et au Turkestan russe, du «premier renouveau» à la soviétisation (fin du XVIII^e siècle–1937)," *Cahiers du monde russe* 37 (1996): 133–210; and Hisao Komatsu, *Kakumei no Chûô Ajia: an Jaddido no shôzô* (Tokyo, 1996). Dudoignon's article covers much of the same ground as this study, but with a different emphasis and rather different conclusions. Komatsu's work, an extended biography of Abdurrauf Fitrat in the context of revolutionary change in Central Asia, remains, unfortunately, beyond my ken. I am grateful to Katie Sparling for acquainting me with its contents.

Western scholars have generally tended to ignore this opposition. As with modernist reform in the Muslim world in general, scholars of Jadidism have tended to focus on the Jadids as the sole voice of reason in their society while dismissing their opponents as unreasoning obscurantists opposed to all positive change. Thus, Edward Allworth sees the Jadids as "men . . . who dared reconsider the predicament of their people," who "for the indigenous population of the region . . . created or adapted six instruments for their purposes." Their opponents, however, are dismissed as "those internally governed by fixed habit and rigid tradition" who "failed to understand" the reforms suggested by the Jadids.⁸ Soviet scholarship, on the other hand, acknowledged the contestation but reduced it to a Marxist metanarrative of class competition. The qadimchi were representatives of the feudal-colonial order, whereas the Jadids were mouthpieces of a rising nationalist bourgeoisie, both groups transparently expressing the ideology of their respective classes.⁹ Both these views are misleading. The complete absence in Western scholarship of any analysis of the contested nature of Jadidism leaves us unable to explain the Jadids' modest success except through invoking such orientalist tropes as the obscurantist nature of traditional elites or the fanaticism of Muslim culture. The Soviet view, too, simplified matters even as it confused them. The debate in Central Asian society cannot be reduced to conflicting economic interests for the Jadids often shared common social origins with their opponents and economic issues seldom surfaced in the debate. Rather, much of the debate discussed in this book centered around the competing claims to cultural authority—the authority to create and interpret culture—in which new elites challenged the authority of the old, for in the attempt to reform society lay a claim for leadership that was profoundly subversive to the established order.

I argue that the struggle between the Jadids and their opponents was over the possession and redefinition of what Pierre Bourdieu has called "cultural capital."¹⁰ The Jadids sought to redefine the culture their society should value, bringing to bear on the debate their access to new intellectual technologies and forms of sociability. Their opponents met the challenge by valorizing the cultural values that guaranteed their status

8. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, 120–121.

9. Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969) remains the standard work on Soviet historiography of the nationalities.

10. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford, 1990 [orig. 1980]), 108–110.

and prestige. Neither group, however, entered the contest fully formed, and the lines between the two groups always remained porous. Many Jads were members of the religious elite in their own right, and many others were only a generation removed. More significantly, however, the ideas of both groups were articulated and refined through this contest. I follow Pierre Bourdieu in contending that only by "apprehending the specific logic of the social world, that 'reality' which is the site of a permanent struggle to *define* 'reality,'"¹¹ may we begin to understand what was at stake.

Bourdieu's numerous works on the social reproduction of culture provide a valuable point of departure for this study. In his attempt to transcend the opposition between structures and representations, between the objectivist claims of twentieth-century social science (shared also by Soviet Marxism) and the phenomenological alternatives proposed to them, Bourdieu has defined a reflexive sociology that seeks to understand how social agents make sense of their world by plotting strategies of social action given the possibilities and constraints of the world. What is significant to Bourdieu are not the "rules" of society, but rather the strategies that social agents bring to bear on their social action. These strategies emerge from a "practical sense" represented by a logic of practice that is defined by the agents' experience of the world. This shift of attention from structures to practices, without denying the existence of structural constraints within which individuals and groups act, allows him to see the individual as an agent actively negotiating the social world rather than as a mere actor acting out a script dictated by structures; at the same time, it reminds us that social agents act on a terrain that contains limits as well as possibilities.¹² The social game is played with symbolic or cultural capital, markers of status and prestige, that signify the distinction of social agents. Wealth is certainly one such marker, but others, such as education, comportment, possession of culturally valued knowledge, and claims to august lineage, are also significant in their own right. The definition of what is culturally valuable, as well as the rules of the social game itself, are constantly being contested and negotiated by individuals and groups. Individuals and groups differ in terms of their symbolic capital, but Bourdieu sees them arranged not in

a rigid pyramidal hierarchy but in a social "field" in which groups have more properties and interests in common the closer they are to each other. The field becomes the arena for competition and contestation. In terms of cultural production, the competition of elites leads to the definition and elaboration of culture, as different groups seek to transmute "egoistic," private, particular interests . . . into 'disinterested,' collective, publicly avowable, legitimate interests."¹³

Such an approach has numerous advantages for this study. The notion of symbolic capital enables us to go beyond the vulgar-Marxist formulations of Soviet historiography without losing sight of the contested nature of reform. It also forces us to consider the competition within Central Asian society as a central feature of Jadid reform. The Russian conquest had transformed the nature of the social terrain in which social competition took place in Central Asia (indeed, the Jads themselves were a result of that transformation); access to new means of communication and sociability allowed the Jads to challenge the rules of the game, while at the same time contesting the value of the symbolic capital possessed by the older elites. The stakes for which the older elites put up such stubborn resistance to the ideas of the Jads were nothing less than their social survival as an elite.

This approach also allows us to problematize the very notion of reform itself. As a trope for disinterested rectification of the social order, "reform" is a problematic enough notion when it is invoked by established states to reaffirm their authority (cases as disparate as those of the Ottoman empire during the Tanzimat era and the Soviet Union during perestroika illustrate this); it is far more so in cases where movement for reform comes from unofficial groups in society. In Central Asia, where the native state ceased to exist (as in Turkestan) or was not a participant in reform (as in Bukhara and Khiva), arguments for reform were nothing short of arguments for a reconstitution of society according to the vision of a new elite. Thus, only a focus on elite competition allows us to understand the politics of the 1917, when revolution redefined the rules of the game and brought competition into the open.

13. Bourdieu, *Logic*, 109; Bourdieu's works on the reproduction of culture include *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Mass., 1984 [orig. 1979]); Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production* (New York, 1993); Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford, 1988 [orig. 1984]); and Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, trans. Richard Nice (London, 1977 [orig. 1970]).

11. Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 224.

12. Bourdieu, *Logic*; Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford, 1990 [orig. 1987]).

By focusing on the social life of ideas and connecting it to the fortunes of their carriers, we can also avoid reifying religious and national identities. This last is a task of considerable importance, for the writing about post-Soviet Central Asia is laden with misleading and false assumptions about identity. Policy makers debate the potential "Islamic fundamentalism" in Central Asia, a danger deemed to inhibit the fact of Central Asia being "Islamic." By showing how the meaning of Islam and of being a Muslim changed over time (and the period covered by this book was pivotal in this regard), I hope to bring some sophistication into the debate over the nature of Islam in Central Asia. On the other hand, post-Soviet state elites in Central Asia have striven for their legitimacy on fulfilling the historical destinies of nations that are deemed to have existed and to have developed together since time immemorial. This book also questions these claims by highlighting the historical process that underlay the construction of modern group identities in Central Asia.

The caveat against reification also applies to viewing Jadidism as a unified movement, as is often done in the existing literature, which tends to see Jadidism as a movement that spread out from its centers in Crimea and the Tatar lands on the Volga and swept all before it throughout the Muslim borderlands of the Russian empire. Jadidism was a coherent movement to the extent that it was (or came to be) embedded in a set of self-reproducing institutions (e.g., new-method schools that recruited their own graduates to teach in them). Beyond that, it is difficult

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14. Anthropologists in recent years have produced numerous excellent studies of "local knowledge" of Islam in diverse contexts: see the following: Clifford Geertz, *Islamic Civilization and Its Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven, 1968); Dale Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center* (Austin, 1976); Dale Eickelman, "The Study of Islam in Local Contexts," *Contributions to Asian Studies* (1982): 1-16; M. Nazif Shahrani, "Local Knowledge of Islam and Social Discourse in Afghanistan and Turkistan in the Modern Period," in Robert L. Canfield, ed., *Turkistan and Persia in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, 1991); Michael Lambek, *Knowledge of Islam: Practice in Mayotte: Local Discourses of Islam, Sorcery and Spirit Possession* (Toronto, 1993); John R. Bowen, *Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society* (Princeton, 1993); Patricia Horvath, "Ways of Knowing Islam," *American Ethnologist* 21 (1994): 811-826; Tone Branga, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way* (Princeton, 1995). In addition, although not directly related to this literature, but very pertinent to Central Asia, is Devin DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tatars and Conversion in Historical and Epic Tradition* (University Park, Penn., 1994).

again provides a splendid introduction to this notion; see his "Culture as Popular Cultural Uses in Early Modern France," in Stephen L. Kaplan, ed., *Popular Culture* (Berlin, 1984). Cf. Michel de Certeau's notion of "The Practice of Everyday Life," in de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven B. Schickel (Berkeley, 1984), 165-176.

New means of the production of knowledge were crucial to the Jadids in numerous ways. Most immediately, these means enabled an unprecedented flow of information, putting Central Asian intellectuals in contact with the broader world in ways that had hitherto been impossible. By the turn of the twentieth century, Central Asian readers could read books and (increasingly) periodicals published throughout the Russian empire as well as those imported from the Ottoman empire, Iran, and farther afield. This circulation of literature, accompanied by the circulation of people facilitated by modern transport, made Central Asia part of a broader world, or rather, a part of several overlapping translocal communities, in a far more immediate way than had ever been possible before.

Furthermore, modern means of communication were not transparent vessels for the communication of ideas; they helped shape new ways of imagining the world and thus transformed the parameters of debate in Central Asian society.¹⁷ Print helped transform the social uses of literacy as it redefined the framework and, increasingly, the norms of public debate over culture. As a result, by the turn of the century, Central Asians not only debated new ideas, but they debated in a manner that was new. As I argue in Chapter 4, newspapers, magazines, books, and theater created a public space that became the central venue for discussing culture and society. Unlike the decades' worth of learning in the madrasa that provided entree to the cultural elite, access to the new public space required only basic literacy (and not even that for the theater). In the new public, the older cultural elite was increasingly marginalized.

This rapid flow of information combined with new means of communications wrought a fundamental transformation in the way in which Central Asian intellectuals had come to see the world. In different ways,

17. A considerable and rapidly growing literature has explored how print contributes to a desacralization of knowledge and its demystification. Some of the landmarks in this literature are Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, *L'apparition du livre* (Paris, 1958); Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1979); Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Uses of Print in Early Modern France*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Princeton, 1987). Scholars of modern Muslim cultural history have recently paid considerable attention to the uses of print; see, Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany, 1989); Juan R. I. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement* (Princeton, 1992); Beth Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: The Early Years of the Press* (New Haven, 1994); Francis Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print," *Modern Asian Studies* 27 (1993): 229–251; Adeb Khalid, "Printing, Publishing, and Reform in Tsarist Central Asia," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26 (1994): 187–200.

discovery of geological time and language families, the idea of Progress, and the modern map of the world all transformed how Central Asians could imagine their world. New conceptions of time and space were reflected in the Jadids' emphasis on history and geography, allowed far-reaching historicization of the world that produced new, rationalist understandings of Islam and Muslimness. The growing consciousness that the grand narrative of history was not necessarily centered on Islam or the Muslim community, that they themselves were a product of history, and that they coexisted (often in disadvantageous situations) with other faiths and other communities were crucial to the elaboration of modern identities in Central Asia during this period. Their emergence, moreover, was a result of this basic reconfiguring of the world, not its cause.

Dale Eickelman has called this the "objectification" of Islam, the emerging perception of Islam as a coherent, systematic, and self-contained set of beliefs and practices, separate and separable from worldly knowledge, which came to displace previously held understandings of Islam as embedded in everyday social practice and as something irreducible to a textbook exposition.¹⁸ Underlying the discourse of reforming tradition was a new kind of knowledge, produced and transmitted in a radically new context. Unlike the Jadids, their opponents set forth an uncompromising traditionalism that valorized existing practices as the essence of "true" Islam. Yet, as I argue, this understanding of tradition was itself marked by modernity, since the very valorization of tradition made use of modern means and was an expression of its proponents' modern predicament.

Similarly, the community—its nature and its boundaries—also came to be reimagined, giving rise to the first articulations of modern Central Asian "national" identity. All nations are imagined,¹⁹ but they may be imagined in many different ways. Jadid notions of identity were articulated in the context of new ethnographic knowledge produced by the colonial regime and the influx of romantic discourses of nationhood from the Tatars and the Ottomans; they were firmly rooted in the political realities on the ground in Turkestan. The objectification of Islam led to the emergence of a largely secular Muslim confessional nationalism in which Islam functioned as a marker of political and cultural identity

18. Dale F. Eickelman, "Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab Societies," *American Ethnologist* 19 (1992): 643, 647–649.

19. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 2nd ed. (London, 1991).

for a community initially defined by its adherence to a religion. The relationship between ethnic and confessional definitions of the nation is fluid, rather than fixed;²⁰ in the Muslim world of the turn of the century, a certain tension between the two forms of community existed, but it could be elided more easily than the existing literature on the subject often realizes. It is well to remember this form of political Muslim identity today, when all "political Islam" has come to be synonymous with the most intransigent visions of the utter incompatibility of Islam and modernity.

DISCIPLINE AND ORGANIZE: NEW FORMS OF SOCIABILITY

Hāji Muin's call for organized schools reflected a central concern of the Jadids: the creation of a system of well-organized schools that would offer a standardized, disciplined education providing *both* religious and worldly education to future generations of the community. Indeed, the new-method (*usul-i jadid*) school gave the movement its name. Understanding the centrality of the faith both in knowledge and in organization provides crucial insights into the nature of Jadidism.

The Jadids' faith in the ability of the human intellect to solve the problems of the world was intertwined with the notion of progress that the desacralization and historicization of their outlook helped promote. I will explore the origins of this conception of the power of knowledge in Jadid thought at some length, for it represents an important aspect of their modernity. In the process, however, the concept of knowledge itself came to be subtly redefined, as it came to encompass new fields of knowledge and new ways of knowing. For the Jadids, of course, these transformations were transparent: They did not contravene tradition but helped bring it to its true fruition. There was no contradiction between the notion of progress and their faith in Islam. Indeed, only knowledge could enable Muslims to understand Islam properly, and Islam itself was the best guarantee of progress. As a closer inspection shows quite clearly, new notions of knowledge (and hence of religion, history, and politics) lay at the bottom of the Jadid critique of society.

But if knowledge was a panacea, it needed organized institutions to be properly produced and disseminated. The Jadids' critique of their society centered on the disorder that they saw prevailing in it. The maktab

was disorganized, unhygienic, and run by uncouth teachers with no system of pedagogy; there was no system for inspecting schools; there were no organizations for establishing schools; and the philanthropy of the rich was insufficient as it was, took no organized form. The Jadids' efforts to overcome this disorder are a central feature of their reformist project. Their faith in the efficacy of organization and order marks the difference between them and the moderns. Their quest for new forms of organization—new schools, publishing houses, benevolent societies, and (eventually) political parties—was significant in itself in transforming the rules of the social game in Central Asia, as organized, impersonal (and to a certain extent, self-perpetuating) institutions increasingly became arenas for debate and the production and transmission of culture, replacing the interaction in the informal settings where cultural practices had previously been located. The new-method school, for instance, was more than merely a reformed maktab: It was the site of a new cultural space, that of schooling, which it marked off from everyday practice and subjectified.

The Jadids' pioneering of incipient institutional forms in the Muslim world of Central Asia gave them a certain advantage over their opponents, who, for various reasons did not organize in similar fashion. A new public space was created for the interpretation of Central Asian culture and of Islam itself, in which the traditional carriers of Islam were increasingly marginalized. The process of institutionalization was not easy nor unilinear, since material difficulties combined with opposition from traditional elites and suspicion of the colonial state to ensure that a large gap remained between Jadid ambition and Jadid achievement. Nevertheless, by 1917, new-method schools were widespread, a new public-based public space had taken hold, and the traditional elites' monopoly over the definition of culture had been shaken.

COLONIAL ENCOUNTERS IN THE RUSSIAN BORDERLANDS

In pointing to the transformative role of Russian rule, it is by no means my intention to claim that imperial benevolence was the linchpin of cultural regeneration in Central Asia. Rather, I hope to distance the analysis from the hackneyed dichotomies of resistance and collusion, of native authenticity and "Westernization" (or, in our case, Russification), by suggesting that the social and institutional terrain on which struggles over culture take place in colonial settings is very much the product of colonial

20. M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Patterns of Political Islamic Identity: Dynamics and Transnational Loyalties and Identities," *Central Asian Survey* 14 (1995): 341–372.

rule. To look for "responses" to colonialism in a domain located entirely outside of it is futile, since the very formulation of the response is inextricably intertwined in patterns of colonial knowledge.²¹ Although obviously applies to modernist re-visions of identity, even visions of authenticity of native tradition are articulated through means of cultural production often introduced by the colonizer. For if culture is to be located in the struggles of elites, then the colonial presence was a major feature of the social terrain on which they took place. This presence may have determined the nature of the competition, but it certainly provided a major resource even as it also defined the limits of the permissible.

The interconnections between empire and imperial knowledge have received considerable scholarly attention in recent years,²² but the politics of native cultural production in the conditions of empire have been less popular. The Jadids, like many colonial intellectuals, occupied a liminal space between the colonial power and native society. From this position they could appropriate colonial ideas for their own uses, invoking the superiority of the colonizer to exhort their society to reform; at the same time, they talked back to the colonizer in the colonizer's own language. This involved them in bitter struggles over turf in their society with groups that had made their own compromises with the colonial regime.

In the Russian case, even the colonial nature of the regime remained a matter of dispute. Although the Russian empire was one of the largest empires in the world during the period under discussion here, sophisticated study of the Russian imperial experience is only now beginning. Scholars centrally concerned with one or more of the "nationalities" of the Russian empire have long been used to viewing the Russian state as a colonial entity (although often more as a matter of reflex than as an analytical preoccupation), but mainstream Russian history has seen imperialism only in Russian foreign policy, being content to study the borderlands as a problem of administration rather than imperialism.²³ At all of the borderlands, Central Asia remains the least known.

21. Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, "Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions of Rule," *American Ethnologist* 16 (1989): 609; Timothy Mitchell, *Colonial Egypt*, new ed. (Berkeley, 1991), xi.

22. The *locus classicus* of this debate is, of course, Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978).

23. The major works on Russian imperialism are concerned almost entirely with imperial competition outside the boundaries of the Russian state, not with imperial interaction within it: Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914*, trans. Bruce Little (New Haven, 1987); John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* (New York, 1997). The recent work by Andreas Kappeler, *Rußland als*

empire's geographic contiguity to its empire made for several of its colonial experience (the state usually did not recognize separate political entities), but the basic epistemologies of empires were, nevertheless, present. Moreover, Central Asia, conquered between the 1860s and 1900, occupied a position that was in many ways unique in the empire's history. The colonial conception that informed Russian rule in Central Asia mirrored markedly to earlier periods of annexation that had occurred under Russian rule. If Muslim and non-Muslim groups under Russian rule had been absorbed into its system of social control, in Central Asia the rhetoric of conquest mirrored the notions of colonialism. Russian administrators continued to British India (the protectorates of British India) or French North Africa and sought to benefit from the direct inspiration by British treaties with various powers of these powers in ruling "their" Muslims. The local remained "natives," regardless of social standing.

Each colonial policy and practice were very important to the cultural life, their appreciation is also crucial to understanding imperial Russia as a whole. The fact that Russia was an empire is often glossed over in mainstream Russian (as opposed to "nationalities") historiography, with a resultant loss of historical context. The imperial borderlands, perhaps Central Asia more so, were not incidental to Russia. Their existence—and their role in helping define Russia and Russianness in very tangible ways—must be lost to analysis if Russia is seen as a unitary state.

Of imperial interactions in the Russian borderlands also instruct the notion of "the West." Scholarly discourse is so often the dichotomy between Russia and "the West" (which in the past decade have only entrenched more deeply) that it appears paradoxical that Russia should personify "the West" in its Asian borderlands. Yet, Russians saw themselves as resolutely European in sharing in the European civilizing mission to which all imperial powers pretended. If world history of the last two centuries is to be seen as "Westernization," then we face the paradox that many of

the *Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich, 1992), is the first substantial work to see Russia as a multiethnic empire.

TABLE I RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA POPULATIONS

	Area (sq. mi.)	Populations	
		1897	1911
Syr Darya	189,150	1,478,398	1,816,550
Samarqand	33,850	860,021	960,200
Ferghana	55,210	1,572,214	2,041,900
Total three core oblasts	278,210	3,910,633	4,818,650
Transcaspia	231,238	382,487	472,500
Semirech'ye	147,510	997,863	1,201,540
Total Turkistan	656,960	5,290,983	6,492,690
Bukhara	78,650	—	2,500,000
Khiva	26,070	—	550,000
Total Central Asia	761,680	—	ca. 9,550,000

SOURCES: V.I. Masalskii, *Turkistan'skii knat* (St. Petersburg, 1913), 348; *Asiatskii Rossiia* (St. Petersburg, 1914), I: 91-92.
For Turkistan, population figures for 1897 are from the census of 1897; those for 1911 represent official estimates. Figures for the protectorates are estimates and pertain to 1909.

the agents of this process were not generally regarded as those of the West. Russia is scarcely the only exception; the burden of Europe was carried in other places by Spain or Portugal, countries that in the continental context were hardly epitomes of "the West." "Europe" and "the West" are but ideas that take various forms at various times and places.]

But if "Westernization" is not a useful concept, "Russification"—the dominant paradigm for understanding cultural interaction in the Russian empire—is even less so. The latter concept has been popular with scholars of "the nationalities" of the Russian empire, who see in every Russian (or Soviet) policy an attempt to dominate and transform authentic national cultures. (It is a measure of the alterity of Russian history vis-à-vis Europe that "Russification," the local variant of "Westernization," carries a completely negative connotation.) By foregrounding themes of national struggle, while ignoring debates within society, such approaches render themselves incapable of exploring the politics of cultural production and identity formation on the Russian borderlands. Going beyond Russification is all the more crucial for the study of Central Asia, where in the tsarist period the state had neither the means nor the will to intervene directly in local cultural life. The impact of im-

perial power has to be sought in more subtle form than the paradigm of "Russification" allows.

CENTRAL ASIA

Russian Central Asia comprised the governorate-general of Turkestan as well as the protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva (see Table 1). For reasons of both space and clarity, I focus largely on Turkestan in this book, although since the writings of Bukharan Jadids (especially Abdurrauf Fitrat) were highly influential, Bukharan developments cannot be wholly excluded. Nor do I deal with the traditional lands of the Qazaqs incorporated in the Steppe province administered from Omsk. Its nomadic population had a conception of Islam very different from that of the inhabitants of the oasis cities of Transoxiana. Moreover, the Steppe province was under direct Russian rule far longer and subject to different administrative policies than Turkestan. During our period, the foci of Qazaq cultural life lay to the north, in Orenburg and even Kazan, rather than to the south in Tashkent or Samarqand. The administrative entity of Turkestan produced its own logic that was a salient feature of Central Asian life in the tsarist period.

Knowledge and Society in the Nineteenth Century

The three and a half centuries between the collapse of the Timurid order and the Russian conquest constitute the least understood period of Central Asian history. The literary production of the period still remains largely in manuscript form, and scholarly attention focuses on the more glamorous Timurids or the more accessible Russian period. In the absence of systematic research, we are left to struggle with V. V. Bartol'd's dictum that "in the nineteenth century, in contrast to the Middle Ages, Turkestan was among the most backward countries of the Muslim world."¹ Soviet scholarship tended to focus on the centralization of states in the nineteenth century as a positive sign (and to contrast it to the feudal dissension of the eighteenth); however, its judgment on the culture of this period was no more generous. Yet, if we are to understand the politics of cultural production that obtained on the eve of the Russian conquest, politics that the Jadids set out to reform, we need to rescue the topic from the domain of aesthetic judgment and place it firmly in the realm of social practice. This is a crucial task in its own right, but it is also of fundamental importance for understanding the politics of culture during the tsarist period.

1. V. V. Bartol'd, *Istoriia kul'turnoi zhizni Turkestana* (1927), in his *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1963), II/1: 297.

KNOWLEDGE, LITERACY, AND CULTURE

A sharp critique of traditional Muslim education in nineteenth-century Central Asia is perhaps the only area of scholarship in which all servers, scholars and officials, tsarist and Soviet, agreed with Jadids émigré nationalists. The maktab and madrasas of Central Asia were clearest sign of the stagnation, if not the degeneracy, of Central Asia. Judged by criteria these observers brought with them, the maktab and the madrasa not surprisingly appeared as inefficient, pointless, and harmful. Yet, if we are to understand the logic of the practices surrounding the transmission of knowledge in pre-Russian Central Asia (many which continued well into the twentieth century), we have to examine them in their own right, and not by the modernist criteria of observation outside the tradition.²

The tradition of learning replicated in the maktab and madrasa of Central Asia was common to many premodern Muslim societies. It is characterized by two overriding concerns: the transmission of knowledge (*ilm*) and the cultivation of proper modes of behavior and commitment (*adab*). The primary impulse was conservative, the transmission to future generations of the finite, fixed truths revealed by God.³ This tradition was marked by rigorous discipline, including severe corporal punishment, and often the insistence on memorization without explicit explanation. As Dale Eickelman has suggested, "‘Understanding’ (*fahm*) in the context of such concepts of learning was not measured by any activity explicitly to ‘explain’ particular verses [of the Qur’an]. . . . Instead, the measure of understanding was implicit and consisted of the ability to use particular Quranic verses in appropriate contexts."⁴ The finite and fixed nature of knowledge by no means precluded a dynamic tradition of interpretation, for it was only through an act of interpretation that divinely revealed knowledge could become meaningful for human beings. This interpretation required a carefully inculcated scholarly *habitus*, a set of predispositions and habits of mind that allow "practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence

reproduced in the maktab, and especially of nineteenth-century Central Asia cultivated a certain life. The distinction between religious and secular knowledge would have been impossible, for all knowledge emanated and was consequently imbued with a certain sacral value. Arts and sciences were similarly deemed to have been invented by prophets. Noah, for instance, was the inventor of woodwork and metalwork.

The transmission of knowledge (*taʿlim*) was one concern of the maktab, but it was the inculcation of proper modes of behavior and commitment (*adab*) as mimetic practice occupied a central place in Muslim education. Originating in pre-Islamic Middle Eastern traditions of apprenticeship, *adab* was thoroughly Islamized after the eighth century, as the works of such Muslim writers of Iranian origins as al-Farabi (d. 756) and Firdawsi (d. 1020). In later centuries the term came to be understood in a more restricted fashion to denote the necessary for a certain profession or station in life (and so it is possible to speak of *adab al-mufti*, the *adab* of one who holds the office of juriconsult).⁶ In nineteenth-century Central Asia, proper *adab* defined the boundaries of civility and status and was a crucial element of capital recognized in urban society. Manuals of civility and the primary arena for its transmission remained the maktab. A number of descriptions of the Central Asian maktab, all of them are the hostile views of outsiders.⁸ Fortunately, in

Richard Niebuhr, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Niebuhr (Stanford, 1990), 58; see also "Systems of Education and Systems of Thought," *International Social Science Review* (1967): 344.

6. "Adab," *Encyclopædia of Islam*, new ed., vol. 1 (Leiden, 1960), 175; G. Le Gerny, "Adab," *Encyclopædia Iranica*, vol. 1 (New York, 1982), 431–432, which discusses the tradition of ethico-didactic writing (*pand. andarz. nasihat*, etc.), which assimilated Muslim ethics as well, see *Encyclopædia Iranica*, II: 16–22, 17–18. See also, Barbara Metcalf, "Introduction," in Metcalf, ed., *Moral Conduct and the Place of Adab in South Asian Islam* (Berkeley, 1984), 1–4.

7. For example, the *Adab us-salihin* of Muhammad Sâlih Kâshghari, translated from Persian into Russian by N. S. Lykoshin, "Kodeks prilichii na Vostokey," *Sbornik materialov*, vyp. 2 (Tashkent, 1900).

8. Central Asian maktab, the following are the most significant: V. P. Nalivkin, "Uchenie v maktabakh i madrasahakh," *Uchenye zapiski Kazanskogo universiteta. Seriya Gumanitarnye nauki*, 1989, 294–303; Nalivkin, "Chto daet srednevekovnaya shkola v obrazovanii?," in *Uchenye zapiski Kazanskogo universiteta. Seriya Gumanitarnye nauki*, 1989, 215–216; Nalivkin, "Musul'manskoe maktab i russko-tuzemnye shkoly v Turkestan-

2. The following discussion of the social uses of knowledge owes a great debt to Michael Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350* (Cambridge, 1994).

3. Dale F. Eickelman, "The Art of Memory: Islamic Knowledge and Its Social Reproduction," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (1978): 490.

4. Ibid., 494.

the writings of Sadriddin Ayni (1878–1954), we possess a unique source on the maktab and the madrasa as they existed in this period. Born in a small village outside Ghjduvān, Ayni was among the last generations of Central Asians to receive a traditional education. A prominent Jadid, he had an illustrious career after the revolution in education and publishing in which he helped found modern literatures in both Tajik and Uzbek. One of the few Jadids to survive the 1930s, he was greatly honored as a national hero of Soviet Tajikistan. This stature allowed him to publish in 1949, at the height of Stalinism, his reminiscences of old Bukhara, a text remarkable for its sensibility.⁹ Although Ayni wrote of the period when Bukhara was a Russian protectorate, much of what he describes can safely be projected back to much of the nineteenth century, for the impact of the Russian presence on the internal life of Bukharan maktab and madrasas was minimal in the 1880s and 1890s.

The education of a Central Asian boy began when his father took him to a teacher (*maktabdār*, *dāmlā*) and left him behind with the formula, "You can beat him as long as you don't kill him; the meat is yours, but the bones are ours."¹⁰ As Ayni later recalled: "When my father left, the teacher sat me down close to him and ordered one of the older students to work with me. This pupil bade me look at my writing board as he said aloud, 'Alif, be, te, se.' I imitated him and repeated the names of these letters. Having taught me how to pronounce them, the student went over to other kids and started teaching them. The children called him *khalfa*."¹¹ The pupil was thus immediately thrust into a set of hierarchical social relationships. In addition to knowledge, the child acquired *adab* from direct contact with the teacher. The maktab had neither formal division into classes nor any examinations. The student progressed through school at his own pace, his status determined by the number of

skom krae," *ZhMNP*, n.s. 1 (1906): otd. nar. ob., 113–126; K. E. Bendrikov, *Ocherki po istorii narodnogo obrazovaniia v Turkestane (1865–1925 gody)* (Moscow, 1960), 36–48; Jiri Bečka, "Traditional Schools in the Works of Sadriddin Aini and Other Writers of Central Asia," *Archiv Orientalni* 39 (1971): 284–321; 40 (1972): 130–163; R. R. Rakhimov, "Traditsionnoe nachal'noe shkol'noe obuchenie detei u narodov Srednei Azii (konets XIX–zakhsana i Kavkaza)," in *Pamiatniki traditsionno-bytovoï kul'tury narodov Srednei Azii, Kavkaza i Kazkhaz* (Leningrad, 1989).

9. Sadriddin Ayni, *Yaddoshtho*, 4 vols. (Stalinabad, 1948–1954). There exist numerous editions of this work, of which perhaps the most readily accessible is a 1984 Persian edition (*Yaddashthā*, ed. Sa'idi Sirjāni [Tehran, 1984]), which I have used throughout.

10. Hāji Muin, *Eski maktab, yangi maktab* (Samarqand, 1916), 17. This ritual phrase was common throughout the Islamic world; on its use in Morocco, see Eickelman, *Knowledge and Power in Morocco* (Princeton, 1985), 63.

11. Sadriddin Ayni, "Eski maktab" (1935), in *Eski maktab* (Tashkent, 1988), 109.

books he finished. Although the students sat together in a "class," their relation to the teacher was individual and direct.

Having memorized the names of the letters of the alphabet, the student was introduced to vowels, which again he learned through memorization. "The lessons on 'zer-u zabar' were interesting. . . . I was taught to say, 'Alif zabar—a, zer—i, pesh—u.' . . . Thus I learned the letters from the beginning to the very end of the Arabic alphabet."¹² At the end of the year, Ayni started on the *abjad*.¹³ He was told: "Say: 'Alif bā be zabar—ab; jim bā dāl zabar—jad; abjad' . . . Once my father said, 'Now that you can read the *abjad*, I'll teach you how to count according to it,' and put in front of me a slate with the *abjad* written on it. Pointing to a letter, he asked, 'What [letter] is this? And this?' I could not answer a single question. I had absolutely no idea; nobody had ever shown me the letters."¹⁴

After the alphabet, the child started with the *Haftiyak*, a compilation of selected verses from the Qur'an, beginning with the shortest *suras* usually located at the end. These too were memorized. The child was thus familiarized with the alphabet at the same time as he or she started the process of memorization of key texts. Of course, the Qur'an was taught in the Arabic, with no translation provided and no attempt made at explanation. The rules of the proper recitation of the Qur'an (*tajwid*, *tar-til*) were taught from this stage, so that the child could recite the Word of God in an acceptable manner. Upon memorization of the *Haftiyak*, the boy received the title *kitabkhwān* (reader of [a] book).¹⁵ He then proceeded to the *Chār Kitāb*, an anthology providing basic information about Islamic ritual. As the name suggests, the anthology contained four works: *Nām-i Haqq*, a tract in verse by one Sharifuddin Bukhārī (fl. fourteenth century), dealing with rules for the fulfillment of ritual obligations of ritual purity, fasting, and prayer (*namāz*); *Chār Fasl*, by an anonymous author, providing a statement, in prose, of the bases of belief, the five pillars of Islam, and ritual purity; *Mubimmāt ul-Muslimin*, another anonymous work providing information on four things that are important to all Muslims (the unity of God [*tawhid*], fasting, prayers, and ritual purity); and selections from the *Pandnāma* of Fariduddin Attār, a

12. Ibid., 128–129.

13. The *abjad* was both a mnemonic device for learning the Arabic alphabet and a system for counting in which each letter of the alphabet was assigned a numerical value (allowing the use of the alphabet in cabals, etc.).

14. Ayni, "Eski maktab," 129.

15. Rakhimov, "Traditsionnoe nachal'noe shkol'noe obuchenie," 122.

major work in the *adab* tradition.¹⁶ After finishing the *Chār Kitāb*, the student encountered poetry, both in Persian and Turkic, by Hāfiz, Sufi Allah Yār, Fuzuli, Bedil, Nawā'i, and Attār. The works of these poets constituted the canon of Central Asian literature, and acquaintance with them (and the ability to recite verses from memory at appropriate times) was *de rigueur* for an educated person.

The instruction up to this point was entirely oral. Students used written texts, but they were meant to be used as visual mnemonic aids. Having finished the *Haftyak*, the *Chār Kitāb*, and the Qur'an, Ayni "could still not read anything, except for what I had read with the [teacher]. For example, I could always read those verses of Hafiz which I had read at school, no matter whose hand they were in. But I could not read others that I had not [already] read—I was illiterate! Writing I did not know at all."¹⁷ Although children were introduced to the alphabet, the acquisition of functional literacy was not the goal of their maktab experience. In a society organized around direct, face-to-face interaction between social agents, writing was of limited use and tended to become a specialized skill. The ability to read and write (and the two were different skills, separately acquired) was necessary for only a few spheres of endeavor, whereas vast spheres of life remained untouched by writing. Even in trade, large-scale transactions were carried out purely orally, with the personal guarantee of special intermediaries (*qāsid*s) taking the place of written documents as late as the 1870s.¹⁸ At the same time, culture was transmitted largely orally. Central Asia, of course, boasted a vibrant tradition of oral poetry, but oral transmission also extended to texts that could be read aloud in various formal and informal settings. Itinerant reciters and storytellers (*maddāhs*, *qissakhvāns*) were a common phenomenon in Central Asia, as were evenings (*masrab*) devoted to reading aloud from manuscript texts.¹⁹ The ability to read was there-

16. For a description of a printed edition of the *Chār Kitāb*, see O.P. Shcheglova, *Katalog litografirovannykh knig na persidskom iazyke v sobranii LO IV AN SSSR*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1975), nos. 600, 640, 650. A very similar anthology from Afghanistan is described by M. Nazif Shahrani, "Local Knowledge of Islam and Social Discourse in Afghanistan and Turkistan in the Modern Period," in Robert L. Canfield, ed., *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, 1991), 170–175.

17. Ayni, "Eski maktab," 132.

18. E.g., N. Stremukhov, "Pozhdka v Bukharu," *Russkii vestnik* 117 (1875): 667.

19. A.L. Troitskaia, "Iz proshlogo kalandarov i maddakhov v Uzbekistane," in *Dominant' mianskie verovaniia i obriady v Srednei Azii* (Moscow, 1975), 191–223; Karl Reichl, *Turkic Oral Epic Poetry* (New York, 1992), 87–89; for contemporary descriptions, see F.H. Skrine and E. Denison Ross, *The Heart of Asia* (London, 1899), 400–401; O. Olufsen, *The Emir of Bukhara and His Country* (Copenhagen, 1911), 434.

fore not a necessary precondition for participation in the literary tradition of Central Asia, and indeed, the audience for written texts was always far greater than the number of competent readers. The high rates of illiteracy and the inability to write prevalent in Central Asia in the nineteenth century did not indicate a lack of education, let alone ignorance.²⁰ Rather, the emphasis on memorization and learning by rote emanated from a different concern: Knowledge was to be embodied by the learner so that his or her body could be marked by sacred knowledge.²¹

Writing was a separate skill altogether, not taught at all by many *maktabs*. When taught, it usually took the form of calligraphy. Just as students were left to learn their native language on their own while the maktab concentrated on Arabic and Persian texts, they were left to their own devices to learn the cursive hand, and only calligraphy was taught at the maktab. Calligraphy and the possession of a fine hand were thus analogous to rhetoric and the ability to quote verses as marks of a civilized individual. As with reading, calligraphy was acquired through imitation. Ayni recalled that he had acquired the rudiments of calligraphy before he could read fluently, having copied letters of the alphabet from a relative who had returned to the village for the summer from his Bukharan madrasa.²² Many more people could read than could write.²³ At the same time, writing had significant ritual uses. Books were used not merely for reading the text but for divination and as charms and amulets.²⁴ Writing could be venerated in its own right as embodying the holiness of the message. The *Majmu'a-yi nurnāma*, an anthology of various prayers, promulgated, "Whoever reads this *Nurnāma* or carries it with him will be saved from the troubles of both the worlds."²⁵ Members of various craft guilds

20. Many scholars of Central Asian intellectual life of the period have seen the high rates of illiteracy in Central Asia as a grave indictment of the maktab and a sign of the stagnation of Central Asian life. See, for instance, Nalivkin, "Chiro daet," 235. Criticism of the maktab on this account was, of course, a staple of Jadid discourse.

21. Frederick Mathewson Denny, "Qur'an Recitation: A Tradition of Oral Performance and Transmission," *Oral Tradition* 4 (1989): 13.

22. Ayni, *Yaddashtha*, 90–92.

23. Iuldash Abdullaev, *Ocherki po metodike obshcheniia gramote v uzbekskoi shkole* (Tashkent, 1966), 79–86. Reading-only literacy was a common phenomenon throughout the world until the rise of universal schooling in the nineteenth century. In France, as late as 1866, 11.47 percent of the population (9.73 percent of men and 13.21 percent of women) could only read. (32.84 percent of the population could neither read nor write.) See François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, *Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry* (Cambridge, 1982), 17.

24. Divination through books (*fāl*imi) was a common practice; see N.S. Lykoshin, "O gadanii u srednezaziatskikh tuzemtssev," *Spravocnaia knizhka Samarkandskoi oblasti* 9 (1907): 163–242.

25. *Majmu'a-yi nurnāma* (Tashkent, 1914), 12.

were similarly exhorted to know the *risāla* of their guild by heart, or else to carry it on their person; failure to do so could bring dire consequences. As the *risāla* of the guild of groomsmen stated, "If a groom does not know this *risāla* or has not heard it, all livestock is more forbidden than the flesh of the swine; he will be tortured in his grave by snakes and scorpions, and his face will be black on the day of judgment."²⁶ Writing had many ritual uses, but the ability to read fluently was a skill required only in a few, very specific niches in society.

The maktab was not a school at all in the sense of an institution set apart from other practices but a site for the acquisition by children of basic elements of culture and modes of behavior through interaction with an older, learned man. It existed wherever the teacher could teach, and any literate person with the proper credentials of *adab* and piety could teach. The maktab seldom had a building of its own: It could be housed in a mosque, the house of the teacher, or that of a wealthy resident of the neighborhood. A teacher seldom had more than a dozen or so pupils in his charge. He did not receive a regular salary but was supported by gifts from parents, which took the form of weekly donations of food, and occasionally money (*paysanbalik*), given every Thursday. In addition, the teacher received gifts of clothes on annual holidays or when a child finished a book.²⁷ The maktab was ubiquitous in the sedentary parts of Central Asia, especially the towns. As a relatively informal institution, without formal admissions or enrollments, the maktab was not reducible to the kind of census-taking that various tsarist statistical committees strove for. Numbers provided by nineteenth-century travelers should also be treated with the greatest caution, since they were invariably based on hearsay or on reports by local "informants," who usually provided mythical numbers. Nevertheless, O. A. Sukhareva's ethnographic data indicate that at the turn of the twentieth century almost every residential neighborhood in the city of Bukhara had its own maktab,²⁸ Maktab were also common in rural areas of sedentary population; in 1903, nine of the fourteen villages of Chapkulluk volost in Khujand uezd had a maktab.²⁹ Among the nomads, the situation was rather different. Instruction for the children of nomads was generally provided by itinerant

mullas from either the settled areas of Central Asia or from among the Volga Tatars. For a fixed salary (paid either in cash or kind), the mulla traveled with the family and taught the children; he was free to take on any other students from the auf.³⁰ Hiring a mulla from Bukhara or Kazan was a status symbol. Once a Türkmen fellow student offered to get Ayni's elder brother a summer job as teacher in a Türkmen village. Ayni's brother hesitated, because he knew no Türkic: "That doesn't matter," said the student to reassure my brother. "The Türkmenian bays don't maintain teachers to teach their children to read and write. The main thing is that people should say: 'Such and such a bai has had a teacher brought from Bukhara.'"³¹ Concerns about civility and markers of respectability were differently defined among the nomads, and the maktab accordingly occupied a different place in nomadic society.

Of course, not every student stayed in the maktab for the duration; in an agrarian society with very low levels of surplus, few families could afford to remove their boys from productive labor for such long periods of time. Those who stayed to the end had only rudimentary literacy skills, but they had acquired basic norms of cultured behavior, of gesture and posture, and an ingrained attitude of deference to older men—in short, cultural capital that was a marker of social distinction in their society. They had also acquired an implicit knowledge of Islam as faith and practice, without which membership in the community was unimaginable. They had not acquired literacy, or skills such as arithmetic, or general knowledge such as history or geography, because these were transmitted elsewhere in society, in appropriate dialogic contexts.

Maktab for girls existed and in many ways paralleled the boys' maktab. A very similar kind of instruction was provided by the *ātin*, who would teach young girls from the neighborhood in her house in return for presents from the parents or, possibly, help with housework. It was not unknown for some women to teach both boys and girls, since segregation by sex was not mandatory before puberty.³² Atns were often wives and daughters of imāms and other educated men, but they were respected members of the community in their own right. As Marianne Kamp has argued, "Women and girls formed their own chains of knowl-

26. "Risāla-yi chār-wādārik," in *ibid.*, 63.

27. Rakhimov, "Traditsionnoe nachal'noe shkol'noe obucheniye," 118–119, 122.

28. O. A. Sukhareva, *Kvartal'nait obshechina pozdnefeodal'nogo goroda Bukhary* (Moscow, 1976), 256–257.

29. N. Lykoshin, "Chapkullukskaia volost' Khodzentskogo uезда," *Spravochnaia knizhka Samarkandskoi oblasti* 8 (1906): 157–158.

30. T. T. Tazhibayev, *Prosvetshenie i shkol'y Kazakhstana vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka* (Alma Ata, 1962), 57.

31. Sadridin Aini, *Pages from My Own Story*, trans. George H. Hanna (Moscow, 1958), 34.

32. Ayni's father moved him to a girls' maktab (run by the imām's wife) when he realized that the teacher at the regular maktab was incompetent. "Eski maktab," 130.

edge transmission, without formal male instruction. In gathering involving religious practice, . . . women's separation from men allowed creation of women's religious authority. Separate spaces and separate knowledges reproduced gender-based networks."³³

MADRASAS AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ISLAM

The transmission of knowledge beyond the maktab was diffused throughout society. Knowledge and skills were acquired in practical contexts of work. Artisans received their training in craft guilds, whose structure admittedly very loose, incorporated a sacralized hierarchy: the apprentice was subordinate to a master (occasionally this relationship was mediated by a *khalifa*), who in turn was subordinate to an *āqsāqāl*, the leader of the craft organization in the whole city; the *āqsāqāl* was ultimately subject to the symbolic authority of the patron of the guild, usually a pre-Islamic prophet. The master (*ustād*) would take the apprentice, usually at age twelve, into his house and over the next several years teach him the required skills of the trade. The master was also responsible for teaching the child rules of proper behavior (*ādab*) and, if he was a literate, knowledge about Muslim law (*ulūm-i shari'at*) and mysticism (*ulūm-i tariqat*). Initiation into a guild revolved around the memorization of the *risāla*, often in verse, that laid out the rules of initiation and proper conduct to be followed by members. An apprentice was, for example, expected "to be well-bred and affect humility before the master, not to be rude to him, not to walk in front of him, not to sit down without his permission, [and] not to address him by his name."³⁴ In order to complete their education, apprentices were required to know the *risāla* for the guild by heart. Beyond the world of artisans, even chancery practices were similarly endowed with sacred origins and intent, as is clear from a late-eighteenth century manual of accountancy.³⁵ The connections to the tradition of *ādab* are quite obvious here.

33. Marianne R. Kamp, "The Orin and the Soviet School: The End of Traditional Education for Uzbek Girls," paper presented to the annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, 1996, 3.

34. *Risāla-yi Chitgari*, ms., cited by R. G. Mukminova, "Remeslennoye korporatsii i uchinichestvo (po sredneaziatiskim pis'mennym istochnikam XVI i XIX vv.)," in *Materialy po istorii Uzbekistana* (Tashkent, 1973), 26; on *risālas* in general, see M. Gavrilov, *Risolia sartovskikh remeslennikov: izsledovanie predanii musul'manskikh tsekhov* (Tashkent, 1912).

35. Mirzā Badi' Diwān. *Majma' al-arqām*, ed. and trans. L. M. Epifanova (Moscow, 1976), 27-33.

context that the place of the madrasa in Central Asian society was understood. Rather than being an institution of higher learning in the sense of the word, the madrasa was the site for the reproduction of a class of professionals, those concerned with various aspects of Islamic law. It was a place where, in dialogic interaction with a scholar, the student acquired mastery over a number of authentic texts of the Islamic tradition as understood locally. Although the madrasa existed in written form, it was transmitted orally. As numerous scholars have noted, the Islamic tradition of learning was marked by a distrust of the ability of the text to convey the author's meaning and distrust that could only be learned from the author himself, or through a transmission going back to the author. Knowledge could be acquired only if acquired through a recognized chain of transmission.³⁶

The proof of mastery of knowledge lay not in a transcript of the text but in the *ijāza* (license) issued by the master at an institution but in the *ijāza* (license) issued by the master at an institution, which signified a link in the chain of transmission. The student entered a madrasa when a mudarris allowed him to listen to lectures; there was no formal matriculation. A gift, usually but not always of money, called the *iftitāhāna*, signified the beginning of a student relationship.³⁷ As in the maktab, progress through the curriculum was marked by successful completion of books; each student was assigned along the curriculum at his own pace. Attendance at lectures was required with more informal peer learning in study circles organized by members of a circle studied the same book, and those with a command of the material helped others in return for food or money, since it was considered "a kind of vileness" to receive money for knowledge.³⁸ Some texts were studied only in such groups, and others were prepared thus before students listened to lectures of the mudarris. When a student had satisfied the professor of his command of a book (which often involved memorization), he could

36. Eickelman, "Art of Memory," 492; Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, new ed. (Berkeley, 1991), 148-154; Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society* (Berkeley, 1993), 25-26, 92-94.

37. Further gifts were given upon completion of each book. The more renowned teachers who could have dozens of students, acquired a sizable fortune from their presents. Ani states that in the 1890s, teachers' income only from their students could amount to 500 rubles, which could buy 2,500 puds [more than 40 tons] of grain; *Yāddāshihā*, 171.) In addition, a teacher received a portion of the endowed income from the waqf, as well as from any other posts (mufti, qāzi, etc.) he might hold.

38. Ani, *Yāddāshihā*, 537-540; for a discussion of similar "peer learning" in Morocco, see Eickelman, *Knowledge and Power*, 98.

pass on to the next book by joining another study circle, possibly with another teacher.

Life in the madrasa began with the private study of several brief tracts, *Awṣal-i 'ilm*, a short tract that covered the essential requirements (*zururiyāt*) of Islam in question-and-answer format; *Bidān*, an exposition of the basic rules of Arabic grammar in Persian; and *Adāb-i muta'al-limin*, which covered the *adab* of the student. After that, the student read *Sharh-i Mullā*, a commentary on Ibn Hājib's *Kāfiya* (which the student had already studied) by Abdurrahmān Jāmi, the Timurid poet; written in Arabic, this was the first book studied with a mudarris. At the same time, the student started studying formal logic with an assistant teacher, using the *Shamsiya* of Najmuddin Qazvinī (d. 1276); when he was ready, he moved on to the *Hāshiya-yi Qutbi*, a commentary on *Shamsiya*; concurrently with the *Hāshiya*, the student was introduced to theology (*'ilm-i kalām*) through the *'Aqā'id* of Abū Hafs Nasa'ī (d. 1142), which he read with an assistant teacher. Later, the student moved to various glosses on this book. These were followed by the *Tabzib ul-Mantiq wa'l kalām*, a tract on logic and dogma by Sa'duddin Taftāzānī (d. 1381); *Hikmat ul-'ayn* by Qazvinī, a tract on natural science and metaphysics; *Mullā Jalāl*, a commentary by Jalāluddin Dawwāmī (d. 1502) on the *'Aqā'id ul-adūdiyyat* of Abdurrahmān b. Ahmad al-Jī (d. 1356), a tract on Muslim beliefs.³⁹ There was no formal termination of studies in the madrasa, and many students lingered on for decades. The core texts could, however, be mastered in nineteen years.

Formal lessons took place four days a week. The entire study group assembled; a designated reader (*qāri*, elected by the students) read out the passage to be discussed; the mudarris then translated the passage (if necessary) and proceeded to explain and comment on it; a disputation involving the students concluded the lesson.⁴⁰ There was no compulsion to take courses at the madrasa of residence; indeed, at many madrasas no lectures were held at all.⁴¹ A student was free to learn from any pro-

in the city. This was especially the case in Bukhara. During the of the pious Shāh Murād (r. 1785–1800), many madrasas in the ate were in such bad repair that the amir issued an edict giving every rights to whoever repaired or rebuilt *bujras* in a madrasa.⁴² As ult, the *bujra* became immovable private property and madrasas ed into hostels. Ownership of a *bujra* brought with it the right to re a portion of the madrasa's endowed (*waqf*) income. The price of a therefore depended on the size of the madrasa's endowment. In the eenth century, many cells in the madrasas of Bukhara were occyed by men who had little connection with learning. Many individuals ned cells as a form of investment and leased or donated them to stuents in need.⁴³ Residents of madrasa cells were free from taxation and for much of the nineteenth century also received scholarships from the amir. During the reigns of Shāh Murād and Mir Haydar, large sums of money were set aside for the use of madrasa teachers and students.⁴⁴ This custom lapsed in mid-century as Nasrullah diverted funds toward defense, but at the end of the century, the amir still handed out pensions (*dehyak*) to students annually.⁴⁵ In this situation, a student's only connection with the mudarris of the madrasa where he lived was that they both derived income from the same *waqf*.

The madrasa was the site of the social reproduction of Islamic legal knowledge and its carriers, the ulama. The method of instruction was connected to this basic concern. It aimed to explicate the meaning of the text and to convey that meaning dialogically. At the same time, it inculcated in students a certain *habitus*, which allowed them to construct meaningful social action in the world. Students acquired the basic skills needed to practice their trade—literacy, a knowledge of canonical texts of Islamic law, and some command of Arabic. Successful completion of the madrasa opened up various possibilities of employment in the legal-administrative nexus of power. A madrasa education was necessary to

39. The foregoing is based on Becka, "Traditional Schools," 39: 296–299; 40: 135–136; Ayni, *Yaddāshthā*, 163–165; A. Mukhammadzhanov, *Shkola i pedagogicheskua mys' Uzbekskogo naroda XIX–nachala XX v.* (Tashkent, 1978), 26–28.

40. The description of madrasa life in Ayni, *Yaddāshthā*, passim, is unique in both its substance and its sensibility; see also Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan*, 2 vols. (New York, 1877), 1: 162–165; V. Nalivkin and M. Nalivkina, *Ocherk byta zhensichiny osedlogo trzemnogo naseleniya Fergany* (Kazan, 1886), 61–65.

41. Sukhareva (*Bukhara*, 72–73) counted eighty madrasas existing in Bukhara at the turn of the twentieth century; lectures were held at only those twenty-two whose waqfs provided for hiring a mudarris.

42. Ayni, *Yaddāshthā*, 161–162.

43. Ibid.; see also F. M. Kerenskii, "Medrese Turkestanskogo kraia," *ZhMNP* 284 (1892): 45–47.

44. Several travelers of the early nineteenth century state that large portions of government revenue from *zakāt* and customs were earmarked for support of madrasas and their students and teachers: Meer Izut-oollah, *Travels in Central Asia in the Years 1812–13*, trans. P. D. Henderson (Calcutta, 1872), 58; Georges de Meyendorff, *Voyage d'Orenbourg à Boukhara fait en 1820* (Paris, 1826), 301; Alexander Burns, *Travels into Bukhara, together with a Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus*, vol. 1 (London, 1834), 306.

45. On the *dehyak* and its corruptions, see Ayni, *Yaddāshthā*, 774–779.

at Bukhara for their villages in October to gather the harvest.⁴⁹ At the same time, sons of ulama began madrasa education with a distinct advantage in cultural capital, and wealthy students could always hire tutors to tutor them. Ayni came from a poor family but possessed cultural capital, for his father was literate and concerned with poetry and letters. Once in Bukhara, the patronage extended to him by Sharifjān Makhsumi, son of a notable Bukharan family, was crucial in ensuring that he complete his education.

The madrasa did not only reproduce the learned elite, it also reproduced a certain understanding of Islam. The description above of the madrasa around which madrasa education centered in Bukhara is revealing. Students did not study the Qur'an and its exegesis, the traditions of the Prophet, or even jurisprudence, although they could do so if they could find a teacher willing to give them private lessons. Rather, instruction revolved around commentaries and supercommentaries, some of post-Timurid provenance. Moreover, students studied a given text (usually itself a commentary) individually or with a khalifa; the mudarris lectured on a commentary. Students aimed at expertise in the interpretation of the texts that connected them to the Islamic tradition as it was understood in Central Asia. "Islam" did not reside in certain scriptures that spoke for themselves; rather it was embedded in the social practices of transmission and interpretation, from which it could not be abstracted. Much the same process was evident even among the ulama, for whom access to the Islamic tradition lay through layers of authoritative interpretation and commentary carried out locally. This Islam was consequently not scripturally "pure." Motivated by a new vision of the world, latter-day critics such as the Jadids were to take the ulama to task on this account as they set about purifying Islam; but their critique arose from assumptions that were inconceivable in the nineteenth century.

The parallels between the madrasa, the craft guild, and the Sufi order point to the madrasa's place in society. The transmission of knowledge was embedded in everyday social practices and consequently diffused throughout society. The madrasa was one institution among many, transmitting one kind of knowledge among many. It was imbricated in the social reproduction of the learned elite and their social distinction, and it could not have been otherwise in the absence of the disciplinary apparatus of the modern state. The logic of cultural reproduction that

49. Ibid., 165-166.

work as *mufti* (jurisconsult), *qāzi* (judge), or mudarris, and truly eminent figures could hold several positions at the same time.

The madrasa was not concerned with other fields of knowledge, or, indeed, with the nonlegal aspects of Islam. We know little about Sufism in nineteenth-century Central Asia, but it is clear that most adult men had a spiritual guide (*shaykh*, *ishān*, *pir*). However, the madrasas were not involved in the initiation and learning of Sufi practices, which took place in the *khānqāh*. This was true even when many mudarrises seem to have been Sufi adepts and many *ishāns* possessed madrasa knowledge. A rough survey commissioned by a Russian administrator at the end of the nineteenth century in Tashkent revealed that a number of *ishāns* in Syr Darya oblast had attended madrasas in Bukhara.⁴⁶ Far from being mutually exclusive, *shariat* and *tariqat* were often paired as sources of proper conduct and understanding in Central Asian Islam; they remained parallel phenomena entrenched in different social spaces. Similarly, while many mudarrises as well as students wrote poetry, as befitted any cultivated individual, poetry itself was not a subject of study in the madrasa. Instead, poets gathered in literary circles to write and study poetry. Princely courts patronized many such circles, but they also existed autonomously.⁴⁷ The madrasas were not concerned with teaching literature or poetry.

Attendance at lectures was open, as Ayni remarked sourly, to "anyone who, having finished the maktab, was seized by the desire to 'become a mulla' . . . whether he be literate, semiliterate, or completely illiterate."⁴⁸ But opportunities were not equal to all: The initial investment of traveling to the madrasa, setting up house there, and providing the *iftitāhāna* for the mudarris was considerable and thwarted many aspiring students. Thereafter, the rate of attrition was high, as many students struggled to make ends meet. Ayni tells of the various jobs he held in order to pay for his keep, from cooking for a circle of his brother's friends, to working as a *mirzā* (clerk) for a merchant, to tutoring wealthy fellow students. The school year, lasting from September to March, was short, allowing students to work productively in the summer. Indeed, many stu-

46. I. Geier, "Ishany," *Sbornik materialov dlia statistiki Syr-Dar'inskoi oblasti*, 1 (1894): 70.

47. Ayni, in his *Yaddashthā*, describes such literary activity at length. According to A. Abibov, *Doirahoi adabii Bukhoroi sharqi* (Dushanbe, 1984), at the turn of the twentieth century, literary circles existed in such provincial towns as Hisar, Kulab, Qarategin, and Darwaz.

48. Ayni, *Yaddashthā*, 163.

underlay the madrasa accorded very well, however, with the vastly centralized political and social order in which it existed.

STATE, SOCIETY, AND KNOWLEDGE

The political order of nineteenth-century Central Asia carried the legacy of the decentralization of the preceding centuries. Shaybāni Khān's conquest of Transoxiana created a confederation of tribes that shared in the sovereignty of the Chinggisid khan, to whom they paid nominal allegiance. This was formalized in the division of the realm into a number of "appanages," usually centered on a town, which were the loci of real political power. The authority of the khan, for all its aura of Chinggisid descent, remained tenuous, since a number of potential Chinggisid rulers existed at any given time. The resulting decentralization of effective political power meant that even revenue extraction and local administration were the domain of appanage holders, in contrast to the unitary, hierarchical bureaucracies of the Mughal and (especially) the Ottoman empires of the same time.⁵⁰ The khan's authority included the Ottoman prerogatives to mint coinage, to have his name recited during the customary (sermon at the Friday prayer), and to receive tribute from the appanages. Individual khans could attempt to assert their authority more fully, but the tribes possessed enough power to thwart such attempts. This decentralization led to the secession of Khwārazm from the Shaybanid domains in the middle of the sixteenth century, but elsewhere, too, political authority remained fragile and deeply contested. In the early eighteenth century, decentralization reached such an extreme that the authority of Abulfayz Khān, ruler of Bukhara, came to be limited to his fortified palace. Some of the reasons were, to be sure, external; the expansion of the Jungar empire in Inner Asia set in motion one last wave of nomadic migration across the Eurasian plain, which resulted in the invasion of Transoxiana by Qazaq tribes from the Qipchaq steppe, who united with disaffected Ozbek tribes against the khan in Bukhara. The impact was felt by the entire sedentary population of the area; an Indian Muslim traveler to Central Asia in 1812 heard accounts of how Samarqand "had fallen into such utter ruin and decay, that tigers and wolves had actually taken up abode in the colleges . . . which are situated in the centre of the

and Ferghana seceded from even nominal allegiance to the khan at this time. The unrelated invasion of Nādir Shāh Afghān from his sack of Delhi, sounded the death knell of the Ashtar-madrasa in Bukhara itself, where a power struggle ensued for the throne. The latter had better Chinggisid credentials.

Members of the new dynasty much of the rest of the century their authority over other tribes. Beginning with Shāh Murād, the rulers of Bukhara (who had taken the title *amir*) began a struggle against the power of the tribes that was to continue until the conquest. Shāh Murād's reign was characterized by constant warfare with Ozbek tribes in Transoxiana as well as Türkmen tribes who inhabited the desert between his domains and Iran, but it was only after Nasrullah (r. 1826–1860), who gained notoriety in Britain for his execution of two British officers, but who also won from his subjects the epithet *amir-i qassāb* (the Butcher Amir), that the power of the tribal chiefs was broken.⁵² Similar developments took place in Ferghana, where over the course of the eighteenth century the Ming khans consolidated their hold as independent rulers. By the turn of the nineteenth century they had captured Tashkent, where urban notables had managed to retain a considerable amount of degree of autonomy under nominal Qazaq rule for much of the eighteenth century. At the same time, the new dynasty made inroads against Qazaq tribes on the steppe in the north. The city of Kokand saw considerable public construction during this period, and the court of Umar Khan (r. 1800–1820) became the center of a minor cultural renaissance.⁵³

The reasons behind this trend toward the greater assertion of power by rulers remain to be explored fully. It may have been rooted in an attempt to control increasing trade with both India and Russia,⁵⁴ but it was also connected with the gradual sedentarization of large parts of the population over the course of the previous century. Nevertheless, centralization had its limits: The struggle against the tribes was not moti-

51. Izzut-ollah, *Travels*, 56. A later Bukharan chronicler recorded that only two quarters of the city remained inhabited during this period; cf. Yuri Bregel, "Bukhara: III," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, IV: 518.

52. Bregel, "Bukhara: III," 518.

53. Susanna S. Nettleton, "Ruler, Patron, Poet: Umar Khan and the Blossoming of the Khanate of Qoqan, 1800–1820," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 2:2 (1981–82): 127–140.

54. A. Z. V. Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve Yakın Tarihi*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1981), 212.

50. R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889* (Princeton, 1992), 59–60.

vated by any new notions of sovereignty, and it was not entrenched in new forms of organization or control. In both Bukhara and Kokand, rulers countered the influence of the tribal elites not by the creation of centralized institutions of government but by promoting to high positions persons (usually Iranian or Qalmuq slaves) personally beholden to them. Shāh Murād had begun his career by having the *qushbegi* (the highest state functionary, responsible for the treasury) and the chief *qāzi* of Bukhara murdered on accusations of corruption and oppression while his father still ruled.⁵⁵ The only institutional development connected with the attempted centralization was the establishment of standing armies (*sarbāz*) in both Bukhara and Kokand, although their size remained small.⁵⁶ Indeed, the political situation seemed anything but centralized to our Indian traveler, who enumerated eight major rulers in the region.⁵⁷ Shahr-i Sabz remained a Keneges stronghold in Bukhara down to the Russian conquest, its rulers (*hākims*) inheriting their authority from each other while maintaining the legal fiction of vassalage to the amir at Bukhara,⁵⁸ and the ascendance of urban power to the amir short-lived, as Qipchaq chiefs successfully reasserted their power in the 1840s and all but overthrew the Ming khan.⁵⁹

Sovereignty was embedded in several levels of obedience and allegiance; it was exercised not through institutionalized means of alliance but rather through a series of personal bonds. A centralized bureaucracy existed in only the most rudimentary form, and then it revolved around the treasury (*dīwān*). Soviet scholarship was fond of revolved structuring stable structures in the khanates of this period,⁶⁰ but it is cru-

55. Abdulkarīm Bukhārī, *Histoire de l'Asie centrale*, ed. and trans. Charles Schefer (*Traktat Akhmada Domisha "Istoriia Mangytskoi dinastii"*, ed. and trans. I. A. Nadzhanov, 1893), 152.

56. N. Khanykov, *Bukhara: Its Amir and its People*, trans. Clement A. de Bode (London, 1845 [orig. 1842]), 87, reported "500 regular troops of Bukhara." A. Madzhlisov, *Agrarnye otnosheniia v vostochnoi Bukhare v XIX-nachale XX veka* (Dushanbe, 1967), 38, puts the number at 800. The statement in the recent *Istoriia Uzbekistana*, III: 158, that the *sarbāz* numbered 40,000, is without foundation.

57. Izziit-ollah, *Travels*, 60-61.

58. T. K. Beisenbiev, "Unknown Dynasty: The Rulers of Shahr-i Sabz in the 18th and 19th Centuries," *Journal of Central Asia* 15, no. 1 (1992): 20-22.

59. T. K. Beisenbiev, "Ta'rikh-i Shakhrukh" *kak istoricheskii istochnik* (Alma-Ata, 1987), 22, 76-77.

60. A. A. Semenov, *Ocherk ustroistva tsentral'nogo administrativnogo upravleniia Bukharskogo khaustva pozdnego vremeni* (Dushanbe, 1954); N. A. Kisiakov, *Triarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnosheniia sredi osedlogo sel'skogo naseleniia Bukharskogo*

the informality of power in the nineteenth century. Ranks were granted by rulers as markers of status and authority, but they correspond to stable offices, which did not exist. The central state could not be abstracted from the practice of social relations in turn did not have access to formal institutions. This paternal, face-to-face relationships was replicated at all levels of including the realm of cultural reproduction.

bonds and the activities that depended on them (trade, irrigation reproduction) survived the political instability and nearly warfare precisely because the state was not a significant node of solidarity. Social solidarities were enmeshed in a series of bonds that numerous localized, often cross-cutting allegiances defined binary society by residential, professional, and genealogical bonds. urban neighborhood (*guzar*, *mahalla*), formed around a mosque holy site (*ziyarat*, usually a tomb [*mazar*]), was the locus of close of mutual assistance. The neighborhood community was territorial brought together people of various standings; the more notable residents were expected to support and protect their neighbors.⁶¹ The neighborhood community coexisted with craft guilds, each of which involved membership in a series of hierarchical relations headed by an elder.⁶² These hierarchies replicated in society the multilayered pattern of political power outlined above and provided a means for the mediation of relations between rulers and the ruled.

These hierarchies rested on differentials of wealth and status and existed because they were widely recognized as "natural." The maintenance and reproduction of this notability was crucial to the social survival of the notables (and of the social order as constituted). Notability could reside in a number of sources, among which wealth was one.

khanstva v kontse XIX-nachale XX veka (Moscow, 1962), 42-63; Madzhlisov, *Agrarnye otnosheniia*, 20-70.

61. O. A. Sukhareva, *Kvartal'naia obshchina pozdnefeodal'nogo goroda Bukhary* (Moscow, 1976).

62. On the guilds of Central Asia, see M. Gavrilov, "O remeslennykh tsekhakh Srednei Azii i ikh statutakh—risolia," *Izvestiia sredne-aziat'skogo komiteta po delam muzeev i okhrany pamiatnikov stariny, iskusstva i prirody*, 3 (1928): 235-236, Tashkent; O. A. Sukhareva, *Pozdnefeodal'nyi gorod Bukhara kontsa XIX-nachala XX veka: remeslennaiia promyshlennost'* (Tashkent, 1962) on Bukhara; R. G. Mukminova, "Remeslennye korporatsii i uchinnichestvo," on Samarqand; I. Dzhabbarov, "Ob uchinnichestve v remeslennykh tsekhakh Srednei Azii v kontse XIX i nachale XX v.," in *Materialy itorogo soveshchaniia arkhologov i etnografov Srednei Azii* (Moscow, 1959), on Khorezm; E. M. Peshchereva, *Remeslennye organizatsii Srednei Azii v kontse XIX i nachale XX v.* (Moscow, 1960).

Substantial merchants (*sawdāgar*) could enjoy influence in society and an entrée at court. Equally important, though, were other less famous but no less important figures, such as claimants to august lineage, the possession of sacred lineage, or a reputation for piety or civility. For the most part, the claims to notability were compatible and mutually reinforcing. Merchants could acquire a reputation for piety through patronage of learned or construction of pious sites, and the learned and the wealthy could (and did) accumulate considerable wealth. More broadly, the learned and commonly decipherable codes of civilized behavior served as significant markers of status, whose cultivation in succeeding generations was crucial to the social reproduction of distinction that underpinned the social order of nineteenth-century Central Asia. The maktab and especially the madrasa were significant channels for the production and reproduction of such social distinction.

The mediated nature of political power meant that the domain of *qāzis* existed in the interpretive practice of legal experts at some remove from the power of the state. While appointments to the various offices of law were often made by the ruler, the prestige and authority of judges and juriconsults was largely defined by peer groups. The decision of a *qāzī* carried authority not because he was a functionary of the state but because of his reputation for piety and the knowledge he possessed. This was symbolized by the seals used by *qāzis*, which carried the name of the *qāzī* and a ritual phrase in Arabic and nothing else. Madrasa education was an instrument for the reproduction of the social distinction and social position of the *ulama* as a group.

Social distinction did not automatically translate into political power, however. The relationship between the rulers and the ulama was dynamic. In times of weakness for the state, the ulama could exercise power in their own right. In fifteenth-century Samarkand, Khoja Ahrār played a very significant role in the social and political life of the city,⁶³ and the Juybāri khojas in Bukhara accumulated vast wealth and political influence in Bukhara in the Shaybānīd period.⁶⁴ In Tashkent, the ulama ruled in their own right for much of the eighteenth century.⁶⁵ At other times, rulers honored the ulama and placed them in places of high influence,

positions as well as control of substantial endowed patronizing madrasas and *khanqāhs*.⁶⁶ The Mani and Mir Haydar seem to have formed especially them. Several ranks among the ulama came to appear. Atā'i and Juybari Khojas. Shāh Murād had appeared the influence of a shaykh before ascending the throne, the *qushbegi* and the qāzi of Bukhara were prompted to his dismay as much at their moral turpitude in smoking a new habit in Bukhara, as at their propensity for Haydar, described by a contemporary as having him a scholar (*mullā tabī'at*), spent a great deal of his time with the ulama (although that did not prevent him from enamored of women [*zan dost*] and contracting a great many).⁶⁷ Both were generous in their support of the ulama both acquired excellent reputations with chroniclers. and Kokand, intermarriage between the ruling dynasty and sufi families was widespread during the first half of the nineteenth century. We

...some automatically. We are

"did not believe in defence or alliance did not come automatically."

His hands of a shaykh who claimed to be a prophet, seated by a pond, Alim Qul ordered a rope to be flung across it, and asked for the said shaykh to be presented to him. The shaykh appeared tomorrow, on the day Alim Qul said, "O Shaykh! Tomorrow, on the bridge of Sirāt over the resurrection, you will lead your disciples across the bridge of Sirāt over the gates of hell. Today, why don't you cross this rope, so that I may witness one of your miracles." The shaykh began to preach admonitions and to recite hadith and the Qur'an, but the khan was inflexible and ordered him to walk the rope at once. No sooner did the shaykh step on the rope than he slipped and fell into the pond. Blows rained down on him from all sides until he died.

66. A. L. Troitskaya, Kaluz'skaya guberniya (1968); M. A. Abduraimov, *Ocherki agrarnykh otношений v Dagestane* (1970), II: 28-52.

67. Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 76 (text), 109 (commentary).

was also noted by all contemporaries...
68. Beisembiev, "Dukhovenstvo v politicheskoi zhizni v Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke v period feodalizma (Moscow, 1985), 37-46; Khanykov, Bokhara, 246; M. Abdurakhmanov, *Vostok v feodal'noye zemlevladieniye i feodal'noi renty v pis'makh Emira Khaidara* (Tashkent, 1978), 31-4; Khaidara, III: 338-343.

63. Jürgen Paul, "Forming a Faction: The *Himāyāt* System of Khwaja Abrar," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23 (1991): 533–548.

64. P. P. Ivanov, *Khoziaistvo dzhubibarskikh sheikhovi: k istorii feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia v Srednei Azii v XVI-XVII vv.* (Moscow, 1954).

65. O. D. Chekhovich, "Gorodskoe samoupravlenie v Tashkente XVIII v.," in *Istoriia i kul'tura narodov Srednei Azii (drevnost' i srednie veka)* (Moscow, 1976) 149-160.

[After that,] wherever [Alim Qull] saw a dervish or a man attired in Sufi robes [*khirqa-pish*], he had him arrested and turned into a camel driver.⁶⁹

In such cases, kingship was its own justification. As Devin DeWeese has recently shown us, popular understandings of Islam in post-Mongol Central Asia fully assimilated myths of conversion to Islam with the very origin of the community itself, which was often defined in terms of ruler-ship.⁷⁰ Dynasts also claimed august lineages that tied them, through an Islamizing figure, to both the Prophet (through 'Alī) and Chinggis Khan, and these claims were constantly renewed through intermarriage with saintly families.

Thus the prestige of scholars of Muslim law did not mean that the states of Central Asia were theocratic or governed by an immutable Islamic law. The ideal was considerably different. Ruining the demise of the old order, Ahmad Makhdum Dānish, a disaffected Bukharan courtier writing in the 1890s, recalled the days when the world was right side up. During the reign of Shāh Murād, the son of an *ākhumd* killed a shopkeeper who was rude to him. The victim's father petitioned the amir for justice, but the amir was so outraged by the temerity of the victim that he imposed a fine on the father instead, exclaiming that if the victim had not been killed, he would have had him thrown from the Minār-i Kalān. "It is clear from the aforesaid," Dānish concluded, "how knowledge and its servants were in ascendance at that time, and how strong were the opinions of the ulama and the rulers."⁷¹ Shariat was honored because its carriers were honored.

As long as the old order continued to exist on its own terms, the madrasa made perfect sense and served crucial purposes in reproducing knowledge and the social order. The demise of the old order, however, cast everything in doubt.

THE LUXURY OF ISOLATION

Madrasas continued to be built and endowed and manuscripts continued to be written in the nineteenth century. If anything, the first half of the nineteenth century was a period of cultural florescence: A majority of

madrasas in existence in Tashkent and Kokand in the first years of Russian rule had been built in the nineteenth century.⁷² The khans of both Kokand and Khiva cultivated vast literary circles that produced numerous works of poetry and history.⁷³ Yet, this florescence was highly traditionalist, the central preoccupation being with writing poetry on the models of Timurid or earlier poets and writing commentaries on existing works. Central Asia's isolation contributed to this conservatism of social cultural practices and tastes. The shift of world trade routes from land to sea after the fifteenth century marginalized the economy of Central Asia; the political dislocation of the eighteenth century added to it.⁷⁴ As a result, Central Asia was little affected by the globalization of the world economy taking place in those centuries, which greatly affected other Muslim lands. The low levels of technicalization that obtained in Central Asia until the Russian conquest provide a measure of this isolation from the world economy.

The picture of Central Asian isolation can be overdrawn, to be sure. In the nineteenth century, Central Asian merchants conducted a vigorous trade with Russia, Afghanistan, India, and China. The reach of Indian trade was considerable. As Stephen Dale has recently demonstrated, an Indian world economy encompassed much of Eurasia in the early modern period.⁷⁵ Although its heyday was over by the nineteenth century, trade was still sizable. In July 1826, an Indian merchant arrived in Orenburg with a cargo of gold and silver coin, muslin, and silk brocades.⁷⁶ Khanykov reported in 1842 that the volume of trade with Afghanistan and India averaged 3,000–5,000 camel loads annually.⁷⁷ A substantial population of Indian merchants resided in the principal cities of Central Asia, where they enjoyed a near monopoly over moneylending.⁷⁸ Cen-

72. N. P. Ostroumov, "Madrasyy v Turkestanskoy kraev," *Zhurnal* n.s., 7, (1907): otd. nar. obr., 7–12; A. B. Vil'danova, "O sostoyanii nauki v sredneaziatikh gorodakh XVI–pervoy poloviny XIX veka," *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane*, 1989, no. 7: 32–36.

73. Umar Khan of Kokand and Rahim Khan of Khiva (r. 1864–1910) were both celebrated patrons and poets in their own right. For notices on the works of members of their court circles, see H. F. Hofman, *Turkish Literature: A Bio-Bibliographical Survey*, 6 vols. (Utrecht, 1969), II: 87–90, IV: 144; see also Nettleton, "Ruler, Patron, Poet."

74. This latter point is made by Morris Rossabi, "The 'Decline' of the Central Asian Caravan Trade," in James D. Tracy, ed., *The Rise of the Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern Period, 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 1990).

75. Stephen Frederic Dale, *Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600–1750* (Cambridge, 1994).

76. G. A. Mikhaleva, *Uzbekistan v XVIII–pervoy polovine XIX veka: remeslo, tor-govlia i poshliny* (Tashkent, 1991), 74.

77. Khanykov, *Bokhara*, 221–228.

78. Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 176.

69. Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 94–95 (text), 211–212 (trans.).

70. Devin DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition* (University Park, Penn., 1994).

71. Dānish, *Traktat*, 30–32.

tral Asia still served as an entrepôt for trade between Russia and China and merchants from Ferghana had acquired a dominant commercial position in Eastern Turkestan, where in 1826 Madali Khan obtained the right to levy taxes in Altı Shahr.⁷⁹ But the most extensive trade was with Russia, whose goods had come to dominate the Central Asian market well before the Russian conquest. Arminius Vámbéry, who traveled in Central Asia in 1863, wrote, "It is by no means any exaggeration to assert that there is no house, and even no tent, in all Central Asia, where there is not some article of Russian manufacture."⁸⁰ This trade was carried on through annual caravans that braved nomad territory on the way to Orenburg and beyond. Orenburg, founded in 1742, had a Bukharan Makariev fair (which later moved to Nizhnii Novgorod) since 1807.⁸¹ The return trade was in the hands of Tatars, however, and few Russians set foot in Central Asia.

There was also considerable circulation of people. The ulama retained contacts with India. In 1842, Kokand's embassy to St. Petersburg was headed by one Sāhibzāda Miān Fazl Khalil, a Sirhindi Sufi from Peshawar. His cousin headed the Naqshbandi order in Kokand from his arrival there in 1826 until his death in 1869.⁸² Those who could also traveled to Arabia for the hajj, although a Kokand notable found that it took him seven years to make the trip in the 1820s.⁸³ Similarly, the incipient modernization of the armies in the khanates was made possible largely by imported soldiers. Iranian soldiers, many of them slaves captured in war or by Türkmen tribes, provided most of the manpower for

newly organized standing armies.⁸⁴ Similarly, several Indian Muslims with experience in the armies of the East India Company served in Kokand, one of them rising to be governor of Tashkent for several years.⁸⁵ The maverick British traveler John Wolff was "most agreeably surprised" when a band of soldiers in Bukhara played "God Save the Queen" for him one evening in 1844.⁸⁶ Three decades later, the American diplomat Eugene Schuyler, visiting Kokand on the eve of its final annexation, found local troops being drilled with a mixture of English and Russian commands, many of them seemingly fully nativized into local Turkic.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, this reorganization of armies was directed primarily at regional struggles. The khanates of Central Asia were surrounded by deserts inhabited by nomadic tribes, and the concerns of rulers continued to focus on the shifting calculus of power involving neighboring khanates and the nomads; relations with outside powers, always sporadic because of the distances involved, were seen through the prism of local rivalries. The khans of Kokand had paid tribute to the Qing dynasty since the 1750s, but this relationship remained largely nominal. To the extent that the khans dealt largely with *ambans* in Kashgar (over the years, only eight Kokand missions were allowed to visit Beijing), this relationship too remained a regional one.⁸⁸ Russia was the only external power to have any significant presence in this regional theater of diplomacy, although as long as the steppe remained beyond Russian control, its power to act was limited. Successive embassies traveled to St. Petersburg over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a smaller number of Russian missions paid visits to Central Asia capitals.

The Ottomans maintained sporadic diplomatic contact, although again the vast distances separating the two realms made it impossible for either side to give these relations any substance. The Ottomans initiated relations with Bukhara in the aftermath of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, in the hope of opening a second front against Russia. The pious Shāh Murād was distinctly unenthusiastic about the cause, informing the Otto-

79. Tōru Saguchi, "The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, no. 24 (1965): 82-89; Joseph Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet," in John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10 (Cambridge, 1978), 360-395.

80. Arminius Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia* (London, 1864), 475-476; for an earlier expression of the same phenomenon, see Mohan Lal, *Travels in the Panjab, Afghanistan, and Turkistan* (London, 1846), 142. There is a considerable literature on trade relations between Russia and Central Asia; see M. K. Rozhikova, *Ekonomicheskie svyazi Rossi i Srednei Aziei (40-60 gody XIX veka)* (Moscow, 1963); G. A. Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i diplomaticheskie svyazi Rossii so sredneaziatskimi khanstami cherez Orenburg* (Tashkent, 1983).

81. Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posolskie svyazi*, 22-27.

82. T. K. Beisembiev, "Farghana's Contacts with India in the 18th and 19th Centuries," *Journal of Asian History* 23 (1994): 126-128.

83. W. H. Wathen, "Note of a Pilgrimage Undertaken by an Uzbek and His Two Sons from Khokend or Kokan, in Tartary, through Russia, &c. to Mecca," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* 3 (1834): 379-382.

84. Khanykov, *Bokhara*, 87; Vámbéry, *Travels*, 225-227; Semenov, *Ocherk ustroistva*, 59.

85. Beisembiev, "Farghana's Contacts with India," 126.

86. Joseph Wolff, *Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara, in the Years 1843-1845, to Ascertain the Fate of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly*, vol. 1 (London, 1845), 351-352.

87. Schuyler, *Turkistan*, II: 15-16.

88. Saguchi, "Eastern Trade," 49-52. According to Abdulkarim Bukhārī, the Chinese emperor had granted Alim Qul a pension (*'alīfa*) in return for making sure that the sons of Sarimsaq Khoja, the last ruler of Kashgar, did not cross Kokand territory to attack their father's lost domains; see Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 96 (text), 217-218 (trans.).

man envoy Alemdar Mehmed Said Ağa that it was "impossible to w
war on a power such as Moscow without cannon and armor," but
ing instead for help against "our real enemy . . . Iran and the Rā
[Shi'is]." ⁸⁹ In the ensuing decades, rulers of the three khanates sen
steady succession of envoys to Istanbul, seeking help in religious as w
as military matters. Yet it was clear to the Porte that even when Cent
Asian rulers offered to swear allegiance (*bi'at*) to the sultan as caliph
the rulers of both Bukhara and Khiva did in the 1810s, it was in
hope of gaining symbolic supremacy in local struggles rather than w
the intent of subordinating their sovereignty to that of the sultan. ⁹⁰

The same distances that isolated Central Asia also provided its ruler
with a certain comfort and safety from colonial intrusion. Unlike the
Muslim states of the Mediterranean, the khanates of Central Asia did
not feel directly the military threat of modern powers until the middle of
the nineteenth century. Central Asia's neighbors had similar levels of
technology and did not therefore mount a significant challenge to its ex
ternal security. No direct challenge arose from foreign powers until the
1830s, when expanding spheres of British and Russian influence threat
ened Central Asia. Even when this isolation was broken, the low level of
institutionalization in the Central Asian khanates meant that the inten
sive reform from the top experienced by the Ottoman empire or Egypt
could not take place in Central Asia. The result was a measure of free
dom in isolation that was available to few other Muslim states in this pe
riod. The relative security of obscurity allowed the Islamic tradition un
questioned domination in Central Asian intellectual life. The Russian
conquest, so rude in its abruptness, ended this isolation and put Central
Asia and its civilization in a completely different situation.

⁸⁹. Mehmet Saray, *Rus İsgali Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları ara
sındaki Siyasi Münasebetler (1775-1875)* (Istanbul, 1990), 21.

⁹⁰. Ibid., 28-53.

RUSSIAN CONQUEST

gradual subjugation of the Bashkir and Qazaq steppe by the Rus
state over the preceding century and a half had brought Russia into
geographical contiguity with the khanates of Central Asia by the middle
of the nineteenth century. In the confrontation that followed, the techno
logical and organizational superiority of Russian forces proved to be its
justification for conquest, which was accomplished with great ease
and rapidity. Although the motivation behind the Russian expansion
has been a matter of much debate, it seems quite clear that the initiatives
of willful and ambitious generals played significant and irreversible roles
in the conquest of Central Asia.¹

¹. Soviet historiography long focused on the economic impulse behind Russian ex
pansion, asserting, not entirely convincingly, the necessity of a nascent bourgeoisie in Rus
sia to find new markets. See the classic statement in N. A. Khalafin, *Prisoedinenie Srednei
Azii k Rossii (60-90-e gody XIX v.)* (Moscow, 1965). Much of Western historiography of
Russian expansion into Central Asia, in positing a calculated Russian advance against
India, is still hostage to the nineteenth-century British understanding of it; for a recent
vulgarization of this theme, see Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game* (London, 1990). The as
sumption of a grand strategy behind Russian expansion has been questioned, quite con
vincingly in my opinion, by David MacKenzie, "Expansion in Central Asia: St. Petersburg
vs. the Turkestan Generals (1863-1866)," *Canadian Slavic Studies* 3 (1969): 286-311;
and Peter Morris, "The Russians in Central Asia, 1870-1887," *Slavonic and East Euro
pean Review* 53 (1975): 521-538.

Russia's first territorial acquisition at the expense of a khanate came in 1853, when Russian forces under the command of General V. A. Perovskii took the Kokand fortress of Aq Masjid to complete the Orenburg line of frontier fortifications. Further action was stalled for a decade, when the decision was made to connect the Orenburg and Siberian lines. The resulting advance led to the conquest of the towns, nominally under Kokand rule, of Turkestan (Yasi) and Awliya Ata, and it finally enclosed the Qazaq steppe behind Russian lines. This was, however, only the beginning of bigger things. The following spring, M. G. Cherniaev, promoted to the rank of major general for his recent exploits, marched on Tashkent and conquered it against the express wishes of his superiors in St. Petersburg. Cherniaev's actions in Tashkent set the pattern for Russia's military activity in Central Asia over the next two decades, as military men repeatedly presented *faits accomplis* to imperial authorities. Military action took place in remote, barely known areas, which left imperial authorities with no ability to monitor the actions of men on the spot, for whom the militarily weak khanates represented an easy source of military glory.²

Cherniaev was decorated and the territories conquered by him retained. War thus came to Bukhara. Amir Muzaffar showed little enthusiasm for taking on the Russians, preferring to continue his campaign against Kokand, but he was surprised by his own population. In early 1866, with the Russians at Jizzakh, the ulama of Bukhara led a vast throng to the amir's palace demanding the declaration of war.³ A similar uprising took place in Samarqand. The amir was forced to fight, but the hastily assembled army, including many volunteers with no experience of war, suffered a massive defeat. The next years were a period of uncertainty. The amir sought help from outside: an embassy led by one Muhammad Pārsā traveled to India and the Ottoman empire, but to no avail.⁴ Meanwhile, his troops suffered a number of defeats, which cost him the

2. On the Russian conquest of Central Asia, see Khalif, *Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii: good summaries in English see Richard N. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley, 1960), ch. 2; Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924* (Cambridge, 1968), chs. 2-7; and Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, "Systematic Conquest, 1865-1884," in Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (New York, 1967), 131-150.

3. 'Abdul 'Azīm Samī, *Tuhfa-yi shāhi* (ms., ca. 1899-1900), quoted by L. M. Epifanova, *Rukopis' nye istochniki Instituta Vostochnoi Akademii Nauk UzSSR po istorii Srednei Azii: perioda prisoedineniia k Rossii* (Tashkent, 1965), 34; Ahmad Makhdom Dānish, *Traktat Akhnada Donisha "Istoriia Mangitskoi dinastii,"* ed. and trans. I. A. Nadzhafova (Dushanbe, 1967), 43ff.

4. For a description of the letter to the sultan, see Epifanova, *Rukopis' nye istochniki, 69-70*; for some Ottoman documents concerning the embassy, see *Osmanlı Devleti ile Kafkasya, Türkistan ve Kırm Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münasebetlere dair Arşiv Belgeleri* (An-

provinces of Khujand and Samarqand. In 1868, Bukhara was forced to pay reparations and to sign a treaty formalizing the loss of territory and granting Russian merchants equal rights in the country. Similar terms were imposed by treaty on the rump khanate of Kokand.

The khanates were allowed to exist for several interconnected reasons. Authorities in St. Petersburg, especially the Ministry of Finance, showed a marked reluctance to take on the expenditure of administering new regions. There was also the need to minimize British concerns about Russian expansion, as well as an uncertainty about the ability to control a large population little known or understood by the Russians. Only the initial conquests were to be incorporated directly into the Russian empire. Yet, the very logic of military success undermined this hope. Each round of warfare resulted in the acquisition of extra territory as reparations. In 1873, a major campaign that reduced Khiva to vassal status gained considerable territory for Russia. In Kokand, Khudāyār Khān found it difficult to assert his authority over his diminished realm and in 1875 lost his throne in an uprising that rapidly turned into a movement against the Russian presence. Russian troops invaded and occupied Kokand; the protectorate was abolished and the khanate incorporated into the Russian empire. Finally, in the 1880s, the Türkmen steppe, where no khanate had managed to assert control, was conquered, often with the use of exemplary brutality (the most notable being Skobelev's massacre at Gök Tepe in 1881). Thus, at the end of the period of conquest, for all its reluctance to take on additional expense, the Russian state found itself in the possession of a vast new densely populated territory.

The 1868 treaty with Bukhara was eventually replaced in 1873 by a new, more far-reaching version that defined Bukhara's status until 1917. It made the amir "acknowledge himself to be the obedient servant of the Emperor of All the Russias." The amir also "renounce[d] the right to maintain direct and friendly relations with neighboring rulers and khans and to conclude with them any commercial or other treaties [or to] . . . undertake any military actions against them without the knowledge and permission of the supreme Russian authority in Central Asia."⁵ Once he

kara, 1992), 133-134, 136-138; see also Muhammad Anwar Khan, *England, Russia and Central Asia (A Study in Diplomacy)* (Peshawar, 1963), 107-112; Mehmed Saray, *Rus İlgali Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi Münasebetler* (İstanbul, 1990), 81-88.

5. For an English translation of the treaty, see Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 316-318 (quote on 316).

had accepted Russian suzerainty, Amir Muzaffar set about making the best of it. Through a series of adroit political maneuvers, Muzaffar and his successors carved out for themselves a position of authority that their ancestors had only dreamed of. Now, despite his military defeat, Muzaffar was installed as a ruler by the Russians, who henceforth had an interest in the security of his throne. (Nor was the defeat complete. In 1873, the Russians made the khan of Khiva cede territory on the right bank of the Amu Darya to the amir of Bukhara, whom the Russians trusted more. The amir also gained territory, with Russian blessings, in Qarātegin and Darwāz and in the Pamirs.)⁶ On more than one occasion, Russian troops were deployed in Bukhara to quell disorders. Muzaffar and his successors kept on good terms with Russian elites, both in Tashkent and St. Petersburg, and backed these contacts with frequent personal gifts and public donations.⁷ Domestically, Muzaffar presented himself as the most powerful surviving Muslim monarch in Central Asia. He even turned defeat into victory by claiming credit for having prevented a complete takeover by Russia.⁸ He appealed to religious piety and grounded his legitimacy in his support for the "traditional" Islamic order in Bukhara. He and his successors jealously guarded against the introduction of any new institutions that might compromise their absolute power by casting all change as a *bid'at* (innovation). The nature of Bukhara's political order was transformed as a result of the protectorate, Russia's professions of non-intervention notwithstanding. With the delineation of its boundaries in the treaty, Bukhara also became, for the first time, a strictly territorial entity.

Bukhara's autonomy was further reduced in 1885, when it was included in the Russian customs boundary and a Russian "political agency" was created to conduct relations with Bukhara (which until then had been carried on through irregular emissaries). The Transcaspian Railway, built in the 1880s to connect Samarqand and Tashkent with the Caspian Sea, also cut through Bukhara. A new treaty made the railway itself and all stations along it sovereign Russian territory. The po-

6. *Ibid.*, 90–92, 157.

7. Thus, while Amir Abdulahad stoutly refused permission for Jadid schools in his domain, he donated 52,000 rubles in the 1890s for the establishment of a *Realschule (real'noe uchilishche)* for Russian students in Tashkent. The tradition was maintained by Alimjan (r. 1910–1920) as well. See A. Dobromyslov, *Tashkent v proshlom i nastoiashchem* (Tashkent, 1912), 227; B. Kh. Ergashev, "Iz istorii obshchestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni Bukhary nachala XX veka," *Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane*, 1992, no. 2, 49–53.

8. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Réforme et révolution chez les musulmans de l'empire russe*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1981), 86–89.

political agency, directly inspired by the British experience of dealing with princely states in India, was located nine miles from Bukhara, in Kāgān, which in time became an important outpost of Russian Turkestan. The political agent was appointed by the governor-general of Turkestan, who could thus keep a closer eye on the amir and project Russian influence into Bukhara more easily. The Russian government periodically contemplated outright annexation of Bukhara, but for the same reasons that had militated against annexation in 1868, the amir escaped unscathed, his autocratic powers intact, until the revolution of 1920.⁹

The khan of Khiva was less successful. His realm was smaller and poorer, and the peace treaty accordingly more punitive. Over the decades, Muhammad Rahim Khān (1864–1910) and his successor were far less prominent in Russian public life, but since they could not make claims to authority like those of the amirs of Bukhara, they proved more open to reform. Their authority over their realm was less certain, however, and an uprising by nomadic tribes in 1916 led to massive Russian intervention that all but abolished the protectorate.

Yet, only the military could be wholeheartedly enthusiastic about the progress of Russian arms in the region. The Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs took a different view of the matter, the former worrying about the expense of administering vast new territories in a period of fiscal restraint, and the latter fearing "complications" in its relations with Britain, which saw any Russian advance as a direct threat to its occupation of India. The fears of these two ministries were reflected in the final outcome, but the military succeeded in setting the pace of conquest. Russian expansion ended when the southern boundaries of the empire were defined in a series of treaties with Britain, which thus made Russian actions subject to European international law. By that time, however, the Russian empire had acquired numerous new subjects and huge tracts of land that it ruled directly. This rule proved quite stable, at least partly because strategic considerations remained paramount in the eyes of local administrators.¹⁰ It was also backed by large numbers of troops, usually numbering around 50,000, who were frequently deployed.¹¹ There

9. Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, ch. 12.

10. David MacKenzie, "Turkestan's Significance to Russia (1850–1917)," *Russian Review* 33 (1974): 167–188, provides a nuanced view of the changing significance of Turkestan to Russia. As the discussion below of irrigation policy shows, however, strategic considerations never completely disappeared.

11. David MacKenzie, "Kaufman of Turkestan: An Assessment of His Administration," *Slavic Review* 26 (1967): 272.

were few overt challenges to Russian rule until the uprising of 1916, although a certain unease about the thinness of their authority never left the minds of the new rulers.

IMAGINING TURKESTAN

The Turkestan *krai* (region) was created in 1867 and put in the charge of a governor-general.¹² In view of the unsettled and largely unknown conditions in the area, civilian and military rule down to the uezd (district) level were placed in the same hands (although uezd administrators were relieved of military command in 1884), and the Ministry of War, rather than Internal Affairs, enjoying ultimate jurisdiction over it. The region was to be ruled by a governor-general, appointed by the tsar himself and answerable only to him. K. P. Kaufman, the first governor-general, enjoyed immense plenipotentiary powers over administration and the conduct of Russian relations with neighboring states. Given its peculiar position, Turkestan was to be governed under its own statute. The tsar promulgated a Provisional Statute in 1867, but the drafting of a permanent statute was delayed by differences between the various ministries involved, and a final version was not published until 1886. For the first two decades of Russian rule, therefore, Turkestan was governed provisionally, with everyday policy being set by Kaufman. The earliest Russian policies and practices bore the stamp of his preferences.

Central Asia's otherness was palpable to nineteenth-century Russians. As Monika Greenleaf has ably argued, since the early nineteenth century, Russian elites had sought to buttress their Europeanness through participation in the discourse of orientalism.¹³ The same could be said of the discourse of imperialism. In his 1864 memorandum to Russian missions in Europe, Foreign Minister A. M. Gorchakov argued in terms of mid-century imperialism common to all Europeans: "The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized States which are brought

into contact with half-savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social organization. . . . In such cases it always happens that the more civilized State is forced . . . to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make most undesirable neighbours. . . . It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force; the moral force of reason and of the interests of civilization has as yet no hold upon them."¹⁴ Nor was this memorandum simply eyewash for the benefit of foreign governments. Educated Russians saw their presence in Central Asia as part of the greater European imperial expansion of the nineteenth century. The Russian intelligentsia might debate its relation to Europe, but no one doubted that Russia represented Europe in Central Asia.¹⁵ Most Russians in Central Asia saw their goals in terms of the usual nineteenth-century imperial notions of replacing the arbitrary, "Asiatic" despotism of local rulers by good government, the pacification of the countryside, and the increase in trade and prosperity. The earliest administrators took pride in the lower levels of taxation Russian rule had brought (even, for some, at the expense of rendering Turkestan "unprofitable"). Kaufman saw the growth of trade as the key to the future prosperity of the region and spent a considerable amount of energy in organizing a biannual trade fair at Tashkent. (The experiment was less than successful and was soon abandoned.)¹⁶

Russia as progress stood in contrast to Central Asia as fanaticism and barbarity, much of which was seen to reside in Islam. "Fanaticism" came to be the defining characteristic of Central Asia, although precisely what it entailed could vary a great deal; its semantic range included everything from armed struggle against the Russians, through the refusal to send

14. Great Britain, Parliament, *Central Asia*, No. 2 (1873): *Correspondence Respecting Central Asia*, C. 704 (London, 1873), 70–75.

15. This bears emphasis for two reasons: first, current discussions of post-Soviet Russia take for granted its otherness from "Europe"; and second, the considerable literature that exists on Russian views of Asia tends to privilege those Russian authors who had more ambivalent feelings toward Europe (and consequently, toward Asia), thus overstating the prevalence of such views. See, for example, Milan Hauner, *What Is Asia to Us?* (London, 1990). In any case, as Mark Bassin ("Russia between Europe and Asia," *Slavic Review* 50 [1991]: 13) has shown, even those Russian writers who asserted Russia's difference from Europe tended nevertheless to see "the gulf separating Russia from the Occident as considerably less deep than that separating it from the Orient"; Central Asia remained a "purely Asiatic land," a colony of Russia, no matter how un-European Russia might be.

16. TWG was full of reports and proclamations about the trade fair in the early 1870s. The fair distinctly failed to amuse Eugene Schuyler, the American minister in St. Petersburg, who visited Central Asia in 1873; see his scathing critique in Schuyler, *Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*, vol. 1 (New York, 1877), 207–212.

12. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, 2nd ser., vol. 42, no. 44831 (St. Petersburg, 1868). The *krai* initially consisted of two oblasts, viz. Syr Darya and Semirech'e; Kokand, respectively, were added. In 1882, Semirech'e was transferred from Bukhara and ruled from Omsk, but returned to Turkestan in 1892, when the Transcaspian *krai*, representing the last fruits of Russian expansion, was also transferred to Turkestan from the viceroyalty of Transcaucasia. Both, however, continued to be ruled under their own statutes.

13. Monika Greenleaf, *Pushkin and Romantic Fashion: Fragment, Elegy, Orient, Irony* (Stanford, 1994), 145.

children to Russian schools, to abstention from alcohol. As David Edwards has pointed out, establishing the other as fanatical denies him or her moral status, since he or she exists beyond the realm of rationality and gives those whose moral superiority is thus affirmed a free hand in defending their interests.¹⁷ In locating the fanaticism in Islam, Kaufman and his contemporaries were part of a much broader phenomenon of nineteenth-century European thought. As European armies of conquest encountered armed resistance, often in the name of Islam and many times organized around Sufi brotherhoods, the "fanaticism" of Muslims came a commonplace in the literature of imperialism. The view of Islam as a conspiratorial religion (Sufi brotherhoods, dimly understood, were particularly suitable grist for this mill), implacably hostile to Christianity (or Europe or the West), provided a common framework for Christian administrators in Asia and Africa.¹⁸ Russian administrators in Turkestan (some of whom were prominent orientalists) looked to the experience of the British and the French in ruling "their" Muslims, and they avidly read the works of Western European orientalists. The Russians had encountered the same phenomenon in their prolonged conquest of Daghestan, where resistance, led by Shamil, had been organized in Sufi brotherhoods. Similarly, the role of the ulama in forcing the amir of Bukhara to fight was proof to many of the implacable fanaticism aroused by Islam. This fear of Islam remained a constant component of policies toward Muslim peoples through the colonial world, although its intensity varied with the political situation. By the end of the century, the fear of traditional Islam organized in Sufi brotherhoods began to give way to a fear of Islam, fanatical as ever, but now mixed up with nationalism and modern education. Bureaucrats in Turkestan could never make up their minds as to which kind of Islam was more dangerous. Nevertheless, the fear of the conspiratorial nature of Islam rendered certain religious practices, such as the hajj, the locus of suspicion, and hence targets of control.

At the same time, in common with other Europeans, educated Russians had boundless confidence in the inherent superiority of their civilization, a belief repeated often by administrators in Turkestan. Writing

the aftermath of the Andijan uprising of 1898, a group of orientalists told blandly state: "Of course, at the present time, no one doubts that Islam has had its day and that each day it nears its final collapse and decomposition. No evidence is needed to show that a renaissance of the world of Islam is not possible: left to itself, it must either meet its final destruction or it will have to adopt a different culture."¹⁹ Russian policies in Turkestan were therefore the product of a curious combination of hubris and paranoia. The superiority and ultimate victory of the civilization they represented was assured, but the natives were nevertheless prone to a fanatical hatred of it. Yet, astute exercise of power (and the utilization of expert knowledge) could ensure the perpetuation of Russian rule and even the diminution of native fanaticism. For Kaufman, policy choices were obvious: Russian authorities were to tread cautiously and leave all aspects of local life that were not of a political nature untouched, so as not to arouse the fanaticism of the natives, while setting before them the example of the superior civilization of their new rulers. The natural corollary to nonintervention was "ignoring" (*ignorirovanie*) Muslim institutions. Kaufman was critical of the treatment of religious functionaries by the earliest Russian rulers in Central Asia, who had attempted to organize them into a hierarchy that had, in his opinion, only strengthened their position.²⁰ His own approach was to be different: "Finding that Islam was accustomed to living in the closest association with the state and to using its power for its own purposes, the local administration realized that the best way to fight it [Islam] would be to ignore it completely. In such a situation, the state, by not allowing Islam to unite under its wing, would condemn it to a process of decay."²¹ While the decay took its course, the state was to avoid at all costs inflaming the fanaticism of the local population. This approach laid the foundations for an often paradoxical administrative policy that in its broad outlines was pursued down to the end of the old regime. The policy, with its intended and unintended consequences, was of fundamental importance in the evolution of Central Asian culture during the half-century of tsarist rule.

19. V. P. Nalivkin et al., "Kratkii obzor sovremennogo sostoiianiia i deiatel'nosti musul'manskogo dukhovenstva, raznogo roda dukhovnykh uchrezhdenii i uchebnykh zavedenii tuzemnogo naseleniia Samarkandskoi oblasti s nekotorymi ukazaniiami na ikh istoricheskoe proshloe," in *Materialy po musul'manstvu*, vyp. 1 (Tashkent, 1898), 21.

20. Cherniaev had reappointed the *qazi kalān* and the *shaykh ul-Islām* of the city to their offices: N. P. Ostroumov, "Poslednie po vremeni Sheikhul-Islam i Kazy-Kalian roda Tashkenta, brat'ia Ai-Khodzha i Khakim-Khodzha," *Protokoly zasedanii i soobshcheniia chlenov Turkestanskogo krugzhka liubiteli arkhologii*, 20 (1914-1915): 20, 13.

21. Quoted in Belivskii, *Materialy po Turkestanu* (St. Petersburg, 1884), 59.

17. David B. Edwards, "Mad Mullahs and Englishmen: Discourse in the Colonial Encounter," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31 (1989): 31, 655.

18. Christopher Harrison, *France and Islam in West Africa, 1860-1960* (Cambridge, 1993): 61-64.

19. R. S. O'Fahey and Brend Radtke, "Neo-Sufism Reconsidered," *Der Islam* 70 (1993): 61-64.

No religious dignitaries were to be appointed to positions of authority, as Cherniaev had done in the aftermath of the conquest of Tashkent. Thus the positions of *qāzi kalān* and *shaykh ul-Islām* in Tashkent were abolished. On his travels around Turkestan, Kaufman often pointedly rebuffed religious dignitaries. He also kept Turkestan out of the jurisdiction of the Muslim Spiritual Administration based in Orenburg (a creation of Catherine II, who had sought to provide a bureaucratic structure for Islam to parallel the Holy Synod), since it would have meant providing an organizational structure to local Islam. Isolating Islam in Turkestan was a natural corollary to the policy of disregarding it. Even before Kaufman left St. Petersburg to take up his new appointment, he had written to the Ministry of the Interior asking for an amendment to existing passport regulations that would make it impossible for Turkestanis to obtain foreign passports for hajj without his permission.²² Over the next three years, his chancellery worked out detailed regulations for the granting of passports to his subjects; finding that "while it is not possible to prevent this movement altogether, there is also no need to make it easy and affordable," it sought to make the practice as difficult as possible by setting high fees for applications for hajj passports.²³ In 1876, Kaufman was writing to the Minister of Education D. A. Tolstoi raising his concern about the active trade in printed Qur'ans and other religious books between Kazan and Turkestan. "Finding the dissemination of Muslim teachings by as powerful a weapon as the printed word harmful for Russian interests in Central Asia," Kaufman asked Tolstoi to take measures to limit the entry and distribution of Muslim books in Central Asia.²⁴ The request was impossible to implement, but it showed that even the principles of free trade so dear to Kaufman could readily be sacrificed at the altar of stability.

More significant was Kaufman's decision to make a clear distinction between the sedentary and nomadic populations of the area. The distinction had a long tradition in Russian thinking about Islam. The relative values assigned to nomad and sedentary differed over time. As late as 1864, Gorchakov had presented the nomads as the problem ("half-savage . . . populations, possessing no fixed social organization") and foreseen stable neighborly relations with the "more civilized" seden-

khاناتes. Kaufman reversed the valences. For him, sedentary populations were repositories of the fanaticism so harmful to Russian interests; the nomads, whose "way of life [was] . . . based on natural and all primitive principles," might "officially adhere to Islam [but] in reality shun it and have no specific religious faith."²⁵ The aim of Russian policy ought to be to protect these noble savages from the influence of the fanatical Islam produced in the cities. Kaufman established distinct patterns of administration for each type of population and even hoped to redraw administrative boundaries to perpetuate the "natural demarcation" of the settled from the nomad.²⁶ Although this territorial demarcation never came about, sedentary populations were placed under the jurisdiction of Muslim religious law (shariat), while personal law among the nomads was to be based on custom (*adat*); in both cases, judges (called *qāzis* among the sedentary population and *biy* among the nomads) were to be elected. The distinction between the two, never as clear as Kaufman had assumed, blurred considerably during this period, largely as a direct result of Russian rule over nomadic territory, which rendered it safe for both Tatar and Uzbek ulama to operate on the steppe. By 1917, a new group of Muslim scholars had appeared among the nomadic population as well. Nevertheless, the dichotomy underlay Russian administrative policies until 1917, leading to distinct patterns of political development among the sedentary and nomadic populations in Central Asia.

These initiatives were combined with a number of other precautionary measures. Kaufman forbade all missionary activity by the Orthodox church in his realm, and the ban lasted until 1917. As a result, Turkestan never experienced the politics of conversion and resistance to it that marked the cultural life of the Volga basin and gave Tatar Jadidism its flavor. Kaufman also prohibited Russian settlement outside of towns and postal stations and did not allow Russians to purchase land.²⁷ This prohibition was short-lived, as the Statute of 1886 allowed Christians and local Muslims the right to buy property in Turkestan, and in time large-

25. Quoted in Daniel R. Brower, "Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan," in Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., *The Russian Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917* (Bloomington, 1997), 122.

26. K. P. fon-Kaufman, *Proekt vsepoddannneshogo otcheta General-ad'iutanta K. P. fon-Kaufmana po grazhdanskomu upravleniiu i ustroistvu v oblastiakh Turkestanskogo general-gubernatorstva 7 noiabria 1867-25 marta 1881 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1885), 82. The concern with protecting the nomads from the influence of their sedentary neighbors, both Tatars and "Sarts," is a constant theme in this report (see esp. *ibid.*, 141-149, 440-441).

27. *Ibid.*, 246.

22. Kaufman to A. A. Lobanov-Rostovskii, 22 July 1867, TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 11, d. 1, ll. 1-2.

23. "O poriadke vydachi zagranichnykh pasportov" (February 1870), TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 11, d. 1, ll. 460b-47; the regulations were published in TWG, 15 March 1871.

24. Kaufman to Tolstoi, 6 February 1876, TsGARUz, f. 47, d. 11, ll. 2-3.

scale resettlement of Russian peasants appeared on the government's agenda, but the caution behind it persisted and served to place limits on the scale of Russian immigration.

Yet, Islam did not "decay." Kaufman was wrong, of course, in asserting that "Islam was accustomed to living in the closest association with the state." Kaufman's hope that "Islam" would decay if bereft of state support therefore proved to be unfounded. There were other reasons, too, why the disregard of Islam did not produce the expected results. Noninterference in native life was not incompatible with fundamental change. Over the half century of tsarist rule, Central Asia was framed with new kinds of knowledge, bureaucratic practices, and forms of economic and political power that profoundly reshaped local understandings of Islam and ensured that it did not simply decay the way Kaufman and his successors had hoped.

The confidence that knowledge could subjugate difference led to the production of colonial knowledge that began immediately after the conquest. Alongside the new administration came statistical committees and their publications, which set about bringing order to the land. Numerous expeditions, Russian as well as foreign, visited Central Asia in the 1870s and 1880s to gather geographical and ethnographic information. Central Asia was surveyed and mapped, its natural features and social institutions described, and its inhabitants, their fanaticism notwithstanding, photographed, counted, measured, and classified.²⁸ Soon this attention extended to archeology and history as well. This research was formalized in a number of learned societies that appeared in Tashkent to further the study of the region's history and archeology, all of which enjoyed official support.²⁹ The aim was to make the region more comprehensible by rendering it an object of familiar modes of description and classification, thus facilitating the new rulers' ability to rule.

This impulse toward rigorous ("scientific") description coexisted with a will to exoticize Central Asia, however. When Kaufman first arrived in Tashkent, he was accompanied by Vasilii Vereshchagin, one of Russia's most prominent painters, who specialized in orientalist themes (he was

28. Physical anthropology and craniological research came to Turkestan at this time. See the numerous photographs of nude specimens of the various ethnographic types of the local population in Ch. E. de Ujfalvy de Mezô-Kovszd, *Expédition scientifique française en Russie, en Sibirie et dans le Turkestan*, vol. 4 (Paris, 1879), passim.

29. B. V. Lunin, *Nauchnye obshchestva Turkestana i ikh progressivnaia deiatel'nost': konets XIX—nachalo XX v.* (Tashkent, 1962); Brower, "Ethnicity and Imperial Rule."

a disciple of Jean-Léon Gérôme). During two stays in Turkestan, Vereshchagin painted and sketched numerous scenes of local life that illustrated the fanaticism and barbarity of the newly conquered territory: dervishes with irrationally dilated eyes, battle scenes with pyramids of (Russian) skulls, and slave auctions all served to fix the otherness of Central Asia in the mind of a wide audience that extended well beyond Russia.³⁰ Arijun Appadurai has suggested that enumeration and exoticization were intertwined strands of a single colonial project in nineteenth-century India.³¹ Russian rule over Central Asia was based on similar epistemological processes.

The knowledge created by the new regime was a force in its own right. Statistical committees even counted what was not really amenable to counting; the maktab, as I have argued, was an unstructured site for the interaction of older men and children; the new regime saw them as "native schools" and insisted on collecting statistical data on them. These data are, to be sure, highly unreliable, but the process of counting itself imparted a new meaning to the phenomenon of the maktab. The regime was even more interested in the ethnic classification of the population and over time reified ethnic categories by using them to classify the population. These classifications were to play an important role in native discourses of identity.

But no amount of knowledge could assuage the fear of the natives' fanaticism, which tended to subvert intentions of introducing citizenship to the area. This was reflected in the new administrative structure created in Turkestan. In order to minimize the chance of provoking the "fanaticism" of the local population, the internal administration of the native population was left in the hands of local functionaries. In its broad outlines, the administrative structure that emerged in Turkestan was similar to that of European Russia in the aftermath of Emancipation, where the peasantry was also left to administer itself, but the implementation of this structure in Turkestan owed as much to the fear of fanaticism as to a principled stance on the part of officialdom to establish

30. Vereshchagin's sketches illustrated the two-volume travelogue of Eugene Schuyler (*Turkestan* [New York, 1876]), perhaps the most substantial work on Central Asia to appear in English in the 1870s. Vereshchagin's vision thus became the standard view of Central Asia in Britain and the United States as well. Many of his paintings have been reprinted in E. V. Zavadskaia, *Vasilii Vasilievich Vereshchagin* (Moscow, 1986).

31. Arijun Appadurai, "Number in the Colonial Imagination," in Carol Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, eds., *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament* (Philadelphia, 1993), 315.

empire-wide structures in the newly acquired territory.³² Existing systems of land tenure and revenue collection often continued unaltered during the period of conquest, often for several years, before the new administration could mobilize resources to reorganize them. Once that was done, lower-level administration was organized at the village and volost levels. In areas of settled population, property owners met to elect electors (*piatidesiatniki, ellikbāshī*), who in turn elected village elders (*āqsaqāāl*) officials in charge of overseeing irrigation channels (*ariq āqsaqāāl*), and volost chiefs. In the cities, different wards elected their own āsaqāls. A parallel system of administration was created among the nomadic population, with electors choosing leaders at the aul and volost levels. These officials performed basic functions and assisted the Russian administration in tax assessment. These functionaries were responsible for all matters not having a "political" character, such as revenue collection and the administration of justice.³³ For the same reasons, the local population was not put under the obligation to serve in the military. Although this measure was no doubt popular with the newly conquered population, it also meant that the bifurcation between the two tiers of administration was complete. A few Tatars and Qazaqs served in the military administration, but Turkestani functionaries remained confined to the "native" tier. The Russian administration, which existed only at the uezd and higher levels, had control over the election and functioning of these officials. Oblast governors retained the right to annul the results of any election (the right was frequently exercised). The 1886 Statute retained these elective officials, and they continued to function until 1917. Larger towns were granted organs of elective public economic administration (*khoziaistvennoe obschestvennoe upravlenie*), with the task of overseeing local fiscal affairs and determining taxes, but Kaufman, citing widespread corruption and misuse of power, aborted the experiment in 1877

32. Motivated both by a spirit of paternalist protectionism and the fear of rural radicalism, the state sought to retain the peasant commune in the aftermath of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Volost-level administration was in the hands of elected peasants and volost courts adjudicated according to customary, rather than case, law. The argument can easily be made that the Russian state's relationship to its peasantry was colonial. But many Russian intellectuals sought to overcome their alienation from the peasantry, and in the middle of the nineteenth century was the high point of the romanticization of the peasant as representative of pure Russianness. In Turkestan, on the other hand, the distance from the local population was self-evident to most Russians and tended to affirm their sense of Russianness. In time, many officials came to see in the settlement of the region by Russian peasants the solution to the problem of Turkestan's otherness. Empire could reconcile the state to its peasantry in a way not possible in European Russia itself.

33. Kaufman, *Proekt*, 43.

of a Colonial Society.³⁴ The one who transferred these functions to the uezd administration was Tashkent, where municipal self-government was questioned as early as 1905. Islam was questioned upon Kaufman's early on.

...Tashkent, where municipal Islam was questioned as early as ... Islam was questioned as early as ... upon Kaufman's ...

[illegible]

als provoked considerable debate, to the background of the Great War pushed such matters of "disregarding" Islam was also debated. Similarly, Kaufman's policy of "disregarding" the Andijān uprising did not change in any fundamental way until after the revolution. The longest attack on it came in the aftermath of the Andijān and killed 2,000, when about 2,000 followers of Madali (Dukchi) Ishan, a muf-shaykh, attacked the Russian barracks in Andijān and were dispersed and were injured some 16 to 20. The insurgents, while they slept and injured some 18 of the insurgents armed only with knives and cudgels, soon dispersed and were hunted down. Russian retribution was swift: 18 of the insurgents were exiled to Siberia, and Mingtepe, Madali's settlement, were hanged, 360 were replaced with a Russian settlement was razed to the ground and replaced with a Russian settlement. The attack did not produce any other incidents, but it sent shock waves through Russian society and reaffirmed officialdom since it reaffirmed officialdom.

Ibid 60-66.
Vysochaistiemu po Vysochai-
stiemu po Vysochomni po
892). 453-463.

35. F.K. Girs, *Otchet revizionshchego, i* 1883-84 kraia, proizvedeniia i potrebnaia raznitsa, i ekonom. 19 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1884-85).

krai, Taimogo Sovetnika Gnsa (St. Petersburg) K. K. Fedenko, V.P.

36. K. K. Paley, *Gosmestrom* Central Asia, 97-102; Fozilbek Otabekovich, *Davlatlarning Senatlarini tashkil etish haqida* (Tashkent: G'ofar nashriyoti, 1998), 11-12.

[illegible]

37. The literature on this episode is extensive (see, e.g., 1927); because of the Russian literature on this episode, I have not included it under the Russians, but under the Ukrainians.

Sal'kov, Andzhinskoe vozrozhdeniye (Tashkent, 1992).
 Sobli, Dub-bi Eshon voqeasi (Tashkent, 1992).
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Review 46 (1987): 261-281.

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performed these functions to the uezd administration.³⁴ The one exception was Tashkent, where municipal self-government was organized early on.

Although this policy of "ignoring" Islam was questioned as early as 1886, it remained in force until 1917. Immediately upon Kaufman's departure, an impasse still continuing in the debate over the permanent features of the imperial government instituted an inspection (*reviziia*) of the region to assess the needs of imperial policy there. The inspector F. K. Kaufman argued for radical change in the region's administration. Arguing that the population was peaceful and well inclined to Russian rule, he recommended the abolition of the special features of the Provisional Administration and its replacement by empire-wide structures.³⁵ These recommendations were not taken into account, and when the permanent statute was enacted in 1886, the two-tier administrative structure remained in place. A second inspection in 1908 recommended replacing the 1886 statute with one granting far greater rights to the local population, including the gradual introduction of *zemstvo* self-government.³⁶ The proposals provoked considerable debate, which continued until the outbreak of the Great War pushed such matters to the background.

Similarly, Kaufman's policy of "disregarding" Islam was also debated and not changed in any fundamental way until after the revolution. The longest attack on it came in the aftermath of the Andijān uprising of 1898, when about 2,000 followers of Madali (Dukchi) Ishan, a minor *shaykh*, attacked the Russian barracks in Andijān and killed 22 soldiers while they slept and injured some 16 to 20. The insurgents, who were armed only with knives and cudgels, soon dispersed and were eventually hunted down. Russian retribution was swift: 18 of the insurgents were hanged, 360 were exiled to Siberia, and Mingtepe, Madali's village, was razed to the ground and replaced with a Russian settlement.³⁷ The attack did not produce any other incidents, but it sent shock waves through Russian society and officialdom since it reaffirmed official fears

34. Ibid., 60–66.

35. F. K. Girs, *Otchet revizitskogo, po Vysokhaishemu poveleniiu, Turkestanskii krai, Tainogo Sovetnika Girs* (St. Petersburg, 1883), 453–463.

36. K. K. Palen, *Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia, proizvedennoi po Vysokhaishemu poveleniiu Senatormi Gofmeisterom Grafom K. K. Palenim*, 19 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1910–1911); see also Pierce, *Russian Central Asia*, 87–91.

37. The literature on this episode is considerable; for a variety of viewpoints, see, V. P. Salikov, *Andichanskoe vozstanie v 1898 g.: sbornik statei* (Kazan, 1901); Fozilbek Otakovich, *Dukchi Eshon uvoqasi* (Tashkent, 1992 [orig. 1927]); Beatrice Forbes Maniz, "Central Asian Uprisings in the Nineteenth Century: Ferghana under the Russians," *Russian Review* 46 (1987): 261–281.

about the thinness of Russian rule in Turkestan. In a memorandum to the tsar, the governor-general, S. M. Dukhovskoi, saw in the uprising the failure of all policies of the Russian state toward its Muslim subjects. He attacked the policies not just of Kaufman but of Catherine II, who had created the Spiritual Administration for Muslim Affairs in Ufa and encouraged the Islamization of the Qazaq steppe. Rather, "Islam, . . . a teaching extremely inert and undoubtedly inimical to Christian culture, excludes all possibility of a complete moral assimilation of our present Muslim subjects with us. A pure Muslim, strongly believing in the letter of the Qur'an and the shariat, cannot be a sincere and trusted friend of a Christian."³⁸ With this much Kaufman could have agreed; Dukhovskoi, however, drew other conclusions. A rapprochement between Muslims and the "Russian people" was possible only once the Muslim faith weakened, and that did not appear likely to Dukhovskoi. "Islam is so strong in the imaginations of the dark and passionate Asiatics that it would be useless to expect a rapid decline [in its influence]."³⁹ It was therefore no longer possible to continue disregarding Islam; rather active measures were necessary to control it, such as the abolition of the Spiritual Administration at Ufa, close supervision over all Muslim institutions, and the creation of a special censor for Muslim publications. In addition, Dukhovskoi suggested using modern medicine as a vanguard for breaking down the fanaticism of the Muslim, especially of women, as well as encouraging mixed marriages between Russians and Muslims (or, since the Church would not recognize such marriages, simplifying procedures for the adoption of children born of such cohabitation).⁴⁰ If the dark and passionate Asiatic fanaticism of the local population could be thinned by Russian blood, then it was to be coopted into the service of the state.

On the whole, Dukhovskoi's dark warnings met only a lukewarm reception in St. Petersburg and did not result in any significant change in policy. In the end, "nonintervention" proved durable because it was rooted not so much in the whims of a governor-general but in a very real shortage of resources, both human and financial, which placed strict limits on the Russians' ability to effect substantial change. Turkestan was vastly undergoverned even by Russian standards. Central Asia was

38. S. M. Dukhovskoi, *Vsepoddanneishii doklad Turkestanskogo General-Gubernatora Generala ot Infanterii Dukhovskogo: Islam v Turkestane* (Tashkent, 1899), 13.

39. *Ibid.*, 14.

40. *Ibid.*, 18.

conquered at a time when the Russian government was deep in debt after the Crimean War and the Great Reforms and every expenditure was closely scrutinized. Once the conquest had been accomplished, the central government continued to be extremely tight-fisted with funds for the new region. Thus, at the time of its creation in 1867, the Syr Darya oblast was staffed with only nineteen career (*shiatnye*) officials with a budget of only 48,500 rubles.⁴¹ At that time, the Ministry of State Control refused to release funds to provide housing for the new administrators, and even the premises for the governor-general's chancellery were built from local taxes.⁴² Simultaneously, down to the end of the old regime, there was a remarkable shortage of capable men to administer the region. As a governor-general pointed out in his report to the tsar in 1897, Turkestan suffered in comparison even with other borderlands administered by the Ministry of War. Samarqand oblast, for example, with a population a little smaller than that of Terek province in the Caucasus, had only half as many permanent staff and no chancellery. The uezd administration lagged behind even more; Samarqand's was run by a mere seventeen officials, compared with fifty-two in Tiflis and forty-four in Brevan, both of which had far smaller populations.⁴³ The 1908 senatorial inspection voiced the same complaints. Ferghana oblast, with a population of two million, was administered by only forty-three career bureaucrats, including two translators. Of these, only nine had a higher education, all in technical fields.⁴⁴ And with the exception of the few capable orientalists among them, Russian administrators had no acquaintance with local languages. The question of providing courses for administrators in local languages was raised at the official level after the turn of the century, but nothing tangible came of it.⁴⁵

THE END OF ISOLATION

Administrative policies might profess to minimize interference, but they could not keep at bay the profound economic transformation of the region as a result of its incorporation into the Russian empire.⁴⁶ Central

41. Belavskii, *Materialy*, 37.

42. Kaufman, *Proekt*, 92.

43. "Vsepoddanneishii doklad Turkestanskogo General-Gubernatora za 1895-97 gg.," TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 31, d. 53a, ll. 100b-11.

44. Palen, *Otchet*, XIV: 47.

45. Lunin, *Nauchnye obshchestva*, 22.

46. What little economic history of Central Asia has been written in the West deals with the Soviet period. Much, of course, has been published on the imperial period in

Asia's isolation was quickly breached. The telegraph arrived in Tashkent in June 1873, and the first bank opened in May 1875.⁴⁷ After a slow beginning, the region was also linked to Russia by railway. Purely strategic reasons (the conquest of the Türkmen steppe) motivated the construction of the Transcaspian Railway, the first railway project in the area. It reached Samarkand from the Caspian only in 1888, and Tashkent and the Ferghana valley were connected only a decade later. The Orenburg-Tashkent line, providing a much more direct link with European Russia, was built between 1900 and 1906. Until then, travel to European Russia from Tashkent entailed a journey through the Türkmen desert to Krasnovodsk on the Caspian, a steamer ride to Baku or Astrakhan, and further train or steamer connections onward. Even so, the new technology represented an immense saving of time and money over previous forms of transport. Not only did it effectively tie Turkestan to Russia, it also altered patterns of overland trade with neighboring countries. The conquest had already subjected the trade with India to Russian tariffs (and the customs boundary was extended to include Bukhara as well in 1885); the introduction of railways and steamships proved to be the last nail in the coffin of the caravan trade, for it became much cheaper and faster to send goods to India via Odessa and Bombay than overland across Afghanistan.

The conquest also led to the triumph of a cash economy in Central Asia. The Statute of 1886 recognized the right to possession of land by those who cultivated it. In sedentary areas, this effectively created private ownership of land in the hands of a class of smallholders. In nomadic areas, the state claimed ownership of the land since it was not cultivated. Long-distance trade was replaced by far more intensive exchange with Russia, which eventually led to the demise of local crafts production and its replacement by industrial goods from European Russia. The key role in this transformation was played by cotton. Cash crop production brought the cash economy to the countryside, created a greater economic surplus than ever before, and caused the emergence of a pros-

Russian, however, with the exception of a few monographs published in the 1920s, this literature suffers from the necessity to reconcile the Central Asian experience with official interpretations of Marxism. An example of the earlier work is P. G. Galuzo, *Turkestan-koloniia* (Moscow, 1929). Many of the orthodoxies of the last three decades of the Soviet period may be found in A. M. Aminov, *Ekonomicheskoe razvitiie Srednei Azii (kolonial'nyi period)* (Tashkent, 1959).

47. TWG, 28 June 1873; 3 June 1875.

TABLE 2 YIELDS OF AREAS SOWN WITH COTTON, BY OBLAST (IN DESIATINAS)

Year	Ferghana	Syr Darya	Samarkand	Total
1888	34,669	25,841	7,980	68,490
1893	85,300	31,500	21,488	138,288
1898	106,230	14,716	17,132	138,078
1903	149,056	11,019	9,812	169,887
1908	190,884	28,007	21,683	240,574
1913	274,897	76,726	31,758	383,373
1916	348,459	64,535	60,305	473,299

SOURCE: A. P. Demidov, *Ekonomicheskii ocherk khlopkovodstva, khlopkotorgovli i khlopkovoi promyshlennosti Turkestana* (Moscow, 1922), 36.

perous city-based class of merchants and middlemen that did more to alter the social terrain in Central Asia than any conscious government policy. Cotton had long been grown in Central Asia and exported to Russia, but its production took a quantum leap in the 1880s with the introduction of long-fiber American cotton into the region. A rapidly developing textile industry in Russia and Poland provided an almost insatiable market that had hitherto been completely dependent on imported cotton. Kaufman early on encouraged the adoption of long-fiber cotton by local cultivators. An experimental farm was established on the outskirts of Tashkent in 1878; three years later, it was providing seed and information gratis to interested peasants.⁴⁸ In 1884, a certain A. Wilkins planted 300 desiatinas (800 acres) with Sea Island and Upland cotton in the Tashkent area on an experimental basis. The Upland variety succeeded beyond all expectation.⁴⁹ Table 2 shows the growth of cotton production in Turkestan in the ensuing three decades. It was accompanied by shifts in patterns of land use, especially in Ferghana oblast, where cotton accounted for 44 percent of cultivated land.⁵⁰ The foundations for Soviet Central Asia's economic catastrophe were already in place.

48. TWG, 18 June 1881, 3-4.

49. A. P. Demidov, *Ekonomicheskii ocherk khlopkovodstva, khlopkotorgovli i khlopkovoi promyshlennosti Turkestana* (Moscow, 1922), 35-36.

50. *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Uzbekistana nakanune oktiabria* (Tashkent, 1973), 30. The table refers only to the three core oblasts of Turkestan. An additional 60,362 desiatinas were sown with cotton in 1916 in Semirech'e and Transcaspia. Cotton cultivation was also widespread in the protectorates, where in 1915, the area under cotton amounted to 146,000 desiatinas (*ibid.*, 29).

the Turkestan authorities about the political consequences of concessions sought by the Moscow financiers.⁵⁶

At the same time, with the imperial government beginning to sponsor resettlement of Russian peasants in the borderlands in the 1890s, Turkestan was cautiously opened to peasant settlement, directed mainly to the nomadic areas of Semirech'e and Syr Darya oblasts, where the state claimed ownership of land not cultivated by the nomads. Settlement was seen by many as an instrument of control and economic exploitation of the new territory; perhaps the most vocal proponent of this view was Minister of Agriculture A. V. Krivoshein, who in 1909 offered the simple formula of "cotton + settlement + irrigation = a new Turkestan" as a means of knitting the region more tightly to the empire. His view was not overwhelmingly popular in the bureaucracy, however, as many worried that unbridled resettlement would lead to mounting disaffection and the emergence of a political issue, as was happening in the neighboring Steppe region, where the "land question" had become a major spur to Qazaq nationalism.⁵⁷ The volume of rural settlement remained small, and as of 1 January 1910, there were 382,688 Russians living in Turkestan, comprising 5.9 percent of the population. (The figure was only 153,651 [3.2 percent] for the three core oblasts.)⁵⁸

Almost all of the cotton produced in Central Asia was exported to the textile centers of inner Russia and Poland. Since production was dispersed among numerous smallholders, the task of procuring the harvest, and of advancing loans for the next one, fell to local middlemen, who made hefty profits. This group, which came to be known as the *chistach* (a corruption of the Russian word *chistit'*, to clean, since most of them were agents for cotton-cleaning firms), arose from among the local merchantry or usurers but in time diversified their operations.⁵⁹ From its ranks emerged a fledgling modern merchant class in Turkestan. Also, land alienated from smallholders tended to concentrate in the hands of wealthier landholders, many of whom belonged to the urban merchantry. Central Asia experienced an unprecedented expansion of its economy, especially in the cities, whose populations swelled. The largest growth

56. Muriel Joffe, "Autocracy, Capitalism and Empire: The Politics of Irrigation," *Russian Review* 54 (1995): 387.

57. In 1909, for instance, the governor-general, P. I. Mishchenko, in a memorandum to the minister of war, warned of the potential of any "artificial growth" of resettlement to lead to antigovernment sentiments; TsGARUz, f. 2, op. 2, d. 369, ll. 110b-12.

58. The figures are from V. I. Masal'skii, *Turkестanskii kraj* (St. Petersburg, 1913), 362-59. Iuldashev, *Agrarnye otnosheniia*, 104.

By the turn of the century, Turkestan had acquired a new significance to the Russian economy. The tsarist government supported cotton production in Turkestan, which it saw as a way of achieving freedom for the textile industry of European Russia from cotton imports from the United States and India. In the oft-quoted words of the minister of agriculture in 1912, "Every extra *pud* of Turkestani wheat [provides] competition for Russian and Siberian wheat; every extra *pud* of Turkestani cotton [prevents] competition to American cotton. Therefore, it is better to give the region imported, even though expensive, bread, [and thus] to free irrigated land in the region for cotton."⁵¹ But since the government's interests lay primarily in encouraging the textile industry of European Russia, and not the economic development of Turkestan, it limited its encouragement to imposing high tariffs on imported cotton (by 1900, the import duty on cotton was four rubles per *pud*). Little was done to improve matters locally by funding improvements in irrigation and transportation or credit to small farmers.⁵² Yet, cotton reconfigured the social order in Central Asia. It required intensive amounts of labor (which altered work patterns in the countryside) as well as cash (to buy seed, pay for transport, and buy food during the growing season), which was available to few peasants. Cotton-buying firms were only too willing to advance large sums of money against the harvest, often at exorbitant rates, thus tying the peasantry into a never-ending cycle of debt.⁵³ This dislocation was cause for some concern among local administrators, since it threatened to provide fertile grounds for disaffection that could lead to an explosion of "fanaticism." The state's interest in maintaining the region's stability could act as a damper on Russia's economic exploitation of the region. From the beginning, governors-general had enacted paternalistic legislation to protect Central Asians from outsiders. They had waged a constant struggle with usurers (mostly Indian), placing limits on what they could claim in return for defaulted loans.⁵⁴ Similarly, a 1902 decree forbade the seizure of plots of under one desiatina for debt.⁵⁵ In the 1910s, an ambitious project for financing a large-scale irrigation works at the Moscow Stock Exchange came to naught in part because of concerns among

51. A. V. Krivoshein, *Zapiska glavnotpravliaushchego zemledeliem i zemleustroistvom o poezdke v Turkéstanskii kraj v 1912 godu* (St. Petersburg, 1912), 7.

52. Demidov, *Ekonomicheskii ocherk*, 86.

53. *Ibid.*, 123ff.

54. TWG, 19 December 1877.

55. A. Iuldashev, *Agrarnye otnosheniia v Turkéstane (konets XIX-nachalo XX vv.)* (Tashkent, 1969), 175-176.

was in Tashkent, which grew from around 76,000 in 1870 to 234,289 in 1911. In the same year, Kokand, at the center of the cotton boom, had a population of 113,636 and Samarqand 89,693.⁶⁰

A NEW SOCIAL MAP

Local society underwent a major realignment in the first decade of Russian rule. In Bukhara and Khiva, Russian support strengthened the rulers against chiefs and governors, allowing a greater degree of centralization than the rulers had been able to achieve themselves. Yet, since this centralization was not entrenched in any new formal institutions of administration, the protectorates did not see the emergence of functionaries in the manner of Turkestan. The ulama, too, enjoyed less autonomy in their affairs, even though their jurisdiction was wider in the protectorates than in Russian territory. The amir also managed to turn the ulama, who had proved so troublesome in 1866 and 1868, into a state-supported estate, providing numerous sinecures and establishing a hierarchy that had never existed before.⁶¹ But the new wealth also affected the protectorates, which were fully absorbed into the Russian economy after 1885. The amir of Bukhara, one of the world's largest traders in astrakhan, acquired a vast personal fortune; others too, native Bukharans as well as Russian subjects from Turkestan and many Tatars, amassed great wealth from this trade.

Change took a rather different direction in Turkestan. In the sedentary areas, the most profound upheaval was the almost total disappearance of the warrior elites. The colonial nature of the conquest of Turkestan, as well as its suddenness, left little room (or need) for the cooptation of native elites, as had been the case in other Muslim areas of the empire, such as the Crimea and the Qazaq steppe. A few scions of ruling families received titles and admission into the Russian armed forces, but their numbers remained small.⁶² Warlords who fought against the Russians met varying fates. Many were pensioned off, others were exiled to provincial towns in European Russia, while some escaped to Afghanistan to live out their days. The Statute of 1886, which granted de facto property rights in land to those who cultivated it, struck a direct blow at the eco-

60. *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1914), 352-353.
61. Sadriddin Aini, *Istoriia Mangytskikh emirov* (1921-23), in *Sobranie sochinenii*, 6 vols. (Moscow, 1971-75), VI: 293-294.
62. A. Z. V. Togan, *Bugünkü Türkleri (Türkistan) ve Yakın Tarihi*, 3rd ed. (Istanbul, 1981), 272.

economic power of the tribal chiefs, and the introduction of elections for administrative positions undermined their political power.

The disappearance of the tribal chiefs was accompanied by a realignment of existing groups and the emergence of new ones. Proximity to the Russians and a knowledge of their language came to be a new source of notability. Anxious to create a group in local society loyal to them, the Russians created a new group of "honorable" (*pochetnyye*) citizens from among those who had welcomed the conquest. Many of the wealthiest merchants of Tashkent, for instance, had even maintained contact with Russians as early as the 1850s, and had even been finally taken in 1865, the Russians in Orenburg. When Tashkent was finally footing in an the Russians provided the conquerors with their initial footing in an these merchants provided the conquerors with their initial footing in an unknown and hostile environment. On 17 July 1865, Cherniaev decorated thirty-one men for "assiduous service and attachment to the Russian government . . . [and] for services rendered during the conquest of Tashkent."⁶³ This laid the foundations for a new elite of notables who served as intermediaries between the colonial regime and local society. Immediately after Tashkent was taken, the conquerors were lionized by two of the wealthiest merchants in the city, Said Azim-bay and Sharaf-bay Zaynulabidin, the latter a Tatar who had lived in Tashkent for a long time.⁶⁴ Between them, they owned the two largest caravansaries in the city and maintained extensive trading interests in Russia.⁶⁵ Both were well rewarded: Said Azim-bay received the rank of "hereditary honorable citizen" from the emperor himself in St. Petersburg, and Sharaf-bay was appointed chair of the first Public Economic Administration of the old city.⁶⁶ Other such appointments followed in Tashkent and in every other city conquered by Russian forces. Said Azim-bay's family remained prominent in local affairs until 1917: Two of his sons, Said Karim-bay and Said Ghani-bay, were elected to the Tashkent City Duma, and a son-in-law won election to the Second Duma in 1906 (although he refused to serve). The family's house acquired a permanent place on official itineraries in the old city, and as late as 1906 the newly appointed governor general stopped by the house for tea as part of his initial tour of Tashkent.⁶⁷ Said Ghani's millions ensured his appointment in 1908 as the

63. F. Azadaev, *Tashkent to vtoroi polovine XIX v.* (Tashkent, 1959), 72-75.
64. P. I. Pashino, *Turkестanskii kraj v 1866 godu. Putevye zametki* (St. Petersburg, 1868), 96, 104, 106, 119.
65. *Ibid.*, 154n.
66. N. P. Ostroumov, *Sarty* (Tashkent, 1908), 98-99; Azadaev, *Tashkent*, 2-4, 104.
67. *Tarraqi—Orta Azyaniing umr gúzarligi*, 3 February 1906.

official guide in charge of supervising the arrangements for the hajj for Muslims of all Russia.⁶⁸ With time, the ranks of these honorable citizens swelled to include local merchants as well as some ulama and other functionaries. Honorable citizens received medals and ceremonial robes, were invited to official functions, and acquired numerous formal and informal privileges. The new economy also produced its own heroes. By the turn of the century, a number of wealthy merchants (*bāys*, *aghniyā*) had emerged as prominent social figures. Some of them were decorated by the authorities, while others enjoyed the fruits of the stability provided by Russian rule, the monetized economy, and freedom from competition with military or khanly elites, as had been the case before the conquest.

Kaufman's policies also ensured that the ulama survived the conquest well. The impulse to nonintervention left the madrasas largely intact. The Provisional Statute of 1867 did not alter the status of waqf property, and although the 1886 statute sought to regulate such property more closely, the concept as such was never abolished. Similarly, the state retained Muslim courts, which, although placed under bureaucratic supervision, continued to function as before and to be staffed by the ulama themselves. Kaufman's hope that the removal of state support would lead to a sharp decline in the authority of the ulama proved misguided, partly because the qāzis were more closely tied to the state now than before. Indeed, given the decline in the fortunes of the old warrior elites, the relative position of the ulama increased in Turkestan. Similarly, judicial affairs remained largely in Muslim hands. Among the settled population, every volost and city ward elected, indirectly through *ellikbāshis*, a qāzi. Anyone over the age of twenty-five without a criminal record could aspire to this office. The jurisdiction of the qāzis was strictly defined by law, although Russian administrators had few means of ensuring strict compliance. Qāzis could sentence people to arrest for up to eighteen months or a fine of up to 300 rubles.⁶⁹ They were not competent to hear cases involving documents written in Russian or cases involving non-Muslims. Their decisions were subject to review by Russian circuit courts. Qāzis did not receive a fixed salary but were allowed to charge fees for each case heard or each document signed.⁷⁰ Apart from avoiding active interference in the religious life of the local population, these

68. *Odesskii listok* (Odessa), 19 July 1908.

69. *Polozhenie ob upravlenii Turkestanskogo kraia* (St. Petersburg, 1886), § 217.

70. On Muslim courts, see F. Bakirov, *Chor Turkistonda sud, shariat va odat* (Tashkent, 1967); N. Lykoshin, *Pol zhizni v Turkestane* (Petrograd, 1916), 52–96.

stitutions were a means of cutting costs. By making the seeker of justice responsible for its cost, the Russian authorities removed a substantial source of expenditure from the colonial budget. Moreover, these institutions were meant to destroy the authority of traditional Islamic institutions among the settled population and of tribal and clan structures among the nomads, a task deemed necessary for turning natives into citizens of the empire.⁷¹

The application of the electoral principle to qāzis had been aimed at diminishing the moral authority of the office in the eyes of the population. (The 1886 Statute further eroded the moral authority inherent in the office by turning qāzis into "popular justices.") This was only partly successful, for although the qāzi's became an elected office, the population in the settled areas of Turkestan continued to recognize the cultural capital of the ulama. Many men who had been qāzis in the last years of Muslim rule returned to office through election. Muhiddin Hakimkhoja-oghli, for instance, the son of the last *qāzi kalān* of Tashkent, was elected qāzi of the Sibzār part of Tashkent and continued to be reelected until 1902.⁷² Of the 253 qāzis serving in the three core oblasts of Turkestan on 1 June 1883, 225 had the usual madrasa credentials.⁷³ There was also a marked reluctance on the part of the population, especially in the early years of Russian rule, to have recourse to Russian justice. In the three years 1880–1882, there were only three instances of natives turning to a Russian court when such recourse was not obligatory.⁷⁴ After 1886, when qāzis became "popular justices" overnight, a struggle ensued about the meaning of their office. The state tried to coopt them as its agents and provided them with new seals, made of steel, and inscribed in Russian with the name of the office. Qāzis had traditionally been appointed because of their personal merits, and the silver seals they had used indicated only the name of the individual. Many qāzis resisted the new reg-

71. Among the nomads, volost boundaries were drawn on a strictly territorial basis, without regard to tribal and clan affiliations of the population. This was intended to loosen tribal affiliations, but some observers saw it as only fueling further intrigue, as members of various tribes sought to elect their tribesmen to office: Lu. Iuzhakov, "Izugi 27-letnego upravleniia nashnego Turkestanskim kraem," *Russkii vestnik*, 1891, no. 7, 70–73; A. A. Divaev, "Atkamnary (stranitsa iz zhizni Kirgiz)," *Sbornik materialov dlia statistiki Syr-Dar'inskoi oblasti*, 3 (1894): 3–17.

72. V. V. Bartol'd, *Istoriia kul'turnoi zhizni Turkestana* (1927), in his *Sochineniia*, Dar'inskoi oblasti, 3 (1894): 359–360. Reelection of incumbents seems to have been routine; in 1880, five of the eight functionaries (four qāzis and four āqsāqāls) up for election retained their offices; TWG, 29 August 1880.

73. Girs, *Otchet*, 326.

74. *Ibid.*, 327.

ulation under various pretexts, and some used both seals for a period. According to the reminiscences of a zealous functionary, this practice ended only when he personally broke the old seals with a hatchet.⁷⁵

The story reveals much more than native obstreperousness or Russian bureaucratic zeal: The meaning of the institution was in flux. The struggle was over whether the qāzis were to operate as agents of the colonial state or as members of a traditional Islamic elite. The Russians also sought to bring order to what seemed to them the chaos of traditional Islamic law. As I argued in Chapter 1, shariat is best understood as interpretive practice in which the possession of knowledge of appropriate texts gave the jurist license to issue his opinions. Abstracted from this discursive context, the manuals of fiqh were rendered incomprehensible and chaotic. The Russians brought a different understanding of law, as a code, accessible to all and universally applicable. The shariat itself was often (mis)taken as such a code; Dukhovskoi, for instance, could state simply that the "shariat . . . a multivolume commentary on the Qur'an [is] considered by Muslims to be a universal codex, in which believers find answers to all questions, without any exceptions, of religious, state, public, and personal life."⁷⁶ Dissatisfied therefore with the practice of qāzis, who cited no precedents and followed no particular procedure, officialdom set out to refashion the shariat as a civil code. The British invention of "Anglo-Mohammedan" law in India, a formalized code of personal law based on shariat precepts and Anglo-Saxon procedure, provided the inspiration. Already in 1893, B. D. Grodekoy had translated the *Hidāya* (an eleventh-century manual of fiqh by 'Alī b. Abī Bakr al-Marghināni used as the basic code for "Anglo-Mohammedan" jurisprudence) from the English, and other attempts at the creation of what Brinkley Messick has aptly called "colonial shariat" continued down to the end of the old regime.⁷⁷ Yet, characteristically, little came of the effort, and the tension between the various conceptions of the status of Muslim law and qāzis was never fully resolved. The ulama, however, came to be seen as keepers of the Muslim tradition, the last bastions of Islam. With political power gone and compromises required in navigating the new

75. Lykoshin, *Pol zhizni*, 70–71.

76. Dukhovskoi, *Vsepoddannishchei doklad*, 5.

77. Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society* (Berkeley, 1993), 58–66; on attempts to create "colonial shariat" in Turkestan, see Bartol'd, *Istoriia kul'turnoi zhizni*, 386–388; N. A. Smirnov, *Ocherki istorii izucheniia Islama v SSSR* (Moscow, 1954), 76.

social and economic order, traditional practices came to be valorized as the sources of Muslim identity.

Local notables operated inside a precarious matrix of loyalty and suspicion. Kaufman was fond of majestic displays of his power, for he believed in behaving like an "oriental" monarch in the Orient. On his travels around the region, and especially on his return from military campaigns, he preferred to be welcomed by local notables with suitable imperial pomp. When Kaufman returned from a trip to St. Petersburg in 1873,

officials, as well as Russian and Muslim merchants of Tashkent met Kaufman three chaqirim outside the city. They welcomed him with a laden table. . . . The Governor General stopped and gave those present the Emperor's greetings to the inhabitants of the region. Later, he mounted his carriage and entered the city, where he reviewed the soldiers who stood, row upon row, from the head of the street to his mansion. At his mansion also, he conveyed the greetings of the Emperor to the officials who had gathered there [to greet him]. Upon hearing this, the men were very pleased and returned home with joy. . . . Later, after nightfall, all streets and houses were illuminated in order to celebrate the return of the esteemed Governor General.⁷⁸

The notables played their part, as they did in presenting addresses and petitions to the new rulers. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877, notables from Aq Masjid presented Kaufman with assurances of loyalty and 10,000 rubles for wounded soldiers collected from the nomadic population of the uezd.⁷⁹ Others sent their sons to Russian schools and built European-style houses in the Russian parts of town. Yet, nothing could dislodge suspicion of even the most loyal notables from the minds of Russian officialdom. For all the prominence Said Azim-bāy acquired, Kaufman felt it "necessary to deal with Said Azim-bāy very cautiously, because he wants to boss everyone and everything."⁸⁰ We have seen that the fear that local notables and functionaries would place their interests before those of the state ("corruption," "misuse of power") led to the demise of organs of municipal self-government in the 1870s. In 1906, the veteran administrator V. P. Nalivkin rued the fact that the Russians had from the beginning enclosed themselves in a "living wall" of op-

78. TWG, 28 February 1873; see also Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I: 81–82.

79. TWG, 29 April 1878.

80. Quoted in N. P. Ostroumova, *Konstantin Petrovich fon-Kaufman, ustroitel' Turkestanskogo kraia. Lichnye vospominaniia N. Ostroumova* (Tashkent, 1899), 321.

portunists and ill-wishers.⁸¹ Other administrators, realizing their dependence on these intermediaries, but helpless to do anything, fretted over their evil designs. Many in Tashkent suspected that Russian policy in Bukhara was hostage to the machinations of a small group of translators who had "taken over" the political agency in Kāgān.⁸² As fears of pan-Islam gathered strength after the turn of the century, honorable status proved no protection against arbitrary searches. Said Karim's house was searched in 1914 because of numerous suspicions harbored against him by the police (ranging from conspiracy to take over the publishing trade in Tashkent to collecting money on behalf of the Ottoman war effort).⁸³ Yet, such searches, while a reminder of the precariousness of their position, did not undermine the notables' prominence in Muslim society.

The Russian presence, for all its professions of noninterference, had created new sources of notability and thus redefined the politics of status and prestige in local society. The new rulers' dependence on the decorated notables and the translators gave them a degree of informal influence in local society. Muslim functionaries in the new apparatus similarly appeared as intermediaries between the local population and the Russian state, as well as figures of authority. The ulama retained their source of moral and cultural authority and became the sole bulwarks of moral authority; indeed, the elimination of tribal chiefs, who had often competed with the ulama, gave the latter a stature in society that was in many ways unprecedented. These new elites reached their compromises with the new order, which in turn defined the positions they came to occupy in the new politics of culture in Turkestan.

RUSSIANS AND NATIVES

But Muslim society was no longer autonomous; it was set against a new settler society that took root as a direct result of the Russian conquest. The earliest Russians to arrive were members of the conquering armies. They were followed by civilian functionaries and, in time, by traders, workers, and divers adventurers, so that quite soon a settler Russian society, complete with its own schools, churches, newspapers, and markets, appeared in Turkestan. Given the cautious approach to peasant re-

81. V.P. Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy ran'she i teper'* (Tashkent, 1913), 72-73, passim; see also Togan, *Türkili*, 274.

82. See, for instance, the report of a police agent sent from Tashkent to Bukhara on a secret mission in April 1910, in GARF, f. 102, op. 240 (1910), d. 277, l. 23.

83. "Spravka" (21 May 1915), TsGARUz, f. 461, op. 1, d. 2263, l. 166b.

settlement in Turkestan, the majority of its Russian population was connected with administration and trade. The emergence of Russian society also transformed the urban landscape. The Russians built their own quarters, which were self-consciously designed as advertisements for the superiority of the conquering civilization, adjacent to native cities. In common with urban development in other European colonies, these streets were laid out according to a regular plan, their straight, wide streets contrasting to the labyrinthine neighborhoods of the traditional cities. Imperial architecture and the presence of churches further defined these quarters as different, and disproportionate expenditure and allocations ensured the maintenance of this order. Such "new cities" arose next to all major cities in Turkestan (in Bukhara, they developed along the Transcaspiian Railway), while in nomadic territory, urban life emerged for the first time during this period. Vernyi (present-day Almaty), Pishpek (Bishkek), and Ashgabat (Ashgabat) were all established as Russian settlements in this period and remained predominantly Russian. Although common in the colonial world, this pattern of urbanism was unique in the Russian empire. Similarly, in common with other settler societies, there were marked differences in wages between settler and native populations. As an American traveler observed in 1910, "Wages of Europeans are very high. A Russian labourer or servant expects twice or three times as much as he gets at home, but the wages of natives are low, 25 and 30 cents a day being the maximum."⁸⁴ This combination of cheap native labor and high salaries for settlers meant that even the poorest sections of the Russian population enjoyed a standard of living considerably higher than the majority of the native population.

All this served to underscore Turkestan's uniqueness in the empire. Unlike other Muslim areas of the Russian empire, Turkestan was a relatively densely populated region with practically no Russian settlement in the beginning. It differed dramatically in that respect from the Volga region and the Crimea, which were also inhabited by Muslims but where the demographic balance was quite different and Russian rule much better entrenched. It also meant that the relationship between the rulers and the ruled was different—and more distant—than elsewhere in the Russian empire. The nomenclature adopted for classifying the local population gives some indication of this difference. Most non-Russian groups inhabiting the Russian empire were designated *inorodtsy* (a term best translated by the French *allogènes*). Although the term had a consider-

84. William Eleroy Curtis, *Turkestan: "The Heart of Asia"* (London, 1911), 289.

able semantic range, it connoted inhabitants of the Russian state who were somehow alien.⁸⁵ For legal purposes, the population of Central Asia was classified as *inorodtsy*, but the term was never used in Central Asia itself, where the term *tuzemtsy*, directly translatable as "native," with all its connotations, held currency. Unlike *inorodtsy*, the term *tuzemtsy* asserted the connection of the given population to the land; conversely, the term also affirmed the foreignness of the Russians in the region in a manner that was inconceivable in other parts of the empire.⁸⁶ Moreover, in Turkestan, the otherness of the local population acquired a social as well as a political or ethnic connotation, for the native population fit the state's system of classifications only awkwardly. Table 3, which classifies the local population by social categories, shows the ambivalence inherent in the state's classifications of its newest subjects. While entry into various estates was open to the native population of Turkestan, natives remained simply natives unless marked by some form of social mobility. As the figures for Tatars show, this was not the fate of all *inorodtsy* in the empire.⁸⁷ Yet the lines between European and native were not entirely rigid. The new Russian cities were never segregated. The vast majority of the European population lived in those quarters, but a substantial proportion of their population was invariably of local origin. "Russian" Tashkent grew rapidly after its establishment in 1866. It had a population of 2,073 in 1870, 4,926 in 1877, 33,276 in 1901, and well over 56,000 in 1911.⁸⁸

85. The concept behind this term has attracted little attention. Its legal and popular meanings differed considerably, and even the former did not remain constant over the last century of the old regime; see the succinct overview in Henning Bauer et al., *Die Nationalitäten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1991), I: 416-419; see also L. Shternberg, "Inorodtsy: obshchii obzor," in A. I. Kastelianskii, ed., *Formy natsional'nogo dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh* (St. Petersburg, 1910), 531-534.

86. In actual bureaucratic practice, *tuzemtsy* and *inorodtsy* could be used as mutually exclusive categories. In 1906, the special regulations governing the election of candidates from Turkestan to the State Duma divided the electorate into "native" (*tuzemnoe*) and "non-native" (*netuzemnoe*) groups, thus classifying the nonnative *inorodtsy* with the Russians; see "Polozheniie o vyborakh v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu," *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, 3rd ser., vol. 25 (St. Petersburg, 1907), no. 26662, § 1, *prilozheniie*. The confusion resulting from attempts to implement this distinction is recorded in TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 17, d. 616, l. 134.

87. As a recent statistical analysis of the 1897 census has shown, Kalmyks and the "small peoples" of Siberia were the only other groups in the empire among whom large parts of the population remained simply *inorodtsy*; see Bauer et al., *Die Nationalitäten des Russischen Reiches*, II: 197.

88. N. A. Maev, "Topograficheskii ocherk Turkestanskogo kraia," *Materialy dlia statistiki Turkestanskogo kraia*, 1 (1872): 10-11; Azadiev, *Tashkent*, 134; A. I. Dmitriev-Mamonov, ed., *Putevoditel' po Turkestanu i sredne-aziatskoi zheleznoi doroge* (St. Petersburg, 1903), 352; *Istoriia Tashkenta* (Tashkent, 1988), 145.

THREE CORE OBLAGS, 1897)

	Tajik	Sart	Ozbek	Turk	Kirgiz	Tatar
entry	5	1	1	32	14	85
personal nobles	10	1	5	15	44	22
honorary citizens	1	3	0	38	5	13
Christian clergy	1	0	0	0	5	0
Merchants	85	18	18	36	6	103
Townfolk	2,801	378	84	1,055	1,190	2,019
Peasants	397	200	338	179	203	1,009
Inorodtsy	345,828	949,155	724,597	438,446	1,216,021	1,805
Miscellaneous	4	5	2	4	19	115
Foreign subjects	890	1,662	469	160	273	455

SOURCE: *Perussia usobshchaita perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii*, 1897 g., vols. 83, 86, 89 (St. Petersburg, 1905), table 24.

The figures for Tatar speakers pertain only to Samarqand and Syr Darya oblasts; in Ferghana, Tatar was counted as one of the "Turko-Tatar" (*turko-tatarskie*) languages, thus rendering both "Tatar" and "Turk" incomparable across oblasts. On the classifications used by the census, see Chapter 6.

It presented a marked contrast to the old city, and already in 1873 a foreign visitor felt that "one can live for years in Russian Tashkent without even suspecting the existence of the Sart part of town."⁸⁹ As early as 1870, members of the local population owned sixty-nine shops in the new city, and they comprised more than one-fifth of its population. By 1901, Muslims (including Tatars) accounted for one-third of the civilian population of the new city,⁹⁰ which had sixteen mosques in 1913 (compared with fifteen churches and two synagogues).⁹¹

Nor could officialdom turn unequivocally to the settler population for support, for it was not immune from the suspicion directed at local notables. Russian autocracy jealously guarded its monopoly over matters of state policy from the interference of any public groups, Russian or not. In colonial borderlands such as Turkestan, this monopoly often

89. Ufal'vy, *Expédition scientifique*, II: 14.

90. Dmitriev-Mamonov, *Putevoditel'*, 352.

91. *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, I: 320.

came up against the need to find broader support for Russian rule. Dukhovskoi's suggestion for the genetic Russification of the region was only the most blunt (because desperate) expression of the hope, frequently expressed in bureaucratic correspondence, that the answer to the lack of personnel resources in Turkestan was to entrust the supervision of various aspects of local life to members of the Russian population. Yet, seeking such support from society implied a partnership with society that the autocracy found unacceptable even after the revolution of 1905. In Turkestan, administrators hoped that Russian society would recognize its duty to empire and act in the interests of state, and they expressed astonished dismay when it failed to do so. The political agent in Bukhara wrote in 1906 of the deleterious effects of the revolution on "Russian prestige" in Bukhara, and in 1910, Governor-General Mishchenko turned literary critic in order to remind the editor of the Tashkent journal *Sredniia Azia* of his duties to Russian power in the region. Presented with a complimentary copy of the new publication, he found "extremely weak in literary terms" a sketch that presented in a poor light the behavior of army officers. "This story belongs to phenomena," he wrote, "that are altogether undesirable, especially in Central Asia."⁹² Russian society did not always agree with officialdom. It was the only segment of Turkestan's population to be involved in the revolution of 1905; in the ensuing elections to the State Duma, local Russians largely voted for radical parties of the left.⁹³ The files of the political police indicate that the state found itself governing settler society almost as sternly as native society.

Along with the Russians came members of other groups that further complicated the dichotomy between Russian and native. Some, such as Ukrainians, Belorussians, and even Poles and Germans, tended to be lumped together with the Russians both in terms of perception and legal privileges. Others, such as Jews, Armenians, and Tatars, occupied separately delineated spaces in the new colonial society. A sizable Jewish community had existed in Bukhara since at least pre-Mongol times and played a significant role in the area's economic life. In 1833, Bukharan Jews were granted the same rights to trade in Russia as Muslim merchants from Bukhara and Khiva, and this pattern of equal legal treatment for all subjects of the amirs of Bukhara was maintained after the conquest.

92. TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 28, d. 1119, l. 112.

93. On the considerable revolutionary activity among the Russian population of Turkestan, see A. V. Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 godov v Turkestane* (Moscow, 1938).

Kaufman saw Bukharan Jews as a good influence in Turkestan as well as a channel for Russian influence in Bukhara. Under the terms of the 1873 treaty with Bukhara, Bukharan Jews had the right to own property and to settle anywhere in Turkestan, a right denied Russian Jews. As a result, large communities of Bukharan Jews appeared in Tashkent, Samarkand, and the cities of the Ferghana valley, where they were very successful in business. This success, as well as general anti-Jewish sentiment of the reign of Alexander III (r. 1881-1894), led to a gradual curtailment of their favored status, culminating in a 1910 law that made it illegal for Bukharan Jews to reside in all but a few towns of Turkestan unless they could prove that their ancestors were duly produced, and the Russian conquest.⁹⁴ Some of them had acquired sizable fortunes, especially three families in Ferghana in their hands. According to one estimate, the Vodiaevs alone managed 60 percent of this trade.⁹⁵ In 1914, there was a large enough Jewish community in Kokand to support a newspaper, *Rahamin*. The wealth of the community, as well as its contacts abroad (extremely sketchy notices in contemporary travelers' accounts refer to the fact that many local Jews had contacts in Western Europe and that many spoke French fluently), allowed it to negotiate increasing legal disabilities.

An Armenian community similarly developed in the major urban centers of Turkestan, performing similar entrepreneurial functions in the economy, its arrival facilitated by the Transcaspian Railway. Under purposes, the most important community was the Volga Tatars. Under Russian rule since the middle of the sixteenth century, the Tatars enjoyed affinities of language as well as of religion with Central Asia during this period. Bukharan madrasas were also a common destination for Tatar ulama. A number of Tatars moved to Turkestan after the Russian conquest, partly because their familiarity with both Central Asia and Russia gave them a considerable competitive advantage in the area. True to form, the administration attempted to stem this unauthorized movement of people, although the repeated prohibitions are evidence of a distinct lack

94. On Bukharan Jews, see Michael Zand, "Bukhara VII: Bukharan Jews," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, IV: 530-545, with an exhaustive bibliography.

95. Catherine Poujol, "Approaches to the History of Bukharan Jews' Settlement in the Fergana Valley, 1867-1917," *Central Asian Survey* 12 (1993): 553-554.

of success.⁹⁶ Some Tatar and Bashkir officers served in the Russian army and therefore appeared in administrative roles; many more served as interpreters and guides; but the vast majority of Tatars living in Central Asia were connected with trade and private business. As *inorodtsy*, they suffered from a number of legal disabilities—they could not legally own immovable property—and were often the objects of suspicion, but they nevertheless occupied a space quite distinct from the local population. They were not *tuzemtsy*, and as Table 3 again shows, were much better integrated into Russian social classifications. Their position with regard to local society was, however, always ambivalent; their religious and linguistic affinities with it had made them the natural intermediaries in the Russian trade before the conquest, but they nevertheless remained outsiders. "A number of Noghays [the Turkestani term for Tatar] have arrived in these parts lately," a newspaper reader stated in 1876. "Some want to buy property here and marry locally because life is good here and the climate is better. But local Sarts and Qazaqs don't want to give them their daughters."⁹⁷ The disdain was mutual, however, as the Tatars in Turkestan soon formed a close-knit community, which self-consciously delineated itself from the local population and looked to phenomena in the Tatar lands of European Russia for inspiration. Numerous markers separated them from the local population: Most chose to live in Russian quarters, far more Tatars sent their children to Russian schools, and Tatar women followed different codes of dress and comportment than Turkestani women. The Tatar community in Tashkent organized a benevolent society with its own school in 1902, which further served to demarcate it from the rest of Muslim society.⁹⁸

Yet for all the intermediary groups and the differences within Russian society, the Russian-native dichotomy came to provide the parameters within which difference and hierarchy were imagined in Turkestan. The settler population's oppositional proclivities did not render it sympathetic to the native population. The otherness of the native population was too widely shared in Russian discourse for that, and the emergence of a colonial economy tended to reinforce the differences. Even though the entire spectrum of Russian political life appeared in Turkestan, all sections of it were united in taking for granted the exclusion (or disre-

96. TWG, 29 March 1874, 19 December 1874.

97. TWG, 28 July 1876.

98. *Tashkent shahriining orus chāstida etub masjid-i jāmi'iniqza qavm bulub turghawchi hamma ahl-i mahalla noghay khalqiga ruski tatariski ishkolānig pāpi chitilishining pedsidatildan dāklād* (Tashkent, 1902).

id) of the natives from mainstream politics. This fact was to be of fundamental importance in 1917. But the dichotomy was also shared by non-Russian groups in Turkestan, who appropriated it for their own uses. The vocabulary of progress and backwardness inherent in the dichotomy was also to figure prominently in the politics of cultural reform in Muslim society itself, which was made necessary by changes in society noted above and the need to make new choices in new circumstances unleashed by the Russian conquest.

Islam after Communism

Religion and Politics in Central Asia

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Introduction

Waiting in line at a cafeteria in Tashkent one day in 1991, in the last months of the Soviet era, I fell into conversation with two men behind me. They were pleased to meet someone from the outside world, to which access had been so difficult until then, but they were especially delighted by the fact that their interlocutor was Muslim. My turn in line eventually came, and I sat down in a corner to eat. A few minutes later, my new acquaintances joined me unbidden at my table, armed with a bottle of vodka, and proceeded to propose a toast to meeting a fellow Muslim from abroad. Their delight at meeting me was sincere, and they were completely unself-conscious about the oddity of lubricating the celebration of our acquaintance with copious quantities of alcohol.

This episode, unthinkable in the Muslim countries just a few hundred kilometers to the south, provides a powerful insight into the place of Islam in Central Asian societies at the end of the Soviet period. Clearly, being Muslim meant something very specific to my friends. Seven decades of Soviet rule had given Central Asians a unique understanding of Islam and of being Muslim. Islam after Communism had its peculiarities.

A few months after my encounter, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the republics of Central Asia became independent states. As old barriers—political, ideological, personal—came down, the region experienced a considerable Islamic revival. Mosques were reopened, new ones built, links with Muslims outside the Soviet Union revived. Islam has indeed experienced a rebirth in the region.¹

For many, especially in the West, this return of Islam boded ill. According to this view, Central Asia would become another hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism, a breeding ground of terrorism—essentially a natural extension of Afghanistan and other anti-Western regimes in the Middle East. Westerners had reasons enough to fear this outcome. In November 1991, demonstrators in the Uzbek city of Namangan besieged the country's president and demanded that he declare Uzbekistan an "Islamic republic." In neighboring Tajikistan, independence degenerated into a bloody civil war that was widely seen as pitting resurgent "Islamists" against the incumbent "Communists." By the late 1990s, militant organizations had emerged in Uzbekistan that sought the overthrow of the regime there and its replacement by an Islamic state. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the most prominent of these organizations, developed links with militant groups in war-torn Afghanistan, and its members fought alongside the Taliban during the American invasion in the autumn of 2001. For many observers, the IMU represents the future of Islam in the region—a "natural" culmination of the rebirth of Islam. This view is based on certain assumptions, often unstated by its proponents, about Islam itself. According to this view, Islam is inherently political and naturally leads to anti-Western militancy. For this reason, the seventy years of Soviet rule were of no consequence, for once Islam reemerged, the paths to its politicization and militarization were foretold.

This book argues that history *does* matter. The way in which Central Asians relate to Islam, what Islam means to them, can only be understood by taking into consideration the experience of seventy years of Soviet rule. Although those years may seem like the blink of an eye in the long history of Islam in Central Asia, the Soviet period was one of enormous transformation in society and culture—transformation, moreover, in a mold that set Central Asia apart from much of the rest of the Muslim world. All forms of Islamic expression came under sustained assault in the Soviet period: patterns of the transmission of Islamic knowledge were damaged, if not destroyed; Islam was driven from the public realm; the physical markings of Islam, such as mosques and seminaries, disappeared. The Soviet period also saw the emergence of strong secular, ethnonational identities among Central Asians, as well as the creation of new political and cultural elites firmly committed to such identities. Independence has not meant the evaporation of these identities, nor of the elites that shaped them. For much of the 1990s, a certain naïve optimism made Westerners believe that the countries of Central Asia, along

with the rest of the former socialist states, were in the midst of a transition from Soviet authoritarianism to something "more normal," perhaps a free-market democracy in which people would think just like them. It is now amply clear that the trajectories of these countries cannot be understood in such simplistic terms. Instead of a neat transition, in which the people and their rulers jettison their past, we have "postsocialist" forms of society and politics that are new in that they combine aspects of Soviet authoritarianism with those of the neoliberal order into which they have emerged. Older understandings of the world have not simply disappeared; they are being shaped and reshaped in interesting ways. Soviet understandings of culture and identity remain dominant in Central Asia. Thus, we can understand little about the region's contemporary politics or about the role that Islam plays in it unless we take serious account of the Soviet period.

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It is probably fair to say that Central Asia remains one of the least-known and least-understood parts of the world. Soviet xenophobia cut off the region from the rest of the world; its languages are little known, and its history is practically a blank slate. A decade and a half after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of the region and its archives, no single decent source is available to nonspecialists who want to look up the broad outlines of even the political history of the region. The contours of cultural and religious change are even harder to discern. In the absence of information, many writers simply opt to dismiss the Soviet period out of hand. Mixing arrogance and ignorance in equal measure, Ahmed Rashid writes, "When independence finally came, in 1991, the Central Asians, ideologically speaking, were still back in the 1920s. The crisis in Central Asia today is directly related to this stunted political and ideological growth, which the Communists ensured by their actions in 1923 and afterwards."² The dismissal of the Soviet period is connected to broader, ahistorical conceptions of Central Asia as an eternal land, whose peoples and cultures stand outside of time and (can) never change. If Islam or traditional culture or patriarchy or authoritarianism is strong today, it is strong because such is the region's tradition. One is left to wonder, how strong can a tradition be to survive even the murderous assault of the Stalinist regime unscathed?

Admittedly, contending with the Soviet period is not easy. The triumphalist mood following the collapse of the Soviet Union has produced

an easy tendency outside the academy to dismiss the entire Soviet era out of hand. In such circles, the Soviets appear at best as ham-fisted buffoons, incapable of creating anything and bent on destroying everything they touched; at worst, they are portrayed as pure evil, and the seven decades of Soviet rule presented as an extended nightmare. In countries of the former Soviet Union, the disavowal of the Soviet past stems from different impulses, such as the need to legitimize the new post-Soviet order, stake a claim in the new world order as “normal” states, or simply put the past behind. In either case, the dismissal of the Soviet past is entirely unhelpful in understanding the extremely complex developments of that era and the many peoples and nationalities it touched. This book, therefore, aims to explore the consequences, intended and unintended, of the Soviet attempt to remake Central Asia. The Soviets did not achieve all their goals, but Central Asia was utterly transformed by them.³

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The biggest problem, however, is with talking about Islam. No discussion of Islam can take place today without reference to the vigorous public debate over Islam that has raged since September 11, 2001. The marketplace is full of books about Islam, and the periodical press and the electronic media have contributed their share to this debate. All shades of opinion are represented in this new literature, from somber academic tomes to sensationalist bestsellers and everything in between. For many, the answer is straightforward: the religion of Islam is innately political, intolerant, oppressive of women, and inimical to “the West” and its values. Moreover, the religion determines all aspects of its believers’ lives in a way that Christianity and Judaism do not. In this view, the political and social behavior of Muslims can be discerned from a reading of the scriptures of Islam, which are beyond the realm of human intervention or interpretation. The most extreme forms of militancy that take place in the name of Islam—acts by al-Qaeda or Hamas—are thus the true and logical manifestations of Islam. Such judgments come from all points of the political and cultural spectrum: the left, the secular right, the religious right, Muslims critical of their tradition, Hindu fundamentalists, friends of Israel, and Serbian nationalists all find this vision of a homogeneous, hostile Islam compelling.

More sympathetic or apologetic authors, Muslims and non-Muslims, argue instead that Islam is “really” a religion of peace that has been hijacked, corrupted, or perverted by militants’ “incorrect” interpreta-

tions of Islamic teachings. They posit the “real” Islam, which is the opposite of the commonly held stereotype—a religion that is tolerant, spiritual, and moderate. We can see a possible step forward in the distinction, often made in public discourse since September 11, 2001, between “good” or “moderate” Islam, on the one hand, and its “bad” or “extremist” counterparts, on the other: Islam has two faces, one tolerant and spiritual, the other intolerant and violent. Not all Muslims are alike—there are “good” Muslims and “bad.” The problem with this binary vision is that too often, the yardstick for measuring moderation is agreement with U.S. geopolitical goals. Muslims who agree with U.S. foreign-policy goals are “good” and “tolerant”; those who do not, are not. Thus, for years, Saudi Arabia was routinely touted as a “moderate” Islamic state, whereas other, more secular states in the Muslim world have been relegated to the “extremist” camp simply because they disagreed with the foreign-policy goals of the United States. Because this distinction has been invoked repeatedly to wage war on Muslim populations, its utility for understanding the world is gravely limited.

The apologetic and “two faces” arguments share a fundamental problem with the views of Islam espoused by its most hostile critics: these views all take for granted that a “real” Islam exists about which one can make such generalizations. The apologetic and “two faces” arguments also locate the sources of Islam in the same places—its scriptures—and assume that the political behavior of Muslims emerges directly from them.

These arguments are *essentialist* in that they derive their explanation from the purported existence of a certain essence of Islam that is immune to historical change and that exists beyond the realm of society and human intervention. (Essences can be found in anything—race, culture, religion—and, as we shall see, they need not be negative.) No matter where Muslims live or what they do, the most important thing about them is that they are Muslims and that they act as such. Essentialist arguments are attractive for their simplicity, for they allow the public to make sense of a world it does not know very well. Although critics have argued that many Western authors have long held essentialist views of Islam and Muslims, essentialist arguments are enjoying a boom these days. With the end of the Cold War, questions of ideology or of economic conflict have receded from the public arena, and “culture,” in all its manifestations, has come to provide explanation for all conflict, struggle, and inequality. Over the past decade, this form of cultural essentialism has been given academic cachet by two thinkers with immense influence among policy makers and the media.

The Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington claims that future conflict on the planet will take place on the lines not of ideology or national interest but between "civilizations." He discerns a number of discrete civilizations that he defines broadly by essentialized cultural features. "Islam" is one of the civilizations, and it is the one that, according to Huntington, is most likely to get into conflict with "the West." The proof of the existence of civilizations is in history, but the history in his book is remarkably thin.⁴ His book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* and its thesis have been routinely invoked since September 11, and indeed the current U.S. paperback edition features a rather crude depiction of this conflict in the form the green banner of Islam battling with the U.S. flag (which presumably signifies all of "the West"). All Muslims, apparently the "good" and the "bad" both, are fated by virtue of belonging to their civilization to act in a particular way, which is hostile to the West.

Much of Huntington's argument about Islam comes from the work of the British-born Orientalist Bernard Lewis, who taught for many years at Princeton University, and who since September 11, has become a one-man industry producing essentialist analysis of Islam and the Middle East. In 1990, the year after the Cold War ended, Lewis argued in a cover story for the *Atlantic Monthly* that conflict in the Middle East is part of a much broader phenomenon: "It should now be clear that we are facing a model and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide importance of both."⁵ At issue are not policies but a reaction to—a rage about—civilizational difference. Muslim rage has roots in Islam itself, according to Lewis. "In the classical Islamic view, to which many Muslims are beginning to return, the world and mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and faith prevail, and the rest, known as the House of Unbelief or the House of War, which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam."⁶ To Lewis, the "classical Islamic view," not interests and aspirations, determines how Muslims act in the world. He also blurs the distinction between "Islamic radicals" and Muslims at large, implying that all Muslims, regardless of where or who they are, face the same compulsions: "What is truly evil and unacceptable is the domination of infidels over true believers. For true believers to rule over misbelievers is proper and natural. . . . But for misbelievers to rule over true believers is blas-

phemous and unnatural, since it leads to the corruption of religion and morality in society, and to the flouting or even abrogation of God's law. This may help us to understand the current troubles in such diverse places as Ethiopian Eritrea, Indian Kashmir, Chinese Sinkiang, and Yugoslav Kosovo, in all of which Muslim populations are ruled by non-Muslim governments."⁷ The fact that the conflicts in Eritrea, Xinjiang, and Kosovo were all purely nationalist struggles in which "Islamic radicals" played no part matters little to Lewis's argument. Islam, for Lewis, is immutable and impervious to change brought about by history or society. He contrasts the Muslim compulsion to act according to Islam to "our secular present," as if religious motivations were entirely absent in the conduct of affairs in the West. Such essentialist arguments are much loved by today's Islamic extremists, who proceed from the assertion of total incompatibility of Islam and the West. Osama bin Laden and Bernard Lewis completely agree on this point.

Essentialist arguments efface history. In them, civilizations are like billiard balls, bouncing off each other on a table, acting and reacting but remaining indivisible wholes all the while. Moreover, all the behavior of a civilization is internally generated, a product of each civilization's unique (and again, unchanging) characteristics. Essentialist arguments thus hide the political or international contexts of the phenomena they seek to explain. All explanation (and responsibility) for the political behavior of Muslims has to be sought in Islam itself with the broader context of Muslims' involvement with Europe and the United States studiously avoided. The denial of interconnections between civilizations is also necessary to create a positive image of the West, as the storehouse of the best achievements of humanity. The West is identified only with lofty ideas such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and free markets; other achievements, such as colonialism, slavery, the near extermination of the indigenous populations of three continents, the industrialization of warfare, and the Holocaust, are never invoked. The "West" is just as clearly essentialized an idea as "Islam"—it too is self-contained and internally homogeneous, but here the essence is entirely positive. When Americans think more narrowly about the United States rather than the West in general, they have access to other mechanisms that enable them to avoid drawing connections between the United States and the rest of the world. Acceptance of the myth of the Innocent Nation precludes doubts about American goodness.⁸ This view is buttressed by the fact that few Americans pay attention to foreign affairs, even though the reach of U.S. foreign policy is truly global. The only possible remaining question, then,

is "Why do they hate us?" (a question in which both the "they" and the "us" are problematic, as is the verb), and in the absence of a dispassionate discussion of interconnections, no answer is forthcoming. George W. Bush could only express amazement in answer to this question: "How do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for America? I'll tell you how I respond: I'm amazed. I'm amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hate us. I am, I am—like most Americans, I just can't believe it. Because I know how good we are, and we've got to do a better job of making our case."⁹

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Like all religions, Islam is internally diverse. Individuals and groups can take vastly different, even opposing positions within the framework of a religious tradition. Over the centuries, Christians have used the Bible to argue for waging war against non-Christians and for persecuting Jews living amid Christians; many Americans justified slavery, apartheid, and Jim Crow by invoking scriptural injunctions. Yet Christians have also used the Bible to fight against slavery, to preach tolerance, and to fight for social justice and civil rights. The same scriptures that yield the doctrine of the poverty of Christ can be made to produce the gospel of wealth. These mutually opposed positions are explicitly and self-consciously Christian. Muslims, too, can and do debate among themselves and derive opposed positions from their sources of religious authority.

To speak of "Islam" as a homogeneous phenomenon is analogous to speaking of Christianity as a single whole that includes Catholics and Orthodox, Protestants and Copts, and members of countless other sects, including such marginal ones as the Mormons, the Scientologists, and Jehovah's Witnesses. Of course, we never speak of Christianity in this way because we intuitively recognize that the label loses all meaning when applied to such a diverse group. We seldom have such qualms, however, in defining Islam, even though the label *Islam* covers just as wide a spectrum of geographic, cultural, and sectarian diversity as the label *Christianity* does. If anything, Islam is more internally diverse than Christianity, which crystallized around an institutionalized church from the beginning. In Islam, such an institution never developed. There is no religious hierarchy and no single individual qualified to pass final judgment on questions of belief or practice. Within thirty years of the death of the Prophet, the Muslim community had split on matters of doctrine.

Since then, Muslims have relied on multiple and simultaneous sources of authority. Authority resides not in church councils and such but in individuals who derive their legitimacy from their learning, piety, lineage, and reputation among peers. This feature gives Islam a slightly anarchic quality: authoritative opinions (*fatwas*) by one expert or one group can be countered with equally authoritative opinions, derived from the same sources, by another group; or one set of devotional practices held dear by one group can be denounced as impermissible by another. In more extreme cases, such conflicts of opinion can turn into "wars of fatwas," fought out, in the modern age, in the press or in cyberspace. (If Islam were held in a more positive light in the West today, this diversity would be described as a free market of ideas!) To speak of Islam as a homogeneous entity ignores this fundamental dynamic of its tradition.

This pluralism extends to the most basic level of belief. The major sectarian divide in Islam, between Sunnis and Shi'is, goes back to the origins of Islam. The two doctrines evolved in parallel; therefore, to see in them an orthodox/heterodox divide is incorrect. All Muslims share certain key reference points (the oneness of God, loyalty to the Prophet and his progeny, the need to prepare for the Hereafter, to take a few examples), but different sects and movements have played upon these points in different ways. Moreover, each of the two sects has many branches and supports a variety of theological and legal schools, and many modern ideological groups straddle the divide between the two sects.

For better or worse, Islam today is identified most closely with law. One of the central ideas in the Islamic tradition as it emerged was that of the *shari'a* (or, in the Turko-Persian form used in Central Asia, *shariat*). The usual rendering of the shariat as "Islamic law" is not wholly accurate. Shariat means "the path," the way of proper demeanor in this world, dictated by God, that paves the way for salvation on the day of judgment. As such, it encompasses only the broadest ethical norms of the Islamic tradition. Law in the narrower sense of passing judgment on concrete cases in real life evolved into the discipline of *fiqh*, jurisprudence. Fiqh grew rapidly in the second and third Islamic centuries, when concern with proper governance and the limiting of possible alternatives led to its codification. Fiqh, too, was, from its inception, plural. Sunnis came to hold four schools (*madhabs*) of fiqh as equally legitimate, if not always interchangeable. Fiqh was, almost by definition, an exercise in interpreting the basic commandments of the shariat in concrete cases. Contrary to common misconception, the Qur'an is not the sole source of Islamic law. The example of the Prophet, preserved both in the practice

of the community and in written traditions (*hadith*), the compilation and sifting of which became a major preoccupation of scholars, is also authoritative, as are reasoning by analogy and the consensus of scholars. Whereas the point of *fiqh* was to discern and implement what God had ordained, the discernment and the implementation of it were recognized to be distinctly human endeavors. The elaboration of legal doctrine was the work of jurists, who were seldom agents of the state. On the most mundane level, then, Islamic law retained an element of anarchy. Courts executed law, but they did so on the basis of opinions (*fatwas*) issued by legal scholars (in this case, *mufti*) at the request of petitioners. The *fatwa* was a legal opinion whose authority derived directly from the authority of the *mufti* who issued it. One *fatwa* could be countered by another from a different *mufti*, leaving the job of adjudication to the judge (*qazi*). A major goal of Islamic jurisprudence was to maintain social order. Islamic law was thus fully integrated into Muslim societies.

But law was always just one source of authority. The ethical tradition in Muslim societies also looked to classical antiquity for inspiration, and Aristotelian and neo-Platonic thought exercised immense influence in Muslim lands.¹⁰ A third ethical tradition was Sufism, which coexisted with sectarian divides and the legal and philosophical traditions. Usually glossed as Islamic mysticism, Sufism represents a complex of diverse religious trends that include mystical philosophy, a cult of saintly figures with miraculous powers, and distinctive liturgical practices. It originated as a movement of personal piety in the first century of Islam. Its adepts, or Sufis, emphasized an esoteric path to the knowledge of God, which they were to achieve through prayer, asceticism, and withdrawal from society, all of which they traced back to the example of the Prophet himself. True knowledge of God could not be achieved through the rational and philosophical traditions beloved of the *ulama*. A tradition of the Prophet that is popular with the Sufis holds that legal knowledge encompasses only one-third of all knowledge; the rest has to come through the direct experience of God. Over time, expressions of Sufism have covered the entire spectrum, from radical antinomian rejection of a rational and legal approach to salvation, to accommodation of the world, and the assimilation of many aspects of the legal tradition of Islam. Influential thinkers such as al-Ghazzali (d. 1111) worked out a synthesis of the esoteric and exoteric currents of Islam. By the thirteenth century, Sufism had become an integral, not to say a dominant, part of the cultural life of much of the Muslim world. It was organized in Sufi brotherhoods (*tariqat*) centered around the followers of individual Sufi masters and

housed in networks of hospices (*khanqah*) supported by followers and pious benefactors of the Sufis. The synthesis proved to be enduring: it produced an aesthetic that underlies the bulk of the literary production in Muslim societies of the past millennium.

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If Islam is not homogeneous, it is also not self-contained or discrete. Muslims have always interacted with their neighbors. Islamic civilization was never coextensive with Islam as a religion; it was a hybrid, multicultural venture in which Christians, Jews, and Hindus participated as central actors. If we can now call the Western tradition "Judeo-Christian" (which both underestimates the extent to which the civilization of the West has historically been identified with Christianity alone and dispenses entirely with non-European Jews), then surely Islamic civilization was at least Judeo-Islamic, if not worthy of an even more complicated label.¹¹ As the great American historian Marshall Hodgson pointed out more than three decades ago, the lands of Islam were the global *oekumene*, in contact with all other civilizations of the old world, for several centuries.¹² Hodgson also coined the adjective *Islamicate* to describe the civilizational, as opposed to the religious, aspects of Islam. It is a great pity that the term has not taken hold, for it describes accurately such varied phenomena as poetry by Hindu poets in praise of the Prophet, Hebrew poetry indistinguishable in its aesthetics or its structure from its Arabic counterpart, or Christian theological debates in the lands where Christianity was born.

This interaction has been particularly sustained in the past 200 years, during which time it has taken many forms. The notions of progress, the nation, and the will of the people; new means of organizing society and state power; and new means of communication all have transformed how Muslims think about Islam and the world of which they are a part. Similarly, Islamic political and religious movements today take place in an international geopolitical context in which Western powers are active agents. Whether Islamic movements react to Western military or political involvement in the Muslim world or are, at times, even actively encouraged by the West, they are never entirely innocent of the West. "What went wrong?" asks Bernard Lewis about the Middle East, and he proceeds to give an answer that explains everything through Islam and makes no reference to the intense intertwining of the history of the Muslim world with that of the West. It is a very flimsy understanding of

current realities that invokes obscure texts a millennium old but ignores the political context of today.

The classical tradition of Islam, in fact, is of singularly little help in understanding the actions of Muslims today, which have been shaped in a profound way by the ideas, technologies, and modes of organization of the modern age. Muslims' relationship to Islam is shaped by modern ways of relating to religious authority, which distance Muslims from the classical tradition. The crucial concept in understanding Islam is modernity, which refers to the emergence of new understandings of the world (a hankering for certainty and classification, disenchantment with the supernatural, and the rise of the authority of science) and new forms of organization (the modern state and its many attributes), communication (the advent of print and, more recently, of electronic media), and socialization that have transformed the world, beginning with Europe in the early modern period. Modernity wreaks havoc with the established order of things, but it does not have a fixed trajectory. It is thus different from the concept of modernization, which assumes an end-driven scheme of historical change in which certain economic changes ("development") lead to similar social and cultural transformations (secularization, the rise of democracy, the equalization of gender roles, and so forth).

The Muslim world has not been immune to modernity. Over the past century or so, new forms of power and new epistemologies have redefined how many Muslims relate to Islam. The introduction of print and mass public education have given ever-larger numbers of Muslims access to the sources of Islam, which has in turn undermined older patterns of learning and put to question the authority of the traditional guardians of Islam. Increasingly, Islamic debates have turned back to the Qur'an and hadith. Scholars have called this process the "objectification" of Islam, which extracts Islam from custom, tradition, and interpretation and reinvents it as a stand-alone object composed of certain original sources.¹³ To a certain extent, Islam has undergone "protestantization," with classical understandings of Islam often giving way to new formulations.¹⁴

This objectification of Islam has produced varied results. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an influential current of opinion called Muslim modernism argued for the complete compatibility of Islam and modernity. In this view, progress was inevitable and desirable and fully consonant with Islam. Indeed, for the modernists, Islam *demand*ed progress of its followers. Muslim modernists argued for the reform of education and of family life, changes in the position of women, new notions of public health and hygiene, and much besides: in effect, they

wanted Islam and Muslims to modernize. Islam itself, they thought, was in a poor way: Muslims had allowed it to become encrusted with alien influences. The modernists placed much of the blame for the situation on traditional elites, such as the ulama and Sufi sheikhs, who had caused the corruption of the faith. A generation later, different groups in society, faced with rather different problems but informed by the same understanding of an objectified Islam, came up with a very different argument. The modernists, they argued, had succeeded only in imitating the West and taking Islam on the path to corruption. The solution was not to make Islam accord with the dictates of the modern age, but rather to make the modern world fit the demands of Islam. In other words, modernity had to be Islamized. Muslims could succeed in this world or the next only by reinventing modernity on truly Islamic principles. We will call this movement *Islamism*.

Islamism is modern in that it presupposes the objectification of Islam, for only when Islam is separated from custom, tradition, and indeed history can it become a stand-alone object that can in turn be applied to the practice of politics. In effect, Islam becomes a political ideology, in which all political goals and actions derive from certain abstract notions embodied in the "true" scriptural sources of Islam. In 1929, Hasan al-Banna (1906–49), an Egyptian schoolteacher, founded the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt (the organization soon spread to several other Arab countries). The Muslim Brothers were self-consciously a modern political party that took political action for the conquest of power in order to Islamize law and the state. Another major thinker of political Islam was Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi (1903–79), who established the Jama'at-e Islami (Islamic Party) in north India in 1941. Although he opposed the creation of a separate state for the Muslims of India (on the principle that such a state would be a secular state and thus no better than an independent India), he nevertheless moved to Pakistan when that country was established in 1947, and from his base in Lahore, presided over a political party that acquired a vocal presence all over South Asia and, later, in the South Asian diaspora. For both al-Banna and Maududi, the goals of politics were not simply the prosperity and strength of Muslims (as most modernists and nationalists had articulated them) but the utter transformation of the individual and of society along principles extracted from the authentic sources of Islam.

Three seemingly disparate currents of modernity came together in the movements of al-Banna (and his more illustrious successor, Sayyid Qutb) and Maududi. First, the three leaders experienced a radical transforma-

tion in their understanding of religious authority, an experience similar to that of evangelical fundamentalists in the United States. For Islamists, religious authority resides in texts, which they see as transparent vessels of meaning available to readers without the help of interpretation. They thus disavow the authority of the interpretive tradition through which Islam has evolved in the world. Second, Islamist politics is part of a much broader search for cultural authenticity that has appealed to many different groups (religious, cultural, ethnic, racial) for its promise to restore purity and dignity in a world built on colonialism and the oppression of others. Islamists seek to reject all sorts of "encrustations" on an authentic tradition they seek to "resurrect." Finally, the political goals of Islamist movements owe a great deal, in their formulation, to modern revolutionary ideologies, and to Marxism-Leninism in particular. During the Cold War, Islamists tended to be rabidly anti-Communist in their stance because Communism was a rival ideology, one that rested on universal principles and was hostile to all religions besides. That stance should not blind us, however, to the fascination that Marxism-Leninism had for Islamists and the model it provided for successful political action. The Russian revolution was, after all, the most successful revolt against the bourgeois world order in the early twentieth century, and the resulting Soviet regime trumpeted its anticolonial credentials loudly. For al-Banna and Maududi, the organizational structure of the Communist Party held the key to its success, and both patterned their parties closely on the Communist model. Maududi's Jama'at-e Islami saw itself, in Leninist fashion, as a vanguard party of committed revolutionaries, membership in whose ranks was to be carefully controlled. The ranks of member, candidate member, and supporter—and the establishment of a youth wing for work among students—were patterned directly on the ranks within the Communist Party. The revolution for which the Islamists worked was, of course, to be an Islamic one.

For both leaders the goal was not just to overthrow established "un-Islamic" regimes but to bring about the inner transformation of individuals. This objective, too, was a modern conceit, and is shared by many ideologies of the modern world. In other ways, too, the Islamist way of posing the question bears all the marks of the contemporary world. The struggle to remake the world through anticolonial struggle, concerns with social justice, a fascination with revolution, and an insistence on seeing politics as the primary space of action are all concerns of modern radical politics worldwide, and their appropriation by Islamists gives us a clue to the appeal of their message in the Muslim world. That appeal

was not always huge. The middle decades of the twentieth century were dominated by secular nationalism in much of the Muslim world, and Islamist parties appealed only to tiny minorities. The political space for Islamism opened up because of several interrelated factors. The nationalist regimes failed to deliver on their promises (partly because of corruption but largely because of global structural problems beyond their control), and the 1967 defeat at the hands of Israel put the claims of secular nationalism under renewed scrutiny, especially in Arab lands. Ever-larger numbers of citizens felt the need for a more "authentic," more moral response to the crisis posed by Israel. Indeed, the conflict with Israel (whose establishment came at the expense of Arab aspirations and against the wishes of the majority of the population on the ground) has driven politics in much of the Muslim world for the past several decades. Since 1967, as the conflict has taken on religious overtones on all sides, it has provided a major boost to the fortunes of Islamist parties.¹⁵ Finally, we might note that the global defeat of the left and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed other alternatives for formulating an opposition to the discredited status quo.

If Islamism is modern, so are the Islamists.¹⁶ Both al-Banna and Maududi were men of the twentieth century with little formal training in the tradition of Islamic learning. Both al-Banna and his successor, Qutb, were schoolteachers; Maududi came from a learned family, but he did not attend a madrasa. He entered public life through journalism instead and managed to live off his writing for much of his life. Engineers and doctors figure prominently in Islamist parties everywhere. Print and the public sphere have allowed Islamists to circumvent the entire tradition of Islamic learning. However, as parvenus, they have little feel for the flexibility of the tradition and take more absolutist positions than do traditional ulama. Because they see the original texts as the transparent vessels of meaning for all time, Islamists tend to denounce interpretation as evil in itself.

The Muslim Brothers and the Jama'at-e Islami do not exhaust the spectrum of modern Islamic movements. The Islamic revolution in Iran belongs to yet a different trajectory. Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, was not a lay intellectual but a high-ranking member of the Shi'i establishment with impeccable scholarly credentials, which he used to articulate his theory of the "rule of the jurist" (*vilayat-i faqih*). Yet this theory is strikingly modern, without precedent in the Shi'i tradition. Indeed, it owes a considerable debt to the work of lay Islamist intellectuals such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–69) and Ali Shariati (1933–77),

who combined Islamic arguments with Western critiques of modernity. Equally at home with Marx, Sartre, and Fanon, Al-e Ahmad and Shariati articulated an "Islamic" critique of modernity that was a product of Iran's century-long encounter with the West and modernity—and as such, it was modern to the core. It is no surprise then that the Islamic revolution resulted in an Islamic *republic*, complete with a constitution, separation of institutional powers, and the principle of electoral representation.¹⁷ Islamic movements in Turkey or Malaysia present yet other varieties of contemporary Muslim politics.

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The militant groups that make the headlines today—al-Qaeda, Hamas, the many outfits in Pakistan, and the IMU—represent a strand of radicalism that we will call *jihadist*. These groups differ from Islamists, because they have little or no political program beyond the conquest of power and the subsequent imposition of the shariat as the law of the land. They interpret *jihad* in a purely military sense, and unlike the Islamists, have no interest in the transformation of society beyond policing norms of behavior.

The genealogy of jihadist Islam is shorter still, going back no further than the 1980s, to the final drama of the Cold War, the extremely bloody proxy war in Afghanistan. Far from being the "natural" product of a coherent, self-contained civilization, jihadist Islam emerged in the hurly-burly of the contemporary world, its birth made possible by various regimes, Muslim and non-Muslim, each of which, for reasons of its own, fostered the development of a peculiar blend of militancy, religious radicalism, and social conservatism that was new in the history of the Muslim world. Because jihadist Islam is the main declared enemy in the "war on terrorism," and because its specter haunts the incumbent regimes in Central Asia today, its origins are well worth closer attention.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was ostensibly to help an indigenous revolutionary regime fight counterrevolution, provoked a "civil" war that transformed much in the world beyond Afghanistan. The Soviet move threatened many actors, both global and regional. For the United States, the Soviet invasion, coming on the heels of the revolution in Iran, threatened to destabilize the American position in the Middle East and its access to the region's oil. The conservative monarchies of the Arab world, led by Saudi Arabia, felt directly threatened by both the Iranian revolution and the Soviet advance, as did the military

regime in Pakistan, which had long had uneasy relations with Afghanistan, common faith notwithstanding. The three sides came together to back the Afghan resistance. The resistance was conceptualized as a jihad against Soviet atheists and did a great deal to heighten the profile of Islamic militancy in the region. The resistance fighters, the *mujahidin* ("those who undertake jihad") were lionized in the West as "freedom fighters." (Ronald Reagan, welcoming several mujahidin leaders to the White House, compared them to the founding fathers of the United States). The mujahidin were not a homogeneous group, but all of them had a strong dislike for the socialists and their largely progressive social agenda, which emphasized women's rights to education and employment, redistribution of wealth, and free and mandatory public education.

The United States supported an Islamic opposition to the Soviet invasion out of doctrinal principles long held sacred. Throughout the Cold War, conventional wisdom in the West saw Islam as an antidote to Communism and thus as a strategic asset to be cultivated. The Soviets' hostility to religion would, it was hoped, make them unpopular in Muslim countries and also keep local socialists at bay. U.S. government agencies spent considerable effort drawing attention to Soviet hostility to religion.¹⁸ The problem was that many Muslims did not see socialism and Islam to be so starkly opposed. Indeed, throughout the twentieth century, a substantial current of opinion in Muslim societies held that Islam's message was one of social justice and that socialism was inherent in Islam. Therefore, only the more extremist and inflexible versions of Islam could effectively counter Communism. The need to counter Communism with Islam thus drew the United States close to the most conservative regimes in the Muslim world, whose wariness of the Soviets coincided with implacable hostility to social or political change at home and which used an appeal to Islam to crush secular leftist opposition at home. (This pattern was, broadly speaking, evident in friends of the United States in the Muslim world, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, and, to a certain extent, even Turkey in the 1980s.) American goals for the proxy war were modest in the beginning: they amounted largely to "killing as many Communists as possible" and making sure the Soviets paid for their misadventure. Quickly, however, the war moved to the center of the Reagan administration's resolve to "use all means necessary" to win the Cold War.¹⁹ For the Saudis, who provided matching funds to the effort, the Afghan war was an opportunity to channel Islamic activism away from themselves and their patrons, the Americans. For Pakistan's military, which had taken power in 1977, the war was a

godsend, for it brought in massive military aid from the United States and financial aid from Arab monarchies.²⁰ The last act of the Cold War was an American-sponsored jihad against Soviet atheism.

Political violence motivated by Islam was new then, and mostly confined to militant offshoots of the Iranian revolution. But the war in Afghanistan made political violence against “unbelievers” a full-blown form of action. Saudi money not only armed the mujahidin, but it also opened a network of schools for the sons of the refugees who poured into Pakistan. These schools purveyed a message of unbending and often bloodthirsty struggle against enemies of Islam. The war also attracted enthusiasts from all over the Muslim world, who congregated in Peshawar to fight the good fight for Islam. Al-Qaeda was to emerge from the ranks of these warriors, which included one Osama bin Laden. The Afghan war also militarized Islamic movements across the Muslim world and did much to produce the Islamist militancy that exists today. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the Soviet collapse two and a half years later, the United States lost all interest in Afghanistan, but the jihadist militancy that it had created (as well as the narcotics-based economy that supported the jihadists) continued to thrive. The jihadist groups did not have to wait long before the first U.S. war in Iraq in 1991 provided another target for their rage. Mahmood Mamdani quite correctly calls al-Qaeda and the events of September 11 the “unfinished business of the Cold War.”²¹

Clearly, the Afghan jihad cannot be explained without mentioning non-Islamic actors and geopolitical motivations that have nothing to do with Islam. History, we find, is not irrelevant to explaining the political behavior of Muslims. Indeed, it is the very explanation. And if history matters, then we need to pay attention to the concrete historical experiences of real Muslim societies. The Muslim societies of Central Asia experienced the twentieth century in a radically different way than Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia or Pakistan did, and any attempt to understand Islam has to take into account their experience.

CHAPTER I

Islam in Central Asia

In 1805, Eltüzher Khan, the reigning khan of Khwarazm, the oasis principality at the mouth of the Amu Darya, commissioned a history of his dynasty that would “place our august genealogy on a throne in the divan [chancery] of words and to set the names of our glorious ancestors into the seal of history.” The resulting work was undertaken by a court historian by the name of Sher Muhammad Mirab Munis, and continued after his death by his nephew Muhammad Riza Agahi, who carried its account down to 1828. The work bore the appropriately grandiose title of *Firdaus ul-iqbâl* (The Paradise of Felicity) and gave an appropriately grandiose account of the achievements of the dynasty. The hefty text contains an enormous amount of information about the history of Central Asia, but perhaps more important is what it tells us about the mental universe of its author and intended audience and about the literary tradition from which it emerged. Like all traditional Muslim histories, it begins with an account of the origin of the community whose history it recounts. In this case, an account of Creation is followed by a short first chapter recounting the Muslim version of the descent of Adam to earth, his reconciliation with Eve, and the Flood. After the Flood, Noah had three sons, who later propagated the human race. The eldest was Japheth, from whose eight sons sprang all the peoples who inhabited Inner Asia (Turânzamin). The eldest of the eight was Turk, the eponymous ancestor of the Turks. The Turks lived peacefully under the sons of Turk, a series of model rulers, until corruption set in during the reign of

Alanja Khan. "The children of Japheth had been Muslims from the time of Noah until this time," but now they fell off the true path and ceased to be Muslims. Events came to such a pass that if a father heard of Islam, his son murdered him, and if a son understood anything of the faith, his father killed him. Then was born Oghuz Khan, who could speak at the age of one and whose first word was "Allah." He rebelled against his father, eventually slaying him, before embarking on a series of conquests that brought Islam to all of "Transoxiana and Turkestan." He ruled for 116 years, before passing away to the afterworld, whereupon his descendants split up. Eventually, one descendant called Jurliq Markan produced Qonghirat, who was the forebear of the Qonghirat tribe that ruled Khiva in the nineteenth century. Jurliq Markan's younger brother Tusbuday sired Qorlas, whose line ultimately produced Genghis Khan. Qorlas's descendants conquered the children of Qonghirat well before Genghis Khan appeared, and the children of Qonghirat were active participants in the rulership of Genghis Khan and his descendants. But during this time, the sons of Qorlas had fallen off the path of Islam again, until they were reconverted. Then the mystic Sayyid Ata, accompanied by Naghday, a Qonghirat notable, went to the court of Özbek Khan, the ruler of the Golden Horde, and brought him into the fold of Islam.¹

Muslim belief holds that Adam and Noah were the first among a vast number of messengers that God sent to humanity as bearers of divine guidance. They were thus Muslims, part of a chain of divine intervention in human life that culminated with Muhammad, the "seal of the prophets." In Munis's account, then, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia appear as having always been Muslim. They might have fallen off the correct path, but local heroes always brought them back to it. Remarkably, the history makes no mention of the Prophet, the rise of Islam in Arabia, or the Arab conquest of Central Asia. In the text, Islam becomes completely indigenized, an innate part of the genealogical heritage of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia. It is also intertwined with rulership: the Qonghirat dynasty that Munis and Agahi served bears an august lineage that goes back, through Oghuz Khan and Japheth, to Adam himself.

The story is obviously "legendary," and it is very easy to dismiss it as nonsense. But it tells us a great deal about how Central Asians related to Islam. For Munis, the origins of the community, and of the dynasty that ruled over it, were not a matter of explication through profane history. Rather, the origins were sacred, and only sacred history could explicate them. Other myths of origins connected cities and towns in Central Asia

directly to the origins of Islam. The celebrated thirteenth-century Arab geographer Yaquṭ quoted a hadith in which the Prophet reportedly said, "There shall be conquered a city in Khorasan beyond a river which is called the Oxus; which city is named Bokhara. It is encompassed with God's mercy and surrounded by His angels; its people are Heaven-aided; and whoso shall sleep upon a bed therein shall be like him that draweth his sword in the way of God. And beyond it lieth a city which is called Samarqand, wherein is a fountain of the fountains of Paradise, and a tomb of the tombs of the prophets, and a garden of the gardens of Paradise; its dead, upon the Resurrection Day, shall be assembled with the martyrs."² Numerous other hadiths connected lesser cities and towns to the Prophet and the very origins of revelation.³ Such hadiths might be considered unsound by Muslim scholars of hadith and by modern historians, but they were a true measure of the Islamization of Central Asia, for they allowed local identities to be imagined in Islamic terms. Such accounts of divine or Prophetic intervention in local histories dissolved time and space and connected Central Asia to the core of the Islamic tradition. The local and the global were thus intertwined.⁴

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Before the Russian conquest, for the bulk of the population, being Muslim meant being part of a community that saw itself as Muslim. It had little to do with the mastery, by every individual, of the basic textual sources of Islam. The Qur'an is central to Islamic ritual: its recitation is a pious deed, its verses can serve as protection from misfortune, and the use of selected phrases from it in appropriate social contexts is the true measure of "comprehension." However, it was not central to the everyday conduct of Muslims. Not even the learned were expected to be able to explicate given passages of the Qur'an. Rather, communities asserted their Muslim identities through elaborate myths of origin that assimilated elements of the Islamic ethical tradition with local norms and vice versa. The account of sacred origins of local Muslim communities provided by *Firdaus ul-iqbal* was replicated in other, more "popular" accounts. One of the most commonly disseminated myths was that of Baba Tükles, who converted Özbek Khan, the Genghisid ruler of the Golden Horde, to Islam by beating the khan's court shaman in a religious contest.

The legend goes as follows: Four Muslim holy men arrived as Özbek Khan participated in a drinking ceremony at a sacred burial ground. In

the holy men's presence, the presiding shamans lost their miraculous powers. Impressed, the khan ordered the shamans and the Muslims to "debate with one another . . . ; whoever among you has the religion that is true, I will follow him." The two parties agreed to a trial by fire: one member from each party would enter an oven fired with ten cartloads of tamarisk, and "Whoever emerges without being burned, his religion will be true." When the time came, Baba Tükles, one of the Muslim saints, volunteered for the ordeal. He walked into the oven, reciting the Sufi *zikr* (remembrance) and survived; his counterpart, however, had to be forced into the oven and was instantly consumed by the fire. Seeing this miracle, the khan and all those present became Muslims.⁵

Baba Tükles was a "friend of God." Islam does not have officially canonized saints, but early on, Muslims came to accept that certain individuals have an intimate relationship to God and may intercede with him on behalf of ordinary Muslims. This cult of sacred persons replicated patronage networks that existed in society. Friends of God could be recognized as such in their lifetimes, and after their deaths, their mausoleums became shrines, places of pilgrimage, and foci of communal identity; their disciples, connected to them through chains of initiation, provided a living link to sacred origins. Many of these bringers of Islam were of foreign origin (usually they were ascribed Arab origins), but they were also fully indigenized as ancestors. Their successors were the living links to the community's sacred origins, whereas their shrines made the landscape itself sacred. It was these locally esteemed figures and their shrines that provided local communities with their links to Islam and to the rest of the Muslim world.

And the identity was communal. It was played out through the communal celebration of august ancestors, annual holidays, and life-cycle events. In turn, the community acquired a sacral aura, and its customs and traditions became "Islamic" in their own right. The veneration of shrines, codes of social intercourse rooted in local societies (showing respect for elders, the position of women, which could vary greatly across time and space, and obedience to those of higher social rank), or political authority could all be understood as Islamic. This dual process of localizing Islam and Islamizing local traditions led communities to see themselves as innately Muslim. Local customs were sacralized, and Islam was made indigenous. For most people, there simply could not be a distinction, let alone a contradiction, between Islam and local customs.

Such local ways of knowing Islam or being Muslim are hardly unique to Central Asia or to the past. Over the past few decades, anthropologists

have created a substantial literature documenting cases of "local Islam" in many places, from Bosnia to the Comoro Islands, from Morocco to the Philippines. The diverse ways in which Muslims relate to Islam tests our assumptions about the unitary or homogenous nature of Islam. Conventionally, there are two ways in which such diversity is explained. One explanation posits the existence (in this case) of a "Central Asian Islam" that is allegedly moderate or liberal. This Islam stands in contrast to a harsher and less tolerant (but perhaps "more real") "Arab Islam." This view thus connects the diversity of Islam to national or ethnic categories and makes it subordinate to them. However, these national categories are themselves of modern vintage, and in no case is each "national" version of Islam internally homogeneous. Instead, such categorization of Islam transposes ethnic for religious essentialization (thus, not all Muslims think or act alike, but all Central Asians or all Uzbeks do). As we shall see in chapter 7, current repressive regimes in Central Asia are quite fond of such arguments and put them to brutal use.

Another way of making sense of Islam's diversity is to argue that Islam "sits lightly" on communities where Islam is thus localized, and indeed, that Muslims who identify with Islam in this manner are not "real Muslims." Implicit in this argument is the notion that "true Islam" exists and that it may be seen in practice in certain Middle Eastern societies. This position is canonized by many Western experts. Bernard Lewis thus writes, "Great numbers of Muslims live outside the Middle Eastern Islamic heartlands—indeed, by now the Muslims of South and Southeast Asia vastly outnumber the Arabic-, Persian-, and Turkish-speaking Muslims of the Middle East. But they have developed their own political and other cultures, much influenced by those of the regions in which they live."⁶ The assumption that certain societies lack any culture other than "Islam," whereas others have only local culture with a coloration of Islam is highly dubious. Ethnographies of Middle Eastern societies, for instance, show the same kind of melding of the local and the global that I describe for Central Asia above. Asserting that Middle Eastern societies exhibit "real" Islam in its purity renders Islam synonymous with a narrow part of the spectrum of its diversity and mischaracterizes this global phenomenon. The Middle East represents only a small proportion (between a fifth and a quarter, depending on one's definitions) of the total Muslim population of the world, most of which resides in Pakistan and points east. Finally, Lewis's argument echoes that of the more exclusivist groups of modern Muslims, for whom "real Islam" is a prescriptive, rather than merely a descriptive, tool.

Neither of these arguments helps us understand Islam as a phenomenon of this world. Islam takes many local forms, but none of them is stable or internally homogeneous. Perpetual tension exists within Islam, and all forms of Islam are open to challenge on "Islamic" grounds, from within the Islamic tradition. "Customary" or "local" understandings of Islam are countered by more "normative" versions of Islam that draw their authority from greater adherence to injunctions or strictures elaborated by scholars who specialize in *fiqh* or other aspects of Islam's normative tradition. This tension between different ways of understanding Islam creates the most characteristic inner dynamic in Muslim societies.

We should not assume, however, that "normative" Islam is any more stable or homogenous than "customary" Islam. Muslims can use the resources of the Islamic tradition to take any number of positions, including diametrically opposed ones, on questions that confront them. The absence of a churchlike hierarchy in Islam, which might have a monopoly over the determination of what is normative, complicates the situation further. The answer to the question of who speaks for Islam is that *any* Muslim may speak on behalf of Islam. Indeed, at any time in any society, there are competing claims to authority based on Islam. Ultimately, it is this contention over competing interpretations that defines Muslim politics. Totalizing statements about Islam, therefore, grossly misrepresent this reality. Characterizations that present Islam simply as wicked or tolerant are equally incorrect. Muslims can draw any number of lessons from Islam. The tradition is much too rich and diverse to be reduced to a single evaluative adjective.

The analytical task, then, is not to ask what Islam is or whether it is good or bad but to ask why certain interpretations of it are more compelling to some groups in society than to others and how views change over time? And we can answer these questions only by asking how religious authority is constituted around Islam in a given society, how it interacts with other kinds of authority (that of the state, or of science or progress, and so on), how religious knowledge is produced and transmitted, and by whom. What "Islam" or "real Islam" are and what they ought to be are thus questions not primarily of theology, but of cultural and social politics. The political implications of these debates depend on what historically contingent forces play a role (which groups in society have what vested interests) and by the historical baggage these groups bring with them. The burden of the past is absolutely crucial in defining the parameters of debate.

Islam arrived in Central Asia with Arab armies at the dawn of the eighth century. Arab expansion had brought the armies of the caliphate to the banks of the Oxus (or Amu Darya) by the middle of the seventh century. "The land beyond the river"—*Mâ warâ al-nahr* in Arabic, Transoxiana in English—boasted an old sedentary civilization, Iranian in speech and predominantly Zoroastrian in religion, that sat at the crossroads of trade between India, China, and the societies of the Mediterranean. Although Arab armies had been raiding the region since the 670s, it was only in 709 that they captured Bukhara and incorporated it into the Umayyad caliphate. The conquest led to the conversion of many local inhabitants, although we have few concrete facts at our disposal about the pace of conversion. The Arab conquerors considered new converts to be their clients, *mauwâlî*, whose conversion freed them from taxation but did not lead to equality with the Arab conquerors. The ethnic nature of the Umayyad polity changed with the coming to power of the Abbasid dynasty as Islam transformed into a universal religion, and the rate of conversion of the sedentary population probably picked up. By the ninth century, Muslim geographers considered Transoxiana to be an integral part of the Muslim world. Over the next two centuries, its cities became connected to networks of Muslim culture and of Islamic learning. Indeed, some of the most important figures in Islamic civilization came from Transoxiana. Sunni Muslims hold six compilations of hadith to be authoritative. Two of the six compilers, Abu Isma'il al-Bukhari (810–70) and Abu 'Isa Muhammad al-Tirmidhi (825–92) were from Transoxiana. The influential jurists Abu Mansur Muhammad al-Maturidi (d. ca. 944) and Burhan al-Din Abu'l Hasan al-Marginani (d. 1197); the great scientist Abu Nasr al-Muhammad al-Farabi (d. ca. 950), known as "the second teacher" (after Aristotle); and the rationalist philosopher Abu 'Ali Ibn Sina (980–1037, known in the West as Avicenna)—figures of absolutely central importance in the history of Islamic civilization in its so-called classical age—were all born in the region. They were part of broader networks of travel and learning, which served to make the cities of Transoxiana part of the heartland of the Muslim world. This position was cemented by the emergence, at the end of the tenth century, of Bukhara as the seat of the independent Samanid dynasty, which patronized the development of "new Persian" (i.e., Persian as a fully Islamized language) as a literary language.

The surrounding steppe, with its largely Turkic-speaking nomadic population, remained a borderland. Many nomads entered the orbit of Muslim civilization and began migrating to the Middle East from the tenth century on, but conversion to Islam was a gradual process that lasted into the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, in the early thirteenth century, non-Muslim steppe nomads burst upon Central Asia in the form of the armies of Genghis Khan, and dealt a massive blow to the region. For their sheer ferocity, the Mongol conquests quickly became proverbial. For the contemporary Arab historian Ibn al-Athir, they were a "tremendous disaster such as had never happened before, and which struck all the world, though the Muslims above all. If anyone were to say that at no time since the creation of man by the great God had the world experienced anything like it, he would only be telling the truth."⁷ The wholesale slaughter and eviction of populations from cities laid waste to whole provinces. Although the Mongols did not bear any particular animus toward Islam, their actions had a destructive impact on the religious and cultural traditions of Transoxiana. Islam was displaced from its position as the recipient of political protection or patronage, and its moral and ethical imperatives were subordinated to Mongol practices. For example, when Genghis Khan rode into Bukhara, he entered the main mosque, mounted the pulpit, and exclaimed to the assembled multitudes, "The countryside is empty of fodder; fill our horses' bellies." Whereupon," we are told by Ara Malik Juvaini, the Muslim historian in Mongol employ who is our best source on the events, the Mongols opened all the magazines in the town and began carrying off the grain. And they brought the cases in which Korans were kept out into the courtyard of the mosque, where they cast the Korans right and left and turned the cases into mangers for their horses. After which they circulated cups of wine and sent for the singing-girls of the town to sing and dance for them; while the Mongols raised their voices to the tunes of their own songs. Meanwhile, the *imams*, *shaikhs*, *sayyids*, doctors and scholars of the age kept watch over their horses in the stable under the supervision of the equestrians, and executed their commands. After an hour or two Chingiz-Khan arose to return to his camp, and as the multitude that had been gathered there moved away the leaves of the Koran were trampled in the dirt beneath their own feet and their horses' hoofs.⁸

Though Transoxiana escaped more lightly than some other regions conquered by the Mongols, the damage to both its economy and its cultural traditions was great. The Mongols had their own code of law and ethics, the *yasa*, which they set against the shariat. Mongol rule thus undid the

hegemony of Islam in the political realm. The devastation also unleashed a lengthy period of religious change, in Central Asia and beyond. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries witnessed numerous messianic movements in the Islamic East (Central Asia, South Asia, Iran, and Anatolia), one of which, the Safavids, ended up taking political power in Iran and imposing Shi'ism on the country. This period also saw the emergence of Sufi movements and their institutionalization in tariqats. The Sufis' attitudes varied enormously. Some were openly antinomian, seeing salvation only in the renunciation of the world. For such Sufis, norms of society had to be trampled; outrageous forms of social deviance (going around naked, consuming narcotics and hallucinogens, renouncing work and reproductive sexuality) became the ultimate measure of true devotion to God.⁹ Other Sufi orders adhered more closely to the norms of society and of juridical Islam, and were intertwined with political power to different degrees. Many of the most prominent Sufi orders (such as the Naqshbandiya and the Kubraviya) originated in Central Asia in these centuries and then spread far beyond its boundaries.

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One of the enduring stereotypes of Islam is that religion and politics are intertwined in it. Unsympathetic observers in the West (who contrast the Muslim world unfavorably with the Christian West with its supposedly clear demarcations between the realms of God and Caesar) are not the only purveyors of this view; many contemporary Muslims, too, insist that "Islam is not just a religion, but a way of life." Historically, however, this is simply not the case. For the bulk of Islamic history, religious and political authority have lain in different hands, a division of labor that was often explicitly formulated by theorists. The earliest caliphs claimed both political and religious authority, but already by the beginning of the third Islamic century, the ulama had supplanted the caliphs as guardians of the faith. The political might of the caliphate, in contrast, disappeared with the rise of numerous independent dynasties, whose legitimacy came primarily from military conquest. The majority of the ulama came to accept the new political order, and they appreciated the security and order that the rulers provided. Indeed, the fear of anarchy, *fitna*, when the supposedly natural order of the social world would be rent asunder, was a fundamental stabilizing force and helped reconcile the ulama to the new order. As the fourteenth-century jurist Ibn Taymiya put it succinctly, forty years of despotism are better than a day of anarchy. But religion and

state—*din va dawlat*—were distinct entities: “The state was not a direct expression of Islam, but a secular institution whose duty it was to uphold Islam; the real community of Muslims was the community of scholars and holy men who carried on the legacy of the Prophet in daily life.”¹⁰ The Hanafi school of jurisprudence, which predominated in Central Asia, in particular, came to articulate an explicitly quietist attitude toward political power, which in the colonial period led many ulama to reconcile themselves to European rule.

Rulers, for their part, professed to uphold Islamic ethical norms and to serve Islam through the patronage of Islamic learning and the construction of mosques, madrasas, Sufi lodges, and shrines to significant personages. But otherwise, the daily conduct of politics was dictated by *raison d'état*. The practice of Muslim rulers—which included plenty of war with other Muslim rulers—can seldom be explained by injunctions laid out in the scriptural sources of Islam. Far more useful for understanding the political conduct of Muslim rulers are the numerous “mirrors for princes” and advice manuals written by literati over the centuries. These writers took the model for the ideal ruler not so much from the Qur'an as from pre-Islamic imperial traditions—Mesopotamian, Iranian, Byzantine—important elements of which were fully assimilated into the new Islamicate political order.

This process was particularly evident in post-Mongol Central Asia. Over the course of the fourteenth century, the Mongol empire crumbled, and its successors in Central Asia converted to Islam, which thus regained its status as the religion of the ruling elite and the object of royal patronage. But the descendants of the Mongols never renounced their heritage. The principle that only true-blooded descendants of Genghis Khan had the right to rule retained wide currency, and later rulers laid their claims to legitimacy through a combination of Genghisid and Islamic factors. In the late fourteenth century, a Turkic notable named Timur established a major empire out of the chaos of feuding Mongol principalities. Timurid culture was thoroughly Islamized. For all the violence of Timur's ceaseless military conquests, he and his descendants presided over a period of remarkable cultural efflorescence. Samarqand, Timur's capital, was adorned with numerous architectural gems, and the Timurid court provided generous patronage for scholarship and the arts. Timur sought to legitimate himself through both Islam and the *yasa*. The Timurid empire lasted for several generations, but eventually Timur's descendants were ousted from Transoxiana by the nomadic followers of Shaibani Khan, a Muslim Genghisid prince who arrived from the north

to reestablish Genghisid rule in the region. Known as Uzbeks, these nomads sedentarized quite rapidly and established what became the khanate of Bukhara. Shaibani Khan's successor, Ubaydullah Khan (d. 1540), made a vow at the shrine of the Sufi master Ahmed Yesevi in the town of Turkistan (in the south of present-day Kazakhstan) that he would rule fully in accordance with the shariat if he were successful in battle against Babur, then allied with the extremist Shi'i Safavid dynasty in Iran. Upon gaining victory, Ubaydullah Khan commissioned Fazlullah Ruzbihan, a scholar from Shiraz in Iran who had found refuge in Samarqand from the Safavids, to compose a manual of governance for him. Fazlullah's *Sulūk ul-mulūk* (The Conduct of Kings) was one of the most comprehensive Islamicate manuals of governance written in Persian. It is largely a synthetic work that describes the consensus of Sunni ulama of the time. It also provides valuable insights into the assumptions that lay behind statecraft in Central Asia in the post-Mongol period.

Fazlullah starts with the assumption that political authority is an absolute necessity and therefore a religious obligation. “Man is social by nature, and bound to cooperate with human society in providing for himself. Because the capacities for lust and anger invite tyranny and conflict, it is necessary for a just ruler to remove [such] tyranny and create proportion and equality among things that are not proportionate.”¹¹ The community of Muslims needs a leader, an imam, to act as a vicegerent of the Prophet “for the sake of establishing the faith and protecting the community's domains.” Although Fazlullah cites several ways of choosing an imam, he also recognizes “domination and sheer exercise of power” as legitimate. A leader who becomes a ruler over Muslims through power and military force is legitimate, and it is incumbent upon Muslims to obey all his orders and prohibitions “as long as he does not oppose the shariat.” More positively, the ruler has to undertake to “protect the shariat” which here means “the solicitude of the ruler that the laws of the shariat should be guarded and protected among the community, and no manner of rupture may occur in its fundamentals or its branches. It is possible to consider a ruler just only to the extent that he protects the divine decrees and the observance of its commandments.” The ruler should fulfill this responsibility by appointing learned men to offices such as *shaykh al-Islām*, “the leader of Islam,” and *al-ʿlam al-ʿulamā*, “the most learned of the learned,” and by patronizing the cultivation of religious knowledge and showing respect to the learned.¹²

In return, Fazlullah was willing to grant Islamic legitimacy to all the

royal pretensions of the rulers. A ruler who upheld the shariat could draw on the treasury for "anything needed to uphold the majesty of his rule." This practice was different from the precedent of the early years of Islam but necessitated by the new era. "Monetary allowances in our times differ from the days of the Prophet or the caliphs," Fazlullah wrote, "because the Prophet was victorious through the respect he inspired, and in the caliphal period, Islam was vigorous and young and people feared the rulers because of prophecy's lingering effects. Today, things have changed and hearts are no longer in their original place. Now if the imam does not undertake the ceremonies of houses, property, horses, and slaves for the sake of appearances, [and] chooses instead to follow the caliphs in his way of living, people would not obey him and all affairs of the Muslim community would come to a standstill."¹³ Without social order, of course, there could be no hope for the maintenance of the shariat.

Fazlullah was not particularly original or unusual in presenting matters thus. His views represent a consensus that Sunni ulama of the region had arrived at by this time. The reconciliation of fiqh to the state ruled by military elites that acquired their legitimacy from conquest alone was of long standing. The events of the three centuries preceding Fazlullah, rife with political violence and religious experimentation, had only strengthened the ulama's faith in the necessity of order and of a harmonious relationship between themselves and the state. Indeed, the early sixteenth century saw the consolidation of stable empires throughout the Muslim world—the Ottomans, the Safavids, the Mughals, and the Uzbeks—that did much to curb the religious experimentation of the previous three centuries and establish a certain orthodoxy of state-ulama relations. In that sense, the Central Asian case is part of a much broader phenomenon.

The ensuing three centuries did see the emergence of an alliance between the state and the ulama along the lines indicated by Fazlullah. The sixteenth century saw the construction of several madrasas—places where knowledge could be transmitted to future generations and the ranks of the ulama replenished. Sufi hospices proliferated as well. Madrasas were funded through the institution of the *waqf*, property endowed in perpetuity for a given purpose. Waqf was a major institution in Muslim societies, anchored in fiqh and serving a host of purposes. The establishment of a waqf was a pious deed by the benefactor. If the latter were a ruler, then the act was part of his claim to being a just and legitimate ruler. The property thus endowed could take any form—agricultural land, shops, other forms of rental property—and was usually free

from taxation. The waqfs were under the supervision of trustees, who normally came from the ranks of the ulama. To a certain extent, then, waqfs gave the ulama considerable financial autonomy from the state.

Although it is hazardous to generalize about a period spanning three centuries, we can say that the post-Timurid period saw a resurgence of Islamic learning in the cities of Transoxiana. Samarqand, Tashkent, and the cities of the Ferghana Valley boasted numerous madrasas, but the pride of place went to Bukhara. Juvaini had described the city on the eve of its sacking by the Mongols as the "cupola of Islam" in the Islamic East, comparable to the very seat of the caliphate, Baghdad. "Its environs are adorned with the brightness of the light of doctors and jurists and its surroundings embellished with the rarest of high attainments."¹⁴ That status returned to Bukhara in the post-Timurid period, when its madrasas attracted students from throughout Central Asia and beyond, from India in the south and Kazan to the north. The city became *Bukhârâ-yi sharîf*, Bukhara the Noble, the center of Sunni orthodoxy in the region.

This orthodoxy rested on a synthesis of juridical Islam with Sufism. Shariat and tariqat came to be seen as complementary sources of authority. All ulama had Sufi affiliations, and Sufism realigned itself to the norms of juridical Islam. Networks of scholarly and Sufi activity were indistinguishable from one another, and the same individuals offered instruction in both exoteric and esoteric sciences.¹⁵ Therefore, we can speak of the ulama and the Sufis as a single group. The synthesis was also self-consciously a tradition of interpretation and as such, was quite conservative. As in the rest of the Muslim world, Central Asian madrasas were not formal institutions that admitted students or granted degrees. Rather they were places where students learned from masters, whose authority derived from their learning, piety, and reputation. The master-disciple relationship was an individual one, and it revolved around the study of a standard body of texts. Most of these texts were commentaries and supercommentaries on older works of law. The Qur'an and the hadith were not studied as such. The ulama of Central Asia had little recourse to the texts that we think of as the original sources of Islam. This fact strikes modern sensibilities as incomprehensible (and, as we shall see, the modernist Muslim critique of madrasa education focused on this point), but it made perfect sense within the logic of the tradition as it had evolved. *Tafsîr*, the science of the explication of the Qur'an, was a high-stakes endeavor left to a few specialists. The task of the tradition of learning embodied in the madrasa was to conserve certain truths

that the ulama themselves were believed that the affirmation of their elite status was the factor that made rulers just. (The notion of an Islamic state belongs to the twentieth century.) During the reign of Shah Murad, we are told, the son of an *âkhund* killed a shopkeeper who was rude to him. The victim's father petitioned the amir for justice, but the amir was so outraged by the temerity of the victim that he imposed a fine on the father instead, exclaiming that if the victim were not already dead, the amir would have had him thrown from the Minar-i Kalan, the tall minaret that overlooked the city and was used for executing criminals in this manner. "It is clear from the aforesaid," our source informs us, "how knowledge and its servants were in ascendance at that time, and how strong were the opinions of the ulama and the rulers."¹⁷ The shariat was honored when its carriers were honored.

In the nomadic societies beyond Transoxiana, where the tradition of book learning in madrasas was practically nonexistent, access to Islam lay primarily through sacred lineages. Communities paid allegiance to individuals, usually Sufi shaykhs, who belonged to lineages that had "brought Islam" to the community. The Turkmens had been in the Islamic orbit since the tenth century, but the Islamization of the Kazakhs was a longer process, completed only in the late nineteenth century. In both societies, members of sacred lineages—the Qojas among the Kazakhs, the *övlad* among the Turkmens—had immense social prestige and often wealth, but political power remained in the hands of tribal chiefs. Power in nomadic societies was imagined in genealogical terms, and to the extent that state structures existed, they derived their moral authority from *âdat*, tribal custom and the traditions of the elders (who were Muslims by definition), rather than through the juridical tradition of the shariat as it was developed in urban societies by generations of ulama. Later, during the colonial period, the Russian state formalized the distinction between *âdat* and shariat by establishing sharply different administrative practices in areas governed by two variants of colonial law.

revealed by God and the sciences elaborated by the masters. Furthermore, law was the central discipline in Bukharan madrasas of the post-Timurid epoch, and it could be mastered without direct recourse to the Qur'an and the hadith. Besides teaching the shariat as thus understood, madrasas taught "Arabic sciences," such as grammar, prosody, and history, and "rational" sciences, such as logic, philosophy, and metaphysics. Curious students could seek out professors with whom to read books in other disciplines as well.

The possession of Islamic knowledge gave the ulama immense prestige and status and turned them into a self-conscious elite. Nevertheless, the relationship between the rulers and the ulama was dynamic. In times when the state was weak, the ulama or the Sufis could exercise power in their own right. In fifteenth-century Samarqand, the Sufi sheikh Khoja Ahrar had played a significant role in the social and political life of the city, whereas in Tashkent, the ulama had ruled in their own right for much of the eighteenth century, when the city was a state unto itself. At other times, rulers honored the ulama and placed them in places of high influence, granting them tax exemptions as well as control of substantial waqf property and patronizing madrasas and khanqahs. This practice was especially common among rulers of the Manghit dynasty, which took over Bukhara in the late eighteenth century. The Manghits could not claim Genghisid descent and therefore had no choice but to assert their legitimacy through Islam. (For this reason, they could not use the title of khan and instead called themselves *amir*, which had strong Islamic connotations.) The first two rulers of the dynasty formed especially strong alliances with the ulama, even intermarrying with the more august families in their ranks. Such connections were mutually beneficial: they provided the amirs with legitimacy and access to august lineages while placing considerable authority in the hands of the ulama.¹⁶

Did this arrangement make Bukhara a theocracy? Contemporary Russian and other European observers and later Soviet-era critics thought so. The rulers conceived of rulership and politics in a conceptual framework that derived from Islam. The requirements for compliance with shariat were quite minimal. The ulama recognized the permissibility of *raison d'état*, and of the proclamation of non-shariat laws. The rulers of Bukhara, like all other rulers in the Muslim world, decreed all sorts of laws about extracting obedience and revenue on their own authority with the full approval of the ulama. The "Islamic" aspect of the governance of Bukhara was rulers' willingness to honor and hold in high esteem the carriers of Islamic learning, the ulama. The sources indicate

CHAPTER 2

Empire and the Challenge of Modernity

Internally, however, the rulers of the two protectorates were left to their own devices. As the administrators of many other European colonial empires had discovered, protectorates were much cheaper than direct rule.

Central Asia had seen many empires in its long history, but the Russian conquest brought new forms of political control and new forms of knowledge to justify it. It brought Central Asia into the modern world via colonialism. This fate was shared by much of the world outside Europe and North America in the nineteenth century. Russian administrators of Central Asia saw their position there as directly equivalent to that of the British in India or the French in Algeria or Vietnam.

Everywhere in the colonized world, conquest and subjugation produced new challenges for the conquered: How have we come to this pass? Why have we been conquered? What can we do? Different groups in society came up with different answers. But they all formulated their answers within a framework that was the product of colonialism. Many of the answers came from new groups of modern intellectuals that appropriated to their own ends the new kinds of education and new ways of looking at the world that empire made possible. They demanded political rights from the imperial power, but they also asserted the need for change in their own societies. The new order unleashed by empire transformed the dynamics of intellectual life in colonized societies, although change was seldom unidirectional. Central Asia was no exception to this pattern. Let us examine these changes in more concrete detail.

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Islam and Muslims have had a constant presence in Russian history. Genghis Khan's grandson Batu had conquered the principalities of Rus', and the conversion of his descendant Özbek Khan to Islam in 1327 meant that political overlordship of the lands of Rus' was in the hands of Muslims for over a century. That relationship was soon reversed, as Muscovy, the principality that grew to be the Russian empire, gained strength while the Golden Horde, the Mongol successor state, disintegrated into numerous smaller entities. Muscovy acquired its first Muslim subjects as early as 1392, when the so-called Mishar Tatars, who inhabited what is now Nizhny Novgorod province, entered the service of Muscovite princes. Nevertheless, it was in 1552 with the conquest of Kazan, one of the remnants of the Golden Horde, that Muscovy first acquired a sizable Muslim population. Over the next two centuries,

On June 15, 1865, Russian troops under the command of General M. G. Cherniaev broke through the city walls of Tashkent. After two days of resistance, notables of the town sued for peace and accepted Russian overlordship. The conquest of Tashkent, a major entrepôt for cross-regional trade and the third largest city in Transoxiana, was a significant landmark in the history of Central Asia. The Russians had been encroaching southward for more than a century and a half, and had, slowly but surely, extended their control over what is now Kazakhstan over the course of the nineteenth century. Tashkent, however, was the first major city in the sedentary zone of Central Asia that they had annexed. The subjugation of the rest of Transoxiana proceeded with great speed. The military forces of the three major states in the region—Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand—proved woefully inadequate in the confrontation, and they were overwhelmed. The Russians annexed large chunks of territory from each of them but left the three rulers on their thrones to rule their rump states as Russian protectorates. (Kokand was later annexed *in toto*.) By 1889, when the Turkmen tribes of the Qizil Qum desert had been finally subjugated, Russia had emerged as the paramount colonial power in the region. The lands annexed from the local states or tribes were consolidated in the province of Turkestan, ruled by a governor-general answerable directly to the tsar. The two protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva were enclosed within Russian customs boundaries and denied the ability to conduct foreign relations on their own.

Muscovy acquired numerous Muslim subjects as it asserted suzerainty over the Bashkir and Kazakh steppes. In 1783, Catherine the Great annexed Crimea, the last of the successors of the Golden Horde, and late eighteenth-century expansion brought Russia to the Caucasus. Although the annexation of the Transcaucasian principalities (including present-day Azerbaijan) was accomplished with relative ease, the conquest of the Caucasus consumed Russian energies for the first half of the nineteenth century. The final subjugation of Caucasian tribes was complete only with the capture of the tribes' military and spiritual leader Shamil in 1859. By the time the Russians conquered Transoxiana, they had long experience with Muslims. The conquest of Transoxiana doubled the size of the empire's Muslim population, inducing the inhabitants of the region into the wider community of "the Muslims of Russia."

Nevertheless, it is difficult to discern a single Muslim policy in the Russian empire. The Russian empire was conceptualized as a vast array of differences in which groups paid allegiance to the tsar-emperor in their own ways. The Russian state's interaction with Islam and Muslims therefore varied greatly over time and place. In the immediate aftermath of the conquest of Kazan, the state followed a policy of harsh repression. Repression returned in the early eighteenth century, when Peter the Great and his successors began to see religious uniformity as a desirable goal. In 1730, a new campaign of conversion led to the destruction of many mosques. For much of the rest of the imperial period, however, the state's attitude was essentially, in the words of Andreas Kappeler, one of "pragmatic flexibility."¹ Service to the state was the ultimate measure of loyalty and the source of privilege. Tatar landlords who survived the dispossession of the sixteenth century were allowed to keep their land and were even able to own Orthodox serfs.

The reign of Catherine II (1762–96) marked a turning point in the state's relationship with its Muslim subjects. She made religious tolerance an official policy and set about creating a basis for loyalty to the Russian state in the Tatar lands. She affirmed the rights of Muslim nobles and even sought to induct the Muslim clergy in this endeavor. In 1788, she established a "spiritual assembly" at Orenburg. The Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly was an attempt, unique in the Muslim world at that time, by the state to impose an organizational structure on Islam. Islam was for Catherine a higher form of religion than shamanism, and she looked favorably upon the Islamization of the Kazakhs by Tatar ulama. This stance, was of course intertwined with the goals of bringing the Kazakh steppe under closer Russian control and outflanking Ottoman

diplomacy there. Headed by a state-appointed mufti, the assembly was responsible for appointing and licensing imams throughout the territory under its purview and for overseeing the operation of mosques.

Although Catherine's policies survived until 1917 in their broad outline, her enthusiasm for Islam did not. The Enlightenment had also brought to Russia the concept of fanaticism, and fear of fanaticism tended to dominate Russian thinking about Islam in the nineteenth century. Islam was now deemed to be inherently fanatical, and the question now was how to curb or contain this "fanaticism." If Catherine had hoped for the Islamization of the Kazakhs as a mode of progress, nineteenth-century administrators sought to protect the "natural" religion of the Kazakhs from the "fanatical" Islam of the Tatars or the Central Asians. These concerns defined Russian policies toward Islam in Central Asia in the nineteenth century.

Russian policies in Turkestan bore a deep imprint of the first governor-general, K. P. Kaufman, who served in office from 1867 until his death in 1881. For Kaufman, the ultimate goal was to assimilate the region into the Russian empire, but full assimilation could happen only in the long term. The Russian presence was too tenuous, the local population too dense and too "fanatical" for full assimilation to take place. The fanaticism inherited in Islam, and the solution was to undermine the influence of Islam. Such "fanaticism" could be lessened by ignoring Islam and depriving it of all state support, which Kaufman was confident would lead to the decay of Islam, while working on a long-term goal of encouraging trade and enlightenment as a way of assimilating the region to the empire. Ignoring Islam meant denying government recognition to religious dignitaries and distancing them from the new institutions of power. Thus, Kaufman forbade the Orenburg Muslim Assembly to extend its jurisdiction into Turkestan. Islam was to be ignored, not destroyed: colonial empires were seldom interested in this type of massive intervention in society. The Russian policy of ignoring Islam did not mean that local social and cultural practices remained untouched by the new circumstances. The mere presence of the Russians, the incorporation of the region into the world economy as never before, and the advent of new forms of communication and organization all produced far-reaching changes. But the changes were complex and cannot be understood simply as either "Russification" or "resistance."

The local population remained subject to indigenous law in civil and personal matters, although the colonial regime brought about many changes here too. From the beginning, the Russians made a sharp dis-

tion between the nomadic and sedentary populations. The former were allegedly close to a "natural" way of life, in which Islam provided merely a thin veneer over ancient customs. They were to be governed by customary law (*adat*). The sedentary populations, in contrast, were associated with "real Islam" and thus were under the domain of the shariat. Both forms of indigenous law were to be administered by judges elected by local notables. Although in theory election was open to any male over twenty-five years of age, in practice, offices for both qazis (judges in shariat courts) and *briys* (those in *adat* courts) remained predominantly in the hands of those with traditional qualifications. This assumption of innate differences between *adat* and shariat crystallized a situation that had been much more fluid, leading nomadic and sedentary societies along separate paths. The state's official recognition of the two modes of law began a process of bureaucratizing and codifying them. Here, Russian policies had much in common with those of other European powers in their colonies. For our purposes, the shariat courts are important because they provided a space for the continued influence of the ulama in the sedentary regions of Transoxiana.

The ulama reacted to the Russian conquest in a number of ways. In some cases, they mobilized armed resistance to Russian armies. In 1866, for example, Muzaffar Khan, the amir of Bukhara, showed little enthusiasm for taking on the Russians when they approached the town of Jizzakh on the way to his capital. The ulama from the madrasas of the city led a throng to the gates of his palace, demanding that he take on the invaders. A similar protest erupted in Samarqand, where the populace had already been complaining about the exactions of the local governor. The protest turned into a riot, which was brutally suppressed by the amir's troops, with large numbers of students and many leading ulama of the city being massacred. Later, in 1898, a Sufi sheikh by the name of Dukchi Eshon led two thousand followers in attacking Russian barracks in Andijan in the Ferghana Valley, killing twenty-two soldiers as they slept. Some ulama are known to have emigrated from lands annexed by the Russians, either to Bukhara, where the amir retained internal autonomy, or to Afghanistan. But such cases were exceptional. The Andijan uprising, quickly suppressed with great brutality, was the most serious armed revolt against Russian rule in Central Asia until 1916. The ulama fell back on a long tradition of quietism well articulated in the local Hanafi tradition. As we saw in chapter 1, Fazlullah Ruzbihan had argued that as long as a Muslim ruler upheld the shariat, his rule was legitimate. In the late nineteenth century, Fazlullah's successors extended this recog-

nition to the Russians. As long as the new rulers did not harm the shariat, and as long as Muslims as a community retained a space in which Islam could be practiced and the bearers of the shariat could adjudicate in matters of civil and personal law, colonial rule was legitimate. Far from decaying as a result of government disinterest, Muslim institutions flourished. The half-century of Russian rule before the revolution of 1917 saw marked growth in the size of cities, as new economic links to empire (most importantly, the introduction of cash-crop agriculture centered on cotton) led to substantial economic growth. Many new madrasas were built, and attendance in them increased. The policy of nonintervention in local life allowed recognition of Muslim society as different. The ulama came to see themselves as the gatekeepers of this difference.

Things turned out somewhat differently in the protectorates. Bukhara acquired a reputation as a bastion of conservative orthodoxy in which the ulama ruled the roost. This generalization had an element of truth, but the reality was complex. The ulama certainly emerged as the gatekeepers of tradition there, too, but Bukhara was no theocracy. The Russians had stopped short of total conquest of Bukhara, in part out of fear of provoking the "fanaticism" of the population to a degree that they could not control. Left to the rule of a Muslim monarch, the Russians calculated, the Muslims were much more likely to be quiescent. The amir of Bukhara thus became a guarantor of the stability of Russian rule in Central Asia. Muzaffar, the defeated amir of Bukhara, brilliantly turned this situation to his own purposes. To his own population, he portrayed himself as the last remaining Muslim ruler in Central Asia, who was thus a defender of the last bastion of Islam in the region. With the Russians at the gates, traditional practices came to be valorized as the measure of true Islam, and Muzaffar fashioned himself as the upholder of local ("Islamic") traditions. To the Russians, he presented himself as the best means of keeping the "fanaticism" of the local population in check, provided the Russians did not interfere in everyday life in the emirate. At the same time, by giving the Russians a stake in keeping him and his descendants on the throne, Muzaffar was able greatly to strengthen his position internally. He had not forgotten the uprisings of the ulama in 1866. Once peace was restored, he acted quickly to assert his authority over them. Over the next few years, he turned the ulama into a subservient estate. He created numerous sinecures for readers of prayers at his palace. He also revived the old Bukharan tradition of the *debyak*, a stipend that the amir gave to madrasa students, as a way of buying the loyalties of the ulama. The amirs also used appointments to offices and

ranks as levers to enhance their position vis-à-vis the ulama.² Although the amirs could not completely disregard scholarly credentials in making appointments, they nevertheless could choose between similarly qualified candidates.

The amirs' control of the ulama was never complete, but the constraints placed on the latter were real. Many ulama accommodated themselves well to the new situation, but tensions remained. Bukharan ulama could, by withholding their assent, stymie any of the amirs' initiatives that they did not like, and if the need arose, they could even assert their power against the amirs through open agitation. But open agitation also brought to the fore divisions among the ulama. Bukhara's status as the most important major center of Islamic learning in Central Asia was not affected by the Russian conquest. Students continued to arrive in Bukhara from all over Central Asia. This scholarly population was of central importance both to the economy and to the politics of the city, which gave the impression of being one citywide campus. Among the ulama were a number of factions, each of which found a constituency among the students, who were tied to their teachers with bonds of loyalty and patronage. The resulting factional struggles over access to influence and wealth defined the parameters of politics in Bukhara under the protectorate.³

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In the generation following the Russian conquest, then, the ulama gradually accommodated themselves to the new order in Central Asia. The new regime left enough space for the practice of Islam and the fulfillment of basic legal codes that the ulama could focus on maintaining that space. In this arrangement, they were happy enough to cooperate with the Russian administration and to accept state honors and decorations. They could respect many of the developments introduced by the Russians—modern medicine, the telegraph, railways—but felt no need for Muslim society to change. That feeling began to change by the turn of the century, when voices for reform began to emerge from other groups in society. Here is a typical example of this new discourse:

O coreligionists, o compatriots! Let's be just and compare our situation with that of other, advanced nations. Let's secure the future of our coming generations and save them from becoming slaves and servants of others. The Europeans, taking advantage of our negligence and ignorance, took our government from our hands, and are gradually taking over our crafts and

trades. If we do not quickly make an effort to reform our affairs in order to safeguard ourselves, our nation, and our children, our future will be extremely difficult. Reform begins with a rapid start in cultivating sciences conforming to our times. Becoming acquainted with the sciences of the present age depends upon the reform of our schools and our methods of teaching. Our present schools take four or five years only to teach reading and writing, and our colleges take fifteen to twenty years merely to study introductions [to canonical texts]. . . . To hope for them to impart a knowledge of the sciences of the present age is as futile as to expect one to reach out to a bird flying in the sky while standing in a well. . . . If we ignore this [now], it will be too late.⁴

Munavvar Qori, the author of this passage, which appeared as a front-page editorial in *Xurshid* (The Sun), a newspaper launched in 1906 in Tashkent, was a teacher who had studied in the madrasas of Tashkent and Bukhara. Well versed in the knowledge possessed by the ulama, he nevertheless argued from different premises. Munavvar Qori and others like him believed that the Muslim society of Central Asia was in a serious crisis, in which its survival was at stake. Everything was in need of change, with traditional education at center stage. The course of action was clear: enlightenment and modern education would solve all the problems of the community, but the community and its members would have to reorganize themselves in order to achieve this goal.

Munavvar Qori was one of the leading figures of a new reformist movement called Jadidism then gaining a foothold in Central Asia.⁵ The movement derived its name from its advocacy of the *usul-i jadid*, the new method of teaching the Arabic alphabet to children in the *maktab*, the ubiquitous elementary school of sedentary Muslim societies of the region. Implicit in the concept was a new way of looking at the world. The most important item in the lexicon of Central Asian Jadidism was *taraqqiy*, a term that covered the notions of progress, development, rise, and growth. The Jadids' assimilation of the idea of progress, the notion of history as open-ended change, altered the way in which they saw the world and their place within it. If progress were a fact of nature, then it was incumbent upon Muslims as a community to strive for it too. Progress begat civilization, which for the Jadids was a singular entity. They would have utterly rejected the notion of a clash of civilizations. Rather, progress and civilization were accessible to all; the only precondition was the cultivation of knowledge. Hence came the centrality of the new-method school in the Jadid project; hence also came the emphasis on self-improvement.

Knowledge also explained for the Jadids the superiority of the "more

advanced" societies of Russia (and Europe in general) over Muslim society. These societies were living examples of the links between knowledge, wealth, and military might that the Jadids constantly asserted. Such positive images were not simply the result of the Jadids' Europhilia. They had a didactic purpose: to exhort the Jadids' own society to acquire all the aspects of Europe that they admired: knowledge, order, discipline, power. This fascination with Europe coexisted with a fear that if Muslim societies did not "catch up," their situation would become even more difficult. The practically unchallenged encroachment of European powers over the rest of the planet sustained these fears. But fear alone did not drive the Jadid agenda. The Jadids genuinely admired the new forms of order and discipline in industrial society and appreciated its technological achievements. The task was to join this civilization, an imperative that the Jadids believed was commanded by Islam itself. The Jadids hoped that Muslims ultimately would join the modern world as respected and equal partners. They wanted the modernity of Europe for themselves.

The call to reform was made from a self-consciously Islamic position. The acquisition of modern knowledge, the Jadids argued, was mandated by Islam itself. In common with other modernists of the period, the Jadids ascribed the "decline" and "degeneration" of their community to its departure from the true path of Islam. When Muslims followed true Islam, the Jadids argued, they were leaders of the world in knowledge, and Muslim empires were mighty. Corruption of the faith led them to ignorance and political and military weakness. The solution was a return to "true Islam."

True understanding of Islam for the Jadids meant recourse to the scriptural sources of Islam without the commentaries and glosses painstakingly developed by centuries of scholars. The textual sources of Islam—the Qur'an and hadith—were now deemed to be self-sufficient and accessible to all educated Muslims. If commentaries and glosses were a hindrance to true knowledge of Islam, other customary practices, such as seeking intercession from "friends of God" or visiting shrines, were blatant signs of polytheism, the biggest sin in the Islamic tradition. For the Jadids, Islam existed in certain texts, not in the customs and traditions of Muslim communities. Jadidism represented, in essence, a new way of knowing Islam.

Jadidism may have started as simply the advocacy of a new method of teaching the alphabet, but in emphasizing the importance of literacy as a functional skill, rather than as a sacred activity, it was profoundly sub-

versive of established patterns of cultural authority. Much of the ulama's authority rested in their command of the tradition of the interpretation of the sacred texts of Islam. The Jadids denounced the long tradition of interpretation that was reproduced in the madrasas; they criticized this tradition and argued that the basic texts were accessible to all those who possessed the literacy provided by the new-method schools they championed. Debates about religion could now take place in print, rather than in the rarefied precincts of scholastic circles. Received understandings could be questioned by new groups acting in a new arena; the transformations that had affected religion in Europe in the early modern period were now happening in the Muslim world. Madrasas faced criticism for not meeting the needs of the age, for producing corrupted versions of Islam, and even for being hotbeds of laziness and docility. The texts that the ulama mastered were now deemed to be full of *safsatalar va xurofof* ("sophistry and superstition") that obfuscated the true message of Islam and kept the Muslim community in the darkness of ignorance. The Jadids mounted a sustained critique of the ulama for their alleged venality, greed, and, most of all, abdication of their responsibility to the Muslim community. The ulama had corrupted the real teachings of Islam and led the nation into ignorance, and hence into colonial subjugation.

The life of Abdurauuf Fitrat (1886–1938) is illustrative of the fate of Jadidism in Central Asia. Fitrat was born in Bukhara when the protectorate was almost two decades old. The son of a merchant who had wide literary and scholarly interests and who had traveled abroad for trade, Fitrat received a traditional Muslim education in Bukhara, studying with the eminent scholars in the city's madrasas. In 1909, however, he received a scholarship from the newly established Education of Children Society (a benevolent society funded by the city's merchants who were frustrated by the inability of their children to acquire a modern education in Bukhara) to go to Istanbul for higher studies. The four years Fitrat spent in the Ottoman capital were tumultuous. He arrived there the year after the Young Turk revolution had rekindled debate about the future of the Ottoman Empire. Fitrat's Istanbul experiences were to be central to the development of his view of the world.

The contours of Fitrat's notion of reform—and of Jadidism in general—are most clearly visible in two reformist tracts that he published in Istanbul. The first tract, *A Debate between a Bukharan Professor and a European in India on the Subject of New Schools* (1910) harks back to a long tradition in Islamic letters of *munâzara*, "disputation," but it addressed a topic of current importance. Even more surprising is Fitrat's

choice of a mouthpiece. The European in the title is an Englishman fully conversant with Islam and sympathetic to the needs of modern Muslim society. As a paragon of modern learning, he easily bests his Bukharan interlocutor. The Bukharan professor, clearly representative of all Bukharan ulama and the entire tradition as it existed in Fitrat's time, was ignorant of the world, narrow-minded, quick to temper, and not even proficient at his job. The Englishman speaks better Arabic than does the Bukharan, who has studied the language for years using the traditional methods. Fitrat turns the defense of new-method schools into a condemnation of traditional Bukharan ulama, whose conduct the Englishman criticizes for going against the injunctions of Islam and countering the best interests of Muslims: "What is this conduct that the ulama of Bukhara have!" exclaims the European interlocutor upon hearing that the ulama receive large sums of money from their students. "Are they not afraid of God or ashamed before the Prophet? . . . Are they not embarrassed to consider legal the imposition of this futile sin [of greed] on their helpless students—which God and the Prophet have declared illegal?"⁶ In his second tract, *Tales of an Indian Traveler*, Fitrat dispenses with the European and uses a fictional Indian Muslim in the role of a sympathetic but stern outside critic to list the desiderata of Bukharan reformers: public order through policing, long-term economic planning, the creation of a system of public health and hygiene, and above all, a system of modern education at all levels. In this project, the state has the central role as the initiator and executor of reform.⁷

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The tension between customary and normative understandings of Islam is a defining feature of the tradition. In criticizing customary practices in the light of textual sources, the Jadids put themselves in a long tradition within Islam of seeking renewal of faith and community. The Jadids were part of a broader current of modernist thought in the Muslim world of the period, which sought renewal of faith and community in a more rigorous approach to Islam. Figures such as the itinerant activist Jamal ad-Din Afghani (d. 1897); his disciple, the Egyptian mufti Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905); and a host of other luminaries sought to break from the accepted wisdom of the time by arguing for a return to the example of the "virtuous ancestors" (*al-aslâf al-sâlihîn*) of Islam—that is, the Prophet and his companions, whose lives were to be exemplary for all Muslims.⁸ But they wedded this call, and the critique of traditional learn-

ing that it encompassed, to notions of progress and civilization and arrived at a radically innovative position.

The idea of a return to the sources is a fundamentally modern one, and not surprisingly, it underlies all reformist movements in the modern Muslim world. But returning to the sources can yield all sorts of political and religious stances. Other groups have used the same premises to argue for more rigorous adherence to Islamic norms without putting that rigor in the service of "progress." In Central Asia on the eve of World War I, a circle of ulama published the journal *al-Islah* in Tashkent, which criticized customary practices associated with Sufism and called for more rigorous attention to requirements of fiqh. This call was a vision of piety rooted in hadith and fiqh, with no concern for yoking Islam to progress and modernity. Such concerns were taken to their extreme by a movement called "Wahhabism." Because Wahhabism figures large in later chapters of this book, a few words about the movement are in order here.

This radically puritanical sect arose in the Najd province of Arabia in the eighteenth century. Najd, a largely barren tract of land beyond the beaten path, had largely been forgotten by history. In the eighteenth century, it was formally claimed by the Ottoman Empire, but local tribes lived an autonomous existence. Here, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab began to preach a strictly puritanical doctrine that broke with the general consensus of Muslims. He took an expansive view of *shirk*, the sin of compromising God's unity, and of *bid'a*, "innovation." For 'Abd al-Wahhab, any concept not derivable from the Qur'an or a very restricted corpus of hadith was un-Islamic. In taking this position, 'Abd al-Wahhab dismissed the long tradition of Muslim jurisprudence (fiqh), which had accepted a much larger range of sources as authoritative. Mainstream Muslim opinion, both Sunni and Shi'i, had also long agreed on the permissibility of seeking the intercession of the Prophet or other "friends of God" in one's dealings with the deity in the form of petitionary prayer, supplication, or the visitation of shrines. 'Abd al-Wahhab denounced all of these acts as *shirk*. Even poetry in praise of the Prophet or other exalted figures, a genre that had produced some of the noblest verse in the Muslim world, was for 'Abd al-Wahhab merely a form of idolatry. The sins of *shirk* and idolatry turned Muslims into infidels. Denouncing all other Muslims for having strayed from the true path, 'Abd al-Wahhab saved the worst for Sufism and Shi'ism, which he denounced root and branch. Nor was denunciation enough: 'Abd al-Wahhab outlined a theory of armed struggle against infidels, but especially those Muslims who had fallen off the true path.⁹

The movement might have disappeared without a trace, had not 'Abd al-Wahhab made an alliance with Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, the petty ruler of a town in Najd. In 1746, the two together declared war (jihad) on all Muslims who did not share their views on Islamic purity. This alliance gave rise to a sectarian state built of conquest that in time conquered much of the Arabian Peninsula, except the province of Hijaz with its holy cities of Mecca and Medina. These cities too fell in 1806. The conquest aimed to bring lapsed Muslims back into the fold of Islam and was accompanied by a distinctly Wahhabi form of iconoclasm. Wahhabis were fond of destroying tombs and shrines, demolishing domes over houses and palaces, burning books other than the Qur'an, forcing people to pray communally, and policing moral conduct and personal behavior. This fate was visited upon the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, where the Wahhabis desecrated the tombs of the wives and the companions of the Prophet and a host of other luminaries of Islamic history, destroyed the dome over the house where the Prophet was supposed to have been born, and forced the ulama of the two cities to accede to their doctrine. Eventually, the Ottomans ousted the Wahhabis from Hijaz, and the Saudi-Wahhabi state retreated to its core in Najd. Eventually, the Saudi-Wahhabi state reemerged at the turn of the twentieth century in the context of the weakening of Ottoman power, when Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud conquered much of the Arabian Peninsula, including the cities of Mecca and Medina, and established the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

The current prominence of Wahhabism in the Muslim world can easily lead us to believe that the movement's influence has always been great. In fact, much of its present success is a product of the late twentieth century, during which its fortunes have been tied intimately to those of the Saudi state and its geopolitical requirements. We need to remember that in the era in which the Jadids lived and argued, Wahhabism was a minor current of opinion, its influence limited to the more lawless expanses of the Arabian Peninsula. In the world beyond, Wahhabism served largely as a polemical foil in sectarian arguments among Muslims, enabling opponents of reform to denounce their opponents as "Wahhabis," whether or not an actual connection existed between the reform and the teachings of 'Abd al-Wahhab. This practice was especially common in India, where "Wahhabism" was tossed around as an accusatory label for many reform movements. The British rulers of India joined in as well, and established an imperial tradition of labeling all troublesome Muslim opponents as Wahhabi. In the lands of the former Soviet Union, the term has come into indiscriminate use to denote any and all expres-

sions of nontraditional Islam. Thus, we need to remember that Wahhabism serves the purpose of accusation as much as that of description and to use the term with circumspection.

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The emergence of Jadidism was not uniformly welcomed in Central Asia. Quite the opposite, in fact. Implicit in the advocacy of reform were large political issues. Who should exercise leadership in society? Who should set the terms of debate? What was really at stake? These questions represented a debate about society and politics as much as one about religion. The Jadid message provoked the opposition of many groups whose position in society was challenged by the message of reform.

Among those who opposed the Jadids were men of traditional Islamic learning. Not all ulama were against the Jadids: many Jadids came from learned families, and they could count on the support of many reformist ulama as well. Nevertheless, the Jadids' harsh criticism of traditional modes of understanding Islam arrayed the majority of ulama against them. These men mustered enormous prestige in society, which had scarcely been dented by the criticisms of the Jadids. In opposing the Jadids, the conservative ulama had the support of other established groups in society whose preeminence was threatened by the Jadids: merchants who might find literacy in Russian useful for their children but who saw little need for the thoroughgoing reform of society that the Jadids advocated, urban notables who felt that the Jadids threatened their positions as intermediaries between the indigenous population and the Russian state, and many others who felt little sympathy or need for the challenges the Jadids posed to their way of life. The fact that most Jadids were very young—Russian observers instinctively compared them to the Young Turks—made their task more difficult in a society in which age garnered enormous respect.

Yet the Jadids had made their mark on Central Asian society by the time World War I summoned the end of the old regime in Russia. Their use of the printed word and theater and their support of new-method schools and benevolent societies had, for all the group's limitations, destabilized the traditional order and challenged the authority of traditional learning. On the eve of the great upheaval of the Russian revolution, Central Asian society was beset with a fundamental conflict about where it was to go and who was to lead it there.

The debate between the Jadids and their conservative opponents was

not, it must be understood, a debate between "secularists" and "Islamists." Both sides used Islamic arguments. Rather, the debate was about different interpretations of Islam—what being Muslim meant, who had religious authority, and how this authority was to be used. Nevertheless, the two sides arrived at radically different answers, providing an apt example of the internal diversity of Islam. Islam does not produce uniform or homogeneous kinds of political action. Rather, the sense Muslims make of their tradition, and the political action they undertake, depends on their sense of their place in the world, the problems they face, and the resources they have. Political actions of Muslims are a product of concrete historical circumstances and of conflicts and debates among human actors.

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The conflicts that beset Central Asian Muslims under Russian rule extended beyond those between the established elites and their Jadid challengers. Conflict between nomads and peasants over land use often took on an ethnic coloration and pitted the Kyrgyzes against the Uzbeks in the Ferghana Valley and Turkmens against Uzbeks in Khiva. In addition, Russian rule brought new ethnic complexity. The conquest prompted substantial immigration from the European parts of the Russian empire, as Russians and members of the empire's numerous nationalities (Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, Germans, Tatars, and Armenians) appeared in the region. The growth of the economy also attracted labor immigrants from Iran and Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang). Most of these immigrants came to the cities, which grew in size (or, in the case of the steppe zone, appeared for the first time), but an organized settlement of Russian and Ukrainian peasants also existed in the area. This ethnic patchwork tended at most times to be subordinated to a European/Muslim divide, but it could never be completely reduced to this division.

Indeed, the stiffest challenge to Russian rule in the tsarist period was a massive revolt by Kyrgyz and Kazakh nomads in 1916. Faced with labor shortages during World War I, the imperial government abolished the exemption from conscription that native inhabitants of Turkestan had enjoyed since the conquest and announced plans to recruit large numbers of them for work in the rear. The announcement immediately triggered a rebellion, first in the oasis towns of Turkestan, then among the nomadic populations of present-day Kyrgyzstan and southern Kazakhstan. In the towns, crowds gathered in front of administrative buildings to protest,

destroying conscription lists and killing many government functionaries, both Russian and local, in the process. The oasis revolt was quashed by late summer. In the steppe, however, protest turned into a full-blown rebellion against Russian rule. Tens of thousands of nomads—armed with lances, swords, and the odd rifle—attacked government offices and Russian peasant settlements (the expropriation of land by officially sponsored settlers had long been a point of complaint), destroying them and killing their inhabitants. The government hastily armed the settlers and diverted soldiers from the front to quell the rebellion. Ultimately, in true colonial fashion, the suppression far surpassed the revolt in its brutality: as soldiers and settlers attacked nomads indiscriminately, the latter fled across the mountain passes to Chinese-ruled territory, only to face epidemics, hunger, and a freezing winter. Those who returned the following spring found their livestock dead and their land expropriated. Russian casualties in the uprising numbered 2,246, but no figure could be attached to "native" casualties (in some districts, they constituted as much as a fifth of the population).¹⁰ The revolt was a protest against colonial oppression, land expropriation, and military conscription; Islam was never an issue.

Р.М. МУСТАФИНА

**ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНИЯ,
КУЛЬТЫ, ОБРЯДЫ
У КАЗАХОВ**

(В КОНТЕКСТЕ БЫТОВОГО ИСЛАМА
В ЮЖНОМ КАЗАХСТАНЕ В КОНЦЕ XIX—XX ВВ.)

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В книге дается всесторонняя характеристика бытового ислама. В этом научном издании рассматриваются место и роль ислама в жизни казахов, специфика мистического ислама — суфизма (ишанизма, дервишизма), культ святых, а также реликты представлений и обрядности, связанные с сельскохозяйственной деятельностью (Наурыз, Жарапазан, Тасагтык), демонологией, шаманством, некоторыми синкретическими религиозными формами: семейно-бытовой обрядностью.

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ВВЕДЕНИЕ

Темой настоящей книги являются представления, культы, обряды у казахов в контексте бытового ислама в Южном Казахстане как в XIX в., так и в наши дни.

В исламе, как и в других вероисповеданиях, принято различать каноническую религию, официальную религию духовенства и религиозно-образованной части населения и религию народную, бытовую форму ислама. Бытовой (народный) ислам представляет собой те реальные формы, в которых ислам существует в повседневной жизни того или иного народа. Формы и проявления бытового ислама разнообразны. Наряду с идеями и нормами ислама, у любого народа сохраняется широкий круг представлений и обычаев, восходящих к местным доисламским традициям, которые подверглись влиянию ислама и в обыденном сознании воспринимаются как мусульманские.

В каждой стране, у каждого народа ислам обрел местные особенности. Эти особенности обусловлены специфическим историческим развитием отдельных народов, которое, в свою очередь, оказало влияние на развитие мусульманской религиозной мысли. Проникая в ту или иную этнокультурную среду, ислам, сталкиваясь с местными обычаями и традициями, подвергался их активному воздействию, что придавало ему характерные для данной среды черты. Как отмечал венгерский востоковед И. Гольдциер: «Сам официальный ислам с самых первых этапов своего существования дал доказательство тому, что его дальнейшее существование связано с переосмыслением и переработкой существовавших до него языческих религиозных элементов»¹.

1-25-95

Во взаимодействии ислама и традиционных верований многие древние обычаи и представления получают новое осмысление, в котором первоначальное содержание нередко приобретает иное значение. В этом отношении показательна роль суфизма, мистического течения в исламе, который получил широкое распространение у принявших ислам народов. Он стал важным элементом бытового ислама, поскольку оказался способным придать новую исламизированную форму традиционным представлениям и нравственным установкам; в частности, суфизм придал мусульманскую трактовку культу свя-
тых, который противоречит исламскому догмату единобожия. С ним связано возникновение определенных групп неофициального духовенства (ходжей, ишанов и др.).

Культовые святых является одной из наиболее характерных черт бытового ислама. Он сложился под влиянием архаичных идей, хранивших представления о многочисленных божествах, которые в исламе приобрели новое толкование в соответствии с духом новой религии.

Простонародный ислам включает рожденные местной этнокультурной средой легенды и предания; некоторые традиционные народные праздники, такие, например, как наурыз, маулид, а также обычаи и обряды, связанные с архаичными представлениями, например, обряд вызывания дождя и другие.

Ислам в своих повседневных формах представляет собой систему религиозных канонов и ритуалов, а также же определенный образ жизни, совокупность правил поведения и обычаев, которых придерживается большинство населения.

Различные формы бытового ислама, его особенности у разных народов, представляют собой важнейшие аспекты большого идеологического явления, без которого непонятна жизнь народа, его культура, под влиянием которой формируются нравственные устои народа, система его ценностей, его национальное самосознание, исторические традиции. Их изучение позволяет выявить подлинную картину сложившихся в обществе и продолжающих функционировать традиций.

Актуальность научных исследований в области бытового ислама, определяется тем, что религиозное мировоззрение в разных его проявлениях остается важным фактором общественной жизни, особенно в регионах

распространения ислама. Опыт специального изучения явлений религиозной жизни дает богатую фактами и пеструю картину бытования религиозных традиций, которые еще не стали достоянием прошлого. В нашем обществе религия утратила свое прежнее значение, но в последние годы интерес к ней, даже у молодежи, резко возрос. Как показывают современные события (празднование 1000-летия введения христианства на Руси, 1100-летия принятия ислама в Поволжье и Приуралье, 200-летия деятельности духовного управления мусульман европейской части страны и Сибири, 1200-летия со дня рождения имама ат-Термези, передача государством среднеазиатским мусульманам почитаемой реликвии — рукописи — так называемого Корана Османа и многие другие), роль религии в жизни нашей страны становится все более заметной. Для правильного анализа современных социальных процессов необходимо знание конкретного материала, связанного с многообразными проявлениями религиозной идеологии.

Многие исследователи прекрасно видели и детально описали различные аспекты простонародного ислама, и в литературе к сегодняшнему дню накоплен огромный конкретный материал. Родоначальником концептуального осмысления этого явления можно считать И. Гольдциера. О различии официального, теоретического ислама и его «народного живого оформления» он, в частности, писал: «Народная религия... должна быть строго отделена от систематического учения богословов»². Но после того, как И. Гольдциер отчетливо сформулировал принципиальное понимание этого явления, интерес к народному исламу приобрел теоретическую базу, что способствовало дальнейшему развитию конкретных исследований, этой проблемы в мировом исламоведении.

Вопросы бытового ислама получили оригинальную разработку и в отечественной науке. Крупнейшие исследования в области среднеазиатского религиозоведения принадлежат С. П. Толстову³. Наряду с целым рядом работ, в которых освещаются и анализируются многие аспекты религий Средней и Передней Азии, рассматривается взаимосвязь ислама с местными доисламскими традициями, необходимо назвать статью «Очерки первоначального ислама»⁴, в которой интерпретируются легендарные, шаманские по происхождению, черты биографии пророка Мухаммада с точки зрения этнографии.

Многие исследователи придавали большое значение существованию такого явления, как бытовое ислам. Так, Г. П. Снесарев обращал внимание на необходимость критического рассмотрения всего комплекса верований и обрядов со свойственными им локальными особенностями, составляющими «среднеазиатскую религию», и разделение ортодоксального ислама и домусульманских реликтов, «мало с ним связанных, а порой бытующих самостоятельно»⁵. При этом большинство исследователей обращали внимание лишь на одну часть бытового ислама — воспринятые исламом домусульманские традиции. Между тем бытовое ислам только к этому не сводится. Бытовой ислам — это религиозная жизнь во всем ее объеме. В этом плане интерес представляют работы О. А. Сухаревой и Т. Дж. Баялиевой⁶, в которых исследователи попытались показать простонародные формы ислама соответственно на узбекском и киргизском материале с возможной полнотой.

В конце XIX в. Казахстан полностью находился в сфере влияния ислама. Но, вопреки усилиям мусульманских миссионеров он оставался провинцией на карте среднеазиатского ислама, по сравнению с оазисами Средней Азии. Отмечаемое многими авторами так называемое «двоеверие» у казахов, по существу, представляло собой синкретизм элементов ислама и домусульманских традиций — реликтов анимистических представлений, магии, зоолатрии, тотемизма, почитания умерших предков, шаманства и других древних воззрений, которые и в конце XIX в. составляли весьма значительный пласт в религиозном мировоззрении казахов.

Ислам, как известно, распространялся в Казахстане неравномерно, и сила его влияния на традиционный образ жизни казахов была далеко не одинаковой в разных районах Казахстана. Если в южных районах Казахстана на он утвердился еще в X в., то в северных его районах ислам завоевал свои позиции лишь в XIX в. И в этом плане любая область или часть Казахстана заслуживает самого пристального изучения. Интерес же к южным районам Казахстана объясняется тем, что ислам у казахов Южного Казахстана до сих пор изучен слабо, хотя именно здесь он наиболее глубоко сросся с традиционным образом жизни казахов. Объясняется это следующими причинами: Южноказахстанские районы находились вблизи крупных среднеазиатских мусульманских

центров, и ислам оказал здесь большое влияние на быт и культуру казахов, по сравнению с другими регионами Казахстана; оседло-земледельческая и городская культура Южного Казахстана создавала благоприятные условия для проникновения и распространения ислама среди казахов; для этих районов характерен смешанный состав населения, наличие значительных групп узбеков и других народов, среди которых ислам давно и прочно завоевал свои позиции.

Данные о национальном составе населения уездов Сырдарьинской области по материалам переписи населения 1920 г. показывают, что узбеки и сарты относительно большинство составляли в Ташкентском и Голден-Стенском уездах. В остальных пяти уездах абсолютное большинство составляли казахи (в частности, в Перовском и Казалинском уездах). На долю остальных национальностей приходилось не более 10—15%. В Аулие-Атинском на долю других национальностей приходилось уже 26,7%; в Чимкентском — 36,3%, в Туркестанском — 44,5%. Согласно современным данным о численности и составе населения южных областей Казахстана, только в Чимкентской области узбеки составляют относительно многочисленную этническую группу⁸.

Исследователи неоднократно обращали внимание на взаимодействие между подвижными скотоводческими и оседлыми земледельческими хозяйственными группами как в рамках одной этнической группы, так и между разными этносами, особенно в маргинальной зоне. Эта особенность относится и к Южному Казахстану. Постоянное экономическое, культурное и политическое взаимодействие кочевников скотоводов и земледельцев, взаимное влияние и обогащение кочевнической и земледельческой культур осуществлялось на территории Казахстана с глубокой древности и способствовало сложению общности территории казахского народа⁹. Расположенный между оседлоземледельческими оазисами Средней Азии и кочевым скотоводческим Дашт-и Кипчаком (Казахской степью), южноказахстанский регион — низовья и среднее течение Сырдарьи, предгорья Каратау и северо-запад Семиречья — с глубокой древности являлся районом зимовок многих скотоводческих племен, а позднее — большинства казахских родов и племен. Долина Сырдарьи была главным центром городской культуры древнего и средневекового Казахстана. Здесь находи-

лись Отрар, Сауран, Ясы, Сюткент, Узкент, Дженд, Жанкент и десятки других городов и поселений¹⁰.

Одним из наиболее крупных политических, экономических и религиозных центров казахского общества в XVI—XVIII вв. являлся г. Туркестан, своей широкой известностью обязанный деятельности крупнейшего мусульманского мистика Ходжа Ахмада Ясави. Здесь находились воздвигнутый ему при Тимуре мавзолей и другие культовые сооружения, привлекавшие многочисленных паломников со всех концов Казахстана и Средней Азии. Расположенный в центре пограничья двух хозяйственных миров — кочевого скотоводства и оседлого земледелия — г. Туркестан (Ясы) начинает играть заметную роль еще в XII в. С г. Туркестаном связан целый ряд поселений, расположенных в районе Каратау и на Сырдарье. В XVII в. в его владения входили Сауран, Сыгнак, Сузак, Сырнак-Ата, Карнак и многие другие окрестные селения¹¹. До возвышения г. Туркестана крупным религиозным центром кочевого населения являлся г. Сайрам, о чем свидетельствуют расположенные в нем многочисленные культовые сооружения. Среди местного населения широко известно изречение: «Сайрамда бар сансыз бап, Түркістанда түмен бап» («В Сайраме святых бесчисленно, а в Туркестане несколько тысяч»). Согласно некоторым данным, в середине XIX в. в Сайраме насчитывалось около 80 памятников старины.

Описательный материал об особенностях религиозных верований у казахов собирался давно. Он нашел отражение в целом ряде работ этнографического характера, хотя многие из них писались не специалистами. Обширный этнографический материал о казахах Южного Казахстана принадлежит известному краеведу А. А. Диваеву. В его научном наследии значительное место занимают материалы о доисламских верованиях. Из дореволюционных авторов необходимо отметить также М. Миропиева, К. Кустанаева, И. Кастанье, в работах которых характеризуется, описывается шаманство Южного Казахстана. Перу выдающегося казахского ученого Ч. Ч. Валиханова принадлежат работы, в которых содержатся интересные сведения о религиозных верованиях у казахов, преданиях и легендах казахов Южного Казахстана, а также материалы, связанные со среднеазиатским суфизмом.

В настоящее время имеется довольно обширная литература, в которой в той или иной степени освещаются особенности ислама в Казахстане. В ней нашли отражение ряд аспектов истории проникновения и распространения ислама в Казахстане, его роли в казахском обществе, описаны его некоторые специфические черты, связь с местными домусульманскими верованиями. Специально исследуются проявления религиозности в современных условиях, распространенность, особенности религиозного мировоззрения, влияние ислама на национальные отношения.

Широкий круг вопросов, связанных с исламом и домусульманскими верованиями у казахов, рассматривается в ряде работ казахстанских этнографов Х. А. Артынбаева, Дж. Х. Кармышевой, А. Толеубаева.


Для всех этих работ характерным является то, что они не ставили своей целью сделать общий очерк религиозных верований у казахов, показать картину религиозной жизни во всем ее разнообразии. Несколько потоков такого рода все же предпринималось¹². Одна из них, в частности, книга К. Ш. Шулембаева «Маги, боги и действенность» заслуживает весьма положительной оценки. В ней представлен сравнительно широкий материал по разным сферам религиозной жизни казахов. Автор попытался показать разнообразие синкретические религиозные формы, сложившиеся в результате взаимовлияния реликтов домусульманских верований и ислама, бытующих у казахов и в наши дни. Эта тема получает развитие и в последующей его работе. Однако спектр бытового ислама настолько широк и разнообразен, что охватить и показать его с достаточной глубиной в кратких очерках представляется невозможным. Между тем новые этнографические материалы позволяют расширить наши представления о характере бытового ислама у казахов, его современных формах проявления. В указанных работах имеются данные, относящиеся к Южному Казахстану. Но задача представить по возможности цельную картину религиозной жизни казахов этой специфической части республики до сих пор никем не ставилась.

В книге дается всесторонняя характеристика ислама в южных областях Казахстана. Обобщается и анализируется фактический материал, среди которого преобладают сведения, полученные автором в ходе полевых эт-

нографических работ. Реальные формы ислама представлены с учетом основных сфер их проявления и разнообразия общественных функций. Рассматриваются как знание населением официального вероучения и выполнение практических предписаний религии, так и действительная роль представлений и обычаев, восходящих к местным домусульманским традициям.

Источниками для написания книги наряду с литературными и архивными данными послужили этнографические материалы автора, собранные в 1983—1991 гг., преимущественно в сельской местности; в основном в Илийском районе Алма-Атинской области, Таласском, Меркенском, Сарысуском районах Жамбулской области; в Кызылжумском, Сузакском, Бугунском, Алгабаском, Туркестанском районах и поселке Сайрам Чимкентской области, Сырдарьинском районе Кызыл-Ординской области, а также в гг. Туркестан, Чимкент, Жамбул, Алма-Ата. Мне представилась редкая возможность присутствовать на камлании казахской шаманки, наблюдать коллективное моление в святыще Арыстан-баб* а также познакомиться с бывшими дуана (дервишами) и записать их рассказы.

* В 1990 г. Мавзолю Арыстан-баб возвращен статус действующей мечети.



РАСПРОСТРАНЕНИЕ ИСЛАМА В ЮЖНОМ КАЗАХСТАНЕ

Вопрос о времени проникновения и распространения ислама в Казахстане до сих пор из-за скудности источников не освещен с должной полнотой. Первые попытки распространения ислама среди тюркских племен предпринимались, видимо, в VIII в. Но целенаправленное, хорошо организованное распространение ислама у тюркских народов, в том числе и у предков казахов, стало проводиться в эпоху Караханидов. Ислам, являясь государственной религией, постепенно проникал во все сферы общественной жизни населения Южного Казахстана.

О распространении ислама в Южном Казахстане свидетельствуют многочисленные археологические материалы, памятники архитектуры. Под влиянием ислама произошла трансформация древних погребальных обрядов, постепенное вытеснение архаичных представлений, связанных с потусторонним миром. Наряду с курганными насыпями стали появляться надмогильные сооружения из камней в виде мусульманских надгробий «сагана»¹³. Предполагается, что традиционные захоронения были вытеснены исламом в XVI—XVII вв.

Доисламские захоронения могли сохраниться в отдаленных районах Казахстана, мало подвергшихся влиянию ислама.

В XVI—XVII вв. развитие экономических и культурных связей казахов со среднеазиатскими народами и волжскими татарами способствует интенсивному распространению и усилению влияния ислама в Казахстане. Проводниками ислама выступали среднеазиатские мис-

сионеры из Бухары, Самарканда, Ташкента, Хивы, Туркестана. К этому периоду относится свидетельство Фазлаллаха ибн Рузбихана о том, что казахи «читают Коран, исполняют молитвы, отдают детей своих в школу, постятся, вступают в брак и вовсе не женятся без брачного договора»¹⁴. XVIII в. характеризуется наиболее интенсивным и широким распространением ислама в Казахстане, чему способствовала политика покровительства царского правительства мусульманскому духовенству и деятельность кокандских завоевателей. Об этом говорят свидетельства путешественников и этнографов, наблюдавших быт казахов. Так П. С. Паллас замечает, что «киргизы (казахи — Р. М.) содержат магометанский закон...»¹⁵. По свидетельству И. Г. Георги, обратившиеся в ислам казахи почитали свою веру¹⁶. Вызывание Н. Рычкова, что казахи, несмотря на то, что «содержат веру магометанскую», не были знакомы с «истинным богослужением» и «даже самыми малейшими духовными обрядами»¹⁷, вряд ли могут послужить решающим доводом в пользу того, что казахам в этот период была неизвестна мусульманская религия. Конечно, языческие традиции у казахов в XVIII в. были, видимо, еще сильны, но основы ислама, его вероучения и обрядности казахи знали. Еще А. Левшин обращал внимание на то, что казахи из различных вероисповеданий предпочтению отдавали мусульманской религии; но при этом они не отличались фанатизмом, свойственным другим мусульманам¹⁸.

В течение XIX в. процесс укрепления ислама среди казахов усилился, заметно пошел вглубь. Об этом свидетельствуют слова Ч. Ч. Валиханова: «Под влиянием татарских мулл, среднеазиатских ишанов и своих прозелитов народность все более принимает общемусульманский тип. Некоторые султаны и богатые киргизы (казахи — Р. М.) забирают жен своих в отдельные юрты, как в гаремы. Набожные киргизы начинают ездить в Мекку, а бояны наши вместо народных былин поют мусульманские апокрифы, переложенные в народные стихи»¹⁹. Исследователь отмечает, что «Всякий кайсака (казах — Р. М.) знает, что он последователь Магомета и что он мусульманин», хотя возможно он и не понимает смысл этого слова²⁰. По его мнению, для большинства казахского населения ислам оставался «звуком, фразой», под которыми скрывались прежние доислам-

ские представления²¹. Противоречивость этих замечаний Ч. Ч. Валиханова отчасти можно объяснить синкретическим характером народных верований. Вместе с тем не исключено, что они отражают личное отношение исследователя к исламу. И возможно, что в определении ислама «звуком», «фразой» получила отражение некоторая тенденциозность публициста, чем объективный анализ исследователя.

ИСЛАМ У КАЗАХОВ ЮЖНОГО КАЗАХСТАНА В КОНЦЕ XIX ВЕКА

Значительное влияние ислам оказал на казахов Южного Казахстана. Об этом свидетельствует следующее сообщение: «Киргизы (казахи — Р. М.) Большой орды более магометане... Они, правда, не читают Корана, потому что почти все безграмотны, но что праздники и посты, в которые, случалось нам видеть, раз при захождении солнца, они целыми группами становятся на колени и читают молитвы, поглаживая лицо бородами и делая земные поклоны. Целый месяц пост (ураза)* почти все киргизы (казахи — Р. М.) — исполняют, были очень редки — оставались по целым дням до вечера, без всякой пищи, даже без глотка воды». Автор отмечает, что казахи постились даже будучи в дороге, несмотря на то, что Коран разрешает путникам не держать пост²². Автор другого сообщения пишет, что казахи, услышав утром призыв к молитве (азан), спешили совершить омовение, за которым следовала первая молитва; зимой молитвы совершали в юрте, летом — в дворе. После завтрака, вымыв руки и погладив себя по бороде, со словами «Алла акбар» («Аллах велик» — Р. М.) мужчины вставали и приступали к своим делам²³.

Казахи Южного Казахстана отмечали мусульманские праздники — «ураза-байрам» (ораза-айт) и «кудуй бан-байрам» (курбан-айт); по случаю разговения платили пятикопеечный сбор с человека; делали пожертвования (кудай, кудай жолына)** по различным случаям.

Весьма неоднозначными представляются свидетельства И. Гейера. Автор констатирует, что ислам являлся

* (ораза — Р. М.).

** «кудай», «кудай жолына».

господствующей религией у казахов. Вместе с тем он считает, что кочевой образ жизни исключал устройство специальных строений для богослужения, чем, по его словам, и объяснялся его случайный характер у казахов, а отсутствие постоянно функционирующих религиозных учреждений и постоянного духовенства затрудняло у них развитие религиозного кругозора и укрепление ислама в его каноническом виде. Автор считает, что поверхностное знакомство с арабским языком явилось причиной туманных представлений о сущности религии. Эти высказывания И. Гейера представляются ошибочными для XIX в., даже для его начального периода. «Богослужения» казаха в этот период не зависели от наличия специальных строений. Молитвы могли совершаться в любом месте. Более того, известно, что Коран и книги на арабском языке — не единственные источники, разъясняющие основы религии. Сам И. Гейер приводит тому доказательства, обращая внимание на то, что казахи благоговейно внимали, каждому слову проповедника и под его руководством исполняли религиозные обряды²⁴. Это можно отнести и к большинству населения Средней Азии, например, к узбекам. Вообще, представления о том, что ислам у казахов имел поверхностный характер, так как кочевой образ жизни затруднял распространение ислама, и, что у кочевых народов, в том числе у казахов, по сравнению с земледельческими народами, доисламские верования отличались особой устойчивостью и сохранностью, являются спорными. В литературе приводится немало примеров того, что доисламские традиции у земледельческих народов характеризуются не меньшей устойчивостью и сохранностью²⁵. По этому поводу, например, С. Асфендиаров писал, что большая зависимость земледельца от естественно-исторических условий создавала «сложную магическую и магическо-религиозную практику, сложные обряды и культы... у кочевых народов... она значительно беднее. Это обстоятельство находит в тесной зависимости от способа хозяйствования кочевников. Скотоводство не связано столь разнообразными нитями с природой, как земледелие. Здесь связь более однообразная. Нередко поэтому мы имеем у кочевых народов монотенистические верования...»²⁶.

Процесс усиления влияния ислама отразился и на традиционном кодексе общественного права и правил — адате, определявшем общественные и личные нормы

нашего времени — восстановление значительного места религии в духовной жизни общества, по крайней мере некоторой его части, а также возрождение многих традиций в самых разных сферах культуры казахов. Все большую популярность в Казахстане получает изучение арабской графики. Обществу возвращается творческое наследие незаслуженно преданных забвению поэтов, писателей, мыслителей, в частности, Шакарима Кудайбердиева и других. Возрождение национальных традиций наблюдается в современной архитектуре. Одним из сооружений, вобравшим в себя выразительные черты исламской архитектуры — величие, одухотворенность, возвышенность, наряду с древними элементами традиционного мировоззрения казахов, символизировавших идею мироздания, является Центральный исторический музей Казахстана в Алма-Ате (архитекторы З. М. Мустафина, Б. А. Рзгалиев, Ю. Г. Рагушинский).

Знание конкретных материалов, характеризующих ислам у казахов в прошлом и настоящем, облегчит анализ происходящих в обществе процессов, и, в частности, явлений культуры, Культуры с большой буквы.

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мым Н. И. Гродековым, в Казалинском уезде обряд бракосочетания проходил таким образом: жених с двумя свидетелями или поручителями, родными и гостями располагались в центре юрты, а невеста с подругами и другими женщинами — за занавесью. Свидетели или мулла спрашивали жениха и невесту об их согласии вступить в брак («взять в жены» или «выйти замуж»). После утвердительных ответов («кабыл кылдым», «кабыл тутым») мулла приступал к чтению хутбы (проповеди, которая произносится во время праздничных богослужений — Р. М.). Затем в чашку с чистой водой (аяк), опущенной монеты, кольца. Мулла освящал ее своим дуновением («дем салады»). Жених и невеста отпивали из нее по глотку, причем из одного места, что символически означало их единение. По одному из описаний обычая, невеста в чашку с водой бросала серги или серебряное кольцо и закрывала чашу белым платком, а жених призывал белым платком к краю чашки палочку, избравшую стрелу. По окончании молитвы молодая забирала из чаши брошенную в нее вещь и хранила ее как залог счастья. В качестве вознаграждения мулла получал 1 барана и 40 коп. или 4 руб. 40 коп., халат с двумя завязками («еки баулы шапан») и т. д. Сумма и содержание вознаграждения зависели от состояния казахов. Богатые одаривали более щедро. За вдову платили только половину указанной суммы³². Интерес представляет описание обряда, приводимое И. И. Ибрагимовым. Вокруг большого костра складывали разные ткани — шелковые, ситцы, платки и т. п. Отец невесты, встав с места, берет чашку с водой, и опустив в нее серебряные монеты или два медных или оловянных кольца, держит чашку в руке до тех пор пока мулла окончит молитву. Затем он передает чашку мулле, который, отпив из нее немного, передает следующему и т. д. На этом обряд венчания оканчивается³⁴.

Исламом был узаконен обычай многоженства. В Казахстане многоженство было частым явлением. В 1897 г. в Сырдарьинской области 15,7 тыс., в Семиреченской области — 14,4 тыс. женщин (данные о численности казахских женщин приводятся вместе с данными о киргизских женщинах) являлись в браке вторыми женами («тожал») ³⁵. Многоженство в основном было распространено среди состоятельных казахов; для бедняка из-за необходимости уплаты калыма, женитьба и на одной женщине

нередко была трудноразрешимой проблемой. Ему приходилось по 10—15 лет отрабатывать калым за одну жену, нередко он до 40-летнего возраста не имел возможности жениться.

Шариат определял и правила развода, представляя приоритетное право на развод мужчине. Он мог единолично решать вопрос о расторжении брака. Согласно мусульманскому установлению, достаточно было мужчине произнести одну из семнадцати формул, следствием которых являлся развод («ты отлучена», «ты отрезана», «ты запретна» и т. д.), и брак считался расторгнутым.

Наряду с другими основными положениями ислама, определяющими религиозную принадлежность, повсеместное распространение получил обряд ритуального обрезания («сундет»). Несмотря на свое древнее немусульманское происхождение (традиция обрезания восходит к глубокой древности, к обрядам инициации, которыми подвергались определенные половозрастные группы общества), этот обряд во всех регионах традиционного распространения ислама приобрел каноническую силу. Различные аспекты среднеазиатского варианта этого обряда получили глубокое освещение в работе Г. П. Снесарева³⁶. Обрезанию, как правилу, подвергались дети 5—7 лет. Обычно его совершал ходжа, мулла или специальный исполнитель этого обряда «суннечи», в роли которого нередко выступал местный цирюльник³⁷. В связи с этим событием состоятельные родители устраивали праздник — сундет-той, на который приглашались преимущественно мужчины. На этом празднике устраивались скачки, борьба и т. д. После выздоровления мальчик получал возможность выбрать из табуна лошадей для ходжи, исполнившего этот обряд³⁸. Вознаграждение зависело от состояния семьи.

Так же как и обряд ритуального обрезания, повсеместное распространение у казахов получил мусульманский обряд погребения, который стал одним из характерных проявлений мусульманской религиозности. Казах не держали умершего более полусуток. Считалось, что душа не обретала места на небе до погребения человека. Получив известие о смерти, в дом умершего тотчас являлись муллы из окрестных аулов для чтения положенных молитв и Корана³⁹. Согласно предписаниям исламского вероучения, покойника, прежде всего, подвергают обмыванию. Для обмывания покойника, чтобы не при-

касаться к нему голыми руками, использовали рукавицы из бязи. Воду на покойника лили также через бязь. Обычно обмывающий забирал эту использованную ткань себе. По сведениям А. А. Дивава, в обмывании покойника участвовало четыре человека. Исследователь считает, что количество обмывальщиков не имело символического значения: два человека переворачивали тело, третий мыл, четвертый носил и подавал воду. Эти же люди заворачивали покойника в саван («кебин» или «кебин акырет»). У мужчин он состоял из трех частей, у женщин — пяти. Затем покойника опускали на погребальные носилки «табыт» и мулла приступал к чтению молитвы «жаназы»⁴⁰. Перед выносом тела совершался обряд посмертного искупления грехов — искат («даур» или «фидия»), известный у других народов Средней Азии. Согласно представлениям казахов, искомат является «продажа муллам грехов покойника за узаконенную плату». Необходимо отметить, что передача мулле грехов покойного не предусмотрена шариадом. И. Алтынсарин в связи с этим обращает внимание на то, что казахи сами заставляли муллу произносить фразу «көтердің бе, көтердім», т. е. «принимаете ли, принимаю грехи на себя»⁴¹. Считается, что искат — это приношение богу за пропущенные покойным при жизни, считая со времени его совершеннолетия (13—15 лет), обязательные мусульманские обряды — пятикратные намазы, дни поста и т. д. Он достигал огромной суммы: за каждый день жизни полагался искат, равный 30 фунтам пшеницы, а за последний месяц Рамазан по 35 фунтов; всего за 365 дней полагалось 277 пудов 20 фунтов. Все это зерно оценивалось в деньгах, деньги обменивались на скот. Если человек не располагал достаточными средствами для уплаты иската, то из всего подлежащего оплате времени выделяется несколько лет или месяцев, и положенная за этот период «фидия» передается какому-либо бедняку, который в свою очередь дарит их наследникам умершего. Эта передача одних и тех же продуктов повторяется столько раз, сколько считалось положенным уплатить за пропущенные покойником дни поста и молитвы. Для выплаты иската можно было выделить какое-либо животное, например, лошадь и оценить ее во много раз больше реальной стоимости. Искат совершался следующим образом: ближайший родственник умершего приводил верблюда или лошадь и, перекидывая повод через

тело умершего, спрашивал муллу или ходжу, берет ли он на себя грехи покойного, сделанные им с 12-летнего возраста до возраста, достигнутого умершим. Этот вопрос он повторяет три раза. Получив утвердительный ответ муллы, родственник снимал переброшенный через тело повод и отдавал животное мулле. Обряд передачи грехов мог совершаться с помощью Корана: сколько лет прошло со времени совершеннолетия умершего, столько раз передавался Коран через тело покойного с вопросом: «Принимаешь ли ты грехи отца моего, брата». Мулла, получая Коран, отвечал: «Принимаю»⁴². Представляется важным обратить внимание на то, что согласно установлениям ислама, «фидия» должна раздаваться бедным, а не муллам, что является отступлением от официального ислама. Более того, как было убедительно показано А. Х. Маргуланом и поддержано Х. А. Аргыбаевым и А. Толеубаевым, обряд искупления грехов не является чисто мусульманским.

При погребении покойника обращали головой к Туркестану, а лицом к Каабе. Могила выкапывали глубиной до пояса, а в длину — в рост человека, рядом с ямой делали нишу, в которую помещали покойника. Тело спускалось в могилу 2—3 или 4 самими близкими родственниками. Заложив вторую яму досками или палками, засыпают первую яму землей. В зависимости от состояния покойного над его могилой возводился мусульманский памятник с большим куполом — кумбез, или скромное надгробье. Покойников старались хоронить вблизи погребений святых возле старых мечетей, на старых кладбищах рядом с предками, родственниками. После похорон муллам предлагалось, в зависимости от состояния умершего, мешок и более пшеницы, проса, ячменя и т. п., с тем, чтобы мулла прочитал молитву за покойного. Мулла трижды обещал исполнить просьбу и затем получал дар.

В XIX в. юридически-правовые отношения казахов еще в значительной степени определялись обычным правом — адатом, что объясняется сохранением в казахском обществе реликтовых форм патриархально-родового быта. Характерной чертой социально-экономической жизни казахов в этот период становится сочетание адата с шариадом. Известно, что ислам осытил многие социальные установления адата, что нередко затрудняло выявление четкой грани между адатом и шариадом.

Ислам не отверг древний обычай сватовства детей, находившихся еще в колыбели — «бесік кұда», «карсы кұда». По этому обычаю стороны должны были выдать дочерей за сыновей свата и наоборот, а также обычай обновления родства «сүйек жанғырту». Согласно этому обычаю, когда степень родства становится отдаленной, то стороны, заинтересованные в сохранении близкого родства, связывают новыми брачными узлами своих детей, близких родственников. Существует и другое толкование этого обычая как «привести новую жену».

Ислам проявил лояльность и к такому древнему обычаю как калым — «выкуп за невесту», который, как известно, представлял собой не что иное как компенсацию за утрату рабочей силы, уплачиваемой семейству (хозяйну), понесшему эту утрату. Размеры калыма зависели от состояния вступающих в родство семейств, колеблясь от большого стада до нескольких голов скота.

Ислам поддерживал древние институты аменгерства (левирата и сорората). По левиратному праву вдова должна была выйти замуж за брата своего умершего мужа или за его ближайшего родственника, а вдовец должен был жениться на сестре умершей жены (сорорат). Аменгерство, как известно, возникло как мера против дробления хозяйства и сохранения в хозяйстве рабочей силы, что является еще одним свидетельством экономического происхождения этих обычаев. В дореволюционном Казахстане эти обычаи не всегда соблюдались строго. Вдова, несмотря на обязанность вступить в брак с родственником покойного мужа, сама могла выбрать мужа или решить остаться вдовой.

Следуя установлению обычного права (адата), в котором шариат не усматривал противоречия исламу, женщина не должен был обращаться к своим женам по имени, так же как женщина не могла называть мужа по имени. Более того, невестка не должна была обращаться к родственникам мужа (кайн) по имени. Братьев и сестер мужа она называла нарицательными именами: торем, ширак, жаркын, бикеш и т. д. Если кто-либо из родственников имел имя, которое совпадало с названием какой-то вещи, то невестка эту вещь не должна была называть, придумывая другие слова, — производные от ее названия, чтобы было понятно.

Говоря о положении женщины в казахском обществе, необходимо отметить, что по сравнению с женщинами

других среднеазиатских народов, женщины-казахи обладали несомненно большей свободой. Они не вели затворническую жизнь, не закрывали своих лиц, не носили ритуальных покрывал — паранджи, чачвана. Они допущены были в мужское общество. Образованные женщины пользовались у мужчин уважением, участвовали в общении важных общественных вопросов. Обычно это были женщины из состоятельных семей. В семьях бедняков женщины трудились наравне с мужчиной, что также вызывало к ним уважение. Вообще отношение к женщине у казахов было противоречивым. Так, А. А. Дикарев обращает внимание на весьма своеобразный взгляд на женщину. На девушку смотрели как на равного с мальчиками члена семьи и оказывали ей уважение и почтение. В подтверждение своих слов исследователь приводит одну из казахских примет: «девицы — гостьи не должны садиться у порога, а садятся в ^{дүр} (тор — Р. М.), т. е. в передний угол, — место почетное, где обыкновенно сажают ^{ань-субик} (ак-суйек — Р. М.), т. е. «белую кость», султанского благородного происхождения, и стариков. Иначе случится несчастье с домохозяином». Но стоило ей выйти замуж, как отношение к ней резко менялось. Она превращалась в рабыню, «удел которой быть женою, матерью и воспитательницей», — последние две обязанности в самом узком смысле⁴³. Очевидно, в этом противоречивом отношении к женщине проявляются элементы архаичного представления о женщине, восходящего к эпохе матриархата, ее почитания, и позднего, особенно мусульманского влияния, низвергнувшего женщину до неравноправного с мужчиной положения.

Таким образом, к концу XIX — началу XX веков ислам в Казахстане имел повсеместное распространение, особенно глубоко проникнув в быт казахов Южного Казахстана; все казахское население Южного Казахстана в той или иной степени было знакомо с мусульманским вероучением, выполняло его предписания и обряды.

МУСУЛЬМАНСКОЕ ДУХОВЕНСТВО И РЕЛИГИОЗНЫЕ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ В XIX ВЕКЕ

У казахов, так же как и у других народов стран традиционного распространения ислама, исламская религиозная идеология тесно связывалась с арабским языком. Арабский язык, арабское письмо, воплощенные в арабских книгах знания даже не теологическое содержание символизировали ислам. Казахи, так же как и другие иранские и тюркские народы, обращенные в ислам, арабский язык связывали с исламским ритуалом и молитвой. Использование арабского языка даже в столь ограниченной мере требовало обучения арабскому языку определенной части населения; освоение начальной грамоты на арабском языке создавало предпосылки для получения более широкого образования в области законоведения, богословия, арабской филологии и овладения традиционным кругом знаний. В таких условиях закономерным было появление людей образованных, владеющих мусульманской культурой на уровне, не уступающем арабоязычным странам. Эта особенность была свойственна и районам Южного Казахстана.

Мектебы

У казахов, так же как и у других народов, принявших ислам, были известны два типа религиозных школ: начальная — мектеб (араб. мактаб) и высшая — медресе (араб. мадраса). Задачей мектеба являлось обучение письму (грамоте) и чтению текстов из Корана и других религиозных книг. Медресе являлось местом лекций (дарс) ученых знатоков ислама, трактовавших вопросы мусульманского богословия и мусульманского права.

Вопрос о количестве казахских мектебов и медресе в Южном Казахстане остается невыясненным. Приводятся различные данные. Отмечается, что в южных районах Казахстана их было значительно больше, чем в других районах. По мнению Н. Сабитова, казахских мектебов как в центре, так и на юге Казахстана было немного, а приводимые разными источниками цифры завышены за счет татарских и среднеазиатских, имевшихся в городах

и крупных населенных пунктах. Так, в Семиреченской области в 1897 году было 88 мектебов и медресе с 12 835 учащимися. В Сырдарьинской области, которая включала г. Ташкент, Ташкентский, Чимкентский, Аулие-Атинский, Туркестанский, Перовский и Казалинский уезды, а также Амударьинский отдел, в 1895 г. действовало 2409 мектебов и 34 медресе с 28 898 учащимися. В число этих учебных заведений наряду с казахскими, включены узбекские, действовавшие, главным образом, в Ташкенте, Ташкентском уезде и Амударьинском отделе, где среди населения преобладали узбеки⁴⁴. Тем не менее по некоторым сведениям дореволюционных авторов и многочисленных информаторов, опрошенных мною, в конце XIX — начале XX вв. казахских школ в Южном Казахстане было много: они были в каждом населенном пункте. Дети казахов, живших в городах вместе с узбеками, обучались мусульманской грамоте вместе с узбекскими детьми.

По сообщениям информаторов, в мектебах обычно заучивали наиболее употребительные молитвы на арабском языке и арабский алфавит. Учебными пособиями служили «Хафтийек» (казах. «Аптийек») — сборник, состоящий из одной седьмой части Корана (перс. «хафт» — семь, «йек» — один); «Иман шарт» («Сущность религии»), содержащее различные молитвы, некоторые положения мусульманского вероучения, а также «Чар-Китаб», содержанием которого являются извлечения из шариата; сборники стихотворений религиозного и мистического содержания — Суфи-Аллаяр (тюрк. яз.), Ходжа-Хафиз, Физули, Бедиль (перс. яз.), а также «Бадауам» — татарское стихотворение о богоугодных и богопротивных поступках; «Кырык фарыс» о сорока заповедях: омовении, молитве, милостыне и т. д.; «Мухтасар-уль-викая», в которой изложены сведения об омовении, жертвоприношении и т. д.

Характерно, что понимать содержание заучиваемого в мектебе не требовалось, так как «боязнь хоть на йоту» изменить смысл прочитанного изречения из Корана при переводе удерживало каждого мусульманина от попыток уяснить себе смысл произносимого им положения. Информаторы называли разные сроки обучения в местных мектебах. Наиболее типичным был мектеб, в котором учились от трех до пяти лет. Срок обучения зависел от прилежания учащихся. На первом году обучения уче-

ники осваивали арабскую графику, «Аптисек», на втором году — чтение, точнее, заучивание текстов из Корана. В день заучивалось 2—3 буквы и несколько строк текста (Сарыуский, Таласский и др. р-ны Джамбулской области).

Учителем мог быть местный имам (дамудла), или мулла (азанчи, иначе муэдзин, суфи). Летом мектебы размещались в юртах, зимой в зимних помещениях, землянках, не приспособленных для школьных занятий. Оплата за обучение зависела от состояния родителей. Каждую пятницу в качестве «жумалыка», ученик мог принести лепешку или 10—15 копеек. В качестве платы за год мулла получал лошадь или барана (козу). Плата не взималась в том случае, если дети в свободное время помогали мулле в домашней работе. Мектебы действовали нерегулярно: летом — во время останков аулов на «джайлау», а зимой — на «кыстау». Для большинства детей срок обучения был очень коротким — не более 4—5 месяцев в год. В мектебах учились преимущественно мальчики в возрасте от 6 до 17 лет, девочек было меньше. В подавляющем большинстве случаев необходимо обучение в мектебе у казахов — связывалась исключительность с возможностью исполнения религиозных ритуалов. Не все ученики преуспевали в подобных занятиях, обычно после обучения в школе ученик мог только писать и читать на арабском языке. Часто, оставаясь мектеб, ученик сразу же забывал все бессознательно заученные слова и буквы. Обучение в мектебе не давало права на какое-либо религиозное звание. Для его получения необходимо было продолжить обучение в медресе, в которых и осуществлялась подготовка представителей мусульманского духовенства.

Медресе

Медресе обычно находились в тех населенных пунктах, где имелись постоянные жители и мечети. Помещения для медресе строились благотворителями или всеми «прихожанами». Учащиеся, «талиб-ул-ильм» («ищущие знаний») или, иначе, шакирды (ученики) жили и учились в помещении медресе. Обучение осуществлялось по общеизвестным в Средней Азии и у волжских татар учебникам и учебным пособиям по арабской филологии, мусульманскому религиозному праву, религиоз-

ной философии, логике, догматике, метафизике с отделом по астрологии и космографии, истории, географии и другим отраслям знания. Юридический курс включал в себя изучение таких книг, как «Фикх-и-кайдани» об обязательных, одобренных и запрещенных исламом действиях. «Мухтасар-уль-викая» — краткое изложение религиозного и государственного права, в первой части которой приводятся установления об омовениях, молитве, посте, закяте и хадже, во второй — гражданские и уголовные законы теократического мусульманского государства; «Шарх-уль-викая» и «Хидая-и шариф», которые содержат подробный разбор тех вопросов, которые кратко рассматриваются в книге «Мухтасар-уль-викая».

Медресе не имели определенных сроков обучения, программ. Но это не мешало достижению главной цели — получить религиозное образование и стать муллой.

Внутренняя обстановка казахских медресе, так же как и мектебов, была проста: не было мебели (столов, парт и др.), ученики сидели, поджав под себя ноги, на полу, устланном кошамами и циновками.

Все медресе существовали в основном за счет добровольных пожертвований. В медресе в подавляющем большинстве обучались дети из состоятельных семей, чаще всего дети мулл, ишанов, ходжей. Число бедняков в них было невелико. Они учились или на добровольные пожертвования, или на средства своих родственников. Часто, оставшись без средств, дети бедняков покидали школу.

Об одной из казахских мечетей-медресе XVIII—XIX вв., ныне историко-археологическим музеем, расположенном в с. Чаян Алгабасского района Чимкентской области (население с. Чаян в основном казахское, что в значительной степени определяет интерес к находящемуся в нем медресе), рассказал его директор С. Акмолдаев.

Официальных документов о строительстве мечети-медресе не сохранилось, сведения основаны на памятных записках и беседах с местными жителями. Согласно преданию, в 40-е годы XIX века в Чаян прибыли два миссионера из Аравии (вероятно, из Средней Азии — Р. М.) с целью уппрочения ислама среди местного населения. Один из них отправился в центрально-казахстанские степи, другой — ишан Косым — предпринял в Чаане строительство мечети-медресе. Она строилась на добро-

вольные пожертвования зажиточных казахов. Строительство было завершено в 60-е годы XIX века. Эта мечеть-медресе стала одним из крупных учебных заведений Южного Казахстана; одновременно на протяжении 4-х лет в ней обучалось 150 человек. Четырехугольный в плане комплекс состоит из мечети, дарихханы (помещения для занятий) и комнат для проживания учащихся. Учителями (устаздар) в медресе были представители среднеазиатского духовенства из Бухары и Самарканда. Крупные медресе имелись и в других районах Южного Казахстана, в частности, в селении Баба-ата недалеко от с. Чулак-Кургана. В настоящее время медресе является памятником архитектуры Казахстана, где ведутся реставрационные работы.

В центральных и северных районах Казахстана строительство медресе в подавляющем большинстве было связано с деятельностью татарского духовенства. Эти медресе мало отличались от казахских традиционных построек; они строились из необожженного кирпича или дерна с плоскими крышами и маленькими окнами. Архитектура медресе Южного Казахстана генетически связана со среднеазиатской строительной традицией.

В Южном Казахстане казахские мектебы и медресе находились в сфере деятельности местного и среднеазиатского духовенства. Учителями являлись лица, получившие образование в местных и среднеазиатских мектебах и медресе, в основном, в Бухаре, считавшейся «опорой ислама и источником чистейшего магометанского вероучения». Для получения духовного образования предпочтнее отдавалось среднеазиатским медресе, так как многие казахские медресе значительно уступали им по организационному и учебно-воспитательному уровню, «не говоря уже о мектебах, которые владели жалкое существование»⁴⁵. Те, кто не имел возможности учиться в среднеазиатских медресе, ограничивались знаниями, полученными в местных «захолустных» медресе, что послужило одной из причин появления многочисленных малограмотных мулл и учителей. И если с конца XIX в. в западных и северо-западных областях казахов стали привлекать мектебы и медресе, в которых предпринималась попытка удовлетворить возрастающую потребность в светском образовании, то южные и юго-восточные области Казахстана до 1917 г. сохраняли ориентацию на медресе Бухары, Самарканда и других городов Средней

Азии, что способствовало укреплению позиций ислама в этих районах.

Мечети

Религиозная образованность у казахов пользовалась уважением, но число культовых сооружений в Казахстане было невелико, и их организация в подавляющем большинстве случаев, была связана с деятельностью татарского (северо-западные районы) и среднеазиатского (на юге) духовенства. Специфика хозяйственно-культурного типа у казахов не могла способствовать строительству культовых сооружений, как это имело место у других оседло-земледельческих народов. Отмечалась неравномерность распространения мечетей на территории Казахстана: к югу их число увеличивалось, а к северу уменьшалось, что объяснялось близостью южных земледельческих районов к среднеазиатским религиозным центрам.

В XVIII—XIX вв. в Казахстане получили распространение так называемые малые мечети. Вместе с тем в торговых и ремесленных центрах отмечалось значительное количество религиозных сооружений, отличавшихся размерами и оформлением. Особенно много мечетей было в г. Туркестане. В 1864 г. их насчитывалось 20, в том числе знаменитая мечеть — мавзолей Ходжа Ахмада Ясави, в 1910 г. их было уже 41. В Чимкенте в 1868 г. было 18 мечетей, а в 1910 г. — 36; по данным А. И. Доросмылова, в начале XX в. их было уже 42. В Перовске в 1910 г. действовало 4 мечети. Очевидно к одной из них относится сведение о том, что в 70-х годах XIX в. здесь казахом К. Бикмурзаевым на собственные средства была построена Бухарско-казахская мечеть. Известна еще одна мечеть, построенная здесь казахом Бисембаем⁴⁶. В 1910 г. в г. Казалинске было 5 мечетей, а в г. Аулие-Ате — 21 мечеть⁴⁷.

В степи не было больших мечетей. Обычно мечети устраивались не в юртах, а в домах, где изредка читали «намази-джума» (пятничную молитву) и совершали праздничные богослужения, в частности, в связи с «ураза-байрамом» и «курбан-байрамом» (ораза-айтом и курбан-айтом).

Имам обычно приглашался благотворителем мечети. Строго определенная плата не гарантировалась, она

определялась приношениями прихожан: натурой («астык») во время жатвы — 1/10 урожая; пожертвованиями по различным случаям мелким скотом («кұдайы»); пятикопеечным сбором с человека по случаю разговения («уразаның бітірі») (оразаның бітірі, т. е. фыр — Р. М.). Муэдзином (суфи, азанчи), обязанностью которого является призывание верующих к молитве, обычно был грамотный казах.

Мечети в Южном Казахстане, как и повсюду в регионах традиционного распространения ислама, являлись религиозными центрами, которые оказывали значительное влияние на религиозные чувства населения. В мечетях совершались мусульманские пятничные и праздничные молитвы. Они обычно были открыты днем и ночью, особенно в дни праздничных служб, когда в мечеть стекались верующие из отдаленных местностей. Мечеть посещали не только для исполнения предписанных молитв, но и в поисках общения, что свидетельствует о сохранении мечетью своего первоначального назначения не только как места для молений, но и как «клуба, народного дома», где «всегда можно было найти общество для беседы...»⁴⁸. Характерным является то, что в конце XIX в. благодетелями и инициаторами строительства мечетей являлись и казахи, что указывает на то, какую важную роль играл ислам у казахов Южного Казахстана в этот период.

Духовенство

Проводниками ислама первоначально выступали представители среднеазиатского мусульманского духовенства — муллы, ходжи, ишаны. Переезжая из аула в аул, иногда оставаясь в каком-либо из них навсегда, они проповедовали ислам, совершали религиозные обряды во время свадеб, похорон; следили за совершением ритуального обрезания («сундет»), учили население основам мусульманского вероучения и обрядности. С образом представителя мусульманского духовенства связывалось представление об образованности или просто грамотности; обученные в Бухаре люди пользовались особым почетом в казахской среде. Даже не являясь муллами, они играли важную роль в распространении ислама. Позднее в центральных и северо-западных райо-

нах Казахстана большим влиянием пользовалось татарское духовенство⁴⁹.

С усилением и углублением мусульманского влияния к концу XIX в., выразившемся, в частности, в появлении низших религиозных школ, увеличении числа казахов, обучавшихся в среднеазиатских религиозных учебных заведениях, строительстве мечетей и появлении медресе, в казахском обществе появляются главы местной мусульманской общины, руководил молитвами в мечети, мог занимать преподавание в начальной школе, что давало ему право на звание «дамулла-имам»; исполнял обязательные мусульманские обряды — чтение «джаназа», заключение брака и другие. В местности, где не было мечети, функции имама брал на себя местный мулла (служитель культа из числа получивших мусульманское образование людей), он занимался не только руководством религиозных обрядов, но также был лекарем, учителем, судьей, так как был одним из немногих грамотных людей в округе. В качестве лекаря он «отчитывал» больных, использовал как целительные средства амулеты — «бойтұмар», записки с изречениями из Корана, которые больные должны были носить при себе или вымачивать в воде, а затем выпивать в качестве «ішірткі»⁴⁹. К мулле обращались за разъяснением закона и положений шариата для разрешения какого-либо конфликта⁵⁰. Со временем число мулл стало заметно увеличиваться, так как любой человек, даже поверхностно знакомый с мусульманской обрядностью мог выступать в роли муллы.

Почти каждый состоятельный казах имел в числе своих домохозяев муллу для молитв и обучения детей татарской грамоте и Корану, за что мулла получал жалование от хозяина и жил на полном его обеспечении.

Наряду с представителями официального духовенства — имамами, муллами, у казахов широкой известностью пользовались представители так называемого неофициального духовенства — ходжи, ишаны, шейхи или ширакши (смотрители мусульманских святынь), а так-

* Лишь в середине XIX в. царизм активно использует татарское духовенство для Islamизации кочевников — киргизов и казахов, чтобы поставить их под контроль царского самодержавия.

же дервиши (дуана), дуажоны, занимавшиеся «отчитыванием» больных по особым книгам, знахари (тауп), прорицатели (палши, жаурынши и другие).

Особое место в религиозной жизни казахов, как и других среднеазиатских народов занимали ходжи. У казахов, как и у других народов Средней Азии, бытовало мнение, что ходжи являются потомками пророка Мухаммада (от брака его дочери Фатимы и четвертого Халифа Али) и его сподвижников. В народе они считались религиозными авторитетами. Ходжи, которые связывали свое происхождение с браком Али и Фатимы, называли себя сайид-ходжами. По свидетельству Ч. Ч. Валиханова «кайсаки (казахи — Р. М.) ходжей не относят к белой кости, а уважают их наравне с султанами, как лиц духовных, строгих исполнителей предписаний шариата, и как потомков пророка»⁵¹. Однако, по свидетельству Н. И. Гродекова, казахи ходжей считали «белой костью». Обычно они жили в юртах у святых, например, у святыни Баба-ата в северных отрогах Каратау в Туркестанском уезде, занимаясь земледелием, торговлей и «ученостью». В Кураминском уезде были ходжи из кочевых киргизов (казахов — Р. М.)⁵².

Вопрос о происхождении ходжей вызывает интерес современных казахстанских исследователей. Так, по мнению С. З. Зиманова, «ходжи возникли не на местной почве, в Казахстане они пришли с юга». По его сведениям, «под влиянием среднеазиатского духовенства некоторые представители казахского духовенства присваивали себе звание ходжей под видом того, что они происходят от лиц, почитавшихся в народе «аулие», т. е. «священными по смерти». Так, например, «среди казахов, живших по соседству с таджиками, были свои ходжи, утверждавшие, что они происходят от казахов и являются потомками святого «Аулие-ата»...»⁵³.

В настоящее время убедительно аргументирована несостоятельность версии об арабском происхождении ходжей у туркмен. Что касается казахских ходжей, то мне представляется возможным допустить, что версия об арабском происхождении ходжей не лишена оснований. В пользу этого говорят бытующие в народе легенды и предания о ходжах, известная их обособленность, степень религиозности.

В религиозной жизни казахов ходжи выполняли те же функции, что и другие представители мусульманско-


го духовенства. Но, в отличие от них, ходжи считались представителями аристократической верхушки духовенства. Тем не менее между ходжами из-за сфер влияния происходили столкновения, принимавшие весьма неприглядные формы.

Особое место в религиозной жизни казахов занимали также ишаны, представители мусульманского мистцизма — суфизма (о них см. главу II книги).

Источниками содержания многочисленных служителей культа являлись закят, фитр (битыр), вознаграждения за совершение акта бракосочетания, похоронно-поминальных обрядов, обрезание, лечение больных и т. д.

Говоря об исламском духовенстве у казахов, необходимо отметить, что так же, как и у киргизов, оно не сложилось в самостоятельную иерархию с большим штатом управления и определенной системой обучения. Представители духовенства находились в зависимости и подчинении у светской знати, жили рядом с ней и получали жалование.

Итак, к концу XIX — началу XX вв. казахи не только были знакомы с основами мусульманского вероучения и следовали его предписаниям, они обучали своих детей в мусульманских школах — мектебах и медресе, посещали мечети, следовательно были мусульманами без всяких оговорок с довольно интенсивной религиозной жизнью, которая поддерживалась деятельностью мусульманского духовенства в лице многочисленных мулл, ишанов, ходжей и других служителей культа. Все это позволяет подвергнуть сомнению устоявшееся в литературе мнение о том, что ислам у казахов в этот период имел поверхностный характер. Конечно, по сравнению со среднеазиатскими народами, казахи были менее подвержены религиозному фанатизму. Этому способствовали сравнительно позднее распространение ислама в Казахстане, отдаленность от мусульманских религиозных центров. Что касается встречаемых в литературе высказываний о механически заучиваемых казахами коранических молитвах и поверхностном знании ими исламского вероучения, то они применимы к подавляющему большинству верующих Средней Азии, например, к узбекам, таджикам, несмотря на то, что ислам у них имел давние и прочные позиции⁵⁴.



М.А. Батунский

РОССИЯ И ИСЛАМ

II



Прогресс-Традиция
Москва

ГЛАВА 1

Русская культура XVIII – XIX вв. и мир ислама

1. Образ Востока в русском менталитете XVIII – начала XIX в. Формальная структура категорий. Общность и различия в восприятии ориентальных феноменов

Уже со времен Петра Великого¹ была, казалось, бесспорно решена принципиальная концептуальная дилемма: принадлежит ли Россия к Востоку, или же, напротив, она и суцностно, и формально на веки вечные включена в динамику глубинных структур европейской цивилизации. Речь шла о цивилизации, для которой считалась имманентной вера в разум и естественную гармонию общих и индивидуальных интересов. Утверждалось, что лишь в реалиях этой цивилизации, в ее утопиях и антиутопиях, в ее ценностных параметрах, в ее морально-этических критериях, наконец, в ее лишь символических и даже семантических категориях Россия будет искать регуляторы собственного будущего, даже если таковые и будут носить зачастую подчеркнутую антизападный характер².

Славянофильские и близкие им модели трансформации духовного наследия и образы наиболее желательных дальнейших путей социополитического развития на основе в первую очередь монациональных и моноконфессиональных культурных институций оказывали на различные уровни и типы общественного сознания мощное новационное влияние. И однако, нормативный статус в конечном счете получили явные и неявные, но достаточнo сильные – в том числе и благодаря своему разнообразию – европобежные тенденции. И системно и структурно определяясь

в борьбе с партикуляристскими притязаниями, они в совокупном действии своем — стремясь освободить русскую мысль от чрезмерной привязанности к собственному «Я» — нередко резко минимизировали роль дискурсивно-логического мышления. Этим самым процессу восприятия западноевропейского идейного масшстава, культурных форм, организационных принципов и т.п. придавался какой-то непосредственный, чуть ли не аксиоматический, характер. Поэтому-то и развернулась борьба против однозначного преобладания западной культуры, за развертывание собственных, «исконно русских», культурных потенций, за право вхождения в радикально меняющуюся мировую историю на правах ее активного и автономного участника, а не объекта влияния извне³.

Но здесь следует отметить, что не только термин «культура» в его латинской транскрипции был известен образованным русским с начала XVIII в., но и само формирование его происходило в русской общественной мысли во многом аналогично западноевропейской⁴. В конце XVIII — начале XIX в. в русский язык начинает входить слово «цивилизация»⁵. И хотя обычно его переводили как «гражданственность», тем не менее именно в таком понимании оно противопоставлялось «дикой Азии», закрепляясь (как и слово «культура»⁶) лишь за Европой⁷, сумевшей перенять от Востока его наилучшие достижения и трансформировать их на качественно новой основе.

Очень показательна в этой связи речь (1836 г.) известного казанского востоковеда Мирзы (Александра — ибо он перешел в христианство) Казем-бека.

Он воздает должное вкладу раннесредневекового мусульманского Востока в мировую цивилизацию: «В памяти Истории... очень глубоко запечатлено состояние VIII, IX и за ними следующих веков, когда халифы и их наследники распространяли просвещение вместе со своим владычеством почти во всей Азии, части Африки и Европы; когда состояние наук в этих странах ознаменовало славу сарацинов не менее славы римлян августовских времен». Между тем именно тогда «европейский мир, покрытый мраком невежества, трепетал перед могуществом магометан и... многие владыки его были совершенно чужды самому первоначальному образованию»⁸. Но вследствие самых разных причин — в ряду которых Казем-бек, однако, совершенно не упоминает расовый фактор — на Западе «просвещение превозмогло». Оно начало «изливать свой свет из двух источников, Флоренции и Ан-

далузии, и в скором времени озаренная Европа начала удивлять мир своим блеском». В Азии же шел обратный процесс: в ней «просвещение склонилось к падению по мере его возвышения в Европе; судьба его там была сопряжена с судьбою владычества халифов, их ревностных наместников и мудрых преемников. Прекращение их власти преградило ему путь к дальнейшим успехам; постепенное разделение исповеданий и властей, умножение суеверия народного, как густые тучи, сокрыли его от взоров любознательных сынов Азии; но оно распростерло лучи свои в других краях, более ясных и безмятежных. Невежество, вооружась, как лютой враг, хотело наложить на него оковы; но оно, вырвавшись из железных рук его, начало искать свободы в других странах... Таким образом, Азия померклаась день ото дня, тогда как Европа озарялась час от часу»⁹.

Но иногда, страстно вызывая Казем-бек (и здесь надо, конечно, учитывать и его же самого восточное происхождение), не следует с пренебрежением отзываться об Азии:

«Одно имя Азии должно уже возбудить почтительное воспоминание каждого члена христианского мира: ибо в ней колыбель рода человеческого; в ней первобытная и светлая страна, где впервые явилась и торжествовала христианская вера; в ней протекали изобильные источники образования народов. Какой философ может исследовать древности, погружаться в филологические изыскания или делать успехи в критических разборах истории древнего мира без того, чтобы не углубиться в поучительные развалины ее обширных областей, откуда вышли первые обитатели Запада и Севера — праотцы Европы! Или кто может без *сыновне-го уважения* взирать на величественные ее (Азии. — М.Б.) памятники, которые, как надгробные камни, возбуждают родное к ним чувство и напоминают нам, что *мы потомки Востока*»¹⁰.

Казем-бек — известный в первую очередь как лингвист — декларирует, что лишь «изучение языков... единственный путь к сокровищницам знаний, сокрытых в лабиринте невежества»¹¹. Поэтому он с восторгом пишет о тех западных интеллектуалах, которые, не жалея ни времени, ни средств, самоотверженно «срывали цветы из прелестного сада восточной литературы»¹², и призывает последовать их примеру и русских, которые, правда, уже немало добились в этом направлении, особенно благодаря Екатерине II — «гениальной почительнице славы своего отечества и покровительнице наук», царствие которой «обратило умы избранных мужей на изобильный Восток и его древности, познано-

милу Россию с учеными, их исследованиями, и основало заведение восточных языков»¹³.

Ее дело было продолжено в эпоху Александра I¹⁴. Правда, «учебники... не могли скоро удовлетворить ожиданию и совершенно соответствовать предположенной цели. Причиной тому были многие обстоятельства: младенческое состояние восточной словесности и знания Востока в России, малое число желающих заниматься сими языками, невнимательность многих к настоящей и истинной цели образования вообще, кратковременность курса и, наконец, самое главное, неимение учебных пособий»¹⁵.

Однако благодаря императору Николаю I, в верноподданническом восторге восклицает Казем-бек, «просвещение еще быстрее течет по областям любезного нашего отчества; всякое русское сердце может утолить жажду к познанию на собственном изобильнейшем и *уже образованном* (т. е. воспринявшем европейский понятийный аппарат. — М.Б.) языке»¹⁶ почти по всем отраслям наук. В Европе гремит слава русских. Журналы образованнейших стран, недавно почитавшие их (русских. — М.Б.) варварами и полудикими, ныне хвалят их деятельность и таланты, и восточная словесность скоро станет в ряду с прочими науками, так успешно процветающими ныне в России»¹⁷.

И тем не менее Казем-бек вынужден приводить все новые и новые аргументы в пользу тезиса о необходимости многогранной активизации вовлеченности своей страны в процесс познания Востока. Он ссылается и на «голоса... европейских ориенталистов», которые «уже доказали, что эти (востоковедческие. — М.Б.) предметы не только полезны для учености и торговли, но даже необходимы собственно для истории России»¹⁸; он, наконец, взывает к опыту Европы:

«Неужели другие страны, отдаленные от Азии, имеют более права покровительствовать восточным языкам и щедро давать средства к их распространению, нежели Россия? Не она ли питает в недрах своих столько азиатских племен, совершенно ей чуждых? Не она ли, простирая руки могущества, обнимает обитающих различнейших поколений Востока?» А ведь «какое европейское государство имеет такую тесную и внутреннюю связь с Азией и азиатцами, как Россия? Не ее ли сыны в теснейших отношениях торговых с соседними им персами, турками и разноплеменными народами независимой Азии?»¹⁹.

И однако, у русских пока еще слабо внимание к «восточной словесности: во-первых, потому, что вкус к учению вообще не так

заметен еще в кругу среднего класса; во-вторых, потому, что число людей, необходимых для дипломатических сношений с азиатскими племенами, менее того, которое могут выпускать все учебные заведения по сей части в России; в-третьих, потому, что *крайне восточной литературы и богатство мыслей, сокрытых в великолепных манускриптах арабских, персидских и турецких, сохраняющихся как драгоценности в русских библиотеках, еще не столь известны у нас, чтобы иметь влияние на просвещенных дворян и пробудить в них желание самим заниматься восточными языками или возбуждать его в своих детях*»²⁰.

Не лучше обстоит дело и с «торговым классом», хотя именно он-то должен был бы отчетливо осознать недюжинную «собственную выгоду» от коммерческих сношений с Востоком. Казем-бек питает надежду — не особенно, впрочем сильную²¹ — на то, что и здесь Россия пойдет по примеру Европы — когда преимущественно экономический интерес обусловил в ней расцвет ориенталистики²². В общем-то она, несмотря на блестящие достижения многих ее представителей уже в первой половине XIX в. и довольно значительный рост соответствующих учебных заведений, долго еще оставалась в статусе некой эзотерической субкультуры, и лица, подобные Казем-беку, могли уповать лишь на то, что всевозможные военно-стратегические и дипломатические цели России смогут радикально изменить положение.

Любопытна поэтому и та часть разбираемого труда Казем-бека, где он касается состояния духовной жизни на мусульманском Востоке и ожидаемых от этого выгод для России (во многом прямо отождествляемой им здесь с Европой).

Как быстро, пишет он, просвещение в Азии распространилось вместе с владычеством халифов и их преемников, точно с той же быстротой оно исчезло вместе с их могуществом. До появления *Магомета, этого грозного и удивительного преобразователя Востока*, арабский и персидский языки... не отличались особенными произведениями, до наук касавшимися... одна отечественная литература занимала деятельные умы образованных. Во время появления *Магомета* словесность арабов была на высшей степени совершенства; *Алкоран* по своей неподражаемости в поэзии приносил энтузиастам за чудо небес. Около этого времени страсть к песнопению, волнение знойных чувств и соревнование талантов создали *никогда не угасимую поэзию арабов*... (впрочем, «арабские поэты писали изящно, умели отличить высокое от надуто-

го... но не могли дать в том никакого отчета. Они писали красноречиво, не имея правил красноречия»²³.

Высоко отозвавшись и о других, в особенности персов- и туркоязычных, как литературных, так и научных, произведений²⁴, Казем-бек далее высказывает одну в высшей степени примечательную мысль.

Как многие представители тогдашней русской культуры, он с сочувствием относился к реформам султана Махмуда, поскольку они-де «предвещают новые и блестящие успехи европейской образованности»²⁵. А коли так, то «может быть, — считает Казем-бек, — скоро настанет время... когда давно покрытая невежеством страна древнего просвещения снова примет его в свой объятия, как потерянное чадо, *но уже увенчанное предвечным благословением неба — неуязвимою главою христианства*»²⁶.

Что касается Персии, то хотя ее духовная жизнь в течение столетий подавлялась схоластическим богословием обоих «суверенных сект», шиитов и суннитов, а «науки оставались в одних флинтах, закупоренных в сундуки или запяленных в полках»²⁷, — все же и в ней модернизаторский курс «просвещенного Аббас-Мирзы» позволяет надеяться на пробуждение «усыпленных умов Азии»²⁸. Конечно, предупреждает Казем-бек, давным-давно ставший (как и полагается образцовому прозелиту!) убежденным исламофобом (если, впрочем, не придавать особого значения его комплиментам в адрес Мухаммеда), «представители веры магометанской запрещали и запрещают ныне иметь какое-либо сообщение с неверными, учиться их языкам и следовать по стопам их, ибо думают, что делами и умом их управляет сатана. Вот *главные данные, на коих основаны предания Пророка и на которых так долго держится фатализм*»²⁹.

И тем не менее Казем-бек вовсе не склонен во всем винить ислам, неустанно прославляя одни лишь «чрезвычайные успехи Европы во всех родах человеческих деяний»³⁰. Ведь «и в самой Европе в VIII — IX и следующих столетиях... богословы старались преградить путь к исследованию Азии, и народ смотрел на магометанские произведения точно такими же глазами, какими они ныне смотрят на христианские»³¹.

Но ныне во всем мире все более и более начинает царить, по воле providения, цивилизация, и, обогащенная ее плодами, Европа «сделалась *главою вселенной*»³². Отсюда у Казем-бека уже постепенно сходит резкое сопоставление двух образов — «просвещенного Запада» и «отсталого Востока». И на последнем теперь

развертывается — благодаря «Небом избранным правителям народов» вроде султана Махмуда и Аббаса-Мирзы — исключитель-но сложная и многоплановая драма, итогом которой станет новый культурный макрокосм, в позитивных своих аспектах имитирующий Европу и ей же безмерно и навсегда благодарный. Но сколь бы ни были сильны у Казем-бека патристическо-русские мотивы, однако и он отдает первенство Европе как таковой, только на нее смотрит как на вдохновляющий образец.

Это была общая для множества российских интеллектуалов установка, заложенная Петром Великим³³. Учтем, что именно с него, когда идеалом была избрана античная имперская структура, начинается серия радикально-секуляристских — во всяком случае, на эгалитарном уровне — акций, которые одновременно позволяли:

— искать все новые и новые аргументы в пользу уникального статуса российской государственности;

— создавать концептуальную основу для присоединения к ней разнообразных, в том числе и «нечестивых» (в первую очередь мусульманских), регионов;

— вводить несравненно больше, чем прежде, толерантные ус-тановки по отношению к неправославным — и даже нехристиан-ским — общинам в соответствии с духом «истинно-имперской» (моделирующей древнеримскую) модели.

Закисленность на европейско-античном (= «западном») госу-дарственном идеале и в то же время сильнейшая приверженность ко множеству традиционнорусских политических мифов и клю-чевых политических символов в совокупности своей играли ста-билизирующую, ассимилирующую и упреждающую функцию в динамике культуры XVIII — начала XIX в. Этот симбиоз поз-волял, наконец, не только консервировать, но и в случае необхо-димости, минимизировать оппозицию между всегда считавши-мися противоположными символами: Россия / Европа; Запад / Восток; христианство / ислам; православие / неправославные разновидности христианства и т. д.

И хотя ни одно из течений русской культуры описываемого времени вовсе не склонно было рассматривать Россию (и всю отождествляемую с западными обществами «Цивилизацию») и мусульманский (или даже «нехристианский») Восток как два равновесных компонента единой культурной субстанции³⁴, тем

не менее уже в XVIII веке — веке большого исторического поворота — российская интеллектуальная элита приняла довольно значительное участие в характерном для всей европейской цивилизации процессе «открытия дверей» на Восток.

Давала ли теоретическую основу для этого современная Петру русская историческая мысль?

Как помним, Лейбниц считал, что «теперь» (при Петре³⁵) пальма культурного первенства переходит к русскому народу, который имеет возможность использовать достижения двух континентов — Европы и Азии. Но лейбниевской теории исторического круговорота суждена была в России известная трансформация, поскольку Дмитрий Кантемир³⁶ попытался соединить ее с теорией четырех монархий (также претерпевшей под пером бывшего молдавского господаря немаловажные изменения). Вместо принципа, исходящего из числа «мировых монархий» — Ассирийской, Персидской, Греко-Македонской и Римской, — Кантемир вводит принцип, основанный на числе *стран света*. Это означает, с его точки зрения (а Дмитрий Кантемир во многом разделял идеи Просвещения), трактовку истории человечества на «естественном основании». Ссылаясь на Аристотеля, Кантемир заявляет, что *восточная монархия* должна выступить первой по тому, что это «сама натура показывает». *Всякое движение* начинается с востока, «по воле Творца и по чину естественному». К первой, восточной, монархии относятся «инды, ассирияне, мидяне, парсы, которые относятся к индиям, ассирийцам, персам, которых титул монархии содержали даже до Александра Великого». Таким образом, вместо двух монархий старой схемы (ассиро-вавилонской и персидской) Кантемир фиксирует одну, персидскую, не упомянув даже о вавилонянах. За восточной (или персидской) монархией, «по жребиям своим исполнение прияше», проделали свой круг следующие монархии — *полуденная*, или греко-македонская, вместо третьего заняла второе, а *западная*, или римская, вместо четвертого — третье место.

«Это сведение известных четырех монархий к трем, — пишет Алпатов, — являлось главной целью автора — освободившееся место четвертой монархии после восточной, полуденной и западной должна занять *Северная*, или *Российская монархия*: «Ей же по чину от самой натуры никак не нарушимого (своего бо устава не весь поменяти натура) и вечно (соизволяще божественной воли) законно хранимому... простираться и распространитися по долине»³⁷.

Северная, Российская, монархия «предвещает» превзойти своим могуществом и культурой все предшествующие монархии, и это начинает осуществляться³⁸. Здесь, однако, мы видим не только культ Северной монархии, но и решительную попытку деориентализировать и прошлое, и настоящее, и будущее России, подчеркивая одновременно ее нетождественность Западу и ее подлинную универсальность, способную создать «едино стадо и один пастырь», слить в гармоничном союзе достижения Запада и Востока.

Но при этом для апологетов Петра³⁹ (убежденных, что допетровская Россия была погружена в «небытие»⁴⁰) «Запад... был единственным и решающим эталоном для определения успехов России — эта идея теперь стала официальной государственной идеей»⁴¹. Однако Запад же — не весь, конечно, но то или иное ставшее враждебным России государство — не раз изображался в качестве самого опасного врага. Так, согласно Феофану Прокоповичу, татары, угнетавшие некогда Русь, не идут ни в какое сравнение со шведами⁴². Впрочем, и Турция не забывалась, как и вся вообще мусульманская (в основном тюркско-мусульманская) проблема, причем она тесно сопрягалась с общевропейской проблематикой.

Так, в известной «Скифской истории» А.И. Лызлова⁴³ (Скифия, территория Северного Причерноморья, для Лызлова — колыбель, откуда вышли татары и турки) последовательно проводится мысль о том, что главной причиной того, что Турция сумела захватить весь юго-восточный угол Западной Европы, были противоречия и борьба между европейскими государствами.

Характерно, однако, что, описывая татарское нашествие, Лызлов подчеркивает, что оно было бедой не только для России, но и Западной Европы («странам полуночным»)⁴⁴.

Ни капли сочувствия нет у Лызлова и к другим завоевателям — арабам. Эти наследники Мухаммеда: «повоевала всю Аравию, Сирию, Египет, Испанию и распространила государство свое от реки Ефрата до моря Атлантичного и от реки Черной до гор Пиринейских... К тому обладали было Сицилию и опустошили Италию и через триста лет непрестанно приумножаху себе государство, свогда обладали восточные и западные государства и быша много лет под державою срацнскою»⁴⁵.

Причиной не только арабских, но и турецких завоеваний Лызлов считает ислам: турки «егда приаша прелесть Магометову, даже донныне, уже через тысящу лет и вясущи непрестанное плене-

ние и пустошение творят народам христианским»⁴⁶. В итоге со-
здалась огромная турецкая империя, которая для христиан «пре-
восходит египетскую неволю, вавилонское изгнание, ассирий-
ское пленение и иерусалимское разорение». Но Лызлов верит,
что близко время, когда турецкое владычество «упасти имат»,
и молит Бога, чтобы это произошло в его дни⁴⁷.

Все это, однако, не мешало тому, что постепенно рос фонд ми-
ровых, общечеловеческих тем, сюжетов, образов, символов
в творчестве различных представителей русской культуры —
фонд, вовсе не ограниченный восточнохристианским духовным
наследием⁴⁸. Так, в XVIII в. журнал «Утренние часы», например,
был одним из тех, кто регулярно знакомил читателей с различно-
го рода образчиками мусульманской (нравоучительной в первую
очередь) литературы, переводя их с английского и французского
языков. И хотя это была псевдовосточная литература, для масон-
ских и промасонских⁴⁹ изданий типа «Утренних часов» (или но-
виковского «Утреннего света») служившая целям борьбы с мате-
риалистическими и рационалистическими системами и к тому же
в русских переводах порой радикально менявшая даже имена
главных героев⁵⁰, тем не менее вместе с нею достоянием читате-
лей делались и «настоящие восточные» произведения или их
фрагменты. Например, те же «Утренние часы» опубликовали
много переводов из французского сборника М. Кардона (*Cardon-
ne M. «Mélanges de littérature orientales»*)⁵¹.

При общем увлечении «восточной повестью» в европейской
литературе тех лет удачный подбор произведений и то обстоя-
тельство, что все они были подлинно восточными, обеспечили
сборнику Кардона успех. Почти сразу же после выхода сборника
(1770 г.; переиздания: в 1771, 1772 и 1778 гг.) появились его пе-
реводы и на другие европейские языки. В 1780-е годы появились
русские переводы. Иван Рахманинов (как и другие масоны) стал
использовать сборник Кардона систематически. Но хотя никто
другой из русских литераторов XVIII в. не обращался к этой кни-
ге столь часто, тем не менее переводы из нее продолжали время
от времени появляться в разных изданиях⁵².

В XVIII в. переводились не одни только идеологически ней-
тральные» произведения, но и те — исключительно западные, —
которые посвящены борьбе христианства с исламом⁵³, в частнос-
ти эпопея «Освобожденный Иерусалим» Торквато Тассо⁵⁴, пове-
ствующая о первом крестовом походе под предводительством
Готфрида Бульонского.

В первом русском (прозаическом) переводе (М.И. Попова) по-
эма представляла собой, несмотря на важность основного замыс-
ла, «произведение в духе увлекательного воллешно-рыцарского
романа»⁵⁵.

Интересен и такой эпизод. Писатель и просветитель М.Н. Му-
равьев (1758–1807) — о котором мы упомянем и далее, — восхи-
щаясь творением Тассо как художественным произведением,
осуждал (как и Вольтер) религиозный фанатизм крестовых похо-
дов, т. е. событий, положенных в основу поэмы.

Он избрал оригинальный способ высказать такое осуждение
в одном из своих трудов («Тетради для сочинения»). Муравьев
приводит следующий нравоучительный пример веротерпимости:
заблудившийся ночью после боя рыцарь Танкред находит убежи-
ще в пещере мусульманина; устами этого «пустынника», отечест-
во которого разоряют «западные рыцари», автор рассуждает об
общем для всех милостивом Боге. «Вы сами, — говорит мусуль-
манин, — когда-нибудь сделавшись просвещеннее, будете жалеть
о бесполезном свирепстве вашем».

И хотя Танкред изображен Тассо как великодушный рыцарь,
тем не менее в его поэме такого эпизода нет: Муравьев «сам со-
чинил его, но подал в форме исторического анекдота, который
должен был вызвать ассоциации с “Освобожденным Иерусали-
мом”»⁵⁶.

Но были и противоположные толкования.

В 1780 г. в русском переводе вышла драма Л.-С. Мерсье
«Олинд и Софрония», сюжет которой был в свою очередь заим-
ствован из «Освобожденного Иерусалима»⁵⁷. И хотя в драме
Мерсье значительно изменены характеристики персонажей и си-
туация, главный пафос оригинала — «отменная ревность к хрис-
тианской вере» — был сохранен.

Слова об «отменной ревности к христианской вере» принадле-
жат переводчице, княгине Екатерине Меньшиковой, посвятив-
шей свой труд⁵⁸ «первейшему члену Синода, архиепископу Нов-
городскому и Санкт-Петербургскому Гавриилу». В посвящении
она писала: «Не вместишь показать может, что мой феатраль-
ного действия перевод посвящаю Вашему высокопреосвященст-
ву, но как намерение сего сочинения не иное что, как отменная
ревность к христианской вере во время победы магометан обла-
сти Иерусалимской до пришествия Годефрита Буллионского
и Крестовой войны; почему и разсудила, что оной перевод нико-
му приличнее отнестись не может, как Вашему высокопреосвя-

шенству...»⁵⁹. Отсюда и манера, в которой перевод был выполнен: «столь возвышенному сюжету подобал, в ее (Меньшиковой. — М.Б.) представлении, высокий — несравненно более высокий, чем у французского автора, — стиль»⁶⁰.

Восточно-мусульманская экзотика проникла и на театральную сцену, причем не в одних только переводах с западных языков. Так, в 1785 г. была представлена трагедия П.А. Плавильщикова «Тахмас Кулыхан» — о жизни персидского военачальника Кули-Хана, узурпировавшего в середине XVIII в. шахский престол и вошедшего в историю под именем шаха Надира⁶¹; казанский литератор-дилетант С.А. Москобильников в трагедии «Остан» (1790 г.) перенес действие ее в экзотическую обстановку древней Индии, «хотя ни о каком древнеиндийском колорите говорить, конечно, не приходится. Герои трагедии... условны и схематичны, как это было принято в трагедиях XVIII в.»⁶².

Сложнее вопрос о трагедии М.В. Ломоносова «Тамира и Селим», успех которой оказался кратковременным, и причины этой неудачи до сих пор вызывают споры.

По мнению А.В. Запорова, дело было прежде всего в политической окраске содержания пьесы. Ведь ее главными положительными героями были татары и арабы, союзники Мамаю и потому — враги России, о чем русский зритель никогда не забывал. В этом Запоров видит «художественный просчет» в замысле трагедии⁶³. В принципе соглашаясь с таким объяснением, Ю.В. Стенник считает в то же время необходимым исходить не только из политического аспекта содержания «Тамиры и Селима», но и учитывать особенности творческого метода Ломоносова, тот уровень художественных решений, какой определялся его эстетической программой⁶⁴.

Но нас все же более интересует «политический аспект», анализ которого позволит отчетливее доказать, что в сознании русской интеллигентной элиты середины XVIII в. образно-концептуальная модель мира ислама выступала как многомерное отображение разных его реалий, описанных (или, скорее, пытающихся быть описанными) разными перцептивными, символическими и вербальными языками.

Вот что гласит предварявшее пьесу авторское «изъяснение» (в соответствии с общеевропейской традицией вводившее зрителя в курс происходящего на сцене): «В сей трагедии изображается стихотворческим вымыслом позорная гибель гордаго Мамаю, царя Татарского, о котором из Российской истории извест-

но, что он, будучи побежден храбростию Московского государя, великаго князя Дмитрия Иоанновича на Дону, убежал с четьрьмя князьями своими в Крым, в город Кафу, и там убит от своих». Такова, по мысли Ломоносова, тема его трагедии. «В дополнение сего, — продолжает автор, — представляется здесь, что в нашествие Мамаева на Россию Мумет, царь Крымский, обещал дочь свою Тамиру в супружество Мамаю, послал сына своего Нарсима с некоторым числом войска на вспоможение оному. В его отсутствие Селим, царевич Багдатский... приступил под Кафу, в которой Мумет, будучи осажден и не имея довольной силы к сопротивлению, выпросил у Селима на некоторое время перемирия... чтобы между тем дожидаться обратно с войском сына своего Нарсима»⁶⁵.

Все, что излагает Ломоносов в «дополнении» к основной теме и что составляет своеобразную экспозицию драматического действия пьесы, не опирается на исторические источники. Романтическая линия любящих друг друга Селима и Тамиры является сюжетообразующей канвой развития трагедийного действия. Единственное историческое лицо пьесы — Мамай, который выступает соперником Селима, рассчитывая жениться на Тамире и заполучить поддержку ее отца в войне с русскими. При этом если Мамай («Царь Татарский») «стремится достигнуть своей цели лостью и коварством, используя корыстолюбие и трусость Мумета (а он ведь тоже «Царь Татарский»! — М.Б.), то Селим (арабский царевич. — М.Б.) олицетворяет собой отвагу и благородство, — качества, в конечном счете и определяющие торжество справедливости»⁶⁶. Сочетание вымышленными фактами истории Тамиры к багдадскому царевичу с подлинными фактами истории России (поражение и смерть Мамаю) призвано было, по мысли Ломоносова, подчеркнуть «очень важную для него патристическую идею, на которую он и указал в «изъяснении». Только в данном случае наглядным воплощением этой идеи должны были служить романтические события борьбы за обладание Тамирой. Подлинным же историческим фактам отводилась роль глубинного подтекста»⁶⁷.

Осведомленный о конечной судьбе Мамаю, зритель не мог не соотносить происходящее на сцене с историей Руси до Куликовской битвы. В течение веков Русь «страдала под владычеством татар, когда насилие и жестокость торжествовали. В пьесе Ломоносова татарский хан тоже временно торжествует»⁶⁸. Согласно Мумета выдать дочь за Мамаю связано с уверенностью в его победе

над русскими, которая основана на ложном известии Мамая. Ложь достигает цели, однако успех Маая призрачен. Второй кульминационный пункт пьесы назревает в 5-м действии, когда вестник извещает о гибели (оказавшейся, однако, мнимой) Селима. Тамира пытается заколотся, но внезапно появившиеся ее брат (Нарсим) и возлюбленный («царевич багдадский») сообщают о смерти Маая. Нарсим подробно описывает ход Куликовской битвы и победу русского войска. Мамай изобличен. Наступает и еще одна счастливая развязка: Тамира и Селим соединяются, преодолев все превратности судьбы.

Опираясь в своем довольно детальном изображении Куликовской битвы на древнерусскую летопись XV в. «Сказание о Мамаевом побоище» (в его киприановской редакции, отраженной в Никоновской летописи)⁶⁹, Ломоносов стремился в своей трагедии прежде всего к моральной назидательности, — но такой, и только такой, которая служила бы в первую очередь прославлению России, прославлению, отождествляемому им с конечным торжеством Истины.

И здесь всего любопытнее, что проводником соответствующих воззрений автора выступает мусульманин — крымский татарин Надир (брат Мумета и, соответственно, дядя Тамиры). Вопреки совету (визиря Заисана) пойти на союз с Мамаем, Надир говорит (проявляя и недожизненные познания в русской истории, и рвение истинно русского патриота):

Нарочно Бог во тьме грядущее скрывает,
Чтоб смертным гордые советы разорить.
Мамет поля свои людьми опустошает,
Дабы их трупами Российский край покрыть.
Насильна власть стоять не может долговечно.
Кто гонит одного, тот всякому грозит.
Россию варварство его бесчеловечно
Из многих областей в одну совокупит.
На плач, на шум, на дым со всех сторон стекутся;
Рассыпанных враждой сберет последний страх.
Какою силою в единстве облекутся
Владимир нам пример и храбрый Мономах⁷⁰.

«За возвышенной риторикой афористически отточенной речи Надира, — замечает Стенник, — явственно слышен голос самого Ломоносова. В доводах, которые выдвигаются этим персонажем,

обращение к примерам русской истории может рассматриваться в контексте политических идеалов, неоднократно утверждавшихся в одах Ломоносова»⁷¹.

Но нам важно зафиксировать не только то, что рупором излюбленных политико-публицистических идей Ломоносова выступает приверженец ислама — явление, впервые столь масштабно и последовательно выступившее в русской литературе, — но и известное расщепление понятия «мусульманин»: одни мусульмане (арабы и крымский вельможа Надир) олицетворяют Добро⁷², тогда как татарин Мамай — Зло. Это вполне соответствует характерной для русского массового сознания и спустя века после свержения ордынского ига связанной с ним парализующей психологической атмосфере тенденции к отождествлению Ига со Страшным Миром, непреклонным, безжалостным, коварным, с трудом преодолимым. Мы не раз убеждались еще в том, что едва ли не во всей русской литературе, повествующей о временах Ига, возникал единый, предельно эмоционально окрашенный ключевой образ Татарины, символ холодной и злой жестокости, нередко, однако (как свидетельствует хотя бы «Тамира и Селим»), противопоставляясь «чужим поганым», в частности арабам.

Таким образом, мы вправе говорить о все более диффузном восприятии понятия «мусульманский Восток», лишавшегося тем самым конкретизирующей четкости описания, что было очевидно в такой, скажем, панегирической драме школьного театра петровских времен, как «Торжество мира православного...»⁷³.

Но неприязненное отношение к татарам — как к бывшим врагам и туркам — как «врагам нынешним» отчетливо проходит через множество трагедий эпохи русского классицизма.

Вот, к примеру, пьеса В.И. Майкова «Фемист и Иеронима».

На выбор ее сюжета, по-видимому, повлияла трагедия Расина «Баязет»⁷⁴.

Действие происходит при дворе турецкого султана Магомета II, который добивается любви плененной греческой княжны Иеронимы, племянницы последнего византийского императора. Но княжна сохраняет верность своему возлюбленному и единственному верцу — греческому князю Фемисту, хотя и считает его погибшим. Однако оставшийся в живых Фемист служит Магомету под именем Солимана. Фемист поднимает восстание греков против поработителей-турок. Подозревая в Иерониме соучастницу мятежников, султан требует от нее выдачи скрывающегося Фемиста и, не добившись, закалывает ее. Схваченный при попытке

убить Магомета, Солиман открывает свое подлинное имя и тоже закалывается.

Источником данного сюжета послужил перевод французской повести «История о княжне Иерониме...». Но Майков⁷⁵ взял отсюда лишь имена героев и основные эпизоды, связанные с судьбой греческой княжны, совершенно изменив смысл оригинала в угоду, как мы сейчас убедимся, политической конъюнктуре.

Согласно тексту «Истории о княжне Иерониме», героиня ее любила одного из военачальников султана, пашу Солимана, спасшего ее во время захвата Константинополя. При помощи одного своего друга Солиман встречается с Иеронимой. Происходит восстание янычар, подстрекаемых первой женой султана и требующих смерти гречанки. Но Солиман помогает Магомету усмирить бунтарей, за что свирепый владыка великодушно прощает провинившегося пашу, отдает ему чудом спасенную Иерониму и благоговяет их брак.

У Майкова же паша Солиман стал греческим князем (как стал греком друг Фемиста, Мурад, устроивший ему свидание с Иеронимой). Все эти изменения «в сочетании с трагической развязкой пьесы придали ее содержанию антииталианскую и антитурецкую направленность. Если вспомнить о начавшейся с 1768 г. русско-турецкой войне, то станут понятными политическая актуальность выбранного Майковым сюжета трагедии и те изменения, которые он внес в этот сюжет по сравнению с первоисточником»⁷⁶. Греческое происхождение основных положительных героев пьесы не только способствовало усилению драматизма действия, но и давало автору возможность дополнить идею трагедии «существенным в тогдашней обстановке мотивом законности выступления греков против жестокости мусульман»⁷⁷.

Спустя более чем пятьдесят лет после постановки ломоносовской «Тамиры и Селима», 7 мая 1807 г., в Санкт-Петербурге прошла премьера трагедии С.И. Глинки «Сумбека, или Падение Казанского царства».

Написанная по мотивам знаменитой эпопеи Хераскова «Россиада», трагедия повествовала о страдающей от безответной любви Сумбеке, трон которой становится объектом притязаний сразу нескольких претендентов.

Для нас, впрочем, и здесь всего интересней, что проводником авторских идей о необходимости всячески чтить утвердившийся порядок вещей и, следовательно, быть покорным не только небес-

ному, но и земному владыке выступает казанский «первосвященник Сеит».

Обличая честолюбивого вельможу Сагруну, поднимающего татар на битву с русскими, мусульмано-татарский священнослужитель говорит:

Народ! Покорен будь уставам высшей власти;
От безначалья шаг к тиранству и напасти.
Ласкателей своих коварный глас отринь;
Любостяженье для них устав один...

Бог, вера и закон — вот к счастью пути!
Велик народ, в душах почтенье к ним хранящий...⁷⁸

Впрочем, в том же 1807 г. громадный успех имела трагедия В.А. Озерова «Дмитрий Донской», где Мамай как репрезентант Татарского Ига олицетворяет Абсолютное Зло. И тем не менее обличение стигнувшей много веков назад татарской власти было для Озерова не самоцелью, а скорее средством пробудить патристический настрой в войнах с Наполеоном. Ту же функциональную нагрузку несла, по-видимому, и трагедия Г.Р. Державина «Евпраксия», обличавшая «наглые требования»⁷⁹ другого татарского хана, Батыея.

Что же касается отношения к собственному исламу, то в принципе оно по-прежнему оставалось негативным, в том числе, конечно, и у представителей вольнодумной мысли⁸⁰. Коль речь идет о просветителях XVIII в., то учтем, что, во-первых, они были приверженцами не просто христианства⁸¹, но и православия (противопоставляя его католицизму)⁸², и, во-вторых, отрицательно оценивали ислам — в особенности за то, что он соединяет в себе светское и религиозное начала.

Так, Аничков критикует не только «натуральное богопочитание» — язычество, не только католицизм и папу, но и весь институт жречества, относя к этой категории и мусульманство. «...Жрецы, — пишет он (в 1769 г.), — которые кроме как только чтоб предстоять алтарю, ни к чему большому не способны, в небыкновенной испещренных одежде невеждам казались имеющими непосредственное сообщение с оным существом, к которому и весь прибегает народ. И сей, по несправедливости своих рассуждений, одним аналогичным образом и то еще заключает час-то, что жрецам как ближайшим всегда к Богу представителям, на-

турально следует поручить и все правление. Сходно с таким заключением мы видим из истории варварских веков, что такие жрецы были купно и правителями целого народа, какими примечаются у древних британцев друиды, а у туток Магомет, *который и один есть доволным доказательством себя истины...* От сего также ослепленного удивления народного, не упоминая других причин политических, и пап римский сделался наместником Божиим и по подобному о себе простого народа разумению принял меч духовный и гражданский (т. е. уподобился Магомету. — М.Б.)⁸³.

Но, полагая, что, за исключением христианства, все веры «суть одни обыкновения народные»⁸⁴, Аничков в то же время предупреждает против насильственной христианизации: «Не должно через усилие никакой переманить веры, когда пременение оно соединяется с большим возмущением, нежели спокойствием народным»⁸⁵.

А Дмитрий Голицын охарактеризовал крестовые походы как «бич, изобретенный честолюбием и видами политическими, подержанный изуверством и суевериями...»⁸⁶.

Вообще же русские просветители злейшим врагом прогресса считали католическую церковь, а не ислам⁸⁷ — при всем том, что с этим словом давным-давно связывалась отрицательная экспрессия.

Как бы то ни было, довольно широкий по тем временам наплыв в русскую культуру⁸⁸ мусульманских персонажей — олицетворявших не только наивно-оптимистический пафос, но и скептическую, изъеденную рефлексией мысль — давал определенные предпосылки для упрочения представлений о признании, говоря словами одного из русских философов, «множественности миров, множественности людей и богов среди необъятных пространств необъятной вселенной»⁸⁹.

Функционирование в русском массовом сознании инорусских персонажей, — или, вернее, различных символов различных же философий, этик, эстетик, преподносимых зачастую в мусульманских одеяниях⁹⁰, — показало, что в принципе можно:

— положить конец тотальному изолированию одного от другого ярусов российского многонационального социума;

— взглянуть на границы между ними как на таие, которые есть в сущности эмпирического происхождения, а не коренятся ни

в природе восточных компонентов социума, ни в природе главной в нем русской культуры.

Конечно, и она и другие культуры, — культуры «инородцев», — твердо предполагались реализованными в разных структурах восприятия, осмысления конструирования бытия и потому полярно разделенными (до тех пор, пока «инородческие» культуры не руссофицируются). Они, эти культуры — как «материальные» образования, получающие свое единство и осмысленность от главенствующей культуры, воплощающей в себе Движущий Дух, но при этом сами не становящиеся субстанциями. Главенствующая культура и имманентна негосподствующим, и трансцендентна им. Негосподствующие культуры могут, в случае необходимости, реализовать — но лишь наряду с господствующей, которой и здесь принадлежит ведущая роль, — функцию, так сказать, физического выражения духа российского социума, но не его глубинное «Я».

Конечно, предполагался — даже в идеале — фрагментарный, а вовсе не целостный компромисс; исключалась сама возможность какого-то уникального праздника всепримирения, ибо зло и от татаро-монгольского ига, и от набегов крымчаков, и от ожесточенных войн с турками могло быть в лучшем случае забыто, но никак не прощено⁹¹.

Но как бы долго ни фигурировало слово «азиатский» в качестве прилагательного с отрицательными в основном эмоциональными коннотациями, какие бы оно ни вызывало тенденциозные концептуальные наслоения, тем не менее уже сама прагматическая неопределенность внутри- и внешнеполитической жизни Российской империи заставляла ее идеологов (или, вернее, ее «дальновидных идеологов») мыслить категориями холизма.

Они приучались видеть в своем государстве не механическую сумму частей. Ими все более осознавалось, что части и целое внутренне необходимы, находятся в иерархических отношениях и подчиняются общим культурным законам. И наконец, что особенно важно, концепция холизма связана с принципом относительной инвариантности: любая единица (т. е. в данном случае какая-нибудь более или менее значимая этноконфессиональная общность) на всех этапах своего участия в динамике целого (т. е. империи) сохраняет набор свойств, определяющих ее идентичность. А это, конечно, заставляло не только не отодвигать проблему «Азиатской России» на периферию интересов, а, напротив,

придавать все большую значимость соответствующей категоризации информации.⁹²

И уже во второй половине XVIII в. русский просветитель Семен (Ефимович) Десницкий так восхвалял успехи России: «...грек и римлянин не могут похвалиться толиким обширным завоеванием, каковым росс ныне (написано в 1768 г. — М.Б.) по справедливости возносятся. Творец его намерениям и предприятим поспешествует во благо, и аки бы единственно для него, оставя на Юге и возлюбленное себе издревле места, ныне в полных странах не вечерний россу жидет познания свет. *Азия уже открывает ему своих сокровищ недро*, из которого девицы и юноши его почерпают себе великолепие и украшение. Сребро и золото истекает у него в своем отечестве»⁹³ и т. п.⁹⁴

При этом Десницкий предупреждает:

«Пленить и покорить многочисленные народы и распространить державу есть только доказать военное искусство и превосходную его силу; но удержат безмерные завоевания в единомысленном повиновении с удовлетворением всенародным есть такое дело, которым неоспоримо доказываются человеческая премудрость и счастливое правительствующих дарование к совершению великих дел». И тут же он напоминает, сколь тщетными оказались грандиозные завоевания и Александра Македонского, и «варварских героев Агилы, Чингизхана и Тамерлана»⁹⁵. Они со своими «гуннами и татарами» стали подобными «ветреной буре, которая, восстав от Востока и с ужасным стремлением прошла до Запада, обратно на Восток с шумом возвратилась... оставляя за собою только одни следы своего свирепства в государствах, чрез которые проходила»⁹⁶.

Десницкий же напоминает российским правителям, что «внезапным превосходного в силах одного народа нападением завоеванные народы разного правления, разных нравов и состояния в скором времени не могут действительно соединиться во единый народ с победителями и не могут быть удержаны в покорении чрез долгое время. Для верного соединения подданных и для их единодушного и единомысленного повиновения своему правлению требуется веков изрядного законоположения, согласно исповедания веры (но вряд ли здесь имеется в виду массовая христианизация. — М.Б.) и великой взаимной коммерции со своими и соседними народами»⁹⁷.

Ясно, что все это имело в виду и мусульманские народы — как входившие в состав Российской империи, так и граничащие с нею.

Несомненно, указанная тенденция была во многом порождена (уже отмеченным мною выше) и начавшимся со времен Петра I процессом секуляризации и его неизбежными спутниками — ростом свободомыслия, индифферентизма в делах религии⁹⁸ и даже призывами к веротерпимости.

Ведь уже сам дух петровских преобразований обусловливал отказ от церковной авторитарности мышления, определенное размежевание философии и теологии, адаптацию принципа «двойственности истины»⁹⁹, более или менее рафинированного деизма, с сопутствующим им всем отказом от экстремистских вариантов христианского централизма.

Так, первый русский светский поэт, крупный дипломат, переводчик и философ Антиох Кантемир (сын Дмитрия Кантемира; 1709–1744) в одном из своих произведений осуждает некоего церковника, проповедующего ненависть к представителям неправославных вероисповеданий. Между тем, утверждает Кантемир, более правильно было бы, «... если б он учил веры басурманской отбегает...»; он же призывает ненавидеть мусульман, хотя «должность пастырская первая» — проповедовать «братолюбие»¹⁰⁰.

Не стоит, конечно, преувеличивать значимость подобного рода тенденций в мировосприятии идеологов российского абсолютизма (к числу которых, бесспорно, относились и оба Кантемира¹⁰¹); выступая за секуляризацию культуры, за подчинение церкви государству и т. п., они оставались принципиальными защитниками православия и антагонистами ислама¹⁰². Но когда нужно было доказать необходимость для России монархии неограниченной и на следственной, тот же Прокопович охотно ссылаясь и на опыт мусульманских деспотов: «Начни от Европы, предстанут Испания, Галлия, Германия, Дания, Швеция и прочая. Все вид монаршеский, все скипетра наследуемое имущия. Пойди в Африку, — такого чина: Фец, Тунис, Алгер, Трипол, Барка и великая Ефиопия — народ абиссинский и прочия... государства. Пойди в Асию, — такова: Туркия, Персида, Индия...»¹⁰³.

Да и вообще стремление и на секулярной основе (ни в коем случае, однако, не отказываясь и от традиционно-теологической) построить сильное централизованное государство с необходимостью вело к определенным прорывам в сторону конфессиональной толерантности в пределах разноликой Российской империи¹⁰⁴.

Одним из первых в России знаменитый историк В.Н. Татищев писал, что «разность вер великой в государстве беды не наносит».

сит»¹⁰⁵, что «умному до веры другого ничто не касается и ему равно Лютер ли Кальвин ли, или язычник с ним в одном городе живет или с нем торгуется»¹⁰⁶ (благо, подчеркивал Михаил Васильевич Ломоносов, «российский народ гибок!»¹⁰⁷). А по категорическому мнению столь радикального мыслителя, как Александр Радищев, «веротерпимость должна быть совершенная и устранимо все то, что стесняет свободу совести»¹⁰⁸.

Не вдаваясь сейчас в детали, отмечу, что еще задолго до Петра Великого русское правительство наладило довольно интенсивные экономические и политические связи со Средней Азией, Казахской степью¹⁰⁹, мусульманскими регионами Кавказа и Закавказья.

Русские послы, отправляясь в страны Востока, обычно получали от правительства особые указы («память»), где предусматривались все вопросы, которые могли быть заданы послу в чужой стране, и тут же давались на них примерные ответы. По мнению известного востоковеда Н.И. Веселовского, «такое глубокое понимание Азии происходило главным образом из того, что полагам русским вменялось в непрерывную обязанность представлять по возвращении подробный отчет о положении тех стран, которые они посещали... А кроме того, при отправлении посланника знакомили со всем тем, что было сделано его предшественниками и что ими было достигнуто»¹¹⁰.

Еще одна цитата — на сей раз из книги другого маститого востоковеда, П.С. Савельева: «...и до времен Петра Великого мы имели в архивах богатый запас географических и этнографических сведений, собранных на месте, обо всей полосе Средней Азии, в обширном смысле взятой, от восточных берегов Каспийского моря до берегов Китая; но при младенчестве нашей ученой деятельности в то время, этими сведениями могло пользоваться одноправительство да немногие иностранные резиденты, которые явно черпали свои сведения о Сибири и восточных странах не из одних рассказов, но и из письменных источников»¹¹¹.

Ситуация принципиально меняется во времена Петра I, начавшего «рациональное совершенствование» российского общества на его собственной основе, но путем таких структурных и функциональных сдвигов, которые осуществлялись в соответствии с идеально-западными моделями. Стремление к автоматизации всей буквально машины управления посредством отлично вы-

школенной и компетентной в определенных пределах иерархии государственных чиновников¹¹² имплицировало и курс на этизацию востокосведения, на придание его эмпирическим или теоретическим критериям большей роли в процессе выработки рациональных решений в сферах как внутренней, так и внешней политики. Таким образом, на институционализирующееся востокосведение — или, во всяком случае, на довольно явный востокосведения Петра I прообраз его — возлагалась функция одного из тех социальных институтов, которые производят «смысл» (*Sinn*)¹¹³, т. е. информацию, идеалы, ориентации, сообщения и т. п., и который (и это уже — его «высокоспециализированная функция») позволил бы показать, что нет Востока как одной и только одной реальности, что, напротив, есть множество ступеней функционирования и структурной сложности множества объемлемых этим термином объектов.

Петра I менее всего интересовали теоретические изыски, лишь бы они явно не противоречили ни экспансионистской динамике его государства, ни общим нормам курса бюрократически господствующей элиты по отношению к мусульманским подданным, лишь бы познавательная эффективность любой связанной с Востоком культурной формы была поставлена на службу имперской власти — будь то ее же стремление к захвату «Киргиз-Кайсецкия орды» — как «ключа и врат всем азиатским странам и землям»¹¹⁴, или же систематические попытки организовать под своей эгидой подготовку знатоков восточных языков, в том числе и мусульманских¹¹⁵, а равно и самого ислама¹¹⁶.

В 1716 г. по распоряжению Петра издается первый полный перевод Корана на русский язык, сделанный Петром Посниковым на основе первого французского перевода Дю Риэ (1647): «Алкоран о Магомете, или Закон турецкий...»¹¹⁷. В период его же царствования постепенно накапливаются различные сведения о Турции, ее внутреннем устройстве, вооруженных силах, торговле и т. п.¹¹⁸.

Советником Петра по турецким делам стал бывший молдавский господарь (выходец из старинного татарского аристократического рода) Дмитрий Кантемир¹¹⁹, автор «Возвышения и падения дома Османов» (1716 г.) и — уже вкратце охарактеризованной мною — «Системы религии и состояния Турецкой империи» (1720 г.) (в русском переводе Н. Ильинского опубликована в 1722 г. под названием «Книга система, или Состояние мухамеданская религия...») — книг, внесших громадный вклад в (до-

селе довольно скудный в целом) фонд не только фактических, но и концептуальных знаний об исламе как специфически конфессиональном комплексе.

Не останавливаясь далее на истории накопления разнообразных фактических сведений¹²⁰ о внутрироссийских¹²¹ и зарубежных мусульманских регионах¹²², обратим пока внимание на следующие два пункта из составленного Г. Кером (1733 г.) грандиозного по тем временам (фантастического, по мнению одних, вполне реального, по мнению других¹²³) проекта «Академии, или Общества восточных наук и языков в империи Российской».

Хорошо уловив истинные мотивы русской восточной политики, Кер писал: «Назначенным в пограничные с Турцией, Персией, Татарией, Бухарой земли Российской империи военачальникам, губернаторам, правителям, советникам, судьям необходимо знать: каким образом, *действуя в соответствии с обычаями этих народов, склонить их на свою сторону* и укрепить в них благосклонность к Российской империи...»; из среды воспитанников Академии русского происхождения должны были избираться не только исполнители на Востоке «секретных императорских дел», но и «*миссионеры* для обращения мусульман в христианскую веру»¹²⁴.

Итак, комбинация безусловно-секулярного и по сути и по форме своей политического прагматизма с идеалом тотальной христианизации всего населения империи — такова идущая еще от допетровских времен модель, с большими или меньшими вариациями воспринятая последующим, XIX, веком.

2. Интерпретация мусульманского мира в средневековом наследии. Дальнейшие поиски идентичности

В семиотической перспективе исторический процесс может быть представлен как процесс коммуникации, при котором постоянно выступающая новая информация обуславливает ту или иную ответную реакцию со стороны общественного адресата (социума). В качестве кода выступает при этом некоторый язык (принимаемый не в узко лингвистическом, а в широко семантическом смысле), определяющий восприятие тех или иных фактов, как ре-

альных, так и потенциально возможных, в соответствующем историко-культурном контексте. «Таким образом, — утверждает Б.А. Успенский, — событиям приписывается значение: *текст событий читается* социумом. Можно сказать тогда, что в своей элементарной фазе исторический процесс предстает как процесс порождения новых фраз на некотором языке и прочтения их собственным адресатом (социумом)»¹²⁵.

Для описания языка определенного историко-культурного ареала — в данном случае России второй половины XVIII — начала XIX в. — особенно показательны конфликтные, контрверсные ситуации, обусловленные столкновением разных языков по отношению к одной и той же действительности и обнаруживающие вообще неадекватное восприятие одних и тех же событий. В предельном случае возможна ситуация, когда отправитель и получатель сообщения, по существу, пользуются различными языками при одних и тех же внешних средствах выражения¹²⁶. Интересующий нас период — яркий образец культурной гетерогенности — дает множество примеров того, что и мощный поток импортируемого языка западноевропейских культурных представлений не только не смог в ряде случаев (однако лишь «в ряде случаев», и не более. — М.Б.) разрушить каркас категорий традиционно-русского мировосприятия¹²⁷, но и активизировал стремление по-новому осмыслить его внутреннюю и внешнюю роль.

Зафиксируем вначале то обстоятельство, что обретающей все более динамичный и многосторонний характер русской петровской и послепетровской культуре, по мере ее выхода из внутреннего замкнутого во внешне разомкнутое пространство, необходимо было резкое изменение своих концептуальных, семантических и психологических структур, и прежде всего — отказ от созерцательного (или трансцендентного) ориентирования (когда даже активизм имел пассивно-защитительный преимущественно характер). Можно далее указать и на процесс — хотя и довольно медленный — возрастания «терпимости к неопределенности», к амбивалентным чувствам и идеям, постепенное убывание стремлений мыслить в «черно-белой альтернативе» и выносить экстремальные решения, ревностно защищая лишь собственную — тщательно изолируемую — систему убеждений и остро негативно реагируя на другие. А ведь толерантность к когнитивной неуверенности в амбивалентных, диссонансных или неожиданных ситуациях — это фактор, благоприятствующий развитию и проявлению познавательного мышления¹²⁸. Он, в частности,

позволяет находить истинные связи между различными перцептивными и концептуальными мирами.

Здесь я подхожу к проблеме формирования старорусского («допетровского») «рефлекса на Иное». История его еще ждет своего обстоятельного концептуального истолкования. Ни в коей мере не претендуя на решение этой задачи в сколько-нибудь генерализованной форме, я хотел бы тем не менее высказать несколько замечаний.

Уже в допетровской Руси элита и массы, несмотря на бесчисленные социальные конфликты между ними, были связаны единой системой социально-религиозных, убежденно-христианских норм, идеалов, символов, в этноцентристском духе проинтерпретированной иерархией ценностей и функционирующих в ней категорий «добра» и «зла». Эта же система, исходящая из представления об априорном совершенстве крепнущей российской государственности — а потому и антиэгалитарная, — в свою очередь, была основой, на которой конструировалась концепция мира, как бы расходящегося concentрическими кругами из центра, каким являлась (или собиралась стать) «святая Русь»¹²⁹.

Первый круг — это государства и народы, наиболее близкие России в религиозном прежде всего («православные») и культурном планах. Стереотипизации идеи «Москва — третий Рим» упорочила взгляд на них как на периферию русской политики-культурной зоны, т.е. ее «сниженный дубликат», но всегда реальный и потенциальный союзник в борьбе и с Западом, и с мусульманским Востоком.

Назовем этот круг «Югом».

Второй круг — католические (а с XVI в. — и протестантские) регионы.

Этот круг — «Запад» — и конфессионально, и культурно, и политически чужд, а во многом даже антиподичен России. Он был и может быть для нее — как и мусульманский мир — перманентным деструктором, инспиратором Зла, и потому между ним и Русским государством так долго сохранялся коммуникационный вакуум, так настойчиво шла акцентуация когнитивного и институционального размежевания.

Но в конечном счете в отношении к Западу возобладала установка на комплиментарность, т.е. на взаимодополняющее сожительство противоположностей.

Третий круг — «нехристианский Восток», обиталище варваров, сфера репрессивной и отчужденной культуры (Не- и Антикультуры), с не-истинностью протекающего в ее руслах бытия¹³⁰. По-тому она должна быть, во-первых, подчинена нормативному контролю со стороны «передовой», «настоящей» культуры и, во-вторых, размыта и разложена (преимущественно — путем христианизации) так, чтобы все слабей и слабей являла себя как фатальный источник страданий «истинно верующих».

Все это — идеальная схема, в которую жизнь вносила фундаментальные зачастую коррекции, но тем не менее обретшая в XVIII в. и позднее статус высокостереотипизованного способа совладения с конфликтными ситуациями и на международной арене, и в пределах собственного государства. Впрочем, не будем абсолютизировать этот «высокостереотипизованный способ».

Я уже привлекал внимание к тому факту, что унификаторская модель работала в Российской империи с громадными перебоями — и не только потому, что удельный вес клерикальных («только-христианизирующих») лозунгов оказывался довольно низким. Прагматизм «строителей и укрепителей империи» — о которых я еще не раз буду говорить дальше — заставлял в «нетрадиционных» терминах интерпретировать природу курса на «сохранение многообразия» нерусской сферы российской государственности. Перед нами — сохранение этнического (и конфессионального) плюрализма не как самоцель, а как стимулирование способности этой сферы к саморегуляции в измененных русско-православным субстратом условиях, чтобы эффективнее осуществлялись всевозможные взаимообмены «во имя общих интересов» этнических компонентов империи. Тем самым каждый из них смог бы не замыкать вопросы своей истории в наличной социальной прагматике — как бы ни была она важна, — а актуализировать одни потенции и, напротив, не объективизировать в своем эмпирическом бытии другие.

И еще один весьма примечательный момент.

Благодаря в общем-то неопределенной спецификации каждый из этнических коллективов мог стремиться к автономии и — по крайней мере, в идеале — даже к преобладающему положению (если и не формально, то фактически). В то же время автономия оказывалась лишь относительной, а преобладание — временным, поскольку ни один из этносов (само собой разумеется, что имеется в виду и его, этноса, конфессиональная принадлежность) не мог осуществлять управление всей государственной и общественной жизнью. Рано или поздно, но тенденция каждого этноса — в том числе и главенствующего, русского, — к тотальной автономии

мии сталкивалась с противоположными требованиями к объединению с другими этническими образованиями. Идеальная норма сводилась поэтому к требованию взаимного «подлаживания» всех этносов, каждый из которых должен участвовать в определении того способа, которым остальные «вносят свою лепту в общее дело». Заключаящему в себе неистощимое поле потенций, каждому этносу надлежит оставаться открытым для других: в каждом из них можно будет тогда распознавать отражение остальных; каждый одновременно будет и структурирующим и структурируемым. Сказанное — я хочу подчеркнуть это с особой силой — относилось и к мусульманским этносам.

Отсюда следует, что концептуальное обоснование «импульса самоопределения» и до-, и петровской, и послепетровской политической организации культуры как только «рыбка на Запад» (или «гяготения к Востоку», как доказывали евразийцы и их современные последователи) обретает всецело фаталистическую направленность. Элиминирован, таким образом, механизм подлинной самодетерминации российского социума в явно амбивалентных условиях. Он выключен из цепи условий выбора, что неминуемо делает альтернативную ситуацию выбора между Востоком и Западом — всегда, к стати, имевшую функциональный характер — беспредметной. Словом, узел проблемы лишь частично реконструирован, но отнюдь пока не разорван. Хотелось бы, однако, отметить, что специфичность отношений России с «кочевым Востоком», — трактуемых как радикальный отрицательный опыт, а не как нечто способное хотя бы и в очень отдаленной перспективе рождать новые открытия и новые ценности — и, главное, пошедшее во многом иными, чем на Западе, путями развитие высших сфер русской культуры обусловили то, что в общем-то эта культура не знала сколько-нибудь масштабной и глубоководной склонности в самоцельном эстетическом употреблении и вызывать, после периода приторно-архаической гуманистической пресыщенности, к «свежей силе первобытности и варварства».

Если, как мы увидим, еще какой-то успех — правда, кратковременный — мог иметь миф о «романтическом варваре-славянине», то культ мусульманина-кочевника был полностью лишен каких-либо интеллектуальных и эмоциональных подпорок.

Как долговременную парадигму надо счесть пушкинское протиположение арабов-мусульманномадам-мусульманам, которые не принесли завоеванным им странам и народам «ни алге-

брии, ни Аристотеля». Утверждая, что русские необозримые пространства, поглотив «силу монголов», тем самым обеспечили спасение «растерзанной и издахнувшей Россией» европейского «образающего просвещения», Пушкин негодующе именует монголов «варварами», вынужденными (имеется в виду финал похода Батыева на Запад) возвратиться «на степи своего Востока».

Конечно, уже многое было сделано для того, чтобы философско-профессиональные (или старающиеся стать таковыми) блоки русской культуры могли бы с вполне достаточной по тем временам объективностью исследовать наиболее общие, абстрактные, инвариантные, фундаментальные онтологические структуры событий истории — не только собственной, но и иноверческих, да же самых ей враждебных ареалов, включая сюда и мусульманский Восток с его различными для судеб России функциональными констелляциями.

Но кристаллизации целостной системы соответствующих воззрений не получилось, несмотря на обилие интуитивно правильных представлений о предмете и задачах комплекса знаний (или даже более или менее автономных научных дисциплин) касательно роли исламского мира в становлении и последующей эволюции российской государственности. И дело тут не только в том, что в русском востоковедении никогда не имели успеха попытки выпятить эвристическую и ориентирующую значимость Теории, ибо доминировал дискриптивизм с его убежденностью в безусловном преимуществе описания эмпирически полученных фактов, с его нежеланием найти какие-либо новые интерпретации связи между поведенческими переменными ориенталов и их профессиональными коррелятами.

Я попытаюсь в последующих главах показать, что — как бы парадоксальным ни казался этот тезис — не академическая, а миссионерская исламистика представала в качестве коммуникативного диалогического типа науки (при всей условности применения к ней этого термина), что именно она-то всего усердней реализовывала (впрочем, так и полагается любой религиозной германевтике!) установку на прояснение различий между внешним обрамлением канонических мусульманских текстов и их же внутренним смыслом, на выделение даже их «подсознательного субстрата» (конечно, в данном случае я полностью снимаю вопрос об истинных плодах этих интерпретаций, настаивая в то же время

Другой видный историк, В.О. Ключевский, дает следующую обобщающую формулу, не проводя никаких дифференциаций влдонятии «кочевой Восток»: «Борьба со степным кочевником, половчином, злым татаринном, длившаяся с VIII почти до конца XVII в., — самое тяжелое историческое воспоминание русского народа... Тысячелетнее и враждебное соседство с хищным степным азиатом — это такое обстоятельство, которое одно может покрить не один европейский недочет в русской исторической жизни»¹³⁹, причем «Русь своей степной борьбой — и, особенно, с татара-монголами, — прикрывала левый фланг европейского наступления (на Восток. — М.Б.)»¹⁴⁰.

А вот еще одна яркая цитата — из книги крупного русского и украинского историка Н.И. Костомарова: «Русь была окружена чужеземцами, готовыми вмешаться в ее дела. С востока, как тути, одна другой мрачнее, выходили полчища степных кочующих народов Азии, жадных к грабежу и истреблению»¹⁴¹.

В 1895 г. Е.Ф. Шмурло дает такую эмоциональную характеристику отечественной истории, характеристики, которую стоит, пожалуй, воспроизвести практически полностью, ибо трудно найти более последовательно манихейское впечатление о судьбах России: «Кроме истории собственно европейской, которую она (Россия) создавала, развивала, культивировала, у нее была еще другая: история азиатская, вынужденная навязанная, неотвязчивая. Обе шли параллельно одна другой, обе самостоятельные, враждебные, никогда не примиренные... сила вещей неумолимо тянула нас... в сторону Азии, отвлекая от общего очага цивилизации (Европы) и принуждая двоиться. История России — это равнодействующая, образованная двумя силами, из которых каждая лишь противодействовала одна другой. Конечно, здесь прежде всего приходится искать объяснений, почему многое в русской истории шло не так гладко, достигалось не так легко... как у наших соседей... Первая страница русской истории еще не была намечена, а темная сила уже тяготее над нами. Если справедливо, как утверждали наши предки, современники половецких набегов и татарского ига, что незваные выходцы азиатских степей были наваждением зла, наказанием божьим, то позволительно утверждать, что Россия началась во грехе»¹⁴².

Подобного рода точек зрения — превеликое множество, и нет смысла приводить их далее.

Но имеют ли они отношение к проблеме «Россия и ислам»? Самое прямое.

на их пионерском характере и гносеологической правомочности). Что же касается описываемых мною сейчас лет, то тогда когнитивная и мотивационная психология практически всех авторов о мусульманстве все еще была в громадной мере аберрирована древней (и, разумеется, грубо редуционистской) оппозицией Россия / кочевой Восток¹³¹ (при том, что вновь важно подчеркнуть отнюдь еще не исламизированным), по своей суггестивной мощи покрывая (и, более того, во многом ее детерминируя) антитезу Христианство / Ислам.

Уже В.Н. Татищев видит в печенгах, торках и половцах злых врагов Древней Руси¹³².

Историография XIX в. относил к разряду «неисторических», утверждая, что они «никогда не будут занимать высокого места во всемирной истории»¹³³, хотя и их надобно изучать. По словам все того же крупного востоковеда Куника, подобно тому как «естественные науки воздвигают наблюдения и тщательным исследованием и низшие, несовершенные организмы в связи с совершеннейшими, так и *историка* по разным причинам впредь должны больше обращать внимание на эти низшие породы человечества, особенно там, где дело идет об оценке истории России в сравнении с другими главными европейскими и азиатскими народами»¹³⁴.

Еще ранее авторитетнейший Н.М. Карамзин представил историю домонгольской Руси как беспрестанную борьбу с «варварами»-печенегами, торками и, наконец, самыми опасными номадами, «свирепыми половцами»¹³⁵. Согласно знаменитому историку Сергею Соловьеву, история России — это история страны, которая колонизируется. «Основное содержание этой колонизации — борьба леса со степью», длительная борьба русского народа с кочевыми народами, вторгавшимися из Азии в южнорусские степи¹³⁶. «Россия, — утверждал Соловьев, — вследствие своего географического положения должна была вести борьбу с жителями степей, с кочевыми азиатскими народами»¹³⁷. В итоге необходимых условиями существования русского народа становились колонизация и укрепление границ со степью, что в свою очередь обусловило необходимость создания сильного централизованного государства¹³⁸. «Постоянная борьба со степными варварами» — это, полагает Соловьев, одно из доминирующих направлений истории России и, более того, есть вообще ярчайшая манифестация извечного соперничества Азии и Европы, или оседлого населения и номадов.

авства, самые отрицательные морально-этические нормы и уста-
новки.¹⁴⁷

Впрочем, еще предстоит с большей, нежели теперь, объектив-
ностью и доказательностью, идя на существенное «перепластова-
ние» и уточнение привычных категориальных связей, осветить
вопрос о том, действительно ли «золотоордынское иго» привело
к коллапсу традиционных аксиологических структур, детерми-
рованных ими мотивационных звеньев и регуляторов и имела
ли поэтому место такая идеологическая мутация, деструктивных
последствий которой можно было бы избежать лишь путем вес-
тернизации?

Нельзя, во всяком случае, не видеть, что упорное противопос-
тавление «аморальности мусульман-завоевателей» «высокой мо-
рали завоеванных христиан» создавало на самом деле логический
капкан полярно-взаимообусловленных понятий, которые семан-
тически сформировались одно через другое, так что всякое их ав-
тономное употребление является бессодержательным. И даже
тогда, когда пытались говорить об их (даже в нейтральном или
положительном смысле) каком-то внутреннем единстве («рус-
ско-татарские» мораль, ментальность и т. п.), анализ в целом
страдал дурной спекулятивностью. Но, с другой стороны, власт-
вующая элита Российской империи — и, соответственно, офици-
альная и официозная идеологии — не могла скидывать со счетов
опасность не только внешнего (Османская держава в первую оче-
редь), но и собственного ислама.

Уйдем в далекое от описываемого нами периода прошлое.

Не приемля линии Л.Н. Гумилева на драматизацию факта му-
сульманизации Золотой Орды¹⁴⁸, я все же не склонен преумень-
шать его значение.

Принятие ислама Золотой Ордой — этим не имеющим единой
интеллектуальной суперструктуры и потому могущим довольно
легко развалиться государством — прежде всего позволяло запол-
нить социокультурный вакуум, преодолеть чувства одиночества
и беспомощности перед католицизмом и особенно православием.
Это могло быть достигнуто лишь посредством установления широ-
кого конфессионального тождества с могущественным мусульман-
ским лагерем. Одновременно же создавалась видимость постоянст-
ва и порядка собственной — золотоордынской — переменчивой
и многоэтнической общины. И в Поволжье, и в казахско-киргиз-
ских степях ислам — точнее, «татарский ислам» — создавал рели-
гиозную общность из представителей различных этносов, племен

Все, что подводилось под термин «Ислам», бесповоротно пере-
ходило в категорию «Аномалия» — которой не позволялось иг-
рать даже самой ограниченной эвристической функции в процес-
се развертывания операционного и символического аспектов по-
знания истории мировой и составляющих ее локальных культур.

Слову «Ислам» твердо отводилась роль «условного раздражи-
теля», представляющего всецело отрицательным знаком любой из
нынешних или будущих ситуаций. Преобладала линия на поли-
фонически многообразную, протейстическую соотнесенность
этого слова со всем миром «поганых»¹⁴³, на коррелирование
с образом мусульманства самых различных враждебных Руси
восточных племен и конгломераций — и прежде всего татаро-
монголов.

Но уже после Куликовской битвы культура упорно создавае-
мая Российского централизованного государства стремилась не
только долгосрочно функционировать в качестве интегрирован-
ного структурного целого, но и, сдвигая прежние международные
стандарты престижа и авторитета (поневоле связанные большей
частью своей с Золотой Ордой), расширить пространство для по-
литического и идеологического манипулирования с целью в наи-
большей степени отмежеваться от нехристианского Востока
и уверенно повернуть в сторону Европы.

Фокус медленно, но непреклонно сдвигавшейся инновацион-
ной драмы сводился теперь именно к тому, чтобы в глазах осталь-
ного христианского мира — и прежде всего европейского — сопо-
ставление России с «азиатским варварством»¹⁴⁴ навсегда утрати-
ло бы характер экспрессивной метафоры (или пояснительной
аналогии)¹⁴⁵.

Поэтому всегда, когда речь шла о (отождествляемом с Исла-
мом) татаро-монгольском владычестве, соответствующий знак
в его объективном, «словарном», значении обретал значение «на-
силia», «жестокости», «лжи», «дьявольщины» и т.п. В лексичес-
ком значении он постоянно парадигматически сопоставлен
с «мраком», «темнотой», «мглой»¹⁴⁶.

Но и это еще не все.

И Пушкин, и подавляющее большинство всех тех русских ав-
торов, которые в той или иной связи касались значимости для су-
деб своей страны периода татаро-монгольского ига, исходили из
того, что оно принесло в отечественную культуру и «синдром за-
висимости». Он же индуцирует конформистские императивы,
механические реакции на воздействие среды, спонтанность про-

и социальных структур. Эта общность покоилась на единых ценностях и привлекала «язычников» пропагандой идей «братства и сплоченности» всех мусульман. Что же касается царского правительства, то оно — особенно со времен Екатерины II — в целом стало склоняться к мысли, что «поддерживать ислам (слово «поддержка», пожалуй, слишком сильно; лучше бы сказать «установление толерантного курса к процессу функционирования — а нередко даже и динамики — ислама». — М.Б.) может быть выгоднее, чем распространять среди исповедующих его народов правослабие».¹⁴⁹

Не вдаваясь в детали — поскольку они достаточно подробно представлены в только что процитированной книге Климовича, — отмечу лишь следующее:

— Екатерина II тщательно следила за тем, чтобы в киргизско-казахских регионах не только распространялся ислам, но и назначенные туда муллы из числа казанских татар были в высшей степени «надежными и преданными людьми», должествующими воспитывать свою паству «в духе подчинения нашему царствующему дому»;

— она же, Екатерина II, стала создавать сеть народных училищ для казахов (печатались и учебники на казахском языке), где преподавателями были опять-таки казанские муллы;

— все та же императрица на государственные средства построила ряд мечетей для кочевников и даже издала для них Коран;

— В 1788 г. по повелению Екатерины II было учреждено Оренбургское магометанское духовное собрание» в г. Уфе (в Крыму уже такое имелося).

Какую бы негодующую реакцию ревнителей жестко-унификаторского курса — особенно у клерикалов — ни вызывали эти и им подобные акции, нельзя не видеть в них очередное доказательство того, что «русское (царское. — М.Б.) правительство в течение уже многих поколений воспитывало государственных деятелей, изодранных в искусстве внутренней дипломатии»¹⁵⁰, что «коллективный опыт и коллективный разум» самодержавного правительства¹⁵¹ далеко не всегда исходили из представления, будто «Россия проживет одним правослабием...»¹⁵².

И при Екатерине II, и при ее предшественниках и преемниках Россия была «полицейским государством»¹⁵³, но таким, которое нередко делало весьма удачные шаги в «искусстве внутренней дипломатии», включая сюда и политику по отношению к нерусским и неправославным коллективам, политику, что особенно важно всегда иметь в виду, в принципе чуждую расизму.¹⁵⁴

Уже в допетровскую эпоху религиозный¹⁵⁵ исключал возможность сколько-нибудь широкого размаха в русской культуре расистских концептов и импликаций. В течение веков только правослабие и лояльность (независимо от конфессиональной принадлежности) к господствующей политической (и культурной) структуре делились той силой, которая охватывает и объединяет руководимое преимущественно разнородной по своему национальному составу элитой полиэтничное Российское государство в единую сферу, несмотря на все его реальные (и кажущиеся) многообразие и изменчивость.

В связи с этим наиболее важным оказывается не столько развитее государства в целом и составляющих его компонентов, сколько проблема «количественного соотношения» как между ними, так и между частями, элементами, функциями и т.п. последних — чтобы не нарушился баланс в сторону «внешних» («подрывных») влияний. С другой стороны, усиление роли таковых критериев, как конфессиональный и лояльность к политической структуре, давало — пусть пока и эмбриональные, но тем не менее имеющие твердый шанс стать перспективными — основания для отказа от увековечивания (разумеется, на уровне официальной идеологии) какого-либо этноса в качестве привилегированного, в качестве носителя онтологически заданных, уникальных, абсолютных и неизменных способностей для того, чтобы быть наиболее ревностным носителем «последовательно-православного духа», высших образцов преданности существующему режиму и патриотизма.

Но поэтому могло существенно трансформироваться и такое казавшееся веками совершенно однозначным понятие, как «мусульманин» — или, вернее, «мусульманин — российский подданный». Его уже нельзя было интерпретировать в рамках дихотомической картины мира с ее жестко разграничиваемой системой категорий.

Я воспользуюсь для дальнейшего анализа моделями концепции «размытых (или нечетких) множеств» Л.А. Задеха¹⁵⁶.

Исходным понятием обычной теории множеств является понятие принадлежности элемента x (в нашем случае — «мусульманин» или даже «отдельная мусульманская община») некоторого множества X (в нашем случае — «все российское мусульманство») к определенному подмножеству Ax (в нашем случае — «весь мусульманский мир»). В основе же теории «размытых» («нечетких») множеств (и, соответственно, «логики нечетких

понятий») лежит представление о том, что составляющие множество элементы, обладающие общим свойством (т. е. «все мусульмане»), могут обладать этим свойством с различной степенью и, следовательно, принадлежать данному множеству («общемусульманский мир») в различной степени. Напротив, уже сам факт вхождения и длительного функционирования данного элемента («мусульманин» или «отдельная мусульманская община») в качестве иную («русско-православную») систему неизбежно вел к таким его трансформациям, которые заставляли считать его одновременно принадлежащим и этой, второй, системе (или «подмножеству») и признавать онтологически правомочным тезис о множественности степеней системы, свойственных не просто человеческому мышлению как таковому, но и тому, которое действует в его, так сказать, российско-имперской разновидности.

Но все это еще в основном было на уровне потенций (лишь часть которых могла более или менее последовательно манифестироваться), но еще не стало категорией ни теоретической, ни даже эмпирической необходимости, тогда как смысловая оппозиция Христианство / Ислам по-прежнему выполняла высокоомоделлирующую функцию в русской послепетровской культуре. Поскольку все сегменты ее (речь идет о XVIII — первой половине XIX в.) страстно стремились и «деаитироваться», и одновременно оградиться как от нехристианского Востока, так и от не-православного Запада.

Нужна была, наконец, спекулятивная трансформация¹⁵⁷ пестрых, противоречивых, ярких, застывших в массовом сознании конкотно-чувственных образов того, что — условно или безусловно — связывалось с исламом и неправославным христианством.

Нетрудно убедиться в том, сколь сильны в этой программемаксимум тенденции явно утилитарного плана. Они, следовательно, давали возможность не ограничиваться одним лишь (тут я воспользуюсь удачным термином итальянского психолога М.З. Гизальберти) «детерминистским поиском», нацеленным не на единственность решения, а на смелое ориентирование и на «эвристический подход»¹⁵⁸.

Развертыванию этих тенденций — в силу самой своей природы требовавших опоры на наблюдение и опыт, а вовсе не умозрительного постижения реальности — препятствовали:

— курс (всего усердней поддерживаемый церковью¹⁵⁹) на интеллектуальный аффективно-эмоциональный изоляционизм русской культуры;

— своеобразная социально-психологическая трактовка понятий «свое» и «чужое»¹⁶⁰.

В сущности, никогда не было какой-то канонизированной матрицы — с весьма ограниченным количеством вводимых в нее параметров и однозначностью демаркационных критериев — развития русской внутри- и внешнеполитической деятельности¹⁶¹. Ведь всякая абсолютизация норм и правил закрыла бы возможность адекватного познания ситуации и, следовательно, ее регулирования в соответствии с интересами формирующегося русского «интегрального национализма»¹⁶² (имевшего, кстати говоря, значительное сходство с испанским национализмом, который выковывался в процессе Реконкисты). А для него термин «мусульмане» (с которым все чаще, по мере усиления «западного крена» в социокультурной динамике России¹⁶³, стал отождествляться метатермин «поганые») по-прежнему осуществлял функции и пространственно-временного и ценностно-смыслового регулирования.

При любых — в том числе и весьма дружественных порой (в том числе с Османской империей) — отношениях с какой-либо мусульманской державой все, покрываемое термином «Ислам», трактовалось как нечто существующее порознь от православно-русского субстрата. Оба они рассматривались как внешние по отношению друг к другу феномены, как разные полюса человеческой экзистенции¹⁶⁴.

Преобразованиями Петра Великого закладывалась гносеологическая основа для того, чтобы:

— понять, что божественный миропорядок существует во времени и пространстве не как статичный монолит, а как разнообразная, многосложная система взаимосвязей с совсем различными зачастую аксиологическими стержнями;

— ускорить тяготение русской культуры к своему Иному, которое доселе казалось Абсолютной Противоположностью, и тем самым;

— признать и себя лишь в качестве сегмента всеобщего бытия, которое развертывается как бесконечная цепь различий и не имеет ни смыслового, ни любого другого вечного фиксированного центра¹⁶⁵.

Но активнейше действовала противоположная вышеописанной тенденция: не толковать мировую историю как историю са-моценных и равноправных культур, несводимых друг к другу и необъяснимых друг из друга, отвергнув любое концептуализи-

рованное признание принципиальной равнозначности и равновероятности любых «условий человеческого существования».

Эта тенденция — наравне с другой, «толерантной», «эгалитарной», «релятивизирующей» и т. п., — получила высокий гносеологический ранг во всех тех когнитивных процессах, которые были связаны с ценностными ориентациями русской культуры по отношению к другим духовным конструкциям, с понятийным оформлением эмпирической констатации трех оказавшихся волею судеб сопряженных феноменов — России, Запада, Востока.

ГЛАВА 2

«Вестернизация» и «деазиатизация»

1. Культурное самоопределение и проблема ислама

В самом начале Части II я фиксировал заданный Петром Великим жестко-европобожный курс русской культуры¹, неминуемо означавший и сущностное и символическое «отталкивание» от мусульманского Востока. Этот курс характерен не только для России XVIII в.: намного ранее, в пред- и ренессансную эпохи, его избрал Запад. Именно тогда становилась нормативной убежденность в том, что:

— вследствие нашествия монголов и Средиземноморье, и Персия перестали быть культурными лидерами;

— окончательно прошли времена, когда Запад видел центры мировой цивилизации лишь в Иерусалиме, Византии и «Вавилоне» (т. е. Каире) и был их старательным учеником, и потому:

— надо найти свою внутренне-личную сущность и в соответствии с ней избрать собственный путь многогранного развития.

Эта позиция по отношению к Востоку («у него нечему учиться, ему незачем подражать», ибо он утратил свое структурное и функциональное значение в истории мировой цивилизации) послужила мощной психологической и культурологической основой для зарождения в XVIII в. идеи «молодой России»². Но для нее и быстро превращающийся в архаику («загнивающий») Запад уже не может быть вдохновляющим образцом. Надлежит поэтому идти своим и только своим — «ни западным, ни, тем более, восточным»³ — путем, дерзновенно сохраняя способность к одному, по сути дела, самовоспроизводству автохтонной руды-

но которой уже не суждено снова проявиться на мировой арене. Эта идея поставила духовное начало во главу общества; она подчинила все власти одному ненарушимому закону — закону истории; она глубоко разработала систему нравственных иерархий; и хотя она втиснула жизнь в слишком тесные рамки, однако, она освободила ее от всякого внешнего воздействия и отметила печать удивительной глубины. У нас не было ничего подобного. Духовное начало, неизменно подчиненное светскому, никогда не утвердилось на вершине общества; исторический закон, традиция никогда не получали у нас исключительного господства; наконец, нравственной иерархии у нас никогда не было и следа»²²³.

Чаадаев акцентирует совсем иной расово-культурный статус России:

«Мы просто северный народ»²²⁴, и по идеям, как и по климату, очень далеки от благоуханной долины Кашмира и священных берегов Ганга. Некоторые из наших областей, правда, граничат с государствами Востока, но наши центры не там, не там наша жизнь, и она никогда там не будет, пока какое-нибудь планетное возмущение не сдвинет с места земную ось или новый геологический переворот опять не бросит южные организмы в полярные льды»²²⁵.

И еще один удар по славянофилам: «В глубине нашей богатой природы они открыли всевозможные чудесные свойства, неведомые остальному миру; они отвергли все серьезные и плодотворные идеи, которые сообщила нам Европа; они хотели водворить на русской почве совершенно новый моральный строй, который отбрасывал нас на какой-то фантастический христианский Восток, придуманный единственно для нашего употребления, нисколько не догадываясь, что, обособляясь от европейских народов морально, мы тем самым обособляемся от них и политически, что раз будет порвана наша братская связь с великой семьей европейской, ни один из этих народов не протянет нам руки в час опасности»²²⁶.

ГЛАВА 3

Российская империя и мусульманский мир: анализ генезиса и функционирования различных моделей теоретических и практических оценок ислама

1. Когнитивный статус в русской культуре XIX в. категорий «Восток», «христианский Восток», «мусульманский Восток»; логико-методологические коллизии в ходе оперирования ими

Итак, как мы имели возможность убедиться, хотя запятнано представляло категорию «Восток», несущую множество функций (идентифицирующую, эстетическую, политологическую и т. д.), она тем не менее обладает однородным набором характеристик. Восток как таковой — в том числе и его христианский компонент — оценивался в качестве чего-то резко отличного от европейской интеллектуальной субстанции и даже логически противоположного ей. Слово «восточный» — типичный пример «слова-раздражителя», сильно действующего, вызывающего серии ассоциативных ответов, довольно, впрочем, монотонных по своей сути («косность», «отсталость», «варварство», «гиперчувствительность» и др.)². Многократное повторение дискредитирующих Восток синонимов, эпитетов, сравнений играло громадную суггестивную роль. Оно придавало касающимся ориентальных сюжетов текстам все новые и новые смысловые и эмоциональные оттенки³, а равно и идеологические конструирующие и регулирующие свойства. Это был уже, во многом, правда, традиционный и для средневековой культуры канон. Последний же означает систему четких параметров и атрибутов, которые характеризуют определенный феномен — все тот же Восток в нашем случае, — который нацелен на представление его и России

(как «органической части Запада») в виде качественно иноприродных друг другу сфер.

Эпистемологическая суть этого подхода заключалась в исследовании Востока только посредством культурных языков Запада, вследствие чего шла априорная подгонка объекта («восточных социумов») под безусловноредукционистский метод. Восток (вновь подчеркну — прежде всего «нехристианский Восток») трактовался как телеологически направленная (= «тотально-антиевропейская», т. е. и «тотально-антирусская») целостность, лишенная сколько-нибудь серьезной, качественной внутренней дифференциации.

Но мы видели также, что шла напряженная борьба западников и славянофилов. Она вносила в высшие пласты русской культуры сильные источники случайности, дезорганизации и неопределенности¹. При этом все они становились масштабнее по мере того, как затягивалось решение следующих тесно связанных между собой вопросов:

— можно ли считать абсолютно противоположными одна другой категории «Запад» и «Восток» тогда, когда к последнему присоединяется — в соответствии с энтузиастическим требованием славянофилов — прилагательное «христианский»;

— будет ли тем самым понятие «христианский Восток» обретать какой-то качественно новый смысл, или же

— его считать подчиненным метакатегории — «Восток» — со всеми закрепленными за ней стереотипизирующим мышлением атрибутами?

А ведь есть все основания утверждать, что понятие «христианский Восток» могло бы стать качественно новым понятием с новой семантикой (тем более что политический эффект его был очень высок в той области международной деятельности России, которая оказывалась связанной с Восточным вопросом). Оно имело возможность превратиться в некое организованное целое, части которого — «христианский» и «Восток» — хотя и различимы, но взаимозависимы. Последние обладали бы определенными характеристиками благодаря включенности в эту целостность. Ей же, в свою очередь, оказались бы присущи такие качества, которых нет ни у одного из ее составляющих. Однако такой целостностью понятие «христианский Восток» как эквивалентное понятиям «Россия» и «Православие»² не стало, ибо оно:

1) констатировало лишь факт взаимозависимости двух компонентов термина («христианский» и «Восток»), а не вид (структуру) их зависимости;

2) придавало термину «Восток» роль всецело «изолирующей абстракции», — но изолирующей почти исключительно по отношению к католическому и протестантскому Западу, т. е. ареалу тоже христианскому, хотя и «прогрессирующими темпами дегенерирующему»;

3) подменяло конкретно-национальные (русское, болгарское, румынское и т. д.) самосознания собирательно-общим понятием, объединяющим несколько подклассов объектов в один класс на основе двух таких признаков (конфессиональное единство и географическая местоположенность), которые уже оказывались нерелевантными в эпоху роста национализма и секуляризма. Более того, закрепление за балканскими, например, православными обществами, столь много натерпевшимися от мусульманской Турции, эпитета «восточный» воспринималось ими как очевидная дискредитация, как стремление не допустить их в процессы модернизации и вестернизации.

Те признаки, которые являются наиболее существенными для описания любого объекта — т. е. относительно независимые друг от друга, — в формуле «Россия есть христианский Восток» оказались взаимно коррелированными. Это затемняло связь между эмпирическими и структурными свойствами охватываемых ею социумов, затрудняло конструирование «распознающих систем», способных полноценно осуществлять операции отождествления и различения, обобщения и ограничения как русской, так и зарубежной истории и современности, добиваться информативного овладения теми или иными, все чаще и чаще попадавшими в поле зрения русских авторов, инокультурными доменами. Словом, перед нами — интересный случай нарушения закона обобщающего отношения между содержанием и объемом сопоставляемых понятий³: содержание понятия («Восток») усложняется путем введения новых признаков («христианский», «греко-восточная вера», «Русское государство» и т. д.), но расширение содержания не имеет места⁴.

Всего легче было бы интенсивно самоопределяющуюся русскую культуру сравнить, например, с маятником, раскачивающимся со все возрастающей амплитудой и быстротой между Западом и Востоком. Но данная метафора опасна прежде всего тем, что игнорирует множество таких ментальных и нравственных моделей, которые никак не укладывались в эту вековую бинарность.

С другой стороны, приращение каждой из данных моделей онтологически-автономного статуса вообще лишило нас возможности

дать более или менее однозначную оценку русской культуре (т. е. в плане ее «восточной», или «западной», или просто «маргинальной» принадлежности)⁸.

Надо, конечно, учитывать, что вообще любая дефиниция содержит элемент условности — в том хотя бы смысле, что она не может сделать ничего больше, кроме как зафиксировать общепринятое значение термина, уточнить его или, наконец, произвольно не репрезентировать⁹. И даже в наши дни — или, вернее, в наши дни особенно — термины «Запад» и «Восток» являются как бы эскизами в поисках оптимального варианта формулировки и не исключают как «литературной обработки», так и коррекции смысла. Продолжая этот сюжет, вновь отмечу, что положенная в основу анализа жесткая дихотомия «Запад» — «Восток» не учитывает существенных модальных окрасок знания о каждом из членов оппозиции в процессе его (знания) приобретения и передачи. Подход, базирующийся на «абсолютном» противопоставлении «западного» и «восточного» начал, игнорирует элементы относительности каждого из них и потому, разумеется, связан с неизбежным упрощением различных явлений познания и коммуникации. Но — и тут по необходимости опять приходится повторяться — релятивизация терминов «западное» и «восточное», бесповоротный отказ от «жесткой стандартизации», от придания нормативности соответствующим терминологическим единицам начисто закрост дорогу к источникам получения понятий. А ведь они-то и дают более или менее четкий способ распознавания определенного объекта (в нашем примере — русской культуры минувшего столетия).

И далее.

Ныне уже нельзя исследовать ни одну историческую проблему без анализа иерархии тогдашних семиотических структур. Надо реконструировать соотношение моделирующих структур в широком литературно-лингвосоциологическом плане, с учетом не только идеологии, быта и т.п., но и культурно-языкового уклада эпохи.

В чем же выход?

Думаю, в том, чтобы поставить интересующую нас проблему как проблему идеологизации кодовых систем в качестве средств субъективной модальности¹⁰. Для каждой исторической эпохи, полагает Ретелуи, характерна уникальная комбинация идей, имеющих специфическое языковое выражение. Объект истории идей составляет неограниченное количество идеологических элементов (знаков).

Они гетерогенны по своим источникам (из философии, истории, политической теории и т. д.), но гомогенны по своей способности образовывать единый комплекс согласованных между собой групп.

В определенные исторические эпохи в результате отношений, создавшихся между элементами, группы идеологических элементов образуют структурное целое. Эти структуры можно охарактеризовать как синхронические, поскольку они ограничены определенным историческим периодом, в течение которого наблюдаются постоянство отношений между элементами. Будем же исходить из того, что бытовавшие в русской культуре XIX в. различные точки зрения на социальные и политические явления в мусульманском мире можно рассматривать как варианты инвариантного кода. Его можно выявить на примерах изменения значения слова «Восток».

Благодаря славянофильской формуле «Россия — христианский Восток»¹¹ (ибо, по известной формулировке Пушкина, «...греческое вероисповедание, отдельное от всех прочих, дает нам особенный национальный характер»), произошло расширение семантического поля слова «Восток»¹². Это поле включило в себя противопоставление «православие / католицизм и протестантизм»¹³ и стало семантически связываться с идеей социального гомеостазиса, с представлением о конфессионально-национальной культуре как о явлении *sui generis*, как сфере, развивающейся по собственным законам, активной матрице, «отливающей» личность по своему образу и подобию¹⁴.

И тем не менее слово «Восток» и в XIX в. — когда в целом царил западобезный курс — превратилось в идеологический знак, воспринимаемый в общем-то одинаково представителями различных социальных страт и культурно-политических группировок¹⁵. Бесконечное количество высказываний о Востоке все же манифестировало конечное поле значений, исходящее из одной и той же (западобезной) фундаментальной системы значений.

Дело в том, что слово «Восток» все чаще стало заменяться словом «Азия»¹⁶, и идеологическая структура его, в свою очередь, протиповставлялась понятию «Цивилизация», которое категорически распространялось и на Россию (Россию в XVIII–XIX вв., стремившуюся максимально деазиятизироваться, забыть все то, что некогда связывало ее с нехристианским Востоком¹⁷, — или придавать этой связи лишь характер вредоносного пережитка и только). Но было бы неверным ограничиться лишь фиксацией очередной контроверзы, генерирующей восприятие соответствующих

высказываний по принципу «да — нет», не отличающейся ни мощностью, ни синтетичностью, существующей для отражения неизменяемого, а не динамического, характера реальности. На самом деле жила и действовала гораздо более сложная, включающая несколько измерений, система восприятия и ассоциирования.

В противном случае наступили бы серьезные деструктивные сдвиги и во внутренней и во внешней политике.

Дело в том, что уже сама специфика генезиса и последующего развития российской государственности, включавшей в себя один за другим гигантские азиатские регионы, заставила ее идеологов искать в качестве психологической основы такое состояние сознания, которое бы позволяло:

- воспринимать все, что находится в поле зрения, во всей полноте и целостности;
- стимулировала бы умение быстро переключать внимание с одних с объектов — будь то западные или восточные, не имело в такой ситуации принципиального значения — на другие, не задерживаясь на них дольше, чем это требуется для успешного проведения какой-либо военной или дипломатической акции;
- сохранять непоколебимое внутреннее спокойствие, дар концентрировать энергию в определенной точке, как только в этом возникает необходимость, и мгновенно «расслабляться» в нужный момент.

Конечно, искусство активной и динамичной «медитации», техники сосредоточения и стабилизации стратегического и тактического хитроумия, дающих как один из важнейших своих результатов эйфорическое (но практически нередко оказывающееся весьма конструктивным) ощущение единства мира, мира, не расколотого на оппозиции, элиминирующее различия и противопоставления между Христианством и Не-Христианством, Цивилизацией и Не-Цивилизацией, Западом и Востоком, — идеал политического лидерства любой страны, вынужденной вступать в широкомасштабные и оперативные взаимодействия с различными соперниками на международной арене и с разными культурными ареалами. Но для России вышеописанная гносеологическая ситуация была особенно необходима. Надо особо подчеркнуть, что ее прагматические выгоды становились все большими по мере реальной и даже в какой-то мере символической секуляризации русской мысли. Именно она-то и вела к глубокой поляризации интеллектуальных исканий русского общества, не позволяя его культуре стать лабильно-субстанциальным единством. Именно

она заставляла строить и в сфере внешнеполитического мышления такие модели, согласно которым в состоянии действия субъект и объект (соответственно — Восток и Запад) могут отождествляться друг с другом¹⁸, т. е. восприниматься как нечто целостное, как некий «гештальт», и, следовательно, вообще перестают существовать как автономные объекты, киллинговское «И нету Востока, и Запада нет» (а я далее приведу и русские аналогии этой мысли) очень точно передает состояние, когда для взаимодействующих западных и восточных сознаний уже нет никакого «Запада», отдельного от «Востока», но есть единый комплекс, единая, целостная и внутренне непротиворечивая система — «Запад, направленный на Восток» или (что совершенно равнозначно) «Восток, направленный на Запад».

И далее, что не менее важно: два составных элемента этой системы призваны играть одинаково важную роль в происходящем процессе, принимать в нем равное участие. Поскольку те две группы феноменов, которые в обычном состоянии организовывали отдельно объект и субъект («Восток» и «Запад»), воспринимались в охарактеризованной выше позиции как абсолютно тождественные друг другу «данности», постольку движение, развитие предстает не как последовательный ряд изменений состояний субъекта и объекта в зависимости от состояний объекта и наоборот, а как одновременный процесс динамики и трансформации. По-видимому, все это можно описать и как становление «типологического» (по М. Ландманну¹⁹, он равнозначен понятию «плюралистический») способа мышления. Он позволяет предполагать равнозначность двух гетерогенных ценностей, из которых ни одна не может быть редуцирована к другой.

В свете плюралистического мировидения совокупность вовлеченных в мировую политику государств предстает лишь как их координация. Вопрос же об их субординации опускается. Ведь каждое из них может быть равноценным (поскольку неявно предполагается, что есть необходимое, неупоницируемое многообразие константных типов государств) Объектом и Субъектом. При этом движение и того и другого обуславливается не их последовательными взаимодействиями, а «целостным» схватыванием ситуации или симультанным развитием в соответствии с ее имманентной закономерностью. Поэтому во время конфликтов и Запад и Восток могли бы воспринимать себя не как две конфронтирующие силы, а как компоненты единой системы, функционирующей по общим для всех ее частей законам²⁰. «Могли

бы» — но не сделали... Мысль о наличии общих и для Запада и для Востока законов социального развития стала, как известно, отворачиваться множеством весьма влиятельных европейских (да и восточных) интеллектуалов. Даже категории и нормы международного права объявлялись целым рядом и западных и русских юристов совершенно неприменимыми к Востоку (или, во всяком случае, к подавляющей части его стран)²¹.

Если, однако, и далее не упускать из виду наличие интегрирующей и Запад и Восток линии, то можно, в частности, отметить вполне закономерное для нее увеличение удельного веса метафоры в касающейся ориентальных сюжетов русской литературе. Метафора была призвана сближать удаленные друг от друга во времени и пространстве понятия²², восстанавливать утраченное в локально-национальных сознаниях представление о внутреннем родстве атомизированного человечества.

И в то же время не забудем, что все то, что можно — весьма, конечно условно — зачислить в категорию «явное ориентофильство», являет себя как «моновалентные» тексты, в которых представлена только одна точка зрения и только одно, «закрытое», мировоззрение, принадлежащее автору. Трудности значительно увеличиваются, когда становится необходимым «формализовать» многоголосую и открытую речь, являющуюся прерогативой не только, скажем, романа²³, но и всего массива любой сравнительно специализированной литературы (в нашем примере — посвященной Востоку).

Поэтому на первый план надлежит выйти микровеличинам описываемого мусульманский Восток процесса. Единичными анализа станут не отдельные произведения или корпус текстов одного автора (напомним, что речь пока идет лишь о непрофессиональной литературе²⁴), а отдельные мотивы, метафоры, клише, входящие в произведения разных авторов, общие для них всех «ключевые слова» (даже если у них не очень ясно очерчены семантические границы). Мы будем видеть перед собой различные изгибы и формы одного и того же «многоликого» Совокупного Текста²⁵. В этом Тексте сопрягаются разные идеологические парадигмы, в свою очередь значительно повлиявшие на различные семантические наполнения и исторические смыслы терминов «мусульманин» и «азиат», — терминов, зачастую отождествлявшихся один с другим.

Не следует поэтому считать каким-то сильным приближением к евразийству следующие слова тогдашнего президента Импера-

торской Академии наук Сергея Уварова (впоследствии — творца знаменитой официальной идеологической формулы «православие, самодержавие, народность»): «Из Азии проистекали все религии, все науки, все философии. Она сохранила чудесный дар производить все большие явления морального мира; там находим мы истинный единственный источник всеобщего просвещения, и кто мог бы не гореть желанием соизмерять вблизи богатства сего неисчерпаемого родника ума человеческого?»²⁶

В речи особо подчеркивалась политическая важность изучения Востока: знание восточных языков необходимо потому, что Россия «повелевает целой третью сего просторного края» и находится в «непрерывных сношениях с Турцию, Китаем, Персию»²⁷.

Уваров полагал, что «если же с распространением классической литературы совокупить познание восточной, то мы и теперь в полном праве ожидать обновления нашей словесности»²⁸.

Еще ранее, в 1811 г., Уваров писал: «Россия утверждена основанием своим на Азии. Сухая, необъятно обширная граница сливается со всеми народами Востока»²⁹.

Но все это — отнюдь не азиатизм. Это — реалистическое описание тогдашнего состояния России и трезвый прогноз ее будущего, призыв к учету ее в громадной мере связанного и с Восток международного статуса и, следовательно, необходимости внесения надлежащих — но не радикальных! — корректив в имманентные российской культуре духовно-мыслительные установки. Последние, однако, должны, согласно Уварову, сохранять свой христианско-европейский настрой³⁰.

Итак, повторяю, не следует придавать особого значения комментариям Уварова в адрес Азии³¹.

Гораздо более точно отражала отношение к азиатским религиям и культурам³² официальной идеологии — или, точнее, ее «непрагматических», «ортодоксальных» блоков — инструкция знаменитого своим обскурантизмом попечителя Казанского учебного округа (1819–1826) М.Л. Магницкого ректору и директору Казанского университета. Она обязывала профессоров воспитывать учащихся на основе «христианской религии, чтобы вредный дух времени, все разрушающий дух вольнодумства не проникнул в те священные убежища», где воспитывается молодежь³³.

Указывалось³⁴, чтобы профессор восточных языков, объясняя историю литератур восточных народов, не вдавался «излишне во все, что собственно принадлежит к их религии и пре-

нии в исполнение сего Устава Российской империи (т. е. конституции. — М.Б.) никто, не обучившийся Русской грамоте, не может быть признан Гражданином» и «кочующие племена не имеют прав Гражданских» (хотя и им предоставляется право участвовать в выборе волостного старшины).

Интересен раздел о таком высшем правительственном органе, как державная Дума.

По мнению Муравьева, члены Думы должны, помимо ряда других характеристик («непорочное поведение», высокий имущественный ценз и т.п.), «пользоваться уже 9-летним Гражданством в России, если они не родились Русскими...»⁴¹.

Ярый ненавистник деспотизма («езде самодержавие считают безумием, беззаконием»), Муравьев полагал, что русские государственники «мало-помалу всяким обманом присвоили себе власть беспредельную, подражая ханам татарским и султану турецкому»⁴². Да и вообще негативная роль татарского ига для истории России кажется Муравьеву решающей.

В составленном им в форме диалога «Любопытном разговоре» (1822 г.) утверждается, что до нашествия Батые в каждом русском городе царил демократия в форме общенародных собраний (вече).

Следует вопрос: «Почему же сии вече прекратились и когда?»
 Ответ: Причину тому было нашествие татар, *выучивших наших предков безусловно покорствовать тиранской их власти*.

Вопрос: Что было причиной побед и торжества татар?
 Ответ: Размножение князей дома Рюрикова, их честолюбие и распри, пагубные для отечества.

Вопрос: Почему же зло сие не кончилось с владычеством татар?

Ответ: Предание рабства и *попятия восточные* покорили их оружием и причинили еще больше зла России. Народ, сносивший терпеливо иго Батые и Сортана, сносил таким же образом и власть князей московских, подражавших во всем сим тиранам»⁴³.

Не менее резки и оценки известного писателя-декабриста Александра Александровича Бестужева (Марлинского).

В статье «Взгляд на старую и новую словесности в России» (1823 г.) читаем:

«...наконец, гроза разразилась... и гордый могол, на пепелище русской свободы, разбил странственную свою палатку. Все, что может истребить огонь, меч и невежество, гибло. Как враны, воцарилось племя батыево над пустынями и кладбищами. Варварство заградило страхом свет с Запада и Востока»⁴⁴.

даниям Магомета... не нужно ему входить во все то, что описано в *аль-Коране*; напротив, надобно разоблачать, настаивает далее Магницкий, лежащие в основе этой книги «баснословные предания». Что касается мусульманской поэзии, то студентам должно быть разъяснено — «насколько она поверхностна... отличается одним блеском мыслей и смелости выражений». Профессор докажет учащимся, что в арабской «мудрости нет ничего особенного, что она почерпнута у греков... Он вообще ограничится преподаванием языков арабского и персидского в том единственном отношении, в котором они могут быть полезны России по ее торговым и политическим связям»³⁵.

Магницкий сделал свою карьеру при императоре Александре I, неустанно пропагандировавшем идею «образования из всех христианских государств единой семьи народов» и потому не допустившем в Священный союз одну только европейскую державу — мусульманскую Турцию»³⁶.

Но он же, этот антиисламский настрой, присущ был и таким противоположным Уварову и Магницкому деятелям, как декабристы»³⁷.

Отстаивая веротерпимость, осуждая религиозный фанатизм, они в то же время в основу своих критических оценок и позитивных программ клали западогенную систему стандартов³⁸ системы, следовательно, противопоставляемую и восточно-мусульманской. В «Дневниках» Н.И. Тургенева за 1819 г. находим такое осуждение «наших мракобеснующихся» (в том числе печально известного Магницкого):

«...губернаторы, начальники отделений, директоры, — не зная наук, но зная средства, ведущие к выгодам, восстают против просвещения. Они кричат, подобно Омару, сожжем все книги! — Если они сходят с Библией, то они не нужны, если же ей противны, то вредны». Он же, скорбя о «бедах Греции», верит тому, что султан «обещался построить в Море дворец из черепов христианских»³⁹.

В уставе Союза Благоденствия — этой первой тайной организации дворянских революционеров (до 1818 г. — «Союз Спасения», или «Общество истинных и верных сынов отечества») — декларировалось, что членами ее могут быть лишь христиане, благо именно «истинный христианин есть наилучший семьянин и вернейший сын отечества и деятельнейший слуга его»⁴⁰.

В написанном Никитой Михайловичем Муравьевым Проекте конституции предусматривалось, что «через 20 лет по приведе-

А ведь до татар, пишет Марлинский в 1833 г. в другой своей статье, «за исключением крестовых походов и реформации, чего у нас не было, что было в Европе? А сверх того характеры князей и народа должныствовали у нас быть ярче, самобытнее, решительнее, потому что человек на Руси боролся с природой, более жестокою, со врагами, более ужасными, чем где-либо. Двудлиный Янус-Русь глядела вдруг на Азию и Европу; был ее составлял звено между *оседлою деятельностью Запада и бродячею ленью Востока*. От того какое разнообразие влияний и оттошений! Баряги на ладях покоряют ее. Печенеги, половцы, черные клобуки зубрят (здесь в смысле: изрезавают, нарушают). — М.Б.) ее границы. Грозой налетает Русь на Царьград и завоевывает в Корсуни христианскую веру. Вольный Новгород опоясывается хребтом Урала и бьется с божьими дворянами в Лифляндии, нападает на свейцев за Невою, режется с литовцами, везет свои товары в города Ганзы, и потом *губительное нашествие татар и душная ночь их власти, во мраке которой спело единодержавие...*»⁴⁵.

Но с меньшим ожесточением нападали декабристы и на современную им Османскую империю.

Так, Петр Григорьевич Каховский с возмущением обвинял императора Александра в том, что он оставил в беде христианских подданных турецкого султана:

«Единоверные нам греки, несколько раз нашим правительством возбуждаемые против *тиранства магометанского*, тонут в крови своей... Сербь, верные наши союзники, стонуют под игмом *бесчеловечья турецкого...*»⁴⁶.

Декабристы считали одной из своих целей оказание помощи грекам⁴⁷, расценивая греческое освободительное движение как существенное звено в цепи революционных событий в Европе. Декабрист М.А. Фонвизин осуждал решение Священного союза не оказывать помощь греческим повстанцам и писал «об общем негодовании русских против Александра (русского императора. — М.Б.) за... равнодушие его к страждущим единоверцам — эллинам»⁴⁸.

Я уже отмечал, что в России конца XVIII — начала XIX в. понятие «культура» закреплялось за народами земледельческими.

Вот что говорит в данной связи один из политических лидеров декабризма Павел Иванович Пестель:

«*Культурность человека* есть следствие его воспитания, в особенности физического, которое имеет большое влияние на воспитание нравственное... Великими средствами морального воспита-

ния у *земледельческих народов* служат религия, законодательство и науки. Два первых создают нравственность народа, вторые — его просвещение»⁴⁹.

И поскольку религия «служит основным способом морального развития», постольку «и для правительств не безразлично, какая религия является господствующей», так как различные религии не одинаково влияют на интеллектуальное развитие населения»⁵⁰. Пестель же полагает: «...обязанности, на человека от Бога посредством веры наложенные, суть первейшие и непрременнейшие. Они связывают духовный мир с естественным, жизнь бренную с жизнью вечною, и потому все постановления государственных должны быть в связи и согласии с обязанностями человека в отношении к вере и всевышнему создателю миров».

Эти «обязанности», касающиеся «мира духовного», Пестель выводит всецело из христианского «священного писания»⁵¹.

В своей знаменитой «Русской правде» Пестель выступает убежденнейшим сторонником строго централизованного и, более того, предельно унифицированного⁵², населенного лишь русскими и обрусевшим населением государства. Морально-этической и мировоззренческой основой его может быть, следовательно, только православие (это, конечно, не только не исключает, а, напротив, предполагает, что «...законы должны быть одинаковы на целом пространстве государства»)⁵³.

Этнический (а равно и лингвистический, конфессиональный и т. п.) плюрализм в пределах одного государства кажется Пестелю вещью ненужной и опасной⁵⁴: «...маленькие народы, между большими находящиеся, служат всегдашним поприщем военным действиям, разорениям и гибельным бедствиям всякого рода»⁵⁵. Поэтому-то «лучше и полезнее будет для них самих, когда они (в том числе и мусульмане! — М.Б.) соединятся духом и обществом с большим государством и совершенно сольют свою народность с народностью господствующего народа, составляя с ним один только народ и переставая бесполезно мечтать о деле невозможном и несбыточном (т. е. о политической независимости. — М.Б.)»⁵⁶.

Значимость христианства в этом интеграционном процессе должна сильно возрасти.

«Законы духовные, — отмечает Пестель, — не могут быть разделены на христианские и иноверные. Мы обязаны защищать все те действия иноверных законов, которые противны духу законов христианских; но дозволять по усмотрению мы можем все, что ду-

ху оных не противно, хотя и с оными различно. Закон же христианский имеет один и тот же дух во всех своих различных исповеданиях (сам Пестель, кстати говоря, был лютеранином. — М.Б.) и от политических законов только того требует, чтобы сии последние его защищали и с духом его были согласны»⁵⁷.

Но такая ситуация складывается тогда, когда «различные духовных законов (т.е. конфессиональных установлений. — М.Б.) может быть сопряжено с одинаковостью политических законов и постановлений»⁵⁸.

Пестель же ратует за то, чтобы в государстве «государственные и гражданские законы» были «одни и те же, потому:

1) что истина политическая, будучи истиной нравственной или отвлеченною, везде одна и та же; 2) что нравы народные зависят везде от веры и правительств. Законы веры христианской везде требуют одинаковых правил нравственности и правительств. Одинаковость законов политических с верою (опять имеется в виду лишь христианство! — М.Б.) согласных будет вере способствовать сие святое единообразие в правилах нравственных повсюду вести к общему всех благоденствию; 3) что правосудие двусмыслия и двойного толкования не допускает и, будучи основано на понятии о наших обязанностях в отношении к ближним, одинаково везде быть должно, тем более, что сии обязанности верою (христианскою. — М.Б.) определены для всех людей одинаковыми и, наконец, 4) потому что самые действительные наставники народов суть законы государства. Одинаковые гражданские законы на целом пространстве государства более всего содействовать будут к дарованию всем частям оного одинакового оттенка нравственности, а тем самым и произведут ту совершенную крепкую и истинно тесную политическую связь в государстве, коея существование столь благодетельно»⁵⁹.

Высоко поднимая статус христианства, Пестель одновременно подчеркивает, что православное духовенство «не должно быть признано за особое сословие в народе, но за особенную отрасль государственного правления или чиновничества»⁶⁰. Такая последовательная этизация духовенства⁶¹ означала, что и миссионерской деятельности его должен быть придан куда больший размах, нежели в предшествующие периоды российской истории.

Приведем еще несколько самих за себя говорящих цитат из «Русской правды», — цитат, прямо или косвенно касающихся отечественного и зарубежного мусульманства.

«Финляндия, Эстляндия, Лифляндия, Курляндия, Белоруссия, Малороссия, Новороссия, Бессарабия, Крым, Грузия, весь Кавказ, земли киргизов, все народы *Сибирские* и *разные другие племена*, внутри государства обитающие, никогда не пользовались и никогда пользоваться не могут самостоятельностью и независимостью и всегда принадлежали самой России или же, по временам, если не России, то Швеции, Дании, Пруссии, Польше, Турции, Персии и вообще какому-нибудь сильному государству. *Да и на будущие времена, по слабости своей, никогда не могут составлять особых государств*; а посему и подлежат все они праву благоустройства, должеству притом *навек отрезаться от права отдельной народности!*» Вследствие этого вышеуказанные регионы должны «на вечные времена» остаться в составе Российского государства⁶². А в целях его безопасности Пестель рекомендует присоединить (помимо Молдавии) «все земли горских кавказских народов, России неподвластных, которые лежат к северу от границ с Персией и Турцией, а в том числе и западную приморскую часть Кавказа, Турция ныне принадлежащую... Земли Киргиз-Кайсацких орд, кочующих к северу от хребта гор, идущего от Бухтарминской крепости прямо к Аральскому морю... часть Монголии так, чтобы все течение Амура, начиная от озера Далая, принадлежало России»⁶³.

«Хищные горские народы кавказские»⁶⁴ вызывают у Пестеля серьезные опасения, поскольку он не видит никакой возможности превратить их в «мирных, спокойных соседей». Они не упускают ни малейшего повода «для нанесения России всевозможного вреда», и потому остается одно лишь средство: «совершенно их покорить»⁶⁵.

Равным образом должны быть окончательно аннексированы «Киргизские земли», потому что сии прекрасные места... могли бы обратиться в отличную страну, которая бы обогащала Россию многими произведениями природы и многими способами для самовыгоднейшей и деятельнейшей торговли, между тем как ныне сие все совершенно теряется от необузданности и невежества киргизов. К тому же находятся сии народы ~~нед-нефровительством~~ ^{нефровительством} России и, следовательно, не имеет на них прав никакая другая держава, они же *сами не могут* иметь самостоятельную независимость»⁶⁶.

Пестель подчеркивает неисчислимы-благоприятные для России последствия присоединения различных кавказских, киргизских и монгольских земель — прежде всего потому, что всемерно облегчатся сношения «со всеми народами Азии». Кроме того, «на-

званные *четыре страны* (в том числе и Молдавия. — М.Б.) *никогда отдельных государства образовать не могут*», и потому их надо включить «на вечные времена»⁶⁹ в состав России как государства «единого и неделимого»⁷⁰, для которого пагубной представляется сама идея федерации. Ведь в таком случае «разнородные области скоро от коренной России... отложатся, и она скоро потеряет тогда не только свое могущество, величие и силу, но даже, может быть, и бытие свое между большими или главными государствами. Она тогда снова испытает все бедствия и весь неизлечимый вред, несенный древней Руси удельною системою, которая также не что иное была, как род федерального устройства...»⁷¹.

Безусловный христианцентризм Пестеля виден и тогда, когда он предлагал сделать столицей Российского государства Нижний Новгород, переименовав его во Владимир: «Сие имя дается столице в память великого мужа, введшего в России христианский закон: да средоточие России свидетельствует даже именем своим о вечной благодарности Россиян за благочестие и благотельное его деяние»⁷².

Но заженный равноапостольным князем Владимиром благотельный свет христианства (притом исключительно православного толка) должен распространиться по всей стране, в частности среди кочевников.

Ведь они «*суть люди полукиевские, а некоторые даже и совсем дикие, не знающие собственной пользы, в невежестве и унижении обретающиеся*. А, следовательно, *по одному уже долгу христианскому* надлежит заботиться об улучшении их положения, тем еще более... что они... в нашем отечестве обитают. А потому *да сделаются они нашими братьями* и перестанут коснеть в жалостном своем положении»⁷³, — и прежде всего посредством их постепенного, но тотального перехода на оседло-земледельческий образ жизни. И конечно, чтобы «открыть им свет *православной веры и лучи истинного просвещения*», надобно послать «к ним для этого *миссионеров*, которые бы кротостью и убеждением мало-помалу сии *несчастные народы* просветили и успокоили»⁷⁴. В категорию «кочевых народов», к которым надлежит принять выше-названные меры, Пестель включает и часть татар.

Что касается «тех татарских народов, которые на Кавказе живут», то их должна была постигнуть судьба «всех вообще кавказских народов»⁷⁵.

Сложнее обстояло дело, согласно Пестелю, со «всеми остальными татарскими народами, в России живущими». Ведь они:

«1) исповедуют веру магометанскую. Им позволяется оной держаться и всякое насилие воспрещается». И все же необходимо «всяким случаем пользоваться, дабы дружелюбием и кротким убеждением их склонять к восприятию Св. крещения, на каковой конец полезно посоветоваться и с их духовными чинами (sic!); 2) у них заведено многоженство, а так как *обычай сей противен православной вере*, то и должно быть многоженство на будущее время запрещено совершенно. Содержание же жен заперти есть большая несправедливость противу сей половины рода человеческого, а посему и надлежит употребить средства кроткие, дабы магометане *обычай сей оставили*»⁷⁶.

Но Пестель тут же настаивает на том, что поскольку «татары и вообще магометане, в России живущие, никаких неприязненных действий не оказывают против христиан»⁷⁷, постольку «справедливо даровать им все частные гражданские права наравне с русскими»⁷⁸. Впрочем, это даже не должно тормозить ход реализации главной цели:

«*Все племена должны быть слиты в один народ... и все различные оттенки в одну общую массу слить так, чтобы обитатели целого пространства российского государства все были русские... чтобы одни и те же законы, один и тот же образ управления по всем частям России существовал и тем самым в политическом и гражданском отношениях вся Россия... являла бы вид единородства, единообразия и единомыслия*»⁷⁹. Именно поэтому «христианская православная, греко-российская вера признана должна быть господствующей верой великого государства Российского. Все прочие христианские вероисповедания, равно как и все инородные веры, дозволяются в России, если только не противны они российским законам, духовным и политическим правилам, чистой нравственности и не нарушают естественных обязанностей человека»⁸⁰.

Другой виднейший декабрист — Сергей Иванович Муравьев-Апостол — искренне убежден в том, что понятия «христианство» и «свобода» вполне коррелируют друг с другом: «...истинная свобода сделалась известною со времен проповедания христианской веры... Франция, впадшая в тяжкие бедствия и страдания во время своего переворота, именно от вкравшегося безверия до того в умы, должна служить нам уроком...»⁸¹.

Еще более интересны в этом плане мысли Михаила Петровича Бестужева-Рюмина.

Излагая свой проект политического и культурного преобразования империи, он так определяет функции «министра внешних

Как бы далеко ни заходили симпатии отдельных авторов к индийской традиционной культуре⁸⁸, всегда тем не менее в русском интеллектуалистском сознании (во всяком случае, первой половины XIX в.) влияние рационализма и прагматизма (пусть они и выступали в самых разных масках) оказывалось настолько значительным, что не влекло за собой сколько-нибудь существенную трансплантацию азию (индийско)-генных трансцендентных мифов и метафизических ориентаций (а значит, и отрицание активной жизненной позиции вообще).

Для типичного русского интеллектуала первой половины XIX в. все Не-европейское представляло как бесструктурно-рыхлое и инертное. Твердо предполагалось, что лишь «европейский дух» в состоянии принести в антиподные ему ареалы некую упорядоченность, придать восточным феноменам значение, которое (хотя оно и может оказаться в онтологическом плане неподлинно) позо-
воляет прагматически использовать их на «всеобщее благо».

2. Русский романтизм и проблема Ислама

При всех филиппиках в адрес Цивилизации (=«христианского мира», особенно его европейского компонента) со стороны не-мало числа представителей русского романтизма, она и для них оставалась олицетворением Порядка, Организованности в сравнении с Азией (особенно мусульманской) как символом Хаоса, Не-Организованности, неупорядоченного и даже сугубо аномального⁸⁹ (ср. инвариантный образ Турецкой империи как «неизлечимого больного») бытия⁹⁰.

Эта идея — своего рода алгоритм⁹¹, организующий структуру едва ли не любого повествования⁹², которому рано или поздно, но в конце концов неизбежно подчиняется спонтанный на первый взгляд бег не знающей пределов вязи ассоциаций⁹³.

И даже наиболее «экстремистские» разновидности русского романтизма:

- с их отрицанием господства разума в пользу чувств;
- с их поворотом от внешней реальности к внутреннему миру;
- с их сочетанием интеллектуального пессимизма и эмоционального оптимизма;
- с их попытками найти сферу «внутреннего действия», самореализации человека не только в идеализируемом прошлом Рос-

сношений»: последний «должен был все способы давать народам европейским для введения у них представительного правления. В Азии же он должен был распространять просвещение и поощрять народы к перемене правления (несомненно, на европейско-либеральный лад! — М.Б.)⁹².

Что же касается «министра духовных дел» (который должен быть «из сословия духовного»), то «главная обязанность его — кроткими мерами преклонять идолопоклонников, принадлежащих России, к принятию христианской веры. Он также должен был посылать миссионеров в Азию, но людей самых просвещенных и одаренных способностями, дабы они могли давать министерству сведения истинные о мыслях, степени образования и наклонности народов, у коих будут находиться»⁹³.

В другом своем произведении («Воззвание») Бестужев-Рюмин писал: «...смертью тирана (Александра I. — М.Б.) Бог ознаменовывает свою волю, дабы мы сбросили с себя узы рабства, противные закону христианскому. Отныне Россия свободна. Но как истинные сыны церкви, не покусимся ни на какие злодеяния и без распрей междоусобных установим правление народное, основанное на законе Божьем, гласящем: да первый из вас послужит вам»⁹⁴.

Правда, декабрист Владимир Федосеевич Раевский считает нужным не отождествлять понятия «Азия» и «Варварство». Он говорит:

«Дворяне русские есть что-то варварское, но не азиатское, ибо вообще роскошь азиатов заключается в числе наложниц, и пышных уборов, оружии, одежде, — у нас все искажено и увеличено...»⁹⁵.

И однако, твердая в целом и у декабристов идентификация понятий «Россия» и «Цивилизация»⁹⁶ означала концептуальную и эмоционально-психологическую оппозицию понятию «Азия» (=«Не-Цивилизация»)⁹⁷, как обители парализующего фатализма, в корне отвергающего антропоцентризм и заставляющего человека смиренно покоряться одной лишь провиденциальной инициативе.

Мы увидим далее, что именно русская миссионерская антимусульманская литература выступала чуть ли не самым последовательным критиком ислама как основного олицетворения фатализма и, соответственно, глашатая органически свойственной, по ее убеждению, христианству идеи непрерывного развития и связанных с ней всеобъемлющих политических, моральных и прочих реформ.

сии или других европейских стран, но и на «нецивилизованном Востоке», этом наиболее древнем и, однако, неутомимом генераторе ярко-мифологических субстратов⁹⁴, — даже они не смогли (да и не стремились) превратить «ориентофильство» в доминанту психологического настроения своего времени, в идеологическую и эстетическую максиму, уверенно ведущую к Абсолютной Истине и Абсолютной Красоте⁹⁵.

Думается, истинные причины этому следует искать в следующем.

Романтизм⁹⁶ — как бы ни казался незбылемым у сонма его адептов примат визионерского, функционального начала над сферой реального бытия рассказчика — оставался верным глубинным устремлениям рационалистическо-конструктивно-трансформирующего по своей природе европейско-христианского этноса⁹⁷.

При всем том, что романтикам чужда метафизическая система альтернативных ценностей, в которой вполне очевидным образом Зла дидактически были бы противопоставлены не менее рельефные образы Добра, даже категориальное восприятие романтизмом человечества как такового отводило его «восточную разновидность» на периферию интеллектуальных и эмоциональных интересов и потребностей.

И романтическая историософия волей-неволей приходила к скептическому выводу — пусть и далеко не всегда вербализуемому, — что любое общество, будь то европейское или восточное, есть не микрочастица некоего глобального божественного благоустройства, а скорее случайное объединение людей-масок, поглощенных материальным и чувственным наполнением своего бытия. Потому-то представленные романтиками «сыны и дочери Востока» — это, как правило, не психологически убедительные, цельные характеры, а скорее аллегорические фигуры⁹⁸, серии образов, противоречивых потому, что они относятся к разным сторонам в высшей степени противоречивого явления. Они — чередование «масок», в чем-то даже тождественных автору, но во многом от него и отличающихся.

И далее.

Как бы ни было первоначально велико жанровое и тематическое многообразие литературы (в том числе и романтической⁹⁹) о Востоке¹⁰⁰, преобладающим в ней становился жанр путевых записок, зарисовок, этюда, дневника, жанр, вполне отвечающий концепции разорванности мира¹⁰¹. Главные приметы

«дневникового повествовательного принципа»¹⁰²: краткость, сжатость; фрагментарность; отказ от риторики и необязательных принципов; фиксация мгновенных озарений мысли. Цель «идеальной модели» дневника — не подкашивать готовые решения, а ставить вопросы, создавать ощущение вездесущности новых возможностей, сеять сомнения в незбылемости существующего.

На примере построенных в форме дневников описаний ряда путешествий на Восток русских авторов (зачастую — представителей романтизма) можно видеть, что изображение в них параллельных миров (скажем, русско-православного и азиатско-мусульманского) с исторически различными типами развития, исторически контрастных типов сознания во многом соответствовало, а во многом — отклонялось от этой «идеальной модели», модели, в которой главным был курс на релятивизацию. Оно, это описание, подчинялось жесткой идеологизации и политизации всех тех предметов описания и анализа, которые связывались с понятием «Ислам».

Попробуем изложить суть дела, исходя из мысли М. Blanchot¹⁰³ о том, что взаимоотношения людей могут быть разделены на три типа.

Первый строится по закону «одинакового»: встречаюсь с «иным», непохожим человеком, мы превращаем его в подобного себе.

Второй конструируется идеей объединения, слияния «Меня» и «Другого» в нераздельное единство, т. е. то, что имманентно «идеальной модели» романтизма. Как уже отмечалось, этот курс пустил лишь слабые ростки в русской литературе о Востоке. Можно даже сказать большее: его унификационный в первую очередь настрой оказался чуждым ведущим направлениям русской культуры XIX в., не склонным рассматривать ее в качестве транснациональной, космополитической, как очередной melting pot, и в целом, как она декларировала, предпочитавшей полифонию онтологических слоев¹⁰⁴, а не их нивелировку.

В 1836 г. Пушкин писал:

«Талант неволен, и его подражание не есть постыдное похищение — признак умственной скудости, но благородная надежда на свои собственные силы, надежда отыскать новые миры, стремясь по следам гения»¹⁰⁵.

Здесь сформулирован, как утверждают многие авторы, один из основополагающих творческих принципов самого Пушкина, и творчество, и личность которого были клубком противоре-

чий¹⁰⁶, где совмещались республиканские устремления и монархизм, христианство и язычество, эгоизм и альтруизм, стоицизм и мечтательность. Этот принцип определял природу его так называемого протезизма, «всемирной отзывчивости», по определению Достоевского («...и не в одной только отзывчивости здесь дело, — уточнял Достоевский, — а в изумляющей глубине ее, в перевоплощении своего духа в дух чужих народов, перевоплощении почти совершенном, а потому и чудесном, потому что нигде, ни в каком поэте целого мира такого явления не повторялось»¹⁰⁷).

Первым в ряду таких пушкинских произведений Достоевский называл «Подражания Корану» — это, как полагает современный исследователь, «качественно новое жанровое образование для пушкинского творчества и вообще для русской литературы»¹⁰⁸.

Не касаясь ни всей темы «Пушкин и Восток»¹⁰⁹, ни деталей — чисто литературоведческих — истории создания «Подражаний...», сконцентрирую внимание на тех данных, которые вполне свидетельствуют в пользу моего тезиса о том, что пушкинское восприятие мусульманского (да и вообще всего восточного) мира¹¹⁰ (или даже лишь отдельных его представителей) не строилось ни по закону «одинакового», ни по принципу «объединения, слияния» «Меня» и «Другого» в неразделенное единство¹¹¹.

Первоначальное содержание цикла (включавшего в себя всего три произведения, темы которых переходят из одного в другое) было — при всей громадной эмоционально-экспрессивной выразительности и богатстве образных стимулов — почти лишено арабского (и вообще мусульманского) колорита. Позже, в примечаниях к циклу, заметив (или, вернее, повторив стародавний европейский антиисламский стереотип), что Коран есть «собрание новой лжи и старых басен», Пушкин добавит: «...несмотря на сие, многие нравственные истины изложены в Коране сильным и поэтическим образом» (II, 358).

Пушкин в качестве первоисточника (как мы увидим чуть ниже, не единственного) использовал сделанный с французского перевод Корана на русский язык¹¹².

«Слог Аль-Корана, — отмечал переводчик М. Веревкин, — *езде прекрасен и текуч, паче же на местах подражательных реченьям пророческим и стихам библейским*»¹¹³.

Я специально подчеркнул слова о том, что всего более эстетическая ценность Корана обусловлена его подражанием ветхозаветной парадигме, одной из важнейших — наряду с античностью и христианством — основ европейской цивилизации¹¹⁴.

Веревкин здесь отнюдь не оригинален, ибо такого рода суждения неизменно преобладали и в западном и в русском интеллектуалистском восприятии мусульманства.

Но и Пушкин «вольно или невольно»¹¹⁵ акцентирует это сходство (правильнее было бы сказать парафразы и повторения), отбывая те коранические тексты, которые звучат подобно книгам библейских пророков и псалмам Давида¹¹⁶.

Конечно, и собственно коранические мотивы и образы привлекали внимание великого русского поэта, и в первую очередь те, которые были пронизаны «высокой нравственной проблематикой»¹¹⁷ (тогда как эсхатологизмом ряда сур Пушкин при их обработке совершенно пренебрегает).

Надо отметить, что обогащению пушкинского толкования и переосмыслению священной книги ислама во многом способствовал находившийся в его распоряжении с конца 1824 г. французский перевод Корана, сделанный М. Савари¹¹⁸. В итоге Пушкину удалось ярче представить «обобщенно-лирический образ пророка, сквозь испытания гонения следующего стезею правды»¹¹⁹. Прав Фомичев, подчеркивая «условно отстраненный характер этого лиризма», и не права Лобикова, утверждавшая, будто Пушкин «восстанавливает хронологическую последовательность глав Корана, как бы отражая историю возникновения и развития ислама»¹²⁰, и что он, в соответствии с доступными ему источниками, показал, как «за проповедью новой веры скрывались узурпаторские намерения проповедника»¹²¹.

Пушкин в достаточной мере был ознакомлен с подобным рода утверждениями — и не только из приложенного к веревкинскому переводу Корана «Жития лжепророка Магомета» аббата Ладвокага, но и из многих других работ и русских¹²² и западных авторов, включая и — весьма им чтимого — Вольтера¹²³.

Но пушкинские «Подражания Корану» далеки от традиционного взгляда на Мухаммеда как на закоренелого преступника, бесовского обманщика, необузданного сластолюбца. Фомичев по этому поводу говорит:

«Наивная убежденность героя пушкинских стихотворений, его вера в пророческую миссию, в избранничество не колеблется ни на миг. Показательно, что, отбывая для своего цикла легендарные события, Пушкин, как правило, касается тех, которые вызывали у современников ему историков скептический или прямо издевательский комментарий... Очевидный для европейских авторов (надо было бы обязательно добавить: «далеко не всех!» — М.Б.) механизм

корыстного лжепророчества (имеется в виду история женьбы Мухаммеда на Зейнаб, жене Саида. — М.Б.) не работает в образной системе стихотворения Пушкина... Лирический герой пушкинского цикла (т. е. все тот же Мухаммед. — М.Б.) ни на миг не колеблется в своих побуждениях, изначально праведных...»¹²⁴ и т. п.

К сожалению, Фомичев забывает, что, с точки зрения Пушкина, Коран — при целом ряде его бесспорных эстетических и этических достоинств — есть все-таки олицетворение лжи (и «старой» и «новой»). Да и без этого сказанное не позволяет сделать — в всяком случае, с полной категоричностью — вывод, что Пушкин всего явственней в «Подражаниях...» достиг «перевосполнения своего духа в дух чужих народов», что он нарисовал истинный образ Мухаммеда (ибо снятие с последнего подозрений в лжепророчестве и т. п. вряд ли было особой заслугой в контексте европейской — в том числе и русской — интеллектуальности 20-х годов XIX века), дал объективную оценку Корана и, наконец, ислама и всего вообще мусульманского Востока.¹²⁵

Хотя вряд ли правомочно толковать весь романтизм как только антирационалистическую и антипросветительную консервативную систему мышления¹²⁶, тем не менее есть множество верных мыслей в статье известного польского историка и культуролога Г. Кзасуски «Великие прегрешения Романтизма. Приглашение к полемике»¹²⁷. Он ставит романтизм в оппозицию к католицизму, в котором выдвигает на первый план черты своеобразного рационализма и прогрессизма¹²⁸. На эти особенности его, говорит Кзасуски, неоднократно указывали многие антагонисты католицизма, но впервые — романтики (в том числе Мицкевич) и особенно русские славянофилы. Согласно Кзасускому, романтики (надо бы уточнить: «не все». — М.Б.) подключились к другой — протестантской — традиции, унаследовав от нее веру в «общинный дух», крайний политический консерватизм и теснейше с ним сопряженный национализм¹²⁹. Правда, романтики не отвергали лозунг *братства* народов; но они отвергали лозунг *равенства* народов, поскольку он мог быть понят в смысле общности культурных черт. Между тем, по мнению романтиков, все, что является для народов общим, оказывается и наносным, то есть вредным. «Романтики видели Европу как мозаику неповторимых монад, атомов»¹³⁰ и потому никоим образом не склонялись к абсолютному признанию «Другого» в его «чуждости»¹³¹, при всем при том, что шли напряженные поиски «внутренней множественности», пересмотр отношения к «Непохожему», к «отличному от Себя»¹³².

Можно продолжить анализ Kzaski в ином ключе.

Согласно «политологии романтизма», все общественные ценности рано или поздно низводятся до своего «аналога-знака» — нации. Лишь нации (и, значит, национальные культуры) являются реальными; любой человек реален постольку, поскольку он представляет собою конкретную нацию. Нация же (а тем более «национальное государство») — это то, что в себе «закончено», хорошо упорядочено (или должно, вполне *может*, в принципе, быть упорядочено!) в отношениях с другими нациями, то, что устойчиво, прочно, стабильно (или в потенции сравнительно легко может быть таковым) — и, следовательно, имманентно «европейскому» (=«цивилизованному») этосу. «Стать нацией» — категорический императив «романтического сознания», и для каждой его национальной разновидности все прочие реалы лишь с этой стороны. Феноменология этого сознания такова, что на место «пространства индивидуально-внутреннего мира» ложится «пространство нации»: «национальное» заполняет субъективность; «нация» подменяет «ценность». Возникает «голое символизирование», «знак без значения» — нация без субъекта (личности).

В основе своей это — порождение тревоги, ощущения внутренней зыбкости и несостоятельности, — заставлявших идеологов той или иной нации искать прочность и стабильность во внешнем мире путем контактов с себе же подобными, чувства собственной надломленности, страха, исходящего из «недр Я», изнуряющей напряженности, доводящие до оцепенения и взрыва. Это разрушение национального «Я» в результате ее сознательного растворения в коллективности — в «национальном» субстрате. «Коллективизируясь», оно, персональное «Я», теряет свои духовные качества, разрушает собственную целостность, и ценностно-смысловой контекст индивидуального сознания характеризуется экспансивной доминантой и импульсивного (т. е. направленного «внутри», на собственную культуру) и экспрессивного (т. е. направленного «вовне», на инокультурные зоны) аффектов. Но в любом случае аффект является структурирующим фактором сознания, несая в себе «мое отношение». Очерчивая внешние или внутренние границы и контуры как персонального «Я», так и национального коллектива, аффект определяет, таким образом, и «место» субъекта: он ориентирует его в пространственно-временных (объективная реальность) или ценностно-смысловых (субъективная реальность) параметрах. В итоге «романтическое сознание» продуцирует фундаментальные сдвиги в отношении

и к той национальной культуре, от имени которой оно выступает, и к своему «значимому другому» (в том числе и в его восточно-мусульманских обликах), вносит четко иерархирующий настрой в систему механизмов ценностного упорядочения универсума, но такой и только такой настрой, который есть в целом урно-европогенный. Все же остальное для этого настраивающе, и окрашенное в ориентальные тона — или же прямо с Востока заимствованная — система различного рода олицетворений, метафор, аллегорий, сравнений и преувеличений служит для того, чтобы решить (пусть в абстрактной форме) насущные философские и моральные проблемы своего собственного бытия, своей национальной культуры, наконец, своей же, европейско-христианской, цивилизации.

И поэтому, скорее всего, пушкинский образ Мухаммеда — образ, повторяем, поданный в красках, очень далекий от реальных¹³³, — нес прежде всего функциональную, а не самодовлеющую нагрузку¹³⁴.

Был ли Пушкин в этом отношении каким-либо исключением? Никоим образом!

Начнем с того, что «Подражания Корану» в общем-то четко отражают основные положения романтической гносеологии и этики (с их принципиальной «внесистемностью», фрагментарностью, с их приданием понятию «значения» скорее прикладного, «пробного», нежели конструктивного и абсолютного характера¹³⁵). Романтическая теория воображения, предписывавшая поэту творить из внутреннего побуждения, включала указание на то, что индивидуальный опыт не может базироваться на моделях поведения, предлагаемых («навязываемых») социокультурной средой. Отсюда — «зашифрованность» романтических произведений, которые не могут быть, как правило, рационально, логически объяснены, а раскрывают свое значение лишь в процессе чтения.

Н. Bratu и I. Marculescu недавно напомнили о различии между намерением и интенциональностью. «Намерение» сводимо к логическому суждению: оно «заморожено» в прошлом и осуществимо (или неосуществимо) в будущем. Эстетическая интенциональность предшествует художественному творчеству и обуславливает его. Она имеет «вечное настоящее». Это — интенциональность перцепции, оценки, суждения, воображения, чувствования, мысли, надежды, разочарования, высказывания, умолчания, интенциональность, которая, взятая вне словесных выражений, не име-

ет значения¹³⁶. Последнее же появляется только при словесном выражении ментального состояния. Поскольку «нет объекта без субъекта», постольку (я тут заменяю приводимые Брату и Маркулеску «западные» примеры на «русские») Мухаммед, герой «Подражаний Корану», имеет столько образов, сколько раз о нем говорит повествователь¹³⁷.

В свете феноменологической редукции станет очевидно, что пушкинский цикл показывает не того Мухаммеда, каким он был в действительности, а Мухаммеда «Подражаний Корану», в том числе (повторяю: лишь «в том числе!») и как идеального, т. е. го- нимого, но в конце концов торжествующего, поэта-пророка.

Попытка воспринять пушкинского Мухаммеда как исторического основателя ислама будет интенциональной ошибкой, ложным отождествлением различных ипостасей мусульманского пророка с фактами, домыслами и полудомыслами, почерпнутыми Пушкиным (или его читателями) из книг Веревкина, Савари и других.

С феноменологической точки зрения Мухаммед (которого Пушкин ставил в ряд с такими поэтами, как Саади и Хафиз, — но каждому из которых приписывал «ребячество и уродство» и утверждал, что «...многие нравственные истины изложены в Коране сильным и поэтическим образом»¹³⁸) «Подражаний Корану» есть множественность эстетических моделей, собранная поэтом.

Интересующий нас образ — это модель образа, который в свою очередь является конечным продуктом акта воображения в сознании автора «Подражаний Корану»; это «новый эстетический объект», который не может быть сведен к простому прототипу.

Но если действительно единственным сюжетом романтической лирики становится не только процесс конструирования представления о бытии как о вместилище чудесного и таинственного, но, главное, процесс постижения этого объективного — для себя — бытия¹³⁹, то тогда встает вопрос: неужели Пушкин ограничивался лишь тем, что:

«в период работы над циклом сопоставлял свою судьбу с судьбой гонимого пророка»;

«в судьбе Мухаммеда стремился посмотреть судьбу человека вообще, спасающегося от невзгод, сомнений и гонений на «стеze правды», обретающего силы в служении истине»;

«за внешними колоритными чертами иной культуры... открывает все тот же мир земной красоты и нравственной истины»¹⁴⁰.

На самом же деле у Пушкина были и другие, порой куда менее глубокие, устремления.

Подобно большинству романтиков¹⁴¹, он видел в поэзии вид пророческого служения, священнодействие, восстанавливающее гармонию между природой и интеллектом; в поэте — мессию, призванного возродить человечество, провидца и созидателя, оказывающего цивилизующее влияние на умы и души людей, олицетворение совершенного героя, который воплощает Человека в его целостности.

Говоря о многоликости пушкинского Мухаммеда, я, однако, не упускаю из виду, что она, эта многоликость, отражает и эволюцию взглядов самого Пушкина на роль поэта-пророка: он может (и должен) быть не только тем, кто открывает новые истины и лепит мир согласно своему воображению, но и тем, кто сводит воедино или примиряет многочисленные и противоречивые стороны действительности, кто может стать даже символом равновесия¹⁴², провозвестником единения, утешения и гармонии¹⁴³. И если уж искать всего более близкий аналог пушкинским идеям о поэте-герое, то это надо делать в философско-этической мысли Томаса Карлейля¹⁴⁴ с ее центральным идеалом «героя-пророка», «пророка-вождя» (в эту категорию он, как известно, зачислил и Мухаммеда¹⁴⁵), обладающего даром «трансцендентного видения» и способного вести других вперед, к нетленной истине¹⁴⁶. По Карлейлю, каждый герой, поскольку он обладает «зрящим оком» и познает высшую истину, является иновоплощением всех других, а в конечном счете — орудием Бога¹⁴⁷. Карлейлевский герой никогда не действует традиционно и всего более дорожит «универсальными ценностями духа». По мнению Карлейля — мнению, к которому в конце концов склонился Пушкин в оценке выдающихся исторических деятелей¹⁴⁸, — сам тип «героя» (будь то правитель или поэт¹⁴⁹, пророк или проповедник) всегда соответствует запросам общества¹⁵⁰. В основе бытия лежит — и это представление свойственно, по-видимому, романтизму как таковому — универсальный моральный закон, предполагающий господство справедливости. Вся деятельность «героев» направлена на достижение этой справедливости, ассоциирующейся с «порядком»¹⁵¹, а не с дискретным, лишенным какой бы то ни было закономерности или причинности, бытием¹⁵².

Однако этот «порядок»¹⁵³ вовсе не есть — так утверждал и сам Карлейль — отказ от идеи свободного волеизъявления, пассивно-меланхолическое бессилие перед лицом судьбы. Напротив, он предполагает максимально полные возможности для реализации

фундаментального свойства человеческого «Я» — бесконечной самореализации, — а значит, «ewige Bewigung», — вечное движение культуры и общества, в свою очередь невозможное без тако-го мощнейшего достижения европейской цивилизации, как логическо-интеллектуальное мышление¹⁵⁴. И хотя романтизму, безусловно, был свойственен иррационализм¹⁵⁵, он, однако, мыслился как некое вынужденное средство, призванное обеспечить в будущем торжество нового рационализма и нового Просвещения¹⁵⁶.

Хотели того или нет многие наиболее страстные антизападники из среды представителей русской культуры, им не удалось¹⁵⁷ подменить понятие «Порядок» и сопряженные с ним же понятия «Развитие», «Разум», «Логика» чем-нибудь совершенно иным, чем понятия (по сути своей тождественные в контексте XIX в.) «Цивилизация», «Европа», «Запад» (пусть даже посредством этих понятий они стремились прежде всего сохранить цельность «русского духа» на его бесконечном пути к совершенствованию через все метаморфозы и одновременно, следовательно, сделать неизменными его «уникальность и неповторимость»).

В историко-философском отношении этот, так сказать, методологический ход также представляет недюжинный интерес, знаменуя собой еще одно подтверждение характерного для Нового времени¹⁵⁸ решительного разрыва с философским индифферентизмом относительно многообразия качественно различного. Новое время твердо признало, что качественные различия, которые в прошлом казались немногочисленными на фоне поверхностно воспринимаемого сходства вещей, выявлялись как бесконечно многообразные, постоянно умножающиеся в ходе познания и, по-видимому, более существенные, чем отношения сходства, нередко оказывавшиеся не более чем видимостью. Категорическим императивом мышления первой половины XIX в. является скрупулезное описание отличий, свойственных отдельным видам существующего. И хотя проблема единства, тождества, многообразного не исчезает из поля философского видения мира, она, однако, осознается теперь как несравненно более сложная, ибо различия не акцентируются уже как несущественные или преходящие. Все вещи, согласно учению Лейбница — учению, оказавшемуся столь созвучным без конца плюрализирующему человечество национализму, — суть монады, но все монады существенно отличны друг от друга, все они индивидуальны и, более того, уникальны. Различию, таким образом, придается статус субстанциональности¹⁵⁹. А это, в свою

очередь, означает, что главенствующей будет тенденция на признание онтологической чуждости этносов и их культур¹⁶⁰, их «странности» друг для друга¹⁶¹. Здесь нет полного взаимопонимания, нет единства, но нет и двойственности. Это — согласно уже отчасти известной читателю схеме М. Бланшо (речь идет уже о «третьем типе») — «нейтральные отношения», поступающие возможные и необходимость признать «Другого» как такового, не отождествляясь с ним¹⁶², не заставляя его отождествляться с собой¹⁶³.

Сказанное ничуть не противоречит тому факту, что процесс обращения русской поэзии к восточной проблематике и элементам ориентальной формы оказался не только необратимым, но и постоянно набирающим темпы, что в ней, этой поэзии, в первой половине XIX в. «развитие восточно-романтических форм, закрепление ряда традиционных штампов, зачастую заимствованных у поэтов европейского ориентализма, шло параллельно с укрепляющимся стремлением отразить действительность и человека Востока, постигаемых в ходе... продвижения России на Кавказ, за Урал и в «киргиз-кайсакии» степи»¹⁶⁴.

Но тут же замечу, что Тартаковский нередко преувеличивает глубину воздействия восточных реалий на тогдашнее литературное употребление, ибо множество иноязычных наименований очень долго еще выступало на правах экзотизмов¹⁶⁵. Все они воспринимались русским читателем как поверхностная, не имеющая прямого значения, *social locale* и глубже в словесный обиход не входили¹⁶⁶.

Как отмечает далее Тартаковский, к Библии, Корану, древневосточной литературе, питавшим в первой четверти XIX в. русскую ориентальную поэзию, прибавляется во второй половине 20-х и в 30-е годы того же столетия фольклор народов Кавказа, татар, башкир, бурят и др. Расширение связей со странами зарубежного Востока определяет тяготение к народному эпосу, к древней индийской и иранской поэзии, дающим импульс творчеству русских поэтов¹⁶⁷.

В 40–50-е годы XIX века, когда реализм становится главной линией литературного развития, можно говорить уже об ориентальной школе, развивающей в этом направлении пушкинские и лермонтовские традиции¹⁶⁸. В русской «ориентальной поэзии» возрастает внимание к живому человеку Востока, представители

тех или иных восточных регионов все чаще рассматриваются национально дифференцированно, с большей широтой воспроизводятся типические обстоятельства их жизни и национальные характеры¹⁶⁹.

Как замечает Тартаковский, 60-е годы XIX в. знаменуются резким расширением тематического диапазона ориентальной русской поэзии. С присоединением Туркестана к России в творчество русских поэтов входит среднеазиатская проблематика: «...мало известные ранее восточные классики определяют русскую поэзию... в 70-е годы весьма значительное количество стихотворений... было посвящено русско-турецкой войне... Так ориентальная поэзия выступает как барометр политических отношений России со странами Востока»¹⁷⁰.

Интересно наблюдение Тартаковского, что в последней трети XIX в., особенно в 80-е годы, «в связи с наступлением реакции становится заметным тяготение ряда поэтов к новой религиозно-мистической интерпретации Корана и Библии, стремление перенести из эпохи надвигающихся бурь в «устоявшийся» мир древнего Востока... В 80-е и 90-е годы... углубляется «туркестанская» проблематика, серьезно осваивается фольклор ~~среднеазиатских~~ атских народов, мотивы и сюжеты которого становятся ~~ее~~ основой ряда произведений русских поэтов (циклы о Хозире-Хиячи, Ходже Насреддине и т. п.)»¹⁷¹.

В 90-е годы XIX в. — первом десятилетии XX в. некоторые поэты — представители модернизма — пытаются сделать ориентальную поэзию «одной из форм ухода от реальной действительности в мир «дикий», экзотической романтики Востока. Вместе с тем... ориентальная поэзия этих лет отразила переход наиболее талантливых представителей символизма на реалистические позиции. Тематический диапазон русской поэзии о Востоке, равно как и линии ее взаимодействия с восточной классикой и фольклором, в этот период необыкновенно расширяются, что связано с общим усилением интереса художественной мысли к Востоку на рубеже XX века»¹⁷².

И все равно — даже тогда (и даже, как мы увидим, у евразийцев) сохранялась, как правило, довольно значительная дистанция между понятиями «нехристианский Восток» и «Россия», убежденность в том, что лишь «Европеец первый соединит дельность с заманчивостью» (А.С. Пушкин к И.В. Киреевскому, 4.II.1832).

Никак нельзя, далее, игнорировать и то, что целый ряд прямо связанных с понятием «мусульманский Восток» слов («Маго-

мет»¹⁷³ в его различных вариантах — «басурманин»¹⁷⁴, «татарин», «турок», «азиат» и т. д.) по-прежнему сохраняли, особенно в сознании низших слоев, наиболее подверженных влиянию традиционной-антиисламской конфессиональной и шовинистической пропаганды, презрительно-экспрессивное значение.

И еще, в который раз подчеркну, что имманентная в целом русской культуре со времен Петра I убежденность во всеобщей Разумности¹⁷⁵ — убежденность, мощно стимулированная затем Просвещением, — все явственней превращалась в оптимистическую, безграничную готовность постановки целей, планирования, реорганизаций. Рационализация не только подчиняла себе развитие естественных наук и искусства, не только обуславливала едва ли не все тогдашнее миропонимание, но и непосредственно вторгалась в социально-политическую мысль.

По мере того как Россия вступала в фазу модернизации, и для нее становилось характерным (пусть пока и в реликтовой форме) восприятие как естественного и самоочевидного того, что Гелен¹⁷⁶ именует принципами «технического» мышления: принцип «исключения вакуума» (максимального использования имеющихся средств); принцип подготавливаемости и направляемости процессов; принцип максимальной концентрации усилий для достижения определенного эффекта.

Все, что не охватывалось этим (или примерно этим) представлением о рациональности (в свою очередь имплицитное восприятие Рациональности формулой Декарта «человек — покоритель и властелин природы»), попадало в сферу «Натурального», «Природа» (отсюда — столь частые дефиниции народов Востока как «детей природы») — в сферу, которую необходимо цивилизовать (= рационализировать¹⁷⁷, = европеизировать¹⁷⁸); одновременно самим же носителям европейского начала надлежит как можно быстрее «денатурализоваться» (= деазиатизироваться, деориентализироваться).

3. Путешествие в мир Ислама: попытка создать новую «стратегию общения» между разноконфессиональными группами

Мне кажется в этом — т. е. «деазиатизирующем», «деориентализирующем» — плане весьма репрезентативными уже цитированные выше «Письма Русского из Персии» — книга, довольно

последовательно развенчивающая сладкоречивые мифы многих романтиков о мусульманском Востоке с позиций искреннего приверженца Цивилизации (в то же время отлично сознающего не только военно-стратегическую, но и экономическую значимость Персии для России)¹⁷⁹.

Как я уже отмечал, автор почти всегда говорит о себе как в первую очередь о Европейте.

И вот читаем, что в Персии «народ недоверчив в высшей степени, сребролюбив до крайности и набит изверством! Я уже успел заметить все это, только что въехав в Персию, так оно ярко, так скоро бросается в глаза Европейца»¹⁸⁰; насколько персы «отвлечены в своей поэзии», настолько они «положительны в своей жизни; для них деньги есть все, а кто без денег, тот для них ничего! Правда, что и мы, европейцы, грешим в том же смысле, но наши грехи *приглажены образованностью*, они *блестят приличием*, хотя в нравственном отношении так же точно не приличны»¹⁸¹; «скудно *Европеицу* смотреть на глиняные стены, которыми в Персии окружены дома; скучны и белые покрывала, за которыми тоже, как за стенами, таятся восточные красавицы»¹⁸²; Персия «кажется издали блестящею, но этот блеск есть блеск какой-нибудь торы на солнце: издали чудятся на ней и золото и алмазы, а подойдешь ближе — увидишь одну слюду»¹⁸³; *правды* все старинные и современные авторы — *европейские* описатели печальной судьбы Персии и всего мусульманского Востока, ибо там «*образование*... держится на *железной цепи Магометова закона*, а эта цепь так коротка, что оно (т. е. образование) может бродить только вокруг столба, к которому приковано»¹⁸⁴, — т. е. вокруг Корана»¹⁸⁵, потому — «насели Восток *образованностью* — и отсюда не скоро тебя выманишь»¹⁸⁶.

Правда, «нельзя ни бранить, ни хвалить ничего безусловно, все в мире *относительно*, все местно»¹⁸⁷ ... пока не присмотришься к чему, — оно *кажется* странно... например, кто не дивился азиатской лени? А между тем это так естественно при несносном зное, когда все валится из рук и ничего нейдет в голову!¹⁸⁸ Кроме этой лени, ничто так не заметно в характере персиян, как смесь противоположностей: величайшее раболепство и такая же наглость! благородный образ мыслей — и коварство в поступках! щедрость и сребролюбие! великодушные и низость! и все это в самом красивом переплете вежливости!»¹⁸⁹.

Правда, в XIX в. уже стало как бы аксиомой убеждение, что «каждый клочок земли нашего света составляет часть целого,

с его эгалитаристскими во многом тенденциями, — пробивал солидные бреши в антигезе Запад/Восток. Она основывалась на выделении однозначных аксиологических критериев, таких, как «духовность», «сосерцательность», «пассивность», «фатализм», «статичность», «эмоциональность», в паре с антиномичными характеристиками. Становившиеся достоянием европейских образованных кругов достижения восточных культур заставили признать, что и в них можно найти элементы, в той или иной степени сходные с теми, которые доселе считались преимущественным достоянием Запада²⁰¹.

Это, однако, не устраивало — а в конце XVIII — первой половине XIX в. даже усиливалось — в глазах апологетов европейских культур представление о системной определенности европейской цивилизации как таковой и культур Востока. И в первую очередь такое представление давало руководящие рамки для социальных и политических действий в отношении мусульманства. Оно соприкасалось с понятием «Застой», «Застойный Хаос», а цивилизация — с понятием «Иновация» (= «Прогресс»).

В 1829 г. А. С. Пушкин совершил свое знаменитое путешествие в Арзрум.

Читаем у него:

— о том, что «черкесы нас ненавидят... Что делать с таковым народом?!»! Влияние роскоши может благоприятствовать их укрошению: самовар был бы важным нововведением. Есть средство более сильное, более нравственное, более сообразное с просвещением нашего века: проповедание Евангелия... Кавказ ожидает христианских миссионеров»;

— о том, что в одной из *грузинских* песен «есть какая-то восточная бессмыслица, хотя и имеющая свое поэтическое достоинство»;

— о том, что нет выражения, «которое было бы бессмысленнее слов азиатская роскошь. Эта поговорка, вероятно, родилась во время крестовых походов... Ныне можно сказать: азиатская бедность, азиатское свинство и проч., но роскошь есть, конечно, принадлежность Европы»²⁰². И т. д. и т. д.

Но было бы большой ошибкой ограничиться лишь фиксацией подобного рода фраз о глубоко качественных различиях между Востоком и Западом, лимитируя анализируемый нами круг авторов лишь тем «средним путешественником», о котором некогда Дж. С. Милль метко сказал: «Сведения, выносимые средним пу-

от которого он в совершенной зависимости¹⁹⁰, что все государства так связаны между собою общими выгодами, что нельзя отделить одно, не произведя потрясения в другом! Во всем мире есть одна общая мысль — благосостояние, — но эта мысль может осуществиться только с общего согласия, только общим усилием...»¹⁹¹.

Правда, тут же автор делает комплименты шаху во время личной с ним встречи — «персидский язык нельзя не любить... и мы (русские. — М.Б.) очень знакомы с Вашим Гафизом, с Вашим Фирдоуси и Саади...»¹⁹²; все равно в качестве интеллектуальной нормы преобладает убежденность в тотальном превосходстве «Европы» (= «и России») над Востоком.

К тому же автору Персия потому еще кажется олицетворением «Анти-Порядка», что в ней царят «два закона» («закон, основанный на преданиях и на Алкоране, т.е. закон, писанный, называется Шарах; тут духовенство как толкователь Корана, есть глава... другой закон, основанный на обычаях, называется Уф, и его-то употребляет шах чаще всего»), которые «держат во всеобщей вражде правительство и духовенство»¹⁹³. Потому в Персии «*беспорядков* больше»¹⁹⁴, чем даже в тех мусульманских же странах (например, в Бухаре), где «духовная власть живет в миру со светскою»¹⁹⁵. Значит, эти страны больше, нежели, скажем, государство Каджаров, напоминают куда более любезные автору «Писем русского» (несмотря на их необозримую сложность и истинность) цивилизаторские структуры с их принципом нацеленного, калькулируемого эффекта. Они в корне чужды характерным для «отсталого Востока» фантастическим и эксцессивным идеалам, всему тому, что порождает и укрепляет «восточный деспотизм»¹⁹⁶, всей, наконец, имманентной для Персии атмосферы тотальной неопределенности, безалаберности, пустой толчеи, всевозможных интриг и интрижек, бесконечных пререканий и мелких дрязг, словом, тому, что бесповоротно губит Восток. Единственное, что можно противопоставить бушующей там энтропии, — это Гармонию¹⁹⁷, несомую Цивилизацией, в особенности ее российской разновидности, Гармонию, немислимую без личной интеллектуальной свободы¹⁹⁸, без Разума¹⁹⁹, без Образования²⁰⁰, без Прогресса.

Попробуем оценить ситуацию уже в более генерализованных терминах.

Опыт исторического общения с мусульманским Востоком — опыт, в те времена руководимый преимущественно романтизмом

тешественником из чужой страны в качестве его личных впечатлений, почти всегда в точности подтверждают те его мнения, с которыми он отправился в путь. Он имел глаза и уши только для того, что он ожидал увидеть и услышать»²⁰³.

Все-таки в основе своей труды путешественников в исламские регионы — это «прагматические тексты». И хотя в них нет какого-либо — четко дистанцированного и от догматического западоцентризма и от традиционно-православного взгляда на чуждые конфессии — гомогенного мировоззренческого комплекса, тем не менее они важны не только как фиксатор существенных сдвигов в русской культурологии.

В сущности, каждое «Путешествие» (я имею в виду изложение его самим путешественником) есть одновременно и поиски самоуглубленности, стремление к самовыражению и самоутверждению (тем более что уже сама эпизодическая структура жанра позволяла осуществлять переход от сюжета к сюжету, от одного эмоционального и интеллектуального среза к другому). Эти поиски и стремления были особенно интенсивны и ярки еще и потому, что они свершались в сфере Нового и Необычного и, в свою очередь, вели к явному ощущению и (невольному, по крайней мере) признанию «кризиса основ», разорванности, амбивалентности неустрашимого плюрализма человечества²⁰⁴.

На примере хотя бы «Писем из Персии» можно было убедиться, как сильна в массиве «текстов путешественников» обективно-релятивизирующая тенденция, как ярка бывает порой их поливалентность, заставляющие излагать множество существенно-равноправных в споре точек зрения на какой-нибудь значимый набор вопросов. Для этого текстового массива характерно стремление увидеть реальность по-новому — нечто вроде «когнитивного отстранения» (ставшего затем важнейшим формальным приемом научной фантастики²⁰⁵). Оно и позволяло «осваивать необъятное».

В повествовании доминирует особый элемент, который — вслед за Эрнстом Блохом²⁰⁶ — назовем *Novum*, странной новизной, новшеством, нововведением. Любая инновация мыслим лишь на фоне тех норм, от которых отклоняется *Novum*. Как отмечает Savin, основное напряжение в научной фантастике создается между читателем как «типическим представителем» своего времени (носителем его норм) и превосходящим его «неведомым», которое в произведении представляет *Novum*²⁰⁷, вследствие чего реальный опыт читателя становится отстраненным.

Но буквально то же самое можно сказать и об интересующем нас здесь массиве текстов, создававших и альтернативную реальность и изменявших — если не все, то уж наверняка многие — привычные представления.

Иное дело, что их-то авторы упорно хотели сохранить как абсолютные точки отсчета. Но мы не вправе требовать от них чего-то большего. Вполне достаточно того, что соответствующие тексты (можно их назвать и «антропологическими», т.е. «непредубежденными», ценностно не обусловленными наблюдениями): — были более информативны, чем максимально «заидеологизированные»;

— в них гораздо меньше ложных (или недоказанных) утверждений;

— они более свободны от неясностей и двусмысленностей, — в них гораздо сильнее распространены неологизмы, имеющие веские основания претендовать на статус стандартизованных и, главное, более релевантных, представляющих собой определенные и упорядоченные концептуальные единицы терминов. И конечно, во всем этом была особенно серьезной роль тех профессиональных востоковедов, которым как раз и приходилось самим совершать путешествия в мусульманские земли.

В 1843 г. выходит «Описание Бухарского ханства»²⁰⁸ — т.е. все тот же «путешественнический текст» — известного впоследствии ориенталиста Николая Владимировича Ханыкова, книга, и по сей день во многом не потерявшая своей фактографической ценности, но для нас всего важнее своими иными, методологическими и историческими, пластами. Зафиксировав, что деспотизм эмира «ограничен только каноническим мусульманским правом»²⁰⁹, Ханыков далее красноречиво повествует о царящих в Бухаре «фанатизме и невежестве», обусловленных непрекращающимся авторитаризмом крайне реакционных, с его точки зрения, ишанов и мулл. Именно они в первую очередь виновны в непрерывно творящейся обскурантизме, в высшей степени архаичной и ксенофобской системе воспитания²¹⁰. Конечный итог печален: надо дожидаться того времени, пока «какая-нибудь европейская держава (не имевшая в виду, однако, лишь Россия. — М.Б.) не привьет силой догадливости и деятельности усипленным жителям»²¹¹ эмирага.

Надо отметить, что Ханыков, европоцентризм которого безоговорочно фиксируется в современной литературе²¹², зачастую склонен был объяснять «отсталость Востока» (в частности, Средней Азии, крупным знатоком которой он всегда по праву считал-

ся) влиянием географической среды. В статье (1844 г.) «Городское управление в Средней Азии»²¹³ утверждает:

«Орографический характер и *человеческие* (курсив мой. — М.Б.) свойства... Средней Азии... были и постоянно останутся существенными препятствиями полному развитию гражданских обществ, существовавших и существующих в означенных пределах...» Правда, Чингиз-хан, Тимурленг и Надир-хан «кровавыми подвигами преодолевали эти природные препятствия; но создания их скоро разрушались, и политические общества, слитые ими в одно целое, уединялись снова в прежние свои границы»²¹⁴.

Но я уверен, что в данном случае нельзя ограничиться лишь формулой «географический детерминизм». Перед нами — некая любопытная игра с понятием «пространство»: у Ханыкова оно становится одной из ключевых метафор, пронизывающих все его повествование о Востоке, участником действия, фатального для тех, кто в нем рожден и в котором им суждено умереть, и, одновременно — той границей, которую стремится преодолеть попавший в замкнутый Восток каждый «настоящий европеец». Ведь ему-то претит все откровенно статичное, в том числе и застойный характер «гражданственности на Востоке», что однозначно коррелирует с «постоянством географии этой части света»²¹⁵. Правда, «печальная недвижимость (среднеазиатских регионов. — М.Б.), приближая прошлое к настоящему, облегчает некоторым образом изучение гражданственности, но она же служит верным ручательством незначительности развития всех ветвей ее». Это изучение, полагает Ханыков, все же важно «для истории обществ человеческих»; оно особенно важно для России, которая долго находилась «*исключительно под влиянием Востока и по необходимости перенимала у него самые несовершенства гражданского быта*» (курсив мой. — М.Б.).

Уже одно это ясно говорило о быстрой для России необходимости «деориентализироваться». Вначале кажется, что Ханыков не склонен сводить все «восточное зло» к исламу. Так, описывая тяжкие условия жизни в Бухаре, он замечает: «*Мусульманство, введя в управление свое фанатическое духовенство, мало коснулось коренного порядка, существовавшего прежде*» (здесь и ниже курсив мой. — М.Б.). Но тут же следует, что именно ислам «окаменяющим своим влиянием» закрыл этому неизменному «коренному порядку» «*всякую возможность усовершенствоваться*», в особенности таким «диким племенам», как, скажем, казахи и киргизы (при оценке «препятствий и способов ~~к~~ существова-

нию» которых — да, впрочем, и не только их — Ханыков склонен руководствоваться теориями *Мальбуса*²¹⁶). В целом Ханыкова надо считать последовательным исламофобом.

В 1846 г. в тифлисской газете «Кавказ» (№ 20, 21) появились его статьи «Перевод мусульманских постановлений о войне» и «О мюридах и мюридизме». Есть, по Ханыкову, «извечная вражда» между «миролюбивым христианством» и «воинствующим исламом». Он пишет:

«Кому не известно, что одною из главнейших причин быстрого распространения и укрепления мусульманства была энергичная настойчивость, с которой последователи Мухаммеда мечом распространяли учение своего учителя; энергии этой история человечества обязана многими кровавыми страницами; история же христианства — многими славными битвами, коими отстаивало оно во время оно свое существование, обязана реакцией, производимой крестовые походы, и горькими страданиями бесчисленного множества членов паствы Христовой, оставшихся в середине земель, завоеванных мусульманами, и нередко жизнью, чтобы поклониться месту рождения, страданий, смерти и славы искупителя рода человеческого»²¹⁷.

Более того: Ханыков и колониализм — причем не один лишь русский, но и западноевропейский — рассматривает как продолжение исламо-христианского единоборства.

«...Теперь уже, — с радостью пишет Ханыков, — мусульманский фанатизм погасает: с севера и юга христианство под знаменами Англии, России и Франции все более и более успокаивает его порывы, так что в настоящее время Алжир и Кавказ представляют две единственные точки земной поверхности, на коих проливается кровь во имя и славу мединского пророка»²¹⁸.

Любопытна и еще одна статья Ханыкова — «О мюридах и мюридизме» (сборник газеты «Кавказ», первое полугодие 1847 г., Тифлис, 1847 г.). Советские исследователи творчества Ханыкова так характеризуют ее.

Публикацией этой статьи Ханыков «преследовал вполне определенные задачи, прямо или косвенно выдвинутые перед ним царской администрацией, крайне заинтересованной в быстрейшем подавлении очага сопротивления среди дагестанских горцев, в дискредитации идей борьбы против войск Российской империи». Но тут же Халфин и Рассадина пытаются доказать, что ханыковская аргументация «лишена какого-либо примитивизма, стремления унижить, высмеять противника. Ее направленность

обращена против едва ли не самого уязвимого места мюридизма — разжигания религиозного фанатизма, сраживания людей на почве религиозной нетерпимости»²¹⁹.

В доказательство приводится — как «яркая и красочная» — следующая цитата из статьи Ханыкина, где описываются кавказские мюриды:

«...С Кораном в руке и с возгласами о притеснении веры врагами ее он (мюрид) соединяет вокруг себя многочисленных последователей и требует от них на основании правил тариката не только бессмысленного повиновения, но и легко может подвергнуть их на кровавые подвиги борьбы с *христианскими властями*...»²²⁰.

Дабы еще более дискредитировать мюридов, Ханыков обвиняет их в узкокорыстных интересах:

«Под видом защиты веры и сохранения исламизма тысячи гибнут в неравном споре, не замечая того, что они защищают не Коран, а жертвуют своим счастьем и спокойствием своей родины для поддержания властолюбивых замыслов учителя, пользующегося неведением и легкомыслием их, чтобы дорогого ценой человеческой крови купить себе преходящую и суетную известность и ничтожный почет перед своими единоплеменниками...»²²¹.

И тем не менее, сколь ни сильна была неприязнь Ханыкова к исламу²²², он — этот видный правительственный эксперт — ясно понимал необходимость не только вести линию на «разделение мусульманства по двум главным сектам исламизма», т. е. на суннитов и шиитов, но и признать гласно и официально свободу отправления мусульманской религии за Кавказом и в пределах империи, с тем чтобы «отнять возможность недоброжелателям нам людям распространять вредное для нас мнение, что мы хотим *искоренить-исламизм*»²²³.

Это была, впрочем, вполне обычная для правящих кругов России первой половины XIX в. мысль, — мысль, четко отражающая многовековую политику по отношению к отечественному исламу вообще (особенно со второй половины XVIII в.), но показавшаяся особенно необходимой в период восстания Шамиля. И потому-то натяжкой — я бы даже сказал больше, ничем не оправданной идеализацией Ханыкова — звучит такая фраза о нем:

«В условиях николаевского режима нужно было обладать гражданской смелостью (а может быть, и некоторой долей на-

ивности), чтобы проектировать существенное расширение прав мусульманского духовенства, принятие его содержания на государственный счет и признание свободы исповедования ислама не только «за Кавказом», где это могло диктоваться конъюнктурными соображениями, но и повсеместно «в пределах империи»²²⁴.

Все тем же прагматизмом — и прагматизмом, надо признать, оказавшимся весьма эффективным (причем и тут вовсе не следует преувеличивать «уникальность» ханыковских предложений), — продиктованы соображения о предоставлении мусульманскому населению определенного самоуправления. Хотя опять-таки преувеличением кажется тезис Халфина и Рассадина, согласно которому Ханыков, будучи «высококультурным, гуманным человеком» считал, что «контроль над духовной жизнью мусульман со стороны их духовенства будет менее обременительным, чем со стороны царских властей», что он, Ханыков, «стремился в какой-то степени облегчить жизнь местного населения, в данном случае мусульманского, ослабив воздействие на него продажности, взяточничества, вымогательства... царского административного аппарата...»²²⁵.

Но в то же время нам важно указать и на перманентное расширение в разножанровой (и специальной и «профанической») литературе сферы многозначности термина «Ислам», и на какие-то — пусть пока во многом латентные, спорадические, противоречивые — попытки отойти от традиционной разобщенности двух пластов — русско-православного и ориентально-мусульманского.

Несомненно, в том же русле шли — опять-таки, быть может, всецело объективно, — многие наблюдения уже упоминавшегося Егора Казимировича Мейендорфа. Он, разумеется, весьма критически относится ко многому, увиденному в Хиве²²⁶ и Бухаре, где «ложь расценивается как талант, недоверие как обязанность, при творство как добродетель, не могут существовать радости искренней дружбы, неизвестны откровенность и доверие»²²⁷, где «недостаток просвещения... препятствует... развитию мануфактурной промышленности»²²⁸ и т. д. и т. д.

Но гораздо более примечательно то, что Мейендорф обращает внимание на обратную зависимость между степенью влияния институционализированного ислама и масштабами разгула ханского деспотизма.

Хан (он же — эмир-уль-муминин, глава правоверных) «объединяет в своих руках всю власть и распоряжается жизнью и иму-

ществом подданных. Но на решения ханов почти всегда оказывают большое влияние бухарские улемы. *Чем первые благочестивей, тем более растет могущество последних и тем более смягчается деспотизм*²²⁹.

Мейендорф, правда, призывает все-же помнить о главном — о том, что в Бухаре «дух правления носит печать самого возмутительного произвола»²³⁰. Но тут же он вновь указывает на одну из важнейших причин: недостаточность прочный статус мусульманского духовенства.

«Константинопольские султаны, — пишет Мейендорф, — обязанные улемам титулом халифа, должны предоставлять им в качестве эквивалента неограниченную власть. А так как в Бухаре другое положение вещей, то тамошнее духовенство не достигло такой степени могущества»²³¹. И хотя в Бухаре духовенство «все-гда оказывает большое влияние на фанатичное население», однако это — «класс, который не несет никаких других общественных обязанностей» и в который не стремятся «знатные люди»²³².

Но хотя улемы косны, религиозное образование весьма архаично (муллы, «тщеславясь своим бесполезным знанием, презирают всякого, кто им не обладает... Никчемные споры о смысле стихов Корана, о положениях, которые никто не смеет опровергать, чтение более или менее точных переводов из некоторых трудов Аристотеля — вот в чем состоят занятия бухарских философов»²³³), все же духовное сословие вызывает у Мейендорфа больше симпатии, нежели «отбросы нации» — правительственные чиновники²³⁴.

Мейендорф критически настроен к исламу, который «оказывает очень большое влияние на быт исповедующих его народов»²³⁵ (при этом зафиксировано: «все, что делает халиф, все, что происходит в Стамбуле, вызывает восхищение мусульман в Бухаре»²³⁶), значительно их к тому же нивелируя²³⁷.

До мозга костей европеизированного Мейендорфа возмущает, что:

— «*Мусульманин* мнит себя безупречным, если исполняет предписания, содержащиеся в Коране и в комментариях к нему, заменяющих собой кодекс законов. *Ему чужды более глубокие нормы поведения, диктуемые нам совестью и честью*»;

— «бухарцы более чем суеверны, и правительством не пренебрегает ничем, чтобы поддержать в них это чувство»;

— «в Бухаре имеет силу закон, воспрещающий кяфирам одеваться одинаково с правоверными»;

— вообще там процветает «нетерпимость», вследствие чего «ни одна религия, кроме ислама, не может открыто исповедоваться»²³⁸;

— вообще мусульманская религия внушает «предрассудки и фанатизм»²³⁹.

Но вину за все это Мейендорф больше склонен приписывать не исламу как таковому и даже не «классу духовных особ», а бухарскому правительству, которое:

— и покровительствует обращению в ислам, воображая, будто совершает «весьма богоугодное дело»;

— и разжигает конфессиональный фанатизм;

— и «в *противоречии с духом ислама*» стремится «управлять религиозным поведением каждого»²⁴⁰.

Этот ход понятен с точки зрения внешнеполитических программ царизма (умным и исправным служакой которого был Мейендорф); прежде чем подчинить своей прямой (или косвенной) власти какой-либо мусульманский регион, оно предпочитало представить главным врагом и его коренного населения и России (как олицетворения лучших черт «европейской образованности») тамошнюю политическую власть, а не религию. Ислам же становился главной мишенью для атак позже, когда надо было либо смирить шедшие под его знаменем антиколонизаторские движения, либо создать культурный плацдарм для укрепления и расширения официально-русской идеологии, нередко в свою очередь преподносимой как реэкспортированная из Европы — через Россию — в «нецивилизованную Азию»²⁴¹.

Спустя несколько лет после «Писем русского», в 1852 г., выходит «Путешествие по Северной Персии» И. Березина, человека, о котором нам еще не раз придется говорить далее.

В отличие от Н. Масальского, Березин — профессиональный востоковед²⁴² (впоследствии — профессор Казанского университета). Но оба автора единодушны в своем стремлении взглянуть на мусульманское зарубежье совершенно трезвыми глазами, без деформирующих, прекарснодушно-романтических установок, глазами того, кто «принял на себя тяжелую обязанность рассказчика о Востоке и *мишмах чудесах его*»²⁴³.

Березин — один из первых представителей «ангажированной ориенталистики», с ее акцентом на Действие и, следовательно, способностью (имманентной вообще любой разновидности праг-

матизма) к отождествлению с «Каждым Другим», со специфичной для него ситуацией. Сколь бы ни были предельно утилитарны (а зачастую даже просто-напросто циничны) цели и задачи «ангажированной ориенталистики», ее интерпретация мира ислама — это не замкнутая в себе, неделимая конструкция; он оказывается как бы весь вовне; он всегда во что-то вовлечен — в политику, в коммерцию, в войну, — и определить его можно только по этой вовлеченности. Конкретные же плоды его показывают, что и мусульманский Восток — как бы ни претендовал он на статус абсолютного бытия — в состоянии быть недетерминированным полностью своим прошлым и динамизировать под воздействием тех проектов будущего, которые дает ему европейская цивилизация²⁴⁴. Как мы увидим, Березин в общем-то крайне неприязненно относится к исламу, видя в нем тормоз на пути прогресса Востока. Но чаще всего это — скорее чисто интеллектуальные ходы, ибо в ходе дескриптивного описания того или иного мусульманского ареала «ангажированная» (она же — «прагматическая») ориенталистика сама невольно отбрасывала этно-психологические, обосновываемые гносеологически и семиологически, альтернативы типа: «мусульманин ленив, коварен, фаталитичен — европеец энергичен, благодушен, терпим» и т. д., альтернативы, из которых делались весьма радикальные, возводимые в статус нормативных, социологические и политологические выводы. В то же время Березин и ему подобные авторы вообще не создают — в отличие от ставших привычными для поверхностно-ориенталистского романтизма структур воображения — образов мусульман как самодостаточных объектов, которые:

- ни на что вне себя положенное не указывают;
- не означают других объектов;
- сами есть объекты-значения, значащие только самих себя.

Под пером Березина даже самые ревностные мусульмане — это, в сущности, такие же люди, как европейцы²⁴⁵, погруженные в те же, что и они, мирские заботы и предприятия, которые если и терпят тотальное поражение, то лишь потому, что они по воле судеб долго были лишены путеводной нити — европогенных мировоззренческих и нравственных ценностей.

В тогдашних условиях именно эта радикальная (при всей заурядности стиля, отказе от углубленного психологизма, от манифестаций глубоко личного, подчеркнутого субъективного переживания «Я» как материала для художественного творчества) направленность на фактуализм, документализм, представление

читающей публике восточно-мусульманских феноменов «как таковых» и «сырой информации» примитивно-репортажного типа об архитектуре, гаремном укладе, торговле, политическом строе, путях сообщения, шахских драгоценностях и нарядах и т. д. и т. п.²⁴⁶ позволяла увидеть некие изначальные качества этих феноменов, не выявленные ранее, затемненные привычными взаимосвязями, интерпретациями, ассоциациями, неточным субъективным подходом. Объективизация в трудах «ангажированной ориенталистики» — предпочитающей использовать самые что ни на есть простые, стандартные фразы, образы и формы²⁴⁷ — достигала иногда такой крайности, как замена социального содержания каким-то каталогом объектов. Шло однотоное перечисление фактов, заменявшее действие и (пусть самую элементарную) психологию предметами и событиями, хладнокровным свидетельством всего, что попадает в поле зрения Путешественника²⁴⁸.

Но он, этот Путешественник, — в первую очередь прагматик и в качестве такового понимает мир (и особенно Восток) как нечто заведомо диссоциативное, атомарное и замкнутое частным опытом. Естественно, что при таком восприятии универсума первостепенное значение придается отдельному моменту («сиюминутности») и деталям. Время исчезает, оно растворяется в едином Настоящем. Операция эта воистину фундаментальная — ибо доселе главным достоинством Востока в глазах Европы могло признаваться лишь его богаче и славнее Прошлое — и неминуемо представляющая как антигегерихическая (= антизападноцентристская). Дело в том, что разрушение всех и всяческих рамок, перестройка, границ («антидифференциация», говоря языком современной культурологии²⁴⁹) между различными культурами. Ни одна из них не может уже считаться центром: все может быть культурой, коль скоро ее называли таковой, все общезначимо и должно осваиваться культурой или различными — и европейскими и не-европейскими — культурами²⁵⁰.

Для каждого Настоящего Путешественника мир в любом своем уголке — это реальность, слишком наполненная изменениями, текучестью, противоречиями и отсутствием порядка, чтобы можно было согласиться на увековечение дифференциации субъекта и объекта, чтобы можно было акцентировать сравнительное значение рисуемых им западных и восточных явлений. И «Путешествие в Северную Персию», и многие иные, близкие ему по духу произведения с таким же примерно сюжетом в общем-то ничего

не навязывают читателю, оставляют ему достаточно полную свободу толкования и одновременно мобилизуют его способность принимать решения (вместо ли европейца-путешественника или же тех или иных мусульманских персонажей), мыслить и действовать логически (но в экзотической для европейца ситуации²⁵¹), восполнять пробелы в действии и даже корректировать ошибки тшачегося, как правило, представить себя перманентно-прямодушным Автора. Последний же создает, однако — уже в силу специфики избранного им жанра, — атмосферу театрализованности, даже какой-то карнавальности, вообще атмосферу «игры» среди кажущейся вначале принципиально чуждой и враждебной культуры, «игры» и в спонтанно-художественном и в осознанно-философском смыслах.

В конечном счете анализируемые произведения постепенно интегрировали (хотя программный момент был совсем иным, европоцентристским по своим несущим конструкциям²⁵²) культурный опыт разных стран мусульманского Востока, отразив тем самым некоторые новые тенденции европейского мышления минувшего века²⁵³ (было бы, замечу мимоходом, интересной задачей именно на примере совокупности интересующих нас здесь текстов построить модель концептуальной кооперации в институциональном, методологическом и эпистемологическом планах между тогдашними востоковедами и философами и социологами²⁵⁴).

Вернемся к Березину.

Не скрывая, что Иран произвел на него в общем «неприятное впечатление»²⁵⁵ он все же описывает эту страну не только как профессионал²⁵⁶, но и как прежде всего Европеец²⁵⁷, сожалующий:

— о ее низком социальном²⁵⁸, интеллектуальном²⁵⁹ и, как ему кажется, нравственном²⁶⁰ уровне;

— о том, что в Персии — «стране развалин по преимуществу»²⁶¹ — повсеместно «гнет мусульманского фанатизма»²⁶²,

— что «низший класс... отличается необразованностью и терпеливостью; единственный двигатель, имеющий влияние на этих людей, есть фанатизм»²⁶³.

— что хотя «персияне»²⁶⁴ одарены от природы довольно щедро умственными способностями, но, при недостатке образования и при сильном влиянии религиозного фанатизма, эти способности глухнут без употребления: единственное поприще, на котором иранец развивает свои умственные силы, — это торговля, но и на

этом пути персияне не возвышаются до сложных операций, конечно, по ограниченности образования»²⁶⁵ и т. д.

Но какими бы противоречивыми ни казались Березину субстанциональные характеристики Персии и персиян²⁶⁶, он, однако, уверен — и нижеприводимая цитата свидетельствует не только о его антиислализме, но и ставшей типичной для множества русских первой половины XIX в. убежденности в преимуществах капиталистического пути развития, — что «Персия могла бы заниматься на Востоке одно из первых мест, если бы обитатели ее, откинув мусульманские заблуждения, под незыблемым покровительством твердого и благоразумного правительства, развили и усовершенствовали свои мануфактуры»²⁶⁷.

В первую очередь ограниченностью образования (разумеется, европейского! — М.Б.) объясняет Березин то, что «изуверство и суеверность развиты широкою лавою в персидском народонаселении»²⁶⁸ и «религиозный фанатизм» лишь всемерно разжигает «ненависть или презрение к не-персиянам», которые «общим всем классам народа», но всего более духовенству»²⁶⁹.

Но именно поэтому оптимизм Березина касательно будущего Персии очень и очень условен:

«Несмотря на неутихительную сложность персидского характера, я не разделяю общего многим путешественникам опасения за будущность персидской нации: есть природные дарования, есть несколько благих начал. Что же касается до вопроса, можно ли ожидать чего-нибудь от Персии на пути, к которому она стремится, то на него можно отвечать почти с уверенностью отрицательно: незначительные улучшения в некоторых частях управления и народной нравственности поглощаются громадою злоупотреблений. С одной стороны, растлительный шиизм, с другой, беспорядочное управление²⁷⁰ тяготет над развитием народного характера; остается одна надежда на волю благого Промысла»²⁷¹.

И еще об Илье Николаевиче Березине.

В 1840 г. (т. е. задолго до своей поездки в Персию) он защитил (в Казанском университете) кандидатскую диссертацию на тему: «Что способствует развитию просвещения и что останавливает ход оного в державах Мухаммеданских?»

Согласно автору²⁷², человек находится под влиянием места и времени: от этих двух начал проистекают причины, действующие вредно или благотворно на развитие просвещения. Как видим, в этом наборе причин отсутствует расовый критерий — что, как я уже отмечал, вполне объяснимо в свете господства в рус-

ской официальной идеологии (а Березин был ей совершенно искренне предан) конфессионального начала.

Вот почему Березин утверждает: «Основным препятствием для развития просвещения в мусульманских государствах является религия — ислам», которая составлена «случайно в большей части своих догматов и несовместима с высокой образованностью». «Из уставов ислама» всего более препятствуют успехам просвещения, полагает Березин, многоженство, фатализм, «неограниченное невольничество», «неопределенность законности верховной власти (sic!)»²⁷³ и «запрещение художеств».

Правда, Березин отмечает — вскользь, не развертывая сколько-нибудь подробно этот сюжет — и факторы, которые «благоприятно действуют на образование».

Это — паломничество в Мекку, «предписание труда и добродетелей» и даже (впрочем, это понятно, если учесть, что Березин был поклонником монархического принципа правления как такового, хотя, конечно, без его «азиатских экстремизмов») «предписание монархического неограниченного правления» (тезис в высшей степени спорный, но в описываемые нами времена принимавший едва ли не за аксиому).

Но далее опять идет охаивание ислама, который, напоминает Березин, более, чем остальные религии, «заключает в себе уставы гражданские». Халифат является «образцом мусульманского государства» и обязан своим и существованием и падением все тому же исламу.

Вновь привлеку внимание к тому факту, что Березин чужд какому-либо стремлению к расизму, предпочитая всю вину за крах сочно описываемые им пороки мусульманских стран возлагать на их религию.

Так, в своем исследовании «Народные пословицы турецкого племени» он пишет, что у «турецкой нации» (т. е. и у подвластных России татар. — М.Б.) есть «природная наклонность выражаться прямо и открыто и избегать окольных путей... Значит, турецкая нация всегда любила свободу выражения, неразлучную со свободой мысли, и только оковы мусульманской апатии и восточно-азиатского порядка наложили клеймо на турецкую мысль». А поэтому, доказывает Березин, уже сам анализ пословиц «покажет... что народные черты турецкой нации лучше» тех ее форм, которые сформированы «под влиянием ислама и посторонних причин (? — М.Б.)»²⁷⁴, — ислама, в целом, как твердо уверен казанский востоковед²⁷⁵, несовместимого с культурным и научным прогрессом.

Пройдет почти четверть века после «Писем русского», и другой русский путешественник и востоковед Петр Чихачев (P. Tchihatchef) издаст (в 1868 г.) в Париже свою книгу «Une page sur l'Orient», где немало места отведено размышлениям о судьбах жителей Малой Азии, «бедных, деморализованных»²⁷⁶, о том, возможно ли их возрождение, а если да, то на какой основе.

Чихачев (с неприязнью относящийся к папству, представляющему, с его точки зрения, ретроградное начало) пишет, что среди различных флагов, поднятых на «арене активного осуществления» тех или иных конфронтирующих концепций «есть два, которые разделяют сражающихся на два лагеря. Один из них будет представителем новых чаяний нашего века, и девизом его будет прогресс. Другой представит незбылемый авторитет прошлого, символы его — тиара и полумесяц. На чьей бы стороне ни был перевес на том или ином этапе этой великой борьбы, победа рано или поздно окажется за поборниками прогресса, миссия которых — привести в исполнение приговор, давно вынесенный советью народов, ибо давно уже Рим, эта Византия Запада, и Константинополь, этот Рим Востока, были привлечены к ответу перед судом нашего века»²⁷⁷.

Подобно многим своим предшественникам — далеким от конфессионального фанатизма, но зато рьяно приверженным Прогрессу, русским же авторам о Востоке — Чихачев скептически относится ко всем попыткам представить Религию детерминатором мировой истории²⁷⁸, утверждая, что ныне «большинство прибегает к религии лишь затем, чтобы прикрыть ее обаянием и авторитетом политических интересов своей страны...»²⁷⁹.

Поэтому Чихачев — при всех своих самых резких обвинениях в адрес и Османской империи²⁸⁰, и султана, и прочих восточных владык²⁸¹ — вовсе не склонен возлагать на ислам (во всяком случае, на современный ему ислам) ответственность²⁸² за упадок Малой Азии, региона, некогда стоявшего «во главе самых богатых, самых цивилизованных и наиболее населенных стран античного мира»²⁸³. Он не сомневается в том, что не только часть Малой Азии, но и Европейская Турция и Сирия освободятся от «турецкого ига».

Возникает, правда, опасение: смогут ли сосуществовать «чужеземные элементы рядом с мусульманами, так как освобождение Малой Азии не должно, само собой разумеется, иметь следствием изгнание местных жителей; это была бы бесполезная жестокость, прибавленная к стольким неизбежным»²⁸⁴.

Чихачев даже заявляет, что «всегда очень преувеличивали мусульманский фанатизм»²⁸⁵, потому что рассматривали вопрос с абсолютной точки зрения, не справляясь у истории, больше ли ислам благоприятствовал религиозному фанатизму, чем христианство²⁸⁶. «Несомненно, если можно было бы выявить все жертвы, принесенные обоим культам не только в войнах, где честолюбие завоевателя имеет такую же долю, как и прозелитизм священника, но и на кострах, в муках пыток или ужасах тюрем, то люди были бы поражены, увидев *большее число человеческих жертв, принесенных Христу, чем мучеников во славу Мухаммеда*»²⁸⁷.

Более того, полагает Чихачев, мусульмане гораздо терпимей, нежели христиане, к религиозным различиям в своей собственной среде²⁸⁸. И вообще «чем больше живешь среди мусульман, тем больше убеждаешься, что религиозный фанатизм, в котором их упрекают, есть лишь историческое воспоминание, которое несколько не передает современное состояние вещей. Фанатизм этот вообще заметно ослаб с тех пор, как мусульмане утратили не только веру в торжество Луны над Крестом, но и всякую надежду устоять против христиан. Все это становится весьма понятным, если принять во внимание тот эффект, который производили на Востоке так называемые баснословные победы, одерживаемые горстью европейцев над многочисленным населением Индии, Небесной Империи, Кохинхины, Японии и пр. В глазах восточных народов поражение — это приговор Неба...»²⁸⁹.

И если действительно «религиозный фанатизм перестал быть серьезным препятствием *прогрессивного слияния народов Востока и Европы*», значит, надо добиваться «*либерального* режима, который *уважал бы* все вероисповедания», при котором «мусульмане и христиане могли бы жить рядом, как равноправные члены общества»²⁹⁰ и который может быть установлен лишь на основе европейских, единственно прогрессивных, норм ценностей.

Спустя тридцать лет, в 1898 г., Иван Клинген напишет в своей трехтомной книге о путешествии на Восток (в том числе и в мусульманскую Африку), что народы его возрождаются только при помощи европейского гения, что в Судане, например, «европейские ученые, европейские инженеры и агрономы раскрывают ему (Судану. — М.Б.) теперь широкие ворота, неся в зубах своих машин по гладкому рельсовому пути освобождение от бесконечно длинного сна»²⁹¹.

Подобного рода примеров — бесчисленное множество, и нет, конечно, смысла перечислять хотя бы часть из них.

Но остановимся на одном в высшей степени любопытном труде — книге «Сирия и Палестина под турецким правительством в историческом и политическом отношении». Она написана востоковедом и дипломатом Константином Михайловичем Базили, который 15 лет (1838–1853 гг.) пробыл на посту русского консула в Сирии²⁹².

Этот труд был закончен автором (надо обязательно учитывать, что он происходил из аристократической греческой семьи, представители которой активно участвовали в антитурецких — греческих и албанских — национально-освободительных движениях) к середине 1847 г., но опубликовать его удалось лишь в 1862 г. Спустя сто лет книга была переиздана в Москве, и все сноски на нее будут даваться по последнему изданию.

Не останавливаясь на общеисторических взглядах Базили²⁹³ — человека, всячески старавшегося обелить и превозносить «внешнеполитический курс русского правительства в Турции даже в тех случаях, когда речь идет о явных дипломатических просчетах»²⁹⁴, — зафиксирую в первую очередь его отношение к мусульманскому миру в целом и отдельным его регионам.

Уже на первой странице читаем:

«В бытность мою в Бейруте, на Ливане и в Иерусалиме, равно и в поездках моих в Дамаск, в Антиливан и во внутренние округа, представлялись случаи облегчить судьбу христиан, *бороться против тиранских властей, противу фанатизма мусульманского*»²⁹⁵ и «укрощать феодальные насилия и бесчинства»²⁹⁶.

Базили убежден — и надо сказать, не без оснований, — что его труд (и ему подобные) способен дать истинное знание о мусульманской Азии — в отличие, скажем, от «Путешествия на Восток» Ламартина, книги, которая «наводнила Европу бреднями»²⁹⁷. Но интересно, что, в целом высоко отзываясь о знаменитом труде Вольтера (C.F. Volney. Voyage en Egypte et Syrie. 1787), Базили, однако, тут же замечает: «К сожалению, книга эта охлаждена отсутствием всякого религиозного чувства и слишком отзывается скептицизмом своей эпохи...»²⁹⁸. Сам же Базили — ревностный приверженец не просто христианства, а исключительно его греко-ортодоксального толка, но при этом с довольно сильным европоцентристским настроением. В то же время Базили решительно возражает против версий о том, что с Востоком «европейский гений» может сделать все что угодно, а тем более посредством силы.

«Давно прошли, — пишет он, — для Азии времена, когда европейский гений 30 тысячами войска и тремя сражениями решал

судьбу этого пространного материка. Народы азиатские таят сами в себе зародыш и гений своих грядущих судеб. Луч науки, истекший некогда с Востока на Запад и ныне отражаемый Западом на Восток, силен направить гражданское развитие обновляющегося Востока; но попытки меркантильных завоеваний, попытки внешних политических переворотов при всем наружном блеске вряд ли благоприятны успеху науки и гражданственности, успеху медлительному, но прочному под знаменами мудрой Минервы, небуйного Марса. Что касается религиозного преобразования арабского мира, и до превращения миллиона бедуинов в миллионы завоевателей по слову нового пророка и по следам Мухаммеда, если это и сбыточно при нынешнем состоянии арабских кочевых племен и курдов Турции и Персии, но не иноземному гению суждено совершить подобный переворот. Ни в одном кочевье бедуинском пришлец иноземный не возбудит к себе сочувствия; в них язык и красноречие играют роль несравненно более важную, чем в палатах и в журналах Западной Европы, и ни одному гению, вскормленному Западом, не будут доступны эти два великие деятели судеб народных на Востоке» — «классической стра- не вымысла»²⁸⁹.

Сами-то обитатели Азии не вызывают у Базили ни малейшего, как правило, восторга:

«Азиат искони покоряется могуществу, в чьих бы оно ни было руках. В жестокостях своего властелина он видит неминуемые приговоры судьбы, на которые он роптать не привык»³⁰⁰; есть, по его мнению, даже «коренной закон» восточной политики: «ла- ской врага, пока настанет время его погубить»³⁰¹; «восточные на- роды привыкли видеть в победителе избранника судьбы, избран- ника божия»³⁰²; «азиат, искони привыкший к деспотическим рас- поряжениям правительственной власти, мог в своем фатализме приписывать судьбе разорительные капризы... пашей и безропот- но им покоряться...»³⁰³ и т. д. и т. п.³⁰⁴

Но Базили часто впадает в другую крайность, идеализируя некоторых государственных деятелей Османской империи, и прежде всего султана Махмуда II, пользовавшегося, как изве- стно, поддержкой России в его борьбе с египетским правителем Мухаммедом Али. Впрочем, Махмуд II хорош в глазах Базили потому, и только потому, что он не только дал льготы христиа- нам, но даже якобы сам намеревался отречься от ислама и при- нять христианство.

Это придумал не сам Базили.

Николай I говорил (в 1832 г. генералу Н.Н. Муравьеву), что из беседы с турецким послом у него создалось впечатление, будто «султан склонен к принятию христианской веры в случае край- ности»³⁰⁵.

Как уверяет Базили, «личная твердая и искренняя воля само- державного Махмуда вводила в правительство новые начала ве- ротерпимости и сурово укрощала фанатизм правоверного наро- да. Высокий ум преобразователя постигал, что владетельное пле- мя (т.е. турки. — М.Б.) уже выполнило подвиг, предназначенный ему судьбой, и что Коран, коим была во время оно создана Ос- манская империя, не может придать новую жизнь распадающе- муся царству. Он не унывал, а полагался на подвластные ему хри- стианские племена... Махмуд разлюбил свой правоверный на- род... он хорошо постигал последствия тех льгот, которые по деспотической своей воле, не совещаясь с ненавидимыми ему уле- мами и без всяких законодательных форм и фраз, даровал он хри- стианам. Он предвидел, что замышленное им равенство между христианами и мусульманами разломает до основы общественное и политическое здание его предместников, что христианское на- родонаселение европейской Турции по численному своему пре- восходству над мусульманами и еще более по преимуществам ума и трудолюбия возьмет верх по всем степеням правительственной иерархии, как только будет ему предоставлено политическое ра- венство, что мусульмане не подчинятся новому порядку всерьез, несомestimому с фанатизмом и с наследственной гордостью по- томства завоевателей... что султану предстанет необходимость избрать одно из двух: или самому избрать христианство... и за- воевать Малую Азию своим христианским оружием, или перей- ти в Азию и фанатизмом ее народа воссоздать мусульманское царство на коренных его началах. Сомнения нет в том, что прак- тический ум Махмуда все это предвидел и не боялся крайних по- следствий предначертанного плана»³⁰⁶.

Базили настолько впадает в восторг, что пытается убедить чи- тателя, будто Махмуд³⁰⁷ не только «в Коран не верил... а турок... глубоко презирал», но даже не прочь был принять православие («религию большинства своих подданных»³⁰⁸).

Неудачу этих и иных — менее фантастическо-радикальных — реформ Базили склонен приписывать «грубому фанатизму му- сульман», который заменяет у них, «как и во всех азиатских пле- менах, чувство народности, развивает анархические их наклон- ности». Да и вообще, подчеркивает Базили, «усердие к исламу

всегда выражается ненавистью к другим вероисповеданиям»³⁰⁹. И тут Базили вспоминает о первоначальном исламе.

«Учение, — пишет он, — скванное *гениальным* проповедником Мекки из противоположных элементов Древнего Завета и учения Зороастрова, морали евангельской и *чувственных наклонностей южного человека*, бурно полилось в заветное перепутье всех религий. Оно избрало Сирию поприщем первых своих подвигов, а саблю — символом и орудием своей проповеди, представляя побежденным народам неизбежный выбор между обращением, смертью и рабством политическим, в котором жизнь иноверца выкупается ежегодной данью. Сирия... сделалась горнилом новой религиозной жизни Востока и лагерем фанатических ополчений, которые потекли отсюда до Индии, до Центральной Азии и до Пиренеев»³¹⁰, неся миру свой Коран, в котором «заключается решительно все, альфа и омега политики и юриспруденции»³¹¹ и, главное, делая, в сущности, то же, что вообще «все народы восточные», привыкшие «видеть в неистовстве атрибут могущества и власти»³¹².

Из всех мусульманских завоевателей Базили, конечно, наибольшую неприязнь выказывает к туркам.

Порассуждав о некоем «физическом законе о возрастах каждого племени», он продолжает: «Очевидно, по крайней мере, что племя турецкое, породившее в цветущий период своего бытия столько гениальных людей и в последовавший период столько гениальных извергов, теперь истощается. В нынешнем поколении личности измелъчали, характеры выровнялись, физиономии стерлись...»³¹³.

Как и подобает ревностному адепту православия, Базили обрушивается на западноевропейских и американских миссионеров — и протестантов, и католиков, — возлагая на них ответственность за многие тяготы, выпавшие на долю Османской империи и «турецкого племени»³¹⁴, и так или иначе способствовавших разжиганию религиозного фанатизма. А он «заменяет в восточных племенах чувство народности, преданность государю и любовь к отечеству»³¹⁵.

При всем разнообразии оценок ислама теми, кого я причислил к категории «Путешественники», нельзя не заметить, что, хотя индивидуальный опыт каждого из них характеризуется неповторимостью, сложностью и многообразием, тем не менее:

— все они выступали как сравнительно последовательные защитники европейско-христианских ценностей;

— даже приобретение ими (а благодаря им — и Читателем) новых знаний о мусульманском мире не означало сколько-нибудь радикального совершенствования собственной же когнитивной организации; вместо этого, как правило, имело место чередование — переход от одной когнитивной структуры к другой, но на том же уровне сложности³¹⁶;

— обилие ярких и точных зачастую описаний и обобщений касательно тех или иных аспектов ислама, прошлого, настоящего и будущего его исповедников отнюдь не вело к появлению сколько-нибудь оригинальных, смелых «имажинативных конструкций» — т. е. теорий. Они, и только они, должны координировать обобщения, сводя их в единую перспективу (или общую схему интерпретации), объяснять и их и факты посредством определенной интеллектуальной структуры, показывающей взаимосвязанности, напряжения и рациональные связи теоретических категорий³¹⁷.

И тем не менее, вследствие уже довольно детально обрисованной выше эпистемологической специфики, «тексты Путешественников» — пусть и не стремясь к сдвигу в концептуальной перспективе — все же немало сделали для признания системы — охватывающей и домены господства ислама — транскультурных и исторических универсалий и, следовательно, факта фундаментальной идентичности всех цивилизаций и исторических эпох.

Я бы улодобил Путешественника — и, конечно, в первую очередь того, у которого базисом объяснительного компонента является рационалистическая парадигма, — посреднику между «общим» («цивилизованный, европогенно-христианский мир») и «особенным» (мусульманский Восток). А в такой ситуации доминирующей становится такая интеллектуальная ценность, как фронезис, т. е., согласно Аристотелю, форма знания, характерная для «этического мастерства», для «этического разума»³¹⁸. По природе своей обладающий универсалистскими притязаниями и импликациями, он позволял все тому же Путешественнику исходить из представления о таком многообразии разумов и культурно-исторических вариантов бытия, которое лишь в очень и очень отдаленной перспективе будет сведено к какому-то единому «правильному образу» и которое поэтому не следует быстро, грубо, не задумываясь о трагических последствиях, подвергать насильственному демонтажу.



11 November, 2008

DEPARTMENT OF
CENTRAL EURASIAN
STUDIES

Central European University
Admissions Office
Nador u. 9
1051 Budapest, Hungary

RE: Ulan Bigozhin

To the Admissions Committee:

This letter is to certify that Ulan Bigozhin has completed all the necessary course work for his M.A. in Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University. He has not yet completed his thesis, but his advisor, Prof. Nazif Shahrani, informs me that he expects Mr. Bigozhin to complete his thesis before 1 August, 2009.

Please let me know if I can supply any further information.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Paul E. Losensky".

Paul E. Losensky
Associate Professor
Director of Graduate Studies
Department of Central Eurasian Studies

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INDIANA UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

Official Transcript with Enrollment

Page 1 of 1

Name : Bigozhin, Ulan Zeinullaevich
 Student ID : 0002058195
 Address : 54 Manas Street Apt 30
 Almaty, 050040
 Kazakhstan

SSN : XXX-XX-3464
 Birthdate : 01-16-XXXX
 Print Date : 11-03-2008
 Request Nbr : 006575853

- - - - - Beginning of Graduate Record - - - - -

Spring 2007 Bloomington

Program : Central Eurasian Studies-GrSch

Course	Title	Hrs	Grd
CEUS-U 520	SEL TOPICS CENTRAL EURASIAN ST	3.00	A
Course Topic(s): THE YASAVI SUFI TRADITION			
REL-R 300	STUDIES IN RELIGION	3.00	W
Course Topic(s): ANTH APPROACHES TO RELIGION			
REL-R 590	DIR READINGS IN RELIGIOUS STDS	3.00	B+
SLST-T 501	ENGLISH FOR INTL GRAD STUDENTS	3.00	A-
Course Topic(s): ACADEMIC WRITING			

Semester: IU GPA Hours: 9.00 GPA Points: 33.000
 Hours Earned: 9.00 GPA: 3.667
 Cumulative: IU GPA Hours: 9.00 GPA Points: 33.000
 Hours Earned: 9.00 GPA: 3.667

Summer 2007 Bloomington

Program : Central Eurasian Studies-GrSch

Course	Title	Hrs	Grd
CEUS-U 600	ADVANCED READINGS IN CEUS	3.00	A
Semester: IU GPA Hours: 3.00 GPA Points: 12.000			
Hours Earned: 3.00 GPA: 4.000			
Cumulative: IU GPA Hours: 12.00 GPA Points: 45.000			
Hours Earned: 12.00 GPA: 3.750			

Fall 2007 Bloomington

Program : Central Eurasian Studies-GrSch

Course	Title	Hrs	Grd
ANTH-H 500	HIST ANTH THGHT 19TH-20TH CENT	3.00	A
CEUS-U 520	SEL TOPICS CENTRAL EURASIAN ST	3.00	A
Course Topic(s): INTRO TO CENTRAL ASIAN HISTORY			
CEUS-U 520	SEL TOPICS CENTRAL EURASIAN ST	3.00	A
Course Topic(s): INTRODUCTORY PERSIAN I			

Semester: IU GPA Hours: 9.00 GPA Points: 36.000
 Hours Earned: 9.00 GPA: 4.000
 Cumulative: IU GPA Hours: 21.00 GPA Points: 81.000
 Hours Earned: 21.00 GPA: 3.857

Spring 2008 Bloomington

Program : Central Eurasian Studies-GrSch

Course	Title	Hrs	Grd
CEUS-U 520	SEL TOPICS CENTRAL EURASIAN ST	3.00	A
Course Topic(s): INTRODUCTORY PERSIAN II			
CEUS-U 520	SEL TOPICS CENTRAL EURASIAN ST	3.00	A
Course Topic(s): SOCIAL THRY CENTRL EURASIANIST			

--- Record continued in next column ---

CEUS-U 720 SEM IN CENTRAL EURASIAN STDS 3.00 A-
 Course Topic(s): SOURCES FOR HIST OF CENTR ASIA

Semester: IU GPA Hours: 9.00 GPA Points: 35.100
 Hours Earned: 9.00 GPA: 3.900
 Cumulative: IU GPA Hours: 30.00 GPA Points: 116.100
 Hours Earned: 30.00 GPA: 3.870

Fall 2008 Bloomington

Program : Anthropology -GrSch

Program : Central Eurasian Studies-GrSch

Course	Title	Hrs	Grd
CEUS-U 520	SEL TOPICS CENTRAL EURASIAN ST	3.00	NR
Course Topic(s): INTERMEDIATE PERSIAN I			
CEUS-U 596	POST-SOVIET TRANSITN CTRL ASIA	3.00	NR
CEUS-U 601	CEUS MA THESIS RESEARCH	3.00	NR

Semester: IU GPA Hours: 0.00 GPA Points: 0.000
 Hours Earned: 0.00 GPA: 0.000
 Cumulative: IU GPA Hours: 30.00 GPA Points: 116.100
 Hours Earned: 30.00 GPA: 3.870

Student Graduate Program Summary

GPA Hours: 30.00 Transfer/Test Hours Passed: 0.00
 Hours Earned: 30.00 Points: 116.100 GPA: 3.870

Indiana University Graduate Summary

IU GPA Hours: 30.00 Transfer/Test Hours Passed: 0.00
 Hours Earned: 30.00 Points: 116.100 GPA: 3.870

Academic Objective as of Last Enrollment

Central Eurasian Studies-GrSch

Central Eurasian Studies MA

--- End Of Record ---

Issued at: Indiana University Bloomington

Roland A. Cote, Associate Vice Provost for Enrollment
 Management and Registrar

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Roland A. Cote

Roland A. Cote, Associate Vice Provost
 for Enrollment Management and Registrar

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